good thesis in philosophy

2.6 Writing Philosophy Papers

Learning objectives.

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Identify and characterize the format of a philosophy paper.
• Create thesis statements that are manageable and sufficiently specific.
• Collect evidence and formulate arguments.
• Organize ideas into a coherent written presentation.

This section will provide some practical advice on how to write philosophy papers. The format presented here focuses on the use of an argumentative structure in writing. Different philosophy professors may have different approaches to writing. The sections below are only intended to give some general guidelines that apply to most philosophy classes.

Identify Claims

The key element in any argumentative paper is the claim you wish to make or the position you want to defend. Therefore, take your time identifying claims , which is also called the thesis statement. What do you want to say about the topic? What do you want the reader to understand or know after reading your piece? Remember that narrow, modest claims work best. Grand claims are difficult to defend, even for philosophy professors. A good thesis statement should go beyond the mere description of another person’s argument. It should say something about the topic, connect the topic to other issues, or develop an application of some theory or position advocated by someone else. Here are some ideas for creating claims that are perfectly acceptable and easy to develop:

• Compare two philosophical positions. What makes them similar? How are they different? What general lessons can you draw from these positions?
• Identify a piece of evidence or argument that you think is weak or may be subject to criticism. Why is it weak? How is your criticism a problem for the philosopher’s perspective?
• Apply a philosophical perspective to a contemporary case or issue. What makes this philosophical position applicable? How would it help us understand the case?
• Identify another argument or piece of evidence that might strengthen a philosophical position put forward by a philosopher. Why is this a good argument or piece of evidence? How does it fit with the philosopher’s other claims and arguments?
• Consider an implication (either positive or negative) that follows from a philosopher’s argument. How does this implication follow? Is it necessary or contingent? What lessons can you draw from this implication (if positive, it may provide additional reasons for the argument; if negative, it may provide reasons against the argument)?

Think Like a Philosopher

The following multiple-choice exercises will help you identify and write modest, clear philosophical thesis statements. A thesis statement is a declarative statement that puts forward a position or makes a claim about some topic.

• How does Aristotle think virtue is necessary for happiness?
• Is happiness the ultimate goal of human action?
• Whether or not virtue is necessary for happiness.
• Aristotle argues that happiness is the ultimate good of human action and virtue is necessary for happiness.
• René Descartes argues that the soul or mind is the essence of the human person.
• Descartes shows that all beliefs and memories about the external world could be false.
• Some people think that Descartes is a skeptic, but I will show that he goes beyond skepticism.
• In the meditations, Descartes claims that the mind and body are two different substances.
• Descartes says that the mind is a substance that is distinct from the body, but I disagree.
• Contemporary psychology has shown that Descartes is incorrect to think that human beings have free will and that the mind is something different from the brain.
• Thomas Hobbes’s view of the soul is materialistic, whereas Descartes’s view of the soul is nonphysical. In this paper, I will examine the differences between these two views.
• John Stuart Mill reasons that utilitarian judgments can be based on qualitative differences as well as the quantity of pleasure, but ultimately any qualitative difference must result in a difference in the quantity of pleasure.
• Mill’s approach to utilitarianism differs from Bentham’s by introducing qualitative distinctions among pleasures, where Bentham only considers the quantitative aspects of pleasure.
• J. S. Mill’s approach to utilitarianism aligns moral theory with the history of ethics because he allows qualitative differences in moral judgments.
• Rawls’s liberty principle ensures that all people have a basic set of freedoms that are important for living a full life.
• The US Bill of Rights is an example of Rawls’s liberty principle because it lists a set of basic freedoms that are guaranteed for all people.
• While many people may agree that Rawls’s liberty principle applies to all citizens of a particular country, it is much more controversial to extend those same basic freedoms to immigrants, including those classified by the government as permanent residents, legal immigrants, illegal immigrants, and refugees.

[ANS: 1.d 2.c 3.c 4.a 5.c]

Write Like a Philosopher

Use the following templates to write your own thesis statement by inserting a philosopher, claim, or contemporary issue:

• [Name of philosopher] holds that [claim], but [name of another philosopher] holds that [another claim]. In this paper, I will identify reasons for thinking [name of philosopher]’s position is more likely to be true.
• [Name of philosopher] argues that [claim]. In this paper, I will show how this claim provides a helpful addition to [contemporary issue].
• When [name of philosopher] argues in favor of [claim], they rely on [another claim] that is undercut by contemporary science. I will show that if we modify this claim in light of contemporary science, we will strengthen or weaken [name of philosopher]’s argument.

Collect Evidence and Build Your Case

Once you have identified your thesis statement or primary claim, collect evidence (by returning to your readings) to compose the best possible argument. As you assemble the evidence, you can think like a detective or prosecutor building a case. However, you want a case that is true, not just one that supports your position. So you should stay open to modifying your claim if it does not fit the evidence . If you need to do additional research, follow the guidelines presented earlier to locate authoritative information.

If you cannot find evidence to support your claim but still feel strongly about it, you can try to do your own philosophical thinking using any of the methods discussed in this chapter or in Chapter 1. Imagine counterexamples and thought experiments that support your claim. Use your intuitions and common sense, but remember that these can sometimes lead you astray. In general, common sense, intuitions, thought experiments, and counterexamples should support one another and support the sources you have identified from other philosophers. Think of your case as a structure: you do not want too much of the weight to rest on a single intuition or thought experiment.

Consider Counterarguments

Philosophy papers differ from typical argumentative papers in that philosophy students must spend more time and effort anticipating and responding to counterarguments when constructing their own arguments. This has two important effects: first, by developing counterarguments, you demonstrate that you have sufficiently thought through your position to identify possible weaknesses; second, you make your case stronger by taking away a potential line of attack that an opponent might use. By including counterarguments in your paper, you engage in the kind of dialectical process that philosophers use to arrive at the truth.

Accurately Represent Source Material

It is important to represent primary and secondary source material as accurately as possible. This means that you should consider the context and read the arguments using the principle of charity. Make sure that you are not strawmanning an argument you disagree with or misrepresenting a quote or paraphrase just because you need some evidence to support your argument. As always, your goal should be to find the most rationally compelling argument, which is the one most likely to be true.

Organize Your Paper

Academic philosophy papers use the same simple structure as any other paper and one you likely learned in high school or your first-year composition class.

Introduce Your Thesis

The purpose of your introduction is to provide context for your thesis. Simply tell the reader what to expect in the paper. Describe your topic, why it is important, and how it arises within the works you have been reading. You may have to provide some historical context, but avoid both broad generalizations and long-winded historical retellings. Your context or background information should not be overly long and simply needs to provide the reader with the context and motivation for your thesis. Your thesis should appear at the end of the introduction, and the reader should clearly see how the thesis follows from the introductory material you have provided. If you are writing a long paper, you may need several sentences to express your thesis, in which you delineate in broad terms the parts of your argument.

Make a Logical and Compelling Case Using the Evidence

The paragraphs that follow the introduction lay out your argument. One strategy you can use to successfully build paragraphs is to think in terms of good argument structure. You should provide adequate evidence to support the claims you want to make. Your paragraphs will consist of quotations and paraphrases from primary and secondary sources, context and interpretation, novel thoughts and ideas, examples and analogies, counterarguments, and replies to the counterarguments. The evidence should both support the thesis and build toward the conclusion. It may help to think architecturally: lay down the foundation, insert the beams of your strongest support, and then put up the walls to complete the structure. Or you might think in terms of a narrative: tell a story in which the evidence leads to an inevitable conclusion.

Connections

See the chapter on logic and reasoning for a developed account of different types of philosophical arguments.

Summarize Your Argument in the Conclusion

Conclude your paper with a short summary that recapitulates the argument. Remind the reader of your thesis and revisit the evidence that supports your argument. You may feel that the argument as written should stand on its own. But it is helpful to the reader to reinforce the argument in your conclusion with a short summary. Do not introduce any new information in the conclusion; simply summarize what you have already said.

The purpose of this chapter has been to provide you with basic tools to become a successful philosophy student. We started by developing a sophisticated picture of how the brain works, using contemporary neuroscience. The brain represents and projects a picture of the world, full of emotional significance, but this image may contain distortions that amount to a kind of illusion. Cognitive illusions produce errors in reasoning, called cognitive biases. To guard against error, we need to engage in effortful, reflective thinking, where we become aware of our biases and use logical strategies to overcome them. You will do well in your philosophy class if you apply the good habits of mind discussed in this chapter and apply the practical advice that has been provided about how to read and write about philosophy.

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How to Write a Philosophy Paper

• Develop a Thesis
• Formulate an Argument
• Structure & Outline
• Grammar & Style

Developing Your Thesis

What is a Thesis?

The thesis is the most important part of your paper; it tells the reader what your stance is on a particular topic and offers reasons for that stance.

Since the rest of your paper will be spent defending your thesis--offering support for the thesis and reasons why criticism of the thesis may not be valid--it's crucial that you develop a strong thesis.

A strong thesis will:

• Answer a question;
• Be engaging;  it can be challenged or opposed, thus also defended;
• Pass the "so what? why should I care?" test;
• Be supported by your paper;
• Not be too broad nor too vague.

Source: Writing Guide for Philosophy. George Mason University.

Image source:  Sergui Bacioiu.  Ripple effect on water.  CC BY 2.0.  Wikimedia Commons.

Thesis Resources

• Developing Your Thesis An overview of writing a thesis statement with guided questions for evaluating the quality of your statement. Everettcc.
• How to Write a Thesis Statement Emphasizes the characteristics of a well-developed thesis statement. Indiana University.
• Thesis Statements "...describes what a thesis statement is, how thesis statements work in your writing, and how you can discover or refine one..." University of North Carolina.
• << Previous: Begin
• Next: Formulate an Argument >>
• Last Updated: Jan 22, 2024 10:48 AM
• URL: https://libguides.lvc.edu/philosophypaper

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Digital Commons @ USF > College of Arts and Sciences > Philosophy > Theses and Dissertations

Philosophy Theses and Dissertations

Theses/dissertations from 2023 2023.

Karl Marx on Human Flourishing and Proletarian Ethics , Sam Badger

The Ontological Grounds of Reason: Psychologism, Logicism, and Hermeneutic Phenomenology , Stanford L. Howdyshell

Theses/Dissertations from 2022 2022

Interdisciplinary Communication by Plausible Analogies: the Case of Buddhism and Artificial Intelligence , Michael Cooper

Heidegger and the Origin of Authenticity , John J. Preston

Theses/Dissertations from 2021 2021

Hegel and Schelling: The Emptiness of Emptiness and the Love of the Divine , Sean B. Gleason

Nietzsche on Criminality , Laura N. McAllister

Learning to be Human: Ren 仁, Modernity, and the Philosophers of China's Hundred Days' Reform , Lucien Mathot Monson

Nietzsche and Eternal Recurrence: Methods, Archives, History, and Genesis , William A. B. Parkhurst

Theses/Dissertations from 2020 2020

Orders of Normativity: Nietzsche, Science and Agency , Shane C. Callahan

Humanistic Climate Philosophy: Erich Fromm Revisited , Nicholas Dovellos

This, or Something like It: Socrates and the Problem of Authority , Simon Dutton

Climate Change and Liberation in Latin America , Ernesto O. Hernández

Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia Nervosa as Expressions of Shame in a Post-Feminist , Emily Kearns

Nostalgia and (In)authentic Community: A Bataillean Answer to the Heidegger Controversy , Patrick Miller

Cultivating Virtue: A Thomistic Perspective on the Relationship Between Moral Motivation and Skill , Ashley Potts

Identity, Breakdown, and the Production of Knowledge: Intersectionality, Phenomenology, and the Project of Post-Marxist Standpoint Theory , Zachary James Purdue

Theses/Dissertations from 2019 2019

The Efficacy of Comedy , Mark Anthony Castricone

William of Ockham's Divine Command Theory , Matthew Dee

Heidegger's Will to Power and the Problem of Nietzsche's Nihilism , Megan Flocken

Abelard's Affective Intentionalism , Lillian M. King

Anton Wilhelm Amo's Philosophy and Reception: from the Origins through the Encyclopédie , Dwight Kenneth Lewis Jr.

"The Thought that we Hate": Regulating Race-Related Speech on College Campuses , Michael McGowan

A Historical Approach to Understanding Explanatory Proofs Based on Mathematical Practices , Erika Oshiro

From Meaningful Work to Good Work: Reexamining the Moral Foundation of the Calling Orientation , Garrett W. Potts

Reasoning of the Highest Leibniz and the Moral Quality of Reason , Ryan Quandt

Fear, Death, and Being-a-problem: Understanding and Critiquing Racial Discourse with Heidegger’s Being and Time , Jesús H. Ramírez

The Role of Skepticism in Early Modern Philosophy: A Critique of Popkin's "Sceptical Crisis" and a Study of Descartes and Hume , Raman Sachdev

How the Heart Became Muscle: From René Descartes to Nicholas Steno , Alex Benjamin Shillito

Autonomy, Suffering, and the Practice of Medicine: A Relational Approach , Michael A. Stanfield

The Case for the Green Kant: A Defense and Application of a Kantian Approach to Environmental Ethics , Zachary T. Vereb

Theses/Dissertations from 2018 2018

Augustine's Confessiones : The Battle between Two Conversions , Robert Hunter Craig

The Strategic Naturalism of Sandra Harding's Feminist Standpoint Epistemology: A Path Toward Epistemic Progress , Dahlia Guzman

Hume on the Doctrine of Infinite Divisibility: A Matter of Clarity and Absurdity , Wilson H. Underkuffler

Climate Change: Aristotelian Virtue Theory, the Aidōs Response and Proper Primility , John W. Voelpel

The Fate of Kantian Freedom: the Kant-Reinhold Controversy , John Walsh

Time, Tense, and Ontology: Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Tense, the Phenomenology of Temporality, and the Ontology of Time , Justin Brandt Wisniewski

Theses/Dissertations from 2017 2017

A Phenomenological Approach to Clinical Empathy: Rethinking Empathy Within its Intersubjective and Affective Contexts , Carter Hardy

From Object to Other: Models of Sociality after Idealism in Gadamer, Levinas, Rosenzweig, and Bonhoeffer , Christopher J. King

Humanitarian Military Intervention: A Failed Paradigm , Faruk Rahmanovic

Active Suffering: An Examination of Spinoza's Approach to Tristita , Kathleen Ketring Schenk

Cartesian Method and Experiment , Aaron Spink

An Examination of John Burton’s Method of Conflict Resolution and Its Applicability to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict , John Kenneth Steinmeyer

Speaking of the Self: Theorizing the Dialogical Dimensions of Ethical Agency , Bradley S. Warfield

Changing Changelessness: On the Genesis and Development of the Doctrine of Divine Immutability in the Ancient and Hellenic Period , Milton Wilcox

Theses/Dissertations from 2016 2016

The Statue that Houses the Temple: A Phenomenological Investigation of Western Embodiment Towards the Making of Heidegger's Missing Connection with the Greeks , Michael Arvanitopoulos

An Exploratory Analysis of Media Reporting of Police Involved Shootings in Florida , John L. Brown

Divine Temporality: Bonhoeffer's Theological Appropriation of Heidegger's Existential Analytic of Dasein , Nicholas Byle

Stoicism in Descartes, Pascal, and Spinoza: Examining Neostoicism’s Influence in the Seventeenth Century , Daniel Collette

Phenomenology and the Crisis of Contemporary Psychiatry: Contingency, Naturalism, and Classification , Anthony Vincent Fernandez

A Critique of Charitable Consciousness , Chioke Ianson

writing/trauma , Natasha Noel Liebig

Leibniz's More Fundamental Ontology: from Overshadowed Individuals to Metaphysical Atoms , Marin Lucio Mare

Violence and Disagreement: From the Commonsense View to Political Kinds of Violence and Violent Nonviolence , Gregory Richard Mccreery

Kant's Just War Theory , Steven Charles Starke

A Feminist Contestation of Ableist Assumptions: Implications for Biomedical Ethics, Disability Theory, and Phenomenology , Christine Marie Wieseler

Theses/Dissertations from 2015 2015

Heidegger and the Problem of Modern Moral Philosophy , Megan Emily Altman

The Encultured Mind: From Cognitive Science to Social Epistemology , David Alexander Eck

Weakness of Will: An Inquiry on Value , Michael Funke

Cogs in a Cosmic Machine: A Defense of Free Will Skepticism and its Ethical Implications , Sacha Greer

Thinking Nature, "Pierre Maupertuis and the Charge of Error Against Fermat and Leibniz" , Richard Samuel Lamborn

John Duns Scotus’s Metaphysics of Goodness: Adventures in 13th-Century Metaethics , Jeffrey W. Steele

A Gadamerian Analysis of Roman Catholic Hermeneutics: A Diachronic Analysis of Interpretations of Romans 1:17-2:17 , Steven Floyd Surrency

A Natural Case for Realism: Processes, Structures, and Laws , Andrew Michael Winters

Theses/Dissertations from 2014 2014

Leibniz's Theodicies , Joseph Michael Anderson

Aeschynē in Aristotle's Conception of Human Nature , Melissa Marie Coakley

Ressentiment, Violence, and Colonialism , Jose A. Haro

It's About Time: Dynamics of Inflationary Cosmology as the Source of the Asymmetry of Time , Emre Keskin

Time Wounds All Heels: Human Nature and the Rationality of Just Behavior , Timothy Glenn Slattery

Theses/Dissertations from 2013 2013

Nietzsche and Heidegger on the Cartesian Atomism of Thought , Steven Burgess

Embodying Social Practice: Dynamically Co-Constituting Social Agency , Brian W. Dunst

Subject of Conscience: On the Relation between Freedom and Discrimination in the Thought of Heidegger, Foucault, and Butler , Aret Karademir

Climate, Neo-Spinozism, and the Ecological Worldview , Nancy M. Kettle

Eschatology in a Secular Age: An Examination of the Use of Eschatology in the Philosophies of Heidegger, Berdyaev and Blumenberg , John R. Lup, Jr.

Navigation and Immersion of the American Identity in a Foreign Culture to Emergence as a Culturally Relative Ambassador , Lee H. Rosen

Theses/Dissertations from 2012 2012

A Philosophical Analysis of Intellectual Property: In Defense of Instrumentalism , Michael A. Kanning

A Commentary On Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's Discourse on Metaphysics #19 , Richard Lamborn Samuel Lamborn

Sellars in Context: An Analysis of Wilfrid Sellars's Early Works , Peter Jackson Olen

The New Materialism: Althusser, Badiou, and Zizek , Geoffrey Dennis Pfeifer

Structure and Agency: An Analysis of the Impact of Structure on Group Agents , Elizabeth Kaye Victor

Moral Friction, Moral Phenomenology, and the Improviser , Benjamin Scott Young

Theses/Dissertations from 2011 2011

The Virtuoso Human: A Virtue Ethics Model Based on Care , Frederick Joseph Bennett

The Existential Compromise in the History of the Philosophy of Death , Adam Buben

Philosophical Precursors to the Radical Enlightenment: Vignettes on the Struggle Between Philosophy and Theology From the Greeks to Leibniz With Special Emphasis on Spinoza , Anthony John Desantis

The Problem of Evil in Augustine's Confessions , Edward Matusek

The Persistence of Casuistry: a Neo-premodernist Approach to Moral Reasoning , Richard Arthur Mercadante

Theses/Dissertations from 2010 2010

Dewey's Pragmatism and the Great Community , Philip Schuyler Bishop

Unamuno's Concept of the Tragic , Ernesto O. Hernandez

Rethinking Ethical Naturalism: The Implications of Developmental Systems Theory , Jared J.. Kinggard

From Husserl and the Neo-Kantians to Art: Heidegger's Realist Historicist Answer to the Problem of the Origin of Meaning , William H. Koch

Queering Cognition: Extended Minds and Sociotechnologically Hybridized Gender , Michele Merritt

Hydric Life: A Nietzschean Reading of Postcolonial Communication , Elena F. Ruiz-Aho

Descartes' Bête Machine, the Leibnizian Correction and Religious Influence , John Voelpel

Aretē and Physics: The Lesson of Plato's Timaeus , John R. Wolfe

Theses/Dissertations from 2009 2009

Praxis and Theōria : Heidegger’s “Violent” Interpretation , Megan E. Altman

On the Concept of Evil: An Analysis of Genocide and State Sovereignty , Jason J. Campbell

The Role of Trust in Judgment , Christophe Sage Hudspeth

Truth And Judgment , Jeremy J. Kelly

The concept of action and responsibility in Heidegger's early thought , Christian Hans Pedersen

Roots and Role of the Imagination in Kant: Imagination at the Core , Michael Thompson

Theses/Dissertations from 2008 2008

Peirce on the Passions: The Role of Instinct, Emotion, and Sentiment in Inquiry and Action , Robert J. Beeson

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227 Philosophy Thesis Topics To Use Right Now

A philosophy dissertation everyone’s favorite. The long list of philosophers and their allegories or theories is not a subject most students would want to listen to comfortably. However, students still have to write a philosophical thesis in their undergraduate or post-graduate to graduate.

Let us narrow down this elephant in the room for you.

What Is A Philosophical Thesis?

A philosophical paper is not a report of what various scholars have had to say on a particular issue. It is a reasoned defense of a particular thesis. Unlike other papers that present the latest findings of tests or experiments, this paper tries to persuade the reader to give in to a particular point of view together with grounds or justification for its acceptance.

The introduction of a philosophy paper states what the writer is trying to show the reader. When writing a dissertation in philosophy, follow the following simple guidelines for efficiency:

• Very carefully and think about your topic
• Have a rough idea of what you intend to establish
• Determine how you’ll go about convincing the reader that your thesis is correct.

For an outstanding philosophy thesis, ensure that you say what you mean and in a way that minimizes the chances of being misunderstood. It is the general rule thumb for this paper that every student should have at his/her finger-tips.

What To Avoid in a Philosophy Dissertation

Understanding the do’s and don’ts of any paper is essential in ensuring that you stick within the scope of what is required of you. Here are some of the things to avoid in philosophical thesis papers for college:

• Lengthy quotations: It is essential to understand that quotations are an essential part of philosophy papers. However, stating long quotes that run into paragraphs or more does not make your paper sound original. One will only see this as a duplication of another person’s work.
• Circular reasoning: If you presuppose the truth of whatever it is that you are trying to bring out in the course of arguing for it, then you are guilty of begging the question.
• Lengthy introductions: An intro should only serve the purpose of giving the context of your philosophy topic and creating interest in the reader. You can do it in less than four short and precise questions. Overloading your introduction only serves to drain your readers’ energy before they get into the real deal – the body.
• Fence sitting: Most students are guilty of presenting several positions in their papers and then saying they are not qualified to settle the matter. Do not close by saying that philosophers have been divided over a particular issue. That only shows how shallow and scanty you were in your research process.

Always organize your work carefully, using the right words to present your stance without any disputes. The stance should also come out naturally without making the reader feel that you are forcing him/her to ascribe to your particular point of view.

It is also essential to support your arguments with undisputed evidence. Do not assume that your reader may not be skeptical of your arguments. Every reader is skeptical of whatever they read, and if sufficient evidence is not provided, then you might not convince anyone at the end of your 20-page long thesis.

Now, for you to have a strong thesis, ensure that it is:

• Answering a specific question;
• Engaging; one that can be challenged or opposed, thus also defended;
• Passes the “so what? Or why should I care?” test;
• Supported by your paper; and
• Not too broad nor too vague.

To have a strong argument in your philosophical paper, demonstrate these sorts of things that make your opponent’s views false in a fashion that does not presuppose that your position is correct. Your philosophy research topics will play a significant role in supporting this claim.

You can find philosophy research paper topics from:

Early American Imprints of 1639 to 1819 Early English Books Online of 1475 to 1700 Internet archives The War Diaries of Jean-Paul Sartre The Metaphysics of Morals by Emmanuel Kant

And many more sources that are readily available in your college library or online catalogs.

We now advance to our professional philosophy topics list:

Sample Thesis Topics For Philosophy of the Human Sciences

• Critique of mainstream assumptions and practices of human behavior globally
• How are constructions of human nature affect our associations and lineation
• Adopting a human science framework to the problem of racial discrimination in the US
• How to adopt positivism in a world bombarded by negative news all the time
• A rigorous and systematic approach to man’s natural behavior
• The role of the Greek philosophers in shaping human sciences around the 18th century
• How existential phenomenology found its way from Europe
• Cultural and biological dimensions of human science research programs
• The role of qualitative research methods across the discipline of the human sciences
• How humanistic psychology offers more substantive findings in human science tradition
• An evaluation of the colleges and universities dedicated to humanistic/human science philosophy
• Discuss the impact of the American infusionism into the cultures and systems of the world
• Fundamental tenets of Western civilization in developing countries
• An assessment of the ancient nature of human interactions
• Political and cultural standards acceptable to all human interactions

Philosophy Potential Senior Thesis Topics

• A philosophical perspective of evil actions and evil persons
• How the ideology of Darwinism has affected the aspect of natural selection
• Distinguishing the underlying differences between intervention and information
• Psychoanalysis of melancholia in teenagers
• Investigating the use of biology in dealing with human philosophical issues
• The evolution of philosophical writings from the 15th century to the 21st century
• Examine the connection between shame and an immoral piece of art
• How depression relates to natural and interactive children
• What is the logic behind nightmares and madness in dreams?
• An investigation of how man is adapting to the invasion of privacy by new technologies
• The ethical and practical arguments against voluntary euthanasia
• Discuss the relationship between value, dignity, and human virtue in the Modern Virtue Theory
• The evolution of personal and corporate responsibility in the 21st century
• Trends in sex and sexuality as seen in the 21st century
• Why arousal of an emotion in the listener is essential in the delivery of any speech

Undergraduate Philosophy Thesis Topics

• Modern science: Should we employ a monistic or pluralistic model?
• How moral philosophy can help improve our understanding of folk psychology
• Why is it close to impossible to escape mental externalism?
• The emergence of technology and resulting bioethics as seen in the 21st century
• Investigate the willingness to accept punishment after committing a civil crime
• Why artificial intelligence may not be a genuinely creative entity
• Discuss empathy, fiction, and morality in the development of fiction stories and folklores
• The role of sporting activities in developing virtues and morals in the society
• Is voluntary suicide justified for any reason whatsoever?
• Why postmodern philosophical theories and market anarchism are enemies
• Discuss the ultimate goal of humanity in the backdrop of the changing roles
• Give a detailed analysis of the relationship between fate, destiny, and free will
• What is the essence of dreams and visions to man?
• Evaluate the sources of your self-worth in the light of personal attributes
• What is the impact of a person’s name on who they become in the future?

Best-Rated Political Philosophy Thesis Topics

• Consider the dividing line between distributive justice and the family
• Investigate the gendered basis for care and caregiving
• What are the underlying differences between multiculturalism and feminism
• Discuss the liberal versus radical feminist positions on pornography
• How social beings should live together considering the underlying differences
• Following the example of Plato, discuss what it means to have an ideal society
• Given the knowledge and resources available, discuss the best form of society using the US as a case study
• The evolution of democracy in the US presidential election
• How the history of the past several centuries has impacted the role of citizens in participation in democracy
• What is the essence of having a conservative free-market economy in the 21st century?
• The role of the government in regulating the economy
• Should the economy incorporate both capitalist and socialist structures?
• Do we have an economically viable socialist alternative to capitalism?
• Is it worth fighting for an economically viable alternative to capitalism?
• The conservative view of the post-World-War-Two period

Thesis Topics on the Renaissance and Philosophy

• The impact of the renaissance period o man’s view of the world
• Compare and contrast the High Renaissance in Rome as compared to the of Northern Europe
• The impact of the scientific revolution on the renaissance period
• The early renaissance period in Florence and the existence of the Flemish art
• Discuss the contributions of some of the godfathers of the Renaissance
• The perfect interplay between music and painting during the renaissance period
• The humanist intellectual, cultural, and artistic revolution of the Renaissance
• Religious symbolism and naturalistic beauty as exemplified in the renaissance period
• The role of sexuality and eroticism in the works of the 16th-century renaissance art
• How the discoveries of the renaissance period helped shape people’s attitudes towards life
• Identify and explain the role of the Carolingian Renaissance on the Bible
• The impact of the Great migration and economic changes on literature and art
• Discuss how art patronage was conducted in Italy during the Renaissance
• How science has made advancements in renaissance culture and art
• Impacts of the early Renaissance on the medical innovations

Master Thesis Topics in Philosophy

• Discuss the benefits and impacts of the renaissance period on the man
• How the renaissance period played a part in the reformation of the world
• A comparative analysis of philosophy, art, and culture during the Renaissance
• How much influence did the renaissance period have on dressing?
• Conduct a critical analysis of Langston Hughes and the Harlem Renaissance
• The contribution of sculptors of the Italian Renaissance
• Discuss artistic renaissance humanism during 1400 and 1650
• The Renaissance and religion: A case study of the Catholic church
• Artistic revolution as a significant element of the Renaissance
• The role of William Shakespeare in the renaissance period
• Discuss the classical and Renaissance humanities art of the Greco-Roman artists
• The cultural, economic, and political influence of the Renaissance
• The age of revolutionary, Renaissance, and enlightenment period
• The representation of nature in the European renaissance artistic works
• How Leonardo, Michelangelo, and Rafael contributed to the new era of the Renaissance

Introduction to Philosophy Thesis Topics

• Discuss whether people are good or evil by nature
• What are the limitations to free will in making personal decisions?
• What is the impact of the belief in God on a person’s way of life?
• Discuss the compatibility issues between science with religion
• Give a detailed argument for or against utilitarianism
• What is the logic behind psychological and ethical egoism?
• Ascertain the relevance of morals to culture or society
• The role of Aesop’s fables in contributing to human philosophy
• Discuss the history and development of African philosophy
• What are the central tenets of African Sage Philosophy?
• The critical role played by altruism and group selection
• Conduct a detailed analysis of the American Enlightenment Thought
• How does the American Wilderness Philosophy vary from that of today?
• A case study of Anselm’s Ontological Argument for the Existence of God
• Critically evaluate motion and its place in nature
• Discuss association in the philosophy of the mind
• How Bolzano’s mathematical knowledge played a crucial role in human philosophy

Thesis Papers Topics on Buddhist Philosophy

• The view of sin and punishment between the Buddhist and Hindu religions
• Buddhist believe in rebirth, which is determined by the actions one does in daily life.
• Misconceptions about sexuality in the Buddhist religion
• Discuss the relationship between Shinto with China and Buddhism
• Analyze the four noble truths of Buddhism
• The concept of salvation according to the Zen Buddhism religion
• A detailed study of the confluence of Buddhism and Hinduism in India
• An analysis of the faith and practices of Buddhism as a religion in India
• The role of Mahatma Gandhi in advancing the ideologies and practices of Buddhism
• Evaluate the vase of treasure hidden in the Buddhist iconography
• Compare and contrast the various variations between Buddhism and Christianity
• Elements of the Buddhism religion that make it sacred
• Discuss the concept of anger and how to manage it in the Buddhism religion
• Cultural histories and the expansion of the Buddhism religion in China
• Differences in the Japanese versus Chinese Buddhism practices

Types of Philosophy Thesis Topics

• Discuss the role of aesthetics in the study of philosophy
• How epistemology has contributed to the growth in philosophical literature
• Elaborate the role of ethics on the survivability of a society
• How logic has been crucial in making rational decisions in a man
• What are the limitations of metaphysics as a branch of philosophy?
• Analyze the philosophy of mind given the fundamental tenets
• Discuss the major revolutions of the African philosophy
• Why does Eastern philosophy have a lower absorption rate?
• Reasons why Western philosophy has a greater acceptance in the world as compared to others
• Give the unique characteristics of the ancient and classical philosophy
• Why the medieval and post-classical philosophies have a place in the modern world
• The modern and contemporary philosophy in terms of improvements
• Discuss the philosophy of language theories and stances in Europe
• What is the impact of the philosophy of science theories and stances?
• Discuss the epistemological stances of different philosophical schools of thought

Epistemology Paper Topics

• The concept of skepticism among different readers
• Analyze the internalist vs. externalist accounts of knowledge and justification
• Discuss the structure of knowledge and justification
• What contributes to contextualism in epistemology?
• Impacts of the relevant alternative accounts of knowledge
• Discuss the pros and cons of the epistemology of lotteries
• A case study of foundationalism and coherentism
• The impacts of facts and beliefs on people
• Is skepticism doomed to an inevitable defeat?
• Arguments and positions in epistemology in the 21st century
• The pros and cons of different positions in epistemology
• Relevant arguments and principles in epistemology: A case of The Closure Principle
• Critically discuss Shoemaker’s ‘self-blindness’ concept
• How the epistemology of attitudes like the belief is very different from the epistemology of other mental states
• Fundamental flaws in various epistemological theories

High-Quality Philosophy Project Topics

• Discuss the concept of happiness
• Why egoism is a negative trait
• Discuss the motive behind acts of charity
• Is love merely an illusion of the mind?
• Are criminals evil by nature?
• Is the current generation less affectionate?
• Discuss the concept of true friendship
• Is there happiness in achieving nothing?
• Does a perfect life exist?
• Why do people struggle to attain perfectionism?
• The impact of technology of taking away emotions
• Analyze time management among high school versus campus students
• Is obsession replacing true love?
• Is the concept of ‘You Only Live Once’ viable?
• Why are most geniuses’ introverts?

Easy Philosophy Paper Topics

• Discuss the existence of fate in the modern world
• Can we achieve an ideal society?
• Is life meaningful after all?
• Why should people work, yet they will die in the end?
• Is the concept of feminism overhyped?
• Is every human action predetermined?
• Discuss the components of the human consciousness
• Why do people tend to do the bad instead of the good?
• Are atheists deceiving themselves?
• Why is the world changing so fast?
• Is there life after death?
• Why must everyone go to school?
• Who determines what clothes each gender should don?
• The impact of religious beliefs on science
• Does death usher in the new life?

Top Philosophical Topics To Write About

• Will the world ever come to an end?
• Why do people have different religions?
• Does stealing originate from the person’s mind?
• Who is responsible for the rot in the society
• The role of parents in instilling morals
• Why do people believe in revenge?
• What makes man different from animals?
• Why should we care about our neighbors?
• Is humility a virtue for ladies?
• Why are most men aggressive
• Discuss the role of sleeping at night
• Should people eat food after all?
• Is man the biggest threat to himself?
• Is the judicial system serving justice?
• Will robots make the world better?

Good Philosophy Topics

• Do beliefs and superstitions match?
• Is sex necessary?
• Why should people love each other?
• Should a woman head the house also?
• Are other planets mere superstitions?
• Are the stars in the sky fantasies?
• Why bother about planning?
• Do aliens exist?
• Why is man rational?
• What is the effect of finding a purpose in life
• Do shooting stars fall on earth?
• Why do fiction movies move people?
• Does the moon exist?
• Are we living reality or a fantasy?
• Can one love more than two people?

Interesting Philosophy Topics

• Was man made out of clay?
• Do guns protect?
• Does true love exist among teenagers?
• Beauty and morality
• Religion and power
• Memories and love
• Peace and war
• Religion and own belief system
• Angels and demons
• Heaven and earth
• Plastic surgery and ethics
• Character and upbringing
• Dreams and the future
• The rich and the poor
• Is death inevitable

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Information on Thesis Proposals

Creating a Thesis Committee

The first step in creating a thesis committee is for a committee chair or advisor to agree to supervise your thesis. Minimally, the committee chair must be a tenured or tenure-track faculty of the CSULB Philosophy Department. Your committee must additionally consist of at least two other faculty members, at least one of whom must also be a tenured or tenure-track faculty of the CSULB Philosophy Department. The department strongly recommends that your third member also be tenured or tenure-track in Philosophy, although it’s possible for the third member to be a part-time faculty member or a person with appropriate qualifications from another university department or another university. Please consult with your committee chair in determining appropriate persons to invite to serve on your committee. (Although many part-time lecturers in the department are generous in volunteering their time for committee service, we request that you remember that the University does not compensate them for it, and most have heavy teaching scheduleshere and on other campuses.) Your committee must be approved by the department.

Writing Your Thesis Proposal

The goal of your thesis proposal is to present the tenured and tenure-track faculty members of the department with a general outline of your intended thesis project together with a brief justification of its merit as a research project warranting a master’s degree. Take as your goal the creation of a concise, well-written document clearly articulating your project and its relationship to the philosophical literature. In general you should aim for 6-8 pages of text and a bibliography of 1-2 pages. A good thesis proposal will have three elements: (1) A clear and concise statement of the position you intend to articulate and defend in the thesis. (2) A well-researched statement relating your position to the philosophical literature indicating how your position connects with important thought on the subject by other philosophers. (3) An outline of how exactly you intend to structure your exposition in the thesis. This outline should present a chapter-by-chapter account, indicating how each chapter relates to the overall project.

The best strategy for writing your thesis proposal is to start early and interact regularly with your committee. Your committee is your resource for advice and feedback on your proposal while you develop it. The director of your committee is responsible for deciding when the proposal is ready for review, and the committee members must agree. Your committee members are also the ones who will present the proposal and defend it to the department. Thus, the more constructive interaction you have with them while writing the proposal the better. It is important to note that a student cannot submit a proposal to the department on his/her initiative without the approval of the thesis committee.

Some Common Proposal Difficulties

Writing a book report: Your thesis should make a modest contribution to the philosophical literature. A mere summary of the positions and arguments is inadequate. There are many ways you can contribute to philosophical thought: Your contribution could consist of finding a significant thesis or type of argument to constructively criticize. You could find an original extension of, or argument for, another person’s theory. You can develop a critical discussion of a view’s underlying methodological, epistemic, or ontological commitments. You can explore what is really at stake in a philosophical debate or the implications of a view. You can propose a useful organization of the positions in a debate. Whatever you choose, it must signify a step forward – an original contribution – albeit a modest one.

Cutting from whole cloth: While your thesis should contain your contribution to philosophical thinking on your thesis topic, your thesis is unlikely to introduce a totally novel and important way to conceive of or solve a problem in philosophy. Good research in philosophy is almost always grounded in a thorough understanding of the ways in which other people have thought about a philosophical topic or problem. Your thesis should build on the tradition.

Rushing to market: Think of your proposal as something that will take numerous drafts and some serious research to complete. Don’t try to slap together a document in order to meet a deadline. The timeline of an advanced degree is dictated exclusively by the amount of time it takes you to acquire and demonstrate a high level of competence in the field. When your proposal is ready for departmental review, you should be well on your way to writing the thesis itself.

Technical language: In general, it is better to state your thesis without technical language for a couple of reasons. First, expressing your project without reliance on technical jargon is an indicator that you have a good grasp of the issues. Second, not everyone in the department will necessarily be familiar with the terms you use. Of course, sometimes it is important to refer to technical terms in framing a view or problem. When you use technical language, you should always explicate its meaning.

Long historical exegesis: When relating your thesis topic to the philosophical literature the most important facts to include are the ones that indicate how your project connects to recent work on the topic. A proposal need not contain a lengthy synopsis of the history of your topic.

Personal histories: However you came to your topic, that story is not relevant to assessing its philosophical merit or its viability as a thesis project.

Submitting Your Thesis Proposal

Once your advisor and all committee members have accepted your proposal, the next step is for your proposal to be submitted to the department for review. Both your proposal and your thesis committee will be reviewed (solely) by tenured and tenure-track members of the department, and will be voted upon at a faculty meeting.

To prepare your proposal, first add a cover sheet including the title, the date, and the names of your committee members with the advisor identified and listed first. Each member of the committee will sign the cover sheet of your proposal, so include a signature line for each member. Once you have collected the committee signatures, you should prepare hard copies of your proposal for distribution to the faculty mailboxes in MHB seven days before the meeting where your proposal will be considered. (Under some circumstances, electronic distribution of your proposal may be possible; please consult your thesis advisor). All the tenured and tenure-track members of the department must receive a copy of your proposal.

Please note that you are responsible for all printing and photocopying of your proposal. The Department does not provide photocopying services for students for this or other purposes.

Some Example Thesis Proposals

Example 1: Back to the Future: Natural Law and the Original Meaning of the Alien Tort Claims Act

Example 2: Conceivability and Possibility Studies in Frege and Kripke

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Belief and ameliorative epistemology , the commonwealth as agent: group action, the common good, and the general will , conceptualism and objectivity in locke's account of natural kinds , counsel and command: an address-dependent account of authority , dependence on persons and dependence on things in rousseau's social, psychological, and aesthetic theory , duties of rescue: a moderate account , essays on biological individuality , formal analyticity , global institutions and relations among non-co-citizens , intellectual property rights and institutions: a pluralist account , into question: an account of inquiry , kant's science of the moral world and moral objectivity , knowledge in action , loving, valuing, regretting, and being oneself , 'making people happy, not making happy people': a defense of the asymmetry intuition in population ethics , no metaphysics within physics , the normativity of structural rationality , objectivity and intersubjectivity in moral philosophy , on perception's role in aristotle’s epistemology .

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This article considers several questions concerning the philosophy of death.

First , it discusses what it is to be alive. This topic arises because to die is roughly to lose one’s life.

The second topic is the nature of death, and how it bears on the persistence of organisms and persons.

The third topic is the harm thesis , the claim that death can harm the individual who dies. Perhaps the most influential case against the harm thesis was made by Epicurus. His argument is discussed, as is a contemporary response, the deprivationist defense of the harm thesis.

The fourth topic is a question that seems to confront proponents of the harm thesis, especially those who offer some version of the deprivationist defense: if a person is harmed by her death, at what time does her death make her worse off than she otherwise would be? Some answers are considered.

Fifth is further issues that may lead us to doubt the harm thesis. One is a further question about deprivationism: we are not always harmed by what deprives us of things; what makes some of these worrisome and not others? Next is a question concerning the fact that there are two different directions in which our lives could be extended: into the past (our lives could have been longer if they began earlier), or into the future (they could have been longer if they ended later). Assuming the former does not matter to us, why should the latter?

The sixth topic concerns events that occur after a person has died: is it possible for these events to harm her?

Seventh is a controversy concerning whether extreme long life, even immortality, would be good for us. Of particular interest here is a dispute between Thomas Nagel, who says that death is an evil whenever it comes, and Bernard Williams, who argues that, while premature death is a misfortune, it is a good thing that we are not immortal, since we cannot continue to have our current characters and remain meaningfully attached to life forever.

A final controversy concerns whether or not the harmfulness of death can be reduced. It may be that, by adjusting our conception of our well-being, and by altering our attitudes, we can reduce or eliminate the threat death poses us. But there is a case to be made that such efforts backfire if taken to extremes.

1.1 Life as a Substance

1.2 life as an event, 1.3 life as a property, 2.1 life and death, 2.2 death and suspended vitality, 2.3 being dead, 2.4 resurrection, 2.5 death and what we are, 2.6 death and existence, 2.7 criteria for death, 3.1 the epicurean case, 3.2 the deprivationist defense, 4.1 concurrentism, 4.2 priorism, 4.3 subsequentism, 4.4 indefinitism, 4.5 atemporalism, 5.1 harmless preclusion.

• 5.2 Lucretius and the Symmetry Argument

6.1 Doubts About Posthumous Harm

6.2 retroactive harm, 7.1 never dying would be good, 7.2 never dying would be a misfortune, 8. can death’s harmfulness be reduced, other internet resources, related entries.

To die is to cease to be alive. To clarify death further, then, we will need to say a bit about the nature of life.

Some theorists have said that life is a substance of some sort. A more plausible view is that life is a property of some sort, but we should also consider the possibility that lives are events. If we say that lives are events, we will want to know something about how to distinguish them from other events, and how they are related to the individuals that are alive. It would also be useful to know the persistence conditions for a life. If instead we conclude that life (or alive ) is a property, we will want to clarify it, and identify what sorts of things bear it. Let us briefly discuss each of these views—that life is a substance, a property, or an event.

We can deal quickly with the view called ‘vitalism’ (defended by Hans Driesch, 1908 and 1914, among others), which holds that being alive consists in containing some special substance called ‘life.’ Vitalism is a nonstarter since it is unclear what sort of stuff vitalists take life to be, and because no likely candidates—no special stuff found in all and only in living things—have been detected. Moreover, vitalism faces a further difficulty, which Fred Feldman calls ‘the Jonah Problem’: a dead thing, such as a whale, may have a living thing, say Jonah, inside it; if Jonah has ‘life’ inside him, then so does the whale, but by hypothesis the whale is not alive. Of course, in this example Jonah is in the whale’s stomach, not in its cells, but the difficulty cannot be solved by saying that an object is alive if and only if it has ‘life’ in its cells, as an infectious agent (organisms with ‘life’ in them) could survive, for a time, within the dead cells of a dead whale.

As Jay Rosenberg noted (1983, p. 22, 103), sometimes when we speak of a life we mean to refer to the events that make up something’s history—the things that it did and the things that happened to it. (For example, the publication of The Problems of Philosophy was one of the events that made up one life, namely Bertrand Russell’s.) Yet a rock and a corpse have histories, and neither has a life. Presumably, then, ‘a life,’ in the sense we are discussing, refers to the history of something that is alive. In that case what we are really looking for is clarification of a property, not an event. We want clarification of what it is to be alive.

According to a second theorist, Peter van Inwagen, while a life is indeed an event, it is not the history of something. “‘Russell’s life,’” van Inwagen writes (1990, p. 83), “denotes a purely biological event, an event which took place entirely inside Russell’s skin and which went on for ninety-seven years.” Russell’s life included the oxygenation of his hemoglobin molecules but not the publication of his books.

If lives are biological events, it would be useful to know more about what they are, how they are individuated, and what their persistence conditions are. Van Inwagen declines to provide these details (1990, p. 145). He assumes that (the events he calls) lives are familiar enough to us that we can pick them out. But he does make the useful comment that each such event is constituted by certain self-organizing activities in which some molecules engage, and that it is analogous to a parade, which is an event constituted by certain marching-related activities of some people. Having taken the notion of a life for granted, he draws upon it in his account of organisms. On his view (1990, p. 90), some things compose an organism if and only if their activity constitutes a life.

Many theorists have defended the view that life, or (being) alive, is a property, but there is considerable disagreement among them about what precisely that property is. The main views on offer are life-functionalist accounts and accounts that analyze life in terms of DNA or genetic information or evolution by natural selection.

Life-functionalism, a view introduced by Aristotle, analyzes the property alive in terms of one or more salient functions that living things typically are able to perform. The salient functions Aristotle listed were nutrition, reproduction, sensation, autonomous motion, and thought. However, life-functionists disagree about how to formulate their account and about which functions are salient. Take Aristotle’s list. Obviously, it would be a mistake to say that something is alive if and only if it can perform all of the functions on the list. Might we say that, for something to be alive, it suffices that it be capable of one or more of the listed functions? Is being capable of one of these functions in particular necessary for something to be alive? As Fred Feldman points out, neither of the suggestions just mentioned is acceptable. Devices such as Roomba cleaning robots can do one of Aristotle’s functions, namely move themselves, but are not alive, so being able to do at least one listed function does not suffice for being alive. Nor is it plausible to say that any one on the list is necessary for being alive. Which on the list would this necessary function be? Perhaps nutrition? Adult silk moths are alive but lack a digestive system, so are incapable of nutrition. And, as many theorists have noticed, many living things cannot reproduce; examples include organisms whose reproductive organs are damaged and hybrid animals such as mules.

What, now, about accounts that analyze life in terms of genetic information? Feldman thinks that something like the Jonah problem arises for any account according which being alive consists in containing DNA or other genetic information, as dead organisms contain DNA. A further problem for such views is that it is conceivable there are or could be life forms (say on other planets) that are not based on genetic information. This latter difficulty can be avoided if we say that being alive consists in having the ability to evolve, to engage in Darwinian evolution, assuming that evolution by natural selection is possible for living things that lack nucleic acid. We might adopt NASA’s definition, according to which life is “a self-sustaining chemical system capable of Darwinian evolution.” However, accounts like NASA’s are implausible for a further reason: while the ability to evolve by natural selection is something that collections of organisms—species—may or may not have, it is not a feature an individual organism may have. Later members of a species come to have features earlier members lacked; some of these new features may make survival more or less likely, and the less ‘fit’ are weeded out of existence. An individual organism, such as a particular dog, cannot undergo this process. Yet individuals may be alive.

Because he has encountered no successful account of life, no account exempt from counterexamples, Feldman concludes that “life is a mystery” (p. 55). Despite his skepticism, however, there is a good case to be made for saying that what distinguishes objects that are alive from objects that are not is that the latter have a distinctive sort of control over what composes them, which the former lack. Let us see if we can make this claim clearer.

Consider ordinary composite material objects that are not alive. We can assume that, at a given time, these are made up of, or composed of, more simple things, such as molecules, by virtue of the fact that the latter meet various conditions. Among the conditions is the requirement that (in some sense in need of clarification) they be bonded together . Take the boulder near my front porch. Among the things that compose it now will be a few molecules, say four molecules near the center of the boulder, that are bonded together, in that each is bonded to the others, directly or indirectly (a molecule, A, is in directly bonded to another molecule, B, if A is directly bonded to a molecule C that is directly bonded to B, or if A is bonded to a molecule that is indirectly bonded to B). The things that make up the boulder are not limited to these four molecules, but they are limited to molecules that are bonded to them. Nor is the boulder unique in this way; something similar seems true of any composite material object. A composite material object is composed of some things at a time only if those things are bonded together at that time.

What sort of bonding relationship holds among the things that compose material objects? Any answer to this question will be controversial. Let us set it aside, and move on to some further assumptions about the composition of nonliving composite material objects, namely that a great many of them persist for a while (some persist for a very long time) and that what composes them at one time normally differs from what composes them at other times. Exactly how this works is a complicated matter, but among the conditions that such objects must meet if they are to persist is that any change in their composition be incremental. (Even this condition is controversial. For more on material objects, see the article Material Constitution and Ordinary objects.) Consider the boulder again. Suppose that at one time, t 0 , it is composed of some molecules, and that all or most of these molecules remain bonded to each other until a later time t 1 . Suppose, too, that no or few (few as compared to the number of molecules that composed the boulder at t 0 ) molecules come to be newly bonded to these by the time that t 1 rolls around. Under these conditions the boulder undergoes an incremental change in composition, and it seems plausible to say that the boulder remains in existence over the interval t 0 – t 1 , and, at t 1 , is composed of the molecules that remain bonded together with the molecules that are newly attached to them. Presumably, it will also survive a series of such incremental changes in composition. But it will not survive drastic and sudden changes. It would stop existing, for example, if the molecules that compose it were suddenly dispersed.

Enough said about composite material objects that are not alive. Now let us see if we can shed some light on what makes living objects special. What is it that distinguishes an object that is alive from an object that is not?

The answer seems to be that, normally, a live object has a distinctive sort of control over whether things come to be, or cease to be, part of it. The control in question is made possible by activities its constituents themselves are capable of. Contrast objects that are not alive, say automobiles. What an ordinary car is composed of is settled for the car by the mechanics who repair it (detaching some parts and affixing others), by whether it is involved in an accident and loses some parts, and so forth. Imagine a car that is not passive in this way. Imagine that its parts were somehow capable of replacing some of themselves with fresh parts, without assistance from outside, so that the activities of the parts that compose the car today were responsible for its being composed of certain parts tomorrow. That would make it quite lifelike.

Let us describe, in a bit more detail, what the molecules that compose living objects can do:

• Working together, these molecules can engage in activities that are integrated in conformity with (under the control of) the information that some of them carry (information that is comparable to blueprints and instructions), much as soldiers that make up an army can engage in activities that are integrated in conformity with battle plans and instructions issued by the commanding officers that are among them.
• Deploying these activities, the molecules can self-modify, in the sense that they can bond new (perhaps recently ingested) molecules to themselves, or prune (and excrete) some away, combining themselves in various ways (e.g., constructing cells), thereby giving way to a slightly different assembly of molecules at a later time, and fueling their activities by drawing upon external energy sources or stored reserves.
• The molecules can also pass along their ability to self-modify, enabling the molecules to which they give way to continue these activities, thus allowing the object they compose to sustain a given form (or forms) over time (say that of a dog) despite the fact that what composes that object at one time differs from what composes it at another time.

The view on offer—we might call it the compositional account of life—is that an object is composed of things that are capable of the activities just described if and only if it is alive.

This account of life needs refinement, but it avoids at least most of the worries mentioned earlier. It implies that an object may be alive even though it is sterile (as in the case of mules), even though it survives on stored energy (as in the case of a silk moth), and conceivably even if it lacks nucleic acid (yet is still composed of things that engage in activities integrated in conformity with information they carry). In fact, it implies that being capable of none of the items on Aristotle’s list is necessary nor sufficient for being alive. What is more, the compositional account just sketched implies that being alive is a property an individual, say the last remaining dodo, may bear on its own, which suggests that it may be alive without being capable of Darwinian evolution. At the same time, it explains how collections of live individuals may evolve. Individual objects are alive only if their composition is under the control of some of their parts (e.g., nucleic acid molecules) that carry information. The mechanisms by which such information is carried tend to be modified over time, altering the information they carry, and thus the features of the organisms they help shape, introducing mutations that may or may not facilitate survival. (For more on the nature of life, see Bedau 2014 and the entry on Life.)

The previous section discussed the nature of life, thereby clarifying what it is that death ends. This section discusses the nature of death and how death is related to the persistence of organisms and persons. (For an excellent discussion of views of death outside of the analytic tradition, see Schumacher 2010.)

According to the compositional account of life discussed in the previous section, objects that are alive have a distinctive capacity to control what they are composed of, fixing these constituents together in various ways, by virtue of the fact that their constituents can engage in various self-modifying activities that are integrated in conformity with information they carry. Let us call these vital activities .

It is one thing to have the capacity to engage in vital activities and another actually to engage in them, just as there is a difference between having the ability to run and actually running. Being alive seems to involve the former. It consists in having the relevant capacity. To die is to lose this capacity. We can call this the loss of life account of death .

The event by which the capacity to engage in vital activities is lost is one thing, and the state of affairs of its having been lost it is another. ‘Death’ can refer to either. However, the capacity to engage in vital activities may be lost gradually, rather than all at once, so it is reasonable to speak of a process of dying. In some cases that process is especially complicated, because the self-modifying activities of some organisms result in the construction of complex physiological systems that must remain largely intact for the self-modifying activities of these organisms to remain integrated. In defining death, some theorists focus on these systems, and claim that an organism’s life ends when that organism’s physiological systems can no longer function as an integrated whole, or when this loss becomes irreversible (Christopher Belshaw 2009; David DeGrazia 2014).

The loss of life account of death has been challenged by theorists who claim that things whose vital activities are suspended are not alive (Feldman 1992, Christopher Belsaw 2009, Cody Gilmore 2013, and David DeGrazia 2014). When zygotes and embryos are frozen for later use in the in vitro fertilization procedure, their vital activities are brought to a stop, or very nearly so. The same goes for water bears that are dehydrated, and for seeds and spores. It seems clear that the zygotes and water bears are not dead, since their vital activities can easily be restarted—by warming the zygote or by wetting the water bear. They are not dead, but are they alive? If we deny that they are alive, presumably we would do so on the grounds that their vital activities are halted. If something’s life can be ended by suspending its vital activities without its dying, then we must reject the loss of life account of death.

However, the loss of life account is thoroughly established in ordinary usage, and is easily reconciled with the possibility of suspended vitality. In denying that frozen embryos are dead, it is clear that we mean to emphasize that they have not lost the capacity to deploy their vital activities. When we say that something is dead, we mean to emphasize that this capacity has been lost. Having used ‘dead’ to signal this loss, why would we want to use the word ‘alive’ to signal the fact that something is making active use of its vital activities? Our best option is to use a pair of contrasting terms. We can use ‘viable’ to indicate that something has the capacity to deploy vital activities and ‘unviable’ to indicate that it has lost this capacity. When instead we are concerned about whether or not something is engaging its vital activities, we can use different contrasting terms, say ‘vital’ and ‘nonvital’, the former to characterize something that is employing its capacity for vital activities and the latter to characterize something that is not making use of its capacity for vital activities. What seems relatively uncontroversial is that being dead consists in unviability. To retain the loss of life account, we have only to add that being alive consists in viability. We can then say that a frozen embryo is viable and hence alive despite its lack of vitality, and it will die if its life ends (it will die if it ceases to be viable). Of course, if we are willing to abandon the loss of life account, we could instead use ‘alive’ to characterize something that is both viable and vital. We would then say that a frozen embryo is not alive (since it lacks vitality) but also that it is not dead (since it remains viable).

People often speak of being dead as a ‘state’ or ‘condition’ as opposed to an event or process. They say an organism comes to be in this state once it dies. This way of speaking can be puzzling on the assumption that what dies ceases to exist. (This assumption is discussed below.) If the assumption is true, then an organism that dies stops existing but simultaneously comes to be in the state of death. Mustn’t something exist at a time if it is (literally) in some state at that time? But of course it would be absurd to deny that something can truly be dead on the grounds that death is a state and what does not exist at a time cannot be in any state at that time.

Why not solve the problem by saying that upon dying an organism leaves a corpse, and it is the corpse that is in the state of being dead? There are several problems with this suggestion. Some organisms do not leave corpses. What corpses are left eventually disintegrate. Whether an organism leaves a corpse or not, and whether its corpse exists or not, if that organism dies at time t and does not regain life then it is dead after t .

The difficulty can be avoided if we say, with Jay Rosenberg 1983, p. 42), that dead is a relation between an organism, the time it died, and a subsequent time, and that when someone asserts, at some given time t , ‘Socrates is dead,’ what is asserted (ignoring the possibility of restored life, discussed in the next section) is roughly that Socrates died before t .

As is mentioned below, some theorists deny that an object that is at one time an organism may continue its existence as a corpse. Such theorists will say that organisms and their corpses are two different objects. They may conclude that ‘dead’ is ambiguous—that it means one thing as applied to organisms, and another thing as attributed to the corpses organisms leave. In any case, they will need to deny that, as concerns corpses, being dead implies having died, as corpses are never alive, according to them. If, on the other hand, an object that is an organism may continue its existence as a corpse, then, at any time t after that object dies, ‘dead’ applies univocally to it at time t , and means roughly died before t .

It will be useful to sharpen the loss of life account if, as seems conceivable, it is possible to restore life to something that has died.

Restoration in this sense is quite different from the revival of something, such as a frozen embryo, whose vital activities have been halted. Something can be revived only if it is alive—only if it has the capacity to deploy vital activities, as in the case of a frozen zygote. It is revived when it regains vitality. Something’s life can be restored only if it has lost its capacity for vital activities. Life is restored when this capacity is regained.

To bring the possibility of restoration into view, imagine a futuristic device, the Disassembler-Reassembler , that chops me into small cubes, or individual cells, or disconnected atoms, which it stores and later reassembles just as they were before. It is far from obvious that I would survive—and that my life would continue—after Reassembly. (Assuming that I am a material object, the account of objects sketched in Section 1.3 implies that chopping me into bits ends my existence forever.) But even if my existence would pick up again after Reassembly occurs, it is quite clear that I would not live during intervals when my atoms are stacked in storage. I would not even exist during such intervals. If I can be Reassembled, my life would be restored, not revived. Restoration, not revival, is a way of bringing a creature back from the dead.

Now imagine a Corpse Reanimator , a device that moves molecules back to where they were prior to the death of the creature that left the corpse, and restarts its vital activities. Some theorists say that I continue my existence as a corpse if it remains in good shape; they will assume that I remain in existence after losing my life, and continue my existence after the Corpse Reanimator does its work. On their view the Corpse Reanimator restores my life--it gives me back the capacity to engage in vital activities.

Given the possibilities of restoration and revivification, it seems best to refine the loss of life account, as follows:

Dying is the loss of an object’s life—the loss of its capacity to perpetuate itself using vital activities. An object dies at the time it loses this capacity. It is dead at all times afterwards, except while that capacity is regained.

Death for you and me is constituted by the loss of our capacity to sustain ourselves using vital activities. This characterization of death could be sharpened if we had a clearer idea of what we are , and its implications concerning our persistence. After all, we cannot retain any capacities if we fail to persist, so if we fail to persist we stop being capable of vital activities. We die. However, what we are, and what is involved in our persistence, is a matter of controversy.

There are three main views: animalism , which says that we are human animals (Snowdon 1990, Olson 1997, 2007); personism , which says that we are creatures with the capacity for self-awareness; and mindism , which says that we are minds (which may or may not have the capacity for self-awareness) (McMahan 2002). Animalists typically say that we persist over time just in case we remain the same animal; mindist typically suggest that our persistence requires our remaining the same mind. Personism is usually paired with the view that our persistence is determined by our psychological features and the relations among them (Locke 1689, Parfit 1984). (For more on what we are, see the entry on Personal Identity.)

If we are animals, with the persistence conditions of animals, we die when we cease to be the same animal. If we are minds, with the persistence conditions for minds, we die when we cease to meet these conditions. And if persistence is determined by our retaining certain psychological features, then the loss of those features will constitute death.

These three ways of understanding death have very different implications. Severe dementia can destroy a great many psychological features without destroying the mind, which suggests that death as understood by personists can occur even though death as understood by mindists has not. Moreover, human animals sometimes survive the destruction of the mind, as when the cerebrum dies but the brainstem does not, leaving an individual in a persistent vegetative state. Many theorists also think that the mind could survive the extinction of the human animal, say when the brain is removed from the body, kept alive artificially, and the remainder of the body is destroyed (assuming that a bare brain is not a human animal). These possibilities suggest that death as understood by mindists can occur even though death as understood by animalists has not (and also that the latter sort of death need not be accompanied by the former.)

What is the relationship between existence and death? May people and other creatures continue to exist after dying, or cease to exist without dying?

Take the first question: may you and I and other creatures continue to exist for some time after our lives end? Fred Feldman (1992, p. 91) coins the term termination thesis to refer to the view that “when a person dies, he or she … goes out of existence; subsequently, there is no such thing as that person.” (A version of the thesis applies to any living thing.) We can call those who accept the termination thesis terminators , and those who deny it anti-terminators . One point anti-terminators such as Feldman (1992, 2000, 2013) cite is that people who encounter corpses sometimes call them dead animals, or dead people. Such talk may suggest that we believe that animals continue to exist, as animals, while no longer alive. The idea might be that an animal continues to count as the same animal if enough of its original components remain in much the same order, and animals continue to meet this condition for a time following death (Mackie 1997). On this view, if you and I are animals (as animalists say), then we could survive for a time after we are dead, albeit as corpses. In fact, we could survive indefinitely, by arranging to have our corpses preserved.

However, this way of defending the anti-terminators’s view may not be decisive. The terms ‘dead animal’ and ‘dead person’ seem ambiguous. Normally, when we use ‘dead people’ or ‘dead animal’ we mean to speak of persons or animals who lived in the past. One dead person I can name is Socrates; he is now a ‘dead person’ even though his corpse surely has ceased to exist. However, in certain contexts, such as when we are standing inside morgues, we seem to use the terms ‘dead animal’ and ‘dead person’ to mean “remains of something that was an animal” or “remains of something that was a person.” On this interpretation, even in morgues calling something a dead person does not imply that it is a person.

Still, the dispute between terminators and anti-terminators is unlikely to be settled on the basis of how we use terms such as ‘dead animal’ and ‘dead person.’ Metaphysical considerations must weigh in. For example, consider that the remarks made in Section 1.3 about the persistence of objects are consistent with the possibility that objects that are people may continue their existence as corpses, which may be useful to anti-terminators. On the other hand, many theorists think that nothing is a person unless it has various psychological features, which corpses lack, and some think that nothing is an organism unless it is alive. Terminators may be able to exploit these thoughts.

What about the second question: can creatures cease to exist without dying? Certainly things that never were alive, such as bubbles and statues, can be deathlessly annihilated. Arguably, there are also ways that living creatures can be deathlessly annihilated (Rosenberg 1983, Feldman 1992, Gilmore 2013). Perhaps an amoeba’s existence ends when it splits, replacing itself with two amoebas, and the existence of chlamydomonas ends when pairs of them fuse to form a zygote. Yet when amoebas split, and chlamydomonas fuse, vital activities do not cease. If people could divide like amoebas, perhaps they, too could cease to exist without dying. (For a famous discussion of division, fusion, and their implications, see Parfit 1981.) If such ‘deathless exits’ are possible, we would have to modify the loss of life account of death.

However, proponents of the loss of life account can hold their ground. They can say that division, fusion, and other apparent examples of deathless exits are unusual ways of dying, because, in such cases, nonexistence is not brought about via the destruction of vital activities, but they are not ways of escaping death altogether. Proponents of the loss of life account might also turn the tables on its critics, and argue as follows: nothing can be alive unless it exists, so if something ceases to exist it ceases to be alive, but to cease to be alive is to die. So there are no deathless exits.

Defining death is one thing; providing criteria by which it can be readily detected or verified is another. A definition is an account of what death is ; when, and only when its definition is met, death has necessarily occurred. A criterion for death, by contrast, lays out conditions by which all and only actual deaths may be readily identified. In some cases criteria for death are intended to capture conditions by which the actual deaths of human persons may be identified. Such a criterion falls short of a definition, but plays a practical role. For example, criteria for the death of a person would help physicians and jurists determine when death has occurred.

In the United States, the states have adopted criteria for the death of a person modeled on the Uniform Determination of Death Act (developed by the President’s Commission, 1981), which says that “an individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards.” In the United Kingdom, the accepted criterion is brain stem death, or the “permanent functional death of the brain stem” (Pallis 1982).

These current criteria are subject to criticism, even if we put aside reservations concerning the qualifier ‘irreversible’. Animalists might resist the criteria since the vital activities of human beings whose entire brains have ceased to function can be sustained artificially using cardiopulmonary assistance. Mindists and personists might also resist the criteria, on the grounds that minds and all psychological features can be destroyed in human beings whose brain stems are intact. For example, cerebral death can leave its victim with an intact brain stem, yet mindless and devoid of self-awareness. (For more on criteria for death, see the article on the Definition of Death.)

3. Epicurus and the Harm Thesis

Is death bad for some people who die? Is it good for some of them?

According to the harm thesis , death is, at least sometimes, bad for those who die, and in this sense something that ‘harms’ them. It is important to know what to make of this thesis, since our response itself can be harmful. This might happen as follows: suppose that we love life, and reason that since it is good, more would be better. Our thoughts then turn to death, and we decide it is bad: the better life is, we think, the better more life would be, and the worse death is. At this point, we are in danger of condemning the human condition, which embraces life and death, on the grounds that it has a tragic side, namely death. It will help some if we remind ourselves that our situation also has a good side. Indeed, our condemnation of death is here based on the assumption that more life would be good. But such consolations are not for everyone. (They are unavailable if we crave immortality on the basis of demanding standards by which the only worthwhile projects are endless in duration, for then we will condemn the condition of mere mortals as tragic through and through, and may, as Unamuno (1913) points out, end up suicidal, fearing that the only life available is not worth having.) And a favorable assessment of life may be a limited consolation, since it leaves open the possibility that, viewing the human condition as a whole, the bad cancels much of the good. In any case it is grim enough to conclude that, given the harm thesis, the human condition has a tragic side.

It is no wonder that theorists over the millennia have sought to defeat the harm thesis. Let us consider some challenges to the harm thesis, beginning with the case against it developed by the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus.

Epicurus (341–270) adopted a version of hedonism according to which pleasure (or pleasant experiences) is the only thing that is intrinsically good for us (that is, the only thing that is good for us in itself), while pain (or painful experiences) is the only thing that is intrinsically bad for us, bad in itself. Call this view intrinsic hedonism. (For a discussion of intrinsic value, see the entry on Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value.) Epicurus’s commitment to intrinsic hedonism prompted him to say, in his Letter to Menoeceus , that “everything good and bad lies in sensation.” He also claimed, in that same letter, that “when we are, death is not, and when death is present, then we are not.” The death of a person, and that person’s existence, do not overlap in time. On the basis of this assumption about death and existence, he concluded that a person’s death does not cause her to have any experiences (sensations)—indeed, “death is to be deprived of sensation.” In the following passage, he uses these thoughts against the harm thesis:

Make yourself familiar with the belief that death is nothing to us, since everything good and bad lies in sensation, and death is to be deprived of sensation. … So that most fearful of all bad things, death, is nothing to us, since when we are, death is not, and when death is present, then we are not.

Much about Epicurus’s argument is unclear, so let us work through it more carefully and see if we can fill in some details that he did not supply. Some speculation will be necessary, but we can develop a reconstruction that aligns with the things he wrote.

Earlier we mentioned one of the views Epicurus accepted, which we can state as follows:

• Intrinsic hedonism is true: a person’s experiences (sensations) of pleasure (or her pleasant experiences) are the only things that are intrinsically good for her, the only things that are good for her in themselves, while her experiences of pain (or painful experiences) are the only things that are intrinsically bad for her, bad in themselves.

From this view it follows that

• something is intrinsically good or bad for a person only if it is an experience.

Now, regardless of whether a person experiences her death, that death is not itself an experience. (Compare: I may experience jogging down the street, and I may experience the cup that is in front of me, but neither jogging nor the cup is itself an experience. My experiences are, so to speak, in my mind. Cups are not.) Let us add this observation to the argument:

• A person’s death is not an experience.

And if a person’s death is not an experience at all, clearly it is not an experience that is intrinsically good or bad for her. So, from 1–3, it follows that

• a person’s death is not intrinsically good or bad for her.

However, something that is not intrinsically bad for a person might nevertheless make other things happen that are detrimental to her, in which case it may be extrinsically bad for her. Seeing somebody fall and break her arm is not intrinsically bad for a person, but it might well cause her painful sadness, which makes the accident she saw extrinsically bad for her. Similarly, something that is not intrinsically good for a person might be extrinsically good for her.

Epicurus recognized the possibility of extrinsic goodness. It is not entirely clear how he understood it, but he seemed to accept a view we can call extrinsic instrumentalism : something is extrinsically good or bad for a person only if it makes her have things (other than itself) that are intrinsically good or bad for her. Let us add this to the argument:

• extrinsic instrumentalism is true: something is extrinsically good or bad for a person only if it makes her have things that are intrinsically good or bad for her.

Armed with this assumption, Epicurus can reject the possibility that a person’s death is extrinsically bad for her, arguing as follows. Because Epicurus thought that the death of a person and that person’s existence do not overlap in time, he thought that

• a person’s death does not make her have any experiences.

From premises 2, 5 and 6 it follows that

• a person’s death is not extrinsically good or bad for her.

To complete the argument against the harm thesis, Epicurus would need an additional assumption, such as this:

• something is good or bad for a person only if it is either intrinsically or extrinsically good or bad for her.

Premises 4, 7 and 8 entail that the harm thesis is false:

• a person’s death is not good or bad for her.

Is this Epicurean argument convincing? Let us see if we can find weak spots. We can begin with a reservation concerning the term ‘death.’

Earlier we noted that ‘death’ might be used for dying, the event or process of losing life, or being dead, the property of having lost life. The first reservation about the argument is that it is strongest if its uses of ‘death’ refer to being dead, and not to (the event or process of) dying. Here is why.

Being dead is not an experience, and it does not make a person have any experiences. So (on Epicurus’s assumptions) it is neither intrinsically nor extrinsically bad for a person to be dead. However, a person may experience dying , and the experience of dying (the experiences dying causes her to have) might well be intrinsically bad for her, even if only painful experiences are intrinsically bad for her (as premise 1 says). So even if being dead is not extrinsically bad for a person, the question arises as to whether, for some people, it is extrinsically bad to die . If something makes a person have painful experiences, isn’t it extrinsically bad for her, other things being equal? At least this much is true: the Epicurean argument does not show that dying painfully is not extrinsically bad for a person.

Apparently, then, the argument does not demonstrate that neither being dead nor dying is ever bad for those who die. Nevertheless, unless we find further weaknesses in it, it still seems to support powerful conclusions: being dead is neither good nor bad for those who die, and dying is extrinsically good or bad for them only if and insofar as it causes them to have painful (pleasant) experiences. Dying is wholly a matter of indifference for those who do not experience it, say because they sleep through it.

But there are further reservations to consider. Intrinsic hedonism is questionable. So is extrinsic instrumentalism.

Consider the first of these. Which things are intrinsically good or bad for us is a controversial matter , but many theorists deny that the list is limited to pleasure and pain. (For further discussion, see the entry on Intrinsic Goodness, the entry on Preferences, and “What Makes Someone's Life Go Best,” Parfit 1984, pp. 493–502.) Adding more things to the list can undermine the Epicurean argument.

For example, we might adopt some version of preferentialism, or the desire fulfillment account, which is the view that it is intrinsically good for us to fulfill one of our desires (assuming that the desire meets various conditions; exactly what these are is controversial—let us put the matter aside), and it is intrinsically bad for us to have a desire that comes to be thwarted. Now, many of my desires may be fulfilled, and many may be thwarted, without my noticing—desire fulfillment need have not experiential upshot. If I want my child to be happy, and she is, my desire is fulfilled, even if she has travelled away so far from me that I cannot interact with her, now or ever again. So preferentialism blocks the Epicurean’s move from premise 1 to 2.

Preferentialism also blocks the move to 7. Epicureans cannot use extrinsic instrumentalism to deny that a person’s death is extrinsically good or bad for her if the things that are intrinsically good or bad for her are not limited to experiences. Preferentialism implies that things may be extrinsically bad for us by virtue of thwarting our desires, regardless of whether this has any experiential upshot. Suppose, for example, that I desire that my child have a happy upbringing, and, for various reasons, it turns out that I am the only one who can make this happen, but I die suddenly, and as a consequence she has a miserable childhood. Arguably, my untimely death would be bad for me, in that it would thwart my desire, even if I die in my sleep, and am never aware of her fate. (The role a person’s experience plays in her being harmed is discussed by several theorists, including Rosenbaum 1986, Nussbaum 2013, Silverstein 2013, and Fischer 2014.)

Now consider some worries about extrinsic instrumentalism, which says that something is extrinsically good or bad for us only if it causes us to have things that are intrinsically good or bad for us. This view overlooks something that Thomas Nagel (1970) noted in his seminal essay “Death,” namely the fact that things may be extrinsically good or bad for us, other things being equal, by virtue of causing us not to have—by virtue of precluding our having—things that are intrinsically good or bad for us. Consider that being rendered unconscious prior to surgery is extrinsically good for a patient who otherwise would endure great suffering when the physicians apply the knife, in that it keeps him from suffering, and not because it causes him to accrue pleasure or some other good. Of course, after waking, the patient might also accrue pleasure or some other good as an indirect result of having been sedated, but in view of the suffering that it averts, being sedated is extrinsically good for him whether he receives that indirect bonus or not. As well, being made unconscious might be extrinsically bad for a person, say when it precedes, not surgery, but rather some joyous occasion he will miss because he is not conscious while it occurs. It is extrinsically bad for him, in this case, because it prevents him from taking joy in the occasion he misses. This remains true whether or not he also accrues some pain or other intrinsic evil as an indirect result of being sedated.

If it is indeed the case that things may be extrinsically good (bad) for us, other things being equal, by virtue of precluding our having evils (goods), we will want to allow for this fact in settling on an adequate understanding of what makes things good or bad for us. Next let us consider how this might be done, and the implications for the harm thesis.

To argue that death may be bad for those who die (even if they do not experience dying), theorists typically draw upon some version of the comparativist view that we are harmed by what makes our lives as wholes worse than they otherwise would be, and benefitted by what makes our lives as wholes better than they otherwise would be (early proponents of this view include Nagel 1970, Quinn 1984, and Feldman 1991). Applying comparativism, we may claim that, in at least some cases, dying at a time makes our lives as wholes worse than they would have been had we not died when we did, roughly because, by cutting our lives short, it deprives us of good life. This suggestion about death needs further development, but first let us explain the comparativist view more clearly.

Note that how well off you are at one time is likely to differ from how well off you are at another time. Your welfare level rises and falls over time. (For a discussion of welfare, see the article on Well-Being.) What determines how well off you are at a time, or during an interval of time, are the things you then accrue that are intrinsically good for you, goods such as pleasure, together with the things you then accrue that are intrinsically bad for you, evils such as pain (using the term ‘evil’ as a synonym for ‘bad’). Accruing the former at a time boosts your welfare level during that time, other things being equal, while accruing the latter lowers your welfare level during that time. Your welfare level during an interval of time will be positive if the goods you then accrue outweigh the evils. It will be 0—neither positive nor negative—if and only if you are capable of accruing goods or evils (unlike, say, a shoe, which is incapable of faring well or ill) but the goods you accrue are exactly offset by the evils and vice versa. The welfare level resulting from the goods and evils you accrue over the course of your life we may call your lifetime welfare level .

Using the notion of a lifetime welfare level, let us formulate an account of what it is for something to be extrinsically good or bad for us. Let us say that something is extrinsically good (bad) for us if and only if, and to the extent that, it is overall good (bad) for us simpliciter , where:

an event is overall good (bad) for us simpliciter if and only if, and to the extent that, it makes our lifetime welfare level higher (lower) than it otherwise would be.

(Why add the term ‘simpliciter’? Read on.) By way of illustration, consider a typical case in which you receive treatment by a dentist. Let us assume that, on this particular occasion, the dentist fills a cavity in one of your teeth, and that, had you not received this treatment, your tooth would have decayed, painfully, for months, until finally you would have sought out proper treatment. So the salient difference between your lifetime welfare level in the situation in which you are treated right away, on one hand, and the lifetime welfare level you would have in the case that you were not treated until much later, on the other, is that, in the latter situation, that level is significantly lower, due to the pain you would incur. Hence, on these assumptions, receiving treatment was overall good for you: the greater that pain would have been, the better for you it was that you were treated.

Note that things that are overall good for you may be a mixed bag—they may bring some pain or other intrinsic evils in their wakes, as well as some intrinsic goods, and the mix may differ from time to time. In some cases, what is overall good for you simpliciter is overall bad for you in a temporally relative sense—overall bad for you during some period of time . And although it is overall bad for you during one period of time, it might be overall good for you during some other period of time. Let us elaborate upon this point briefly. Comparativists can say that:

an event is overall good (bad) for us at some time t if and only if, and to the extent that, it makes our lifetime welfare level higher (lower) at t than it otherwise would be.

Suppose, for example, that, while your tooth’s cavity is being filled, the dentist’s drill causes you pain, and that this is pain you would not have had if you had not sought treatment, and instead watched TV. In that case, your visit to the dentist is overall bad for you during the time your tooth is being repaired. Yet, as emerged earlier, your visit to the dentist is overall good for you simpliciter , insofar as it enables you to reduce the episodes of toothache you would suffer over the course of your life.

Comparativists can accept intrinsic hedonism, but need not. They could, for example, pair comparativism with some version of the preferentialist view (mentioned earlier) that getting what we want—fulfilling one of our desires—is intrinsically good for us, and having our desires thwarted is intrinsically bad for us. Comparativism is neutral on the issue of what counts as the intrinsic goods and evils. Theorists who conclude that things other than pleasure are intrinsically good for us will want to weigh them in when they assess an individual’s welfare level. For example, preferentialists can say that even if accruing pleasure boosts a person’s welfare level so does desire fulfillment.

According to comparativism, a person’s death, whether painful or not, may well be overall bad for her (and hence extrinsically bad for her). To decide whether a person’s death is overall bad for her simpliciter (usually we can drop ‘simpliciter’ without creating confusion) we compare her actual lifetime welfare level to the lifetime welfare level she would have had if she had not died. Suppose, for example, that Hilda died (painlessly) on December 1, 2008 at age 25 and that, had she not died, she would have gone on to prosper for 25 years—her welfare level during that time would have been high—then suffer during her final five years. Her overall welfare level over her final 30 years would have been high, despite the downturn during the last five. Hence her lifetime welfare level had she not died at age 25 is significantly higher than her lifetime welfare level would be upon dying at 25. The former is boosted by the many goods she accrues during her final 30 years, and these goods are absent from her lifetime welfare level as it would be were her life ended at age 25. Hence dying at 25 is overall bad for her.

Importantly, dying at a time is not overall bad for everyone who dies. In fact, it will be overall good in many cases. Imagine that, had she not died at age 25, Hilda would have fared badly for 25 years—her welfare level during that time would have been low. We might also suppose that, during her last five years her welfare level would have been positive. Despite this last stipulation concerning her final five years, her lifetime welfare level had she not died at 25 is significantly lower than her lifetime welfare level would be if she did die at 25, so, on our new assumptions, dying at 25 is overall good for her.

According to comparativism, when a death is bad for us despite not making us accrue intrinsic evils such as pain, it is bad for us because it precludes our coming to have various intrinsic goods which we would have had if we had not died. We might say that death is bad for us because of the goods it deprives us of, and not, or at least not always, because of any intrinsic evils for which it is responsible. This stance is sometimes called deprivationism , and its proponents deprivationists .

As promising as it is, however, there may be grounds for doubting that comparativists can give the harm thesis a deprivationist defense. Let us discuss one such doubt next.

4. The Timing Puzzle

If we cannot identify a time when something makes us worse off than we otherwise would be, we might well doubt that it really was bad for us. We might go so far as to say that what never makes us worse (better) off than we otherwise would be is not bad (good) for us. Call this the Epicurean presumption . Given this presumption, proponents of the harm thesis need an answer to the timing question , which asks: if death is bad for us, at what time (or times) does it make us worse off than we otherwise would have been? In some cases in which things are bad for us, it seems rather easy to identify times when we are made worse off, but in other cases, especially in some cases involving death, it seems more difficult, which may make us worry about the deprivationist defense of the harm thesis. All this needs elaboration.

If having something is intrinsically bad for us, it is bad for us—because it is intrinsically bad for us—while we have it. Moreover, if something is overall bad for us wholly by virtue of making us have things that are intrinsically bad for us, we can say that it makes us worse off while we have those evils. For example, coming to be infected with a flu virus is overall bad for us, and the time it makes us worse off is not when we come to be infected, but rather while we are sick, while we suffer. (If we came to be infected with a virus, and our immune system dealt with it, preventing our becoming sick, the infection would not be bad for us.) This line of thought suggests that a painful death makes us worse off while we die, or rather while dying is painful for us. What about a painless death? Might it also be bad for us? (If so, when are we made worse off?) Perhaps; more on that in a bit.

We can use the term concurrentism for the view that a bad death makes us worse off while we die.

If we reject intrinsic hedonism, we might conclude that death can make us worse off not just while we die but at other times as well. If we adopt some form of preferentialism, we can take the view that things may make us worse off at the time one of our desires is thwarted. Suppose that, as George Pitcher (1984) suggested, a desire that you have now may be thwarted by your death, even though you will die several months from now. In that case, it might be now that your death makes you worse off than you would have been had you not died. Pitcher’s assumptions suggest that priorism is true: death may make you worse off before you die. It may harm you retroactively.

Identifying a time something makes us worse off seems rather easy in cases, such as the examples of infection or thwarted desire, in which it brings us have pain or other things that are intrinsically bad for us. But what about cases in which something is bad for us due to the fact that it precludes our having things that are intrinsically good for us? In cases like this, the victim incurs deprivation harm . But at what time are such persons worse off than they otherwise would be? When, in particular, does dying painlessly make a person worse off?

Is it possible to defend a concurrentist answer to this question about death? Julian Lamont (1998) says we incur deprivation harm at the time some event ensures that we will not retain or attain some good that is otherwise available. Call such an event an ensuring event . Death may itself be an ensuring event, he thought, so death and deprivation harm may occur simultaneously.

But this suggestion appears doubtful. Recall the earlier case in which we come to be infected and only later experience any symptoms. The event of coming to be infected is overall bad for us, but it seems implausible to say that this makes us worse off than we otherwise would be at the time we are infected . Instead, it seems, coming to be infected makes us worse off later, while we are sick. We are unlikely to adopt concurrentism as our story concerning catching the flu, which makes it doubtful as our story concerning deprivation harm.

In cases like catching the flu, it makes sense to say that the offending event is bad for its victim after it occurs—while she is incurring intrinsic evils she otherwise would lack. Perhaps the same is true of deprivation harm. Recall the example, discussed earlier, in which being sedated at time t is bad for a person due to the fact that it deprives her of good things: in this example, it seems, being sedated makes her worse off than she otherwise would be at a time after t —at the time when she would have been enjoying those goods had she not been sedated. Can we extend this story to the deprivation harm for which a victim’s death is responsible? Does a person’s death makes her worse off than she otherwise would be after she dies—during the time when she would have been enjoying the goods of which her death has deprived her, had she not died? Call this stance subsequentism . Proponents of subsequentism include Neil Feit (2002) and Ben Bradley (2004, 2009).

Subsequentism is plausible only if we can make good sense of the welfare level someone occupies while dead, but this may not be possible. There are at least two problems to discuss.

One difficulty is the problem of the subject . Suppose we are terminators rather than anti-terminators (discussed in Section 2.6). Suppose, too, that you die at time t 1 but had you not you would have experienced joy at time t 2 . Time t 2 arrives while you are dead, so that, given the termination thesis, t 2 arrives while you no longer exist. Consider the property, lacks joy . Does it make sense to attribute this (or any other) property to you at t 2 ? Does it make sense to say that some subject has a property at a time when that subject does not exist? If not, it seems difficult to make sense of your having a welfare level then. Epicurus seemed to be thinking along these lines when he wrote that “death is nothing to us, since when we are, death is not, and when death is present, then we are not.” (Echoing Epicurus, Nagel 1970 wrote “So long as a person exists, he has not yet died, and once he has died, he no longer exists; so there seems to be no time when death, if it is a misfortune, can be ascribed to its unfortunate subject.” But if this is the reason we cannot ascribe misfortune to a victim of death then we cannot even ascribe death to any victim.)

It might seem possible to solve the problem of the subject by simply switching sides and becoming anti-terminators, but this will not work. Anti-terminators can say that it is a straightforward matter to attribute the property lacks joy to you at t 2 , since you still exist at t 2 . You are your (joyless) corpse at t 2 . This won’t work because you might die and go out of existence without leaving a corpse, and even if you leave a corpse it might rot away, taking you out of existence, well before time t 2 arrives. Both possibilities are consistent with the fact that, had you not died when you did, at t 1 , you would have experienced joy at t 2 .

Still, there are more promising strategies for solving the problem of the subject. Subsequentists might adopt a view that is sometimes called metaphysical eternalism (defended by Nagel 1970 and Silverstein 1980, among others). On this view, past and future objects are ontologically on a par with present objects. Existing things are spread out in both space and time. Suppose it is possible to refer to anything that is ontologically on a par with present objects. Then, given metaphysical eternalism, we can still refer to Socrates, even though ‘Socrates’ refers to something whose existence is temporally located wholly in the past, and say of him that he is not alive. For similar reasons, perhaps, we can also attribute the property lacks joy to a person, such as Socrates, whose existence is over.

However, even if they can solve the problem of the subject, and make sense of attributing properties to subjects who are dead, subsequentists face another difficulty: it seems confused to speak of how well off a subject is during times when she is dead. Now, it does make sense to attribute the property lacks joy to a corpse, and to a person who has stopped existing. Anti-terminators will add that a person will have this property— lacks joy —while she is a corpse. But it makes no sense to ask how well off a person is while she is a corpse or during some time after she has stopped existing altogether. The concept of faring well or ill does not apply to things like concrete blocks and corpses or to persons while they are corpses. Things that do fare well or ill may pass through periods of time when they have a level of welfare that is equal to 0—during those times they are capable of accruing goods or evils but do neither—but unlike them, bags of concrete are not capable of having any welfare level, not even a level of 0. The same seems true of a corpse. And the same seems true of us during such times as we are no longer alive—times when we have become corpses or when those corpses have turned to dust.

Many theorists who reject subsequentism assume that because death takes a person out of actual existence, the dead are not “there” to be harmed. Palle Yourgrau (2019) rejects this assumption. He combines modal realism (the view that, like the actual world, other possible worlds are concrete objects) with the thesis of transworld identity (one and the same object exists in more than one possible world), and says that although a dead person no longer exists in the actual world, one and the same person is still alive, and exists, in other possible worlds. We may deny that, after a person has died, she is no longer real at all—not “there” to be harmed—because she still exists in other worlds, according to Yourgrau.

Some (Nagel 1970; Silverstein 1980) suggest that death harms us but at no determinate time. This view is criticized by Julian Lamont (1998) on the grounds that it implies that some events take place but at no particular time. But William Grey (1999) counters that Lamont has misunderstood Nagel’s (and Grey’s) indefinitist position, which is that the harm death causes is incurred during a stretch of time that has blurry boundaries (compare: the time of the onset of baldness).

As Grey understands it, indefinitism is correct only if subsequentism, priorism or concurrentism is true (Grey opts for subsequentism), for even a period of time with blurry edges must occur before, after or at the same time as a mortem event (eternalism is an exception since an infinite period has no boundaries to blur).

Suppose we conclude that there just is no (stretch of) time, whether with blurry edges or not, at which we are made worse off than we otherwise would be by a death that precludes our having goods we otherwise would have. Given the Epicurean presumption, we would have to conclude that it is not bad for us to be deprived of such goods by death. But of course we need not accept this conclusion. We can instead reject the Epicurean presumption. Being deprived of goods by death is bad for us, we can say, if, and insofar as, it is overall bad for us simpliciter , and to be overall bad for us simpliciter , there need not be a time at which death makes us worse off than we otherwise would be. There need be no time at which death makes our welfare level lower than it otherwise would be. Death can preclude our enjoying years of pleasant activities, making our lives worse than they would have been had we not died, even if at no time we are worse off than we would be had our lives not been cut short.

Isn’t it still possible to raise a question about timing, namely: if death is overall bad simpliciter for those who are deprived of happy years, at what time is it bad for them? This question does indeed arise, but it is not the timing question we have been asking, and an answer to the one is not an answer to the other. The answer to the new question is this: if true at all, the proposition that death is overall bad for us simpliciter is an eternal, a timeless, truth (Feldman 1991). A timeless truth is a proposition that is true at all times if true at all. That 6 is less than 7 is an example. That the welfare level Harry accrued today is lower than the welfare level Mary accrued today is another example. And so is the proposition that Sam’s death is overall bad for him simpliciter . It amounts to the claim that Sam’s actual lifetime welfare level is lower than the lifetime welfare level Sam would have accrued had he not died. Jens Johansson (2013) coined the term atemporalism for the view that “death is bad for the deceased but not at any time.” (For further discussion of atemporalism see Lamont 1998, Silverstein 2000 and Feit 2002.)

5. Further Reservations Concerning the Harm Theses

Before we move on, let us consider some further objections to the harm thesis and the deprivationist defense of it.

Another worry about the deprivationist defense is that deprivationism appeals to comparativism, and comparativism says that an event or state of affairs harms me, in that it is bad for me, when my life would have been better for me, my lifetime welfare higher, had that that event not occurred. However, there seem to be exceptions.

I am not harmed, it seems, by failing to be brilliant, or rich and beautiful. But compare my life as it is, with my unimpressive IQ, income and looks, to my life as it would be were I brilliant or rich or beautiful: the former is considerably worse than the latter. My not being a genius (or rich and so forth) precludes my coming to have many goods. It makes my life worse than it otherwise would be, so comparativism seems to imply that not being a genius is bad for me. Suppose you have the winning Mega Millions jacpot ticket, and you decide to give it to me. Before you hand it over, you have a stroke and die. Has your death harmed me?

Epicureans might renew their attack on the harm thesis by exploiting examples like these. The examples appear to show that things can have enormous negative value for me without harming me. Similarly, Epicureans might insist, the preclusion of goods by death is harmless: cut short, my life is worse than it would be were I not to die, but this comparative difference does not show that I am harmed.

It seems that the comparative criteria work well when we evaluate losses, such as the loss of my arms, and also when we evaluate some lacks, such as the inability to see or to feel pleasure. But, arguably, the criteria have worrisome implications when we evaluate certain other lacks, such as my lack of genius. It is relatively clear that a person is harmed by the inability to see but less clear that he is harmed by the lack of genius. Why is that?

Nagel seems inclined to think that the solution is to “set some limits on how possible a possibility must be for its nonrealization to be a misfortune,” but also mentions that we might not regard, as a misfortune, “any limitation, like mortality, that is normal to the species.” Draper suggests that harmless preclusion involves cases in which the events or states of affairs that would be good for us if they held are highly improbable (Draper 1999). Another explanation might focus on the relative importance of having some goods rather than others. In some moods, we may consider it harmful to be deprived of a good just when it is important for us to have it. The troublesome lacks we have been discussing might be lacks of goods it is unimportant to have; such lacks would not be harmful even though we would be better off without them. (But if, against all odds, a person is a genius, or rich, or beautiful, would taking these away be harmless to her?)

5.2 The Symmetry Argument

Lucretius, a follower of Epicurus, extended Epicurus’s case against the harm thesis. The argument he developed involved a thought experiment:

Look back at time … before our birth. In this way Nature holds before our eyes the mirror of our future after death. Is this so grim, so gloomy? (Lucretius 1951)

According to his symmetry argument, it is irrational to object to death, assuming it ends our existence, since we do not find it objectionable that we failed to exist prior to being alive, and the way things were for us while not existing then is just like the way things will be for us after death ends our existence; our pre-vital nonexistence and our posthumous nonexistence are symmetrical, alike in all relevant respects, so that any objection to the one would apply to the other.

Lucretius’s argument admits of more than one interpretation, depending on whether it is supposed to address death understood as dying or as being dead (or both).

On one interpretation, the argument is this: the ending of life is not bad, since the only thing we could hold against it is the fact that it is followed by our nonexistence, yet the latter is not objectionable, as is shown by the fact that we do not object to our nonexistence before birth. So understood, the symmetry argument is weak. It would have some force for someone who thought initially that death puts us into a state or condition that is ghastly, perhaps painful, but that need not be our complaint. Instead, our complaint might be that death precludes our having more good life. Notice that the mirror image of death is birth (or, more precisely, becoming alive), and the two affect us in very different ways: birth makes life possible; if a life ends up being good for us, birth starts a good thing going. Death makes further life impossible; it brings a good thing to a close.

Perhaps Lucretius only meant to argue that being dead is not bad, since the only thing we could hold against it is our nonexistence, which is not really objectionable, as witness our attitude about pre-vital nonexistence. So interpreted, there is a kernel of truth in Lucretius’s argument. Truly, our pre-vital nonexistence does not concern us much. But perhaps that is because our pre-vital nonexistence is followed by our existence. Perhaps we would not worry overly about our post-vital nonexistence if it, too, were followed by our existence. If we could move in and out of existence, say with the help of futuristic machines that could dismantle us, then rebuild us, molecule by molecule, after a period of nonexistence, we would not be overly upset about the intervening gaps, and, rather like hibernating bears, we might enjoy taking occasional breaks from life while the world gets more interesting. But undergoing temporary nonexistence is not the same as undergoing permanent nonexistence. What is upsetting might be the permanence of post-vital nonexistence—not nonexistence per se.

There is another way to use considerations of symmetry against the harm thesis: we want to die later, or not at all, because it is a way of extending life, but this attitude is irrational, Lucretius might say, since we do not want to be born earlier (we do not want to have always existed), which is also a way to extend life. As this argument suggests, we are more concerned about the indefinite continuation of our lives than about their indefinite extension . (Be careful when you rub the magic lamp: if you wish that your life be extended, the genie might make you older!) A life can be extended by adding to its future \(or\) to its past. Some of us might welcome the prospect of having lived a life stretching indefinitely into the past, given fortuitous circumstances. But we would prefer a life stretching indefinitely into the future.

Is it irrational to want future life more than past life? No; it is not surprising to find ourselves with no desire to extend life into the past, since the structure of the world permits life extension only into the future, and that is good enough. But what if life extension were possible in either direction? Would we still be indifferent about a lengthier past? And should our attitude about future life match our attitude about past life?

Our attitude about future life should match our attitude about past life if our interests and attitudes are limited in certain ways. If quantity of life is the only concern, a preference for future life is irrational. Similarly, the preference is irrational if our only concern is to maximize how much pleasure we experience over the course of our lives without regard to its temporal distribution. But our attitude is not that of the life- or pleasure-gourmand.

According to Parfit, we have a far-reaching bias extending to goods in general: we prefer that any good things, not just pleasures, be in our future, and that bad things, if they happen at all, be in our past. He argues that if we take this extensive bias for granted, and assume that, because of it, it is better for us to have goods in the future than in the past, we can explain why it is rational to deplore death more than we do our not having always existed: the former, not the latter, deprives us of good things in the future (he need not say that it is because it is in the past that we worry about the life-limiting event at the beginning of our lives less than the life-limiting event at the end). This preference for future goods is unfortunate, however, according to Parfit. If cultivated, the temporal insensitivity of the life- or pleasure-gourmand could lower our sensitivity to death: towards the end of life, we would find it unsettling that our supply of pleasures cannot be increased in the future, but we would be comforted by the pleasures we have accumulated.

Whether or not we have the extensive bias described by Parfit, it is true that the accumulation of life and pleasure, and the passive contemplation thereof, are not our only interests. We also have active, forward–looking goals and concerns. Engaging in such pursuits has its own value; for many of us, these pursuits, and not passive interests, are central to our ‘identities’, our fundamental values and commitments. However, we cannot make and pursue plans for our past. We must project our plans (our self–realization) into the future, which explains our forward bias. (We could have been devising and pursuing plans in the past, but these plans will not be extensions of our present concerns.) It is not irrational to prefer that our lives be extended into the future rather than the past, if for no other reason than this: only the former makes our existing forward-looking pursuits possible. It is not irrational to prefer not to be at the end of our lives, unable to shape them further, and limited to reminiscing about days gone by. As Frances Kamm (1998, 2021) emphasizes, we do not want our lives to be all over with.

Nevertheless, it does not follow that we should be indifferent about the extent of our pasts. Being in the grip of forward-looking pursuits is important, but we have passive interests as well, which make a more extensive past preferable. Moreover, having been devising and pursuing plans in the past is worthwhile. If fated to die tomorrow, most of us would prefer to have a thousand years of glory behind us rather than fifty. We want to have lived well.

In “Death” Thomas Nagel offered a response to Lucretius that has been widely discussed. It is entirely reasonable not to want to come into existence earlier even though we want to live longer, Nagel said, because it is metaphysically impossible for a person to have come into existence significantly earlier than she did, even though it is possible for a person to have existed longer than she actually did. However, his response hinges on questionable assumptions about the essential features of people’s origins, as Nagel acknowledges (in footnote 3 of the reprint of “Death” in his collection Mortal Questions .) Imagine someone who originated from a zygote that had been frozen for a very long time. Mightn't that zygote have been frozen for a brief time instead? Wouldn’t that be a way for this person to have come into existence far earlier than she did?

According to Frederik Kaufman (2016, p. 63), this thought experiment (perhaps tweaked a bit) might provide a way in which a human organism could have come into existence far earlier than she did, but it does not provide a way in which a person could have come into existence far earlier. “Persons (properly understood) cannot exist earlier than they do.” He bases this view on the assumption—challenged by animalists but defended by Parfit—that persons are objects (distinct from organisms) with psychological persistence conditions, chief among which is psychological continuity, together with the assumption that “if mental continuity is constitutive of personal identity, then when a particular consciousness emerges is essential to that person.”

6. Posthumous Harm

According to Aristotle,

a dead man is popularly believed to be capable of having both good and ill fortune—honour and dishonour and prosperity and the loss of it among his children and descendants generally—in exactly the same way as if he were alive but unaware or unobservant of what was happening ( Nicomachean Ethics 1.10)

The belief Aristotle reported in this passage is that a person may be benefitted or harmed by things that happen while she is dead. Nagel (1970, p. 66) agrees; drawing upon his indefinitist approach he says that “a man's life includes much that does not take place within the boundaries … of his life” and that “there is a simple account of what is wrong with breaking a deathbed promise. It is an injury to the dead man.” If something that occurs while a person is dead is bad for her, let us say that it is responsible for posthumous harm . (But this way of speaking is potentially misleading, as theorists who argue that posthumous events may harm us need not assume that the victims are worse off while they are dead.) Is there such a thing as posthumous harm?

The main reason to doubt the possibility of posthumous harm is the assumption that it presupposes the (dubious) possibility of backwards causation. As Ernest Partridge wrote, “after death no events can alter a moment of a person's life” (1981, p. 248). The dead may be wronged, Partridge thought, but being wronged is not a kind of harm. (The claim that a person may be wronged by actions others take after she is dead is itself quite controversial. Like Partridge, some theorists think that people may be wronged but not harmed posthumously. Priorists typically argue that both are possible, while other, theorists, such as J.S. Taylor 2012, argue that neither is possible.)

We might also question the possibility of posthumous harm by drawing on the assumption (made by Mark Bernstein 1998, p. 19, and Walter Glannon 2001, p. 138, among others) that something is intrinsically good or bad for a person only if it reduces to her intrinsic, non-relational properties. For simplicity, we can focus on one version of this view, namely intrinsic hedonism. Suppose we assume that a person is harmed only by what is intrinsically or extrinsically bad for her, that intrinsic hedonism is the correct account of intrinsic harm and comparativism is the correct account of extrinsic harm, and also that the termination thesis (people do not exist while dead) is true. On these assumptions, it is impossible for an event that occurs after a person dies to be bad for her. It cannot be bad for her in itself and it cannot be overall bad for her either. To be overall bad for a person, a posthumous event would have to make her have fewer goods or more evils or both than she would have had if that event had not occurred. But nothing that happens after a person dies and ceases to exist has any bearing on the amounts of pleasure or pain in her life. Nothing that occurs after she ceases to exist modifies any of her intrinsic properties.

Although the above assumptions rule out the possibility of posthumous harm, they are entirely consistent, we have seen, with the possibility of mortal harm, the possibility that people are harmed by dying. (We might think otherwise if, as some theorists do, we assume that a person no longer exists at the time she dies. Joel Feinberg 1984, following Barbara Levenbook 1984, defined death as “the first moment of the subject’s nonexistence,” which makes death something that occurs after a person has ceased to exist, and suggests that by ruling out the possibility that a person is harmed by things that occur after she ceases to exist we rule out the possibility of mortal harm.)

Those who defend the possibility of posthumous harm deny that it involves backwards causation. But how could posthumous events affect people if not via backwards causation?

Some theorists say that posthumous harm occurs when posthumous events change the value of a person’s life for the worse. Dorothy Grover (1989) suggests that posthumous events may affect the “quality” of a person's life, say by changing the value of her accomplishments. David Velleman (1991) argues along similar lines, claiming that later events may affect the meaning of earlier events, and the latter bears on the value of a person’s life.

Some theorists (for example, Pitcher 1984, Feinberg 1984, Luper 2004 and 2012, and Scarre 2013) appeal to preferentialism to explain the possibility of posthumous harm. We noted earlier that preferentialists can defend the idea that some events harm their victims retroactively, and that death is such an event. Preferentialists can take a similar stance on posthumous events, assuming that things that happen after we die may determine whether desires we have while alive are fulfilled or thwarted.

According to Pitcher, posthumous events harm us by being responsible for truths that thwart our desires. For example, being slandered while I am dead makes it true that my reputation is to be damaged, and this harms me at all and only those times when I desire that my reputation be untarnished. It is while I am alive that I care about my reputation’s always being intact, and it is while I am alive that my well-being is brought lower by posthumous slander. Similarly, my desire that my child have a happy upbringing even if I am not there to provide it will be thwarted if, after I die, she catches some devastating illness. The event that makes it true that my child will be miserable occurs after I am gone, but this truth thwarts my desire about my child now, so it is now that I am worse off. The posthumous events themselves harm me only indirectly; directly I am harmed by their making things true that bear on my interests.

However, the desire-based case for the possibility of posthumous harm remains controversial. It will be rejected by theorists who doubt that people are harmed by events that do not modify their intrinsic features, and by theorists who think that it hinges on the possibility of backwards causation, of course. Velleman (1991, p. 339) rejects the desire-based case on the grounds that “we think of a person's current well-being as a fact intrinsic to the present, not as a relation that he currently bears to his future.” Some theorists echo a criticism that was offered by Partridge (1981, p. 246). Consider an event that thwarts one of a person's desires. To harm her by virtue of thwarting that desire, Partridge claims, the event must occur while she still has that desire , while she still cares about whether it is fulfilled, but she and her desire are gone by the time a posthumous event occurs. For some theorists (Vorobej, 1998, Suits 2001), the point is that we have no reason to care whether our desires are fulfilled by events that occur once we no longer have those desires, and we no longer have desires after we die. Parfit resisted this charge by noting that while some of our desires are conditional on their own persistence (we want them fulfilled at a time only on condition that we will still have them at that time), others are not.

7. Never Dying

Is it always a misfortune for us to die? Would never dying instead be bad for us? In a pair of influential essays, Thomas Nagel defends an affirmative answer to the first question, while Bernard Williams defends an affirmative answer to the second.

In “Death” (and in The View From Nowhere , p. 224) Nagel argues that no matter when it happens, dying is bad for those who die. He bases this view on the claim that “life is worth living even when the bad elements of experience are plentiful and the good ones too meager to outweigh the bad ones on their own. The additional positive weight is supplied by experience itself, rather than by any of its contents.” (1970, p. 60) Nagel’s view appears to be that it is intrinsically good for us to experience things, and that this good is great enough to outweigh any evils that accompany it. Hence a person’s welfare level is positive at any time when she is experiencing things, and no matter how much misery continued existence will bring her, it is overall good for her to live longer, assuming that she continues to experience things. (Nagel does not argue that being deprived of continued life would be a misfortune if that life were entirely devoid of experience.)

Nagel considers objections to his view towards the end of his essay. One might argue, Nagel points out (as noted earlier), that mortality is not a misfortune on the grounds that the nonrealization of remote possibilities (like being immortal) is not harmful, or on the grounds that limitations that are normal to the species (like mortality) are not harmful. He responds that the normality and inevitableness of death “do not imply that it would not be good to live longer.” Whenever death comes, it would have been good to live longer, so it is bad for us that we will not: “if there is no limit to the amount of life that it would be good to have, then it may be that a bad end is in store for us all.” (1970, p. 69)

Nagel’s case for saying that death is always bad for those who die rests on his claim that the goodness of experiencing outweighs any accompanying evils. However, the latter is implausible, as is evident to anyone who would rather be sedated into unconsciousness than undergo the suffering she would otherwise experience during surgery. Under such circumstances, sedation is overall good for us, despite the fact that (indeed: because) it stops us from experiencing things for a time. And once this is acknowledged, it seems reasonable to add that, under certain circumstances, dying would be overall good for us, and hence not bad for us after all. It would be overall good for us if the further life we otherwise would have would bring us great evils, such as suffering, that are not offset by goods.

Bernard Williams (and others, such as Shelly Kagan 2012) takes the view that it would be bad to live forever, even under the best of circumstances. In his influential essay “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality,” Williams argues that although the deaths of some persons is a misfortune for them, never dying would be intolerable. In arguing for these views, Williams draws upon the notion of a categorical desire, which we can clarify as follows.

Consider a woman who wants to die. She might still take the view that if she is to live on, then she should be well fed and clothed. She wants food and clothing on condition she remain alive. In this sense her desires (for food and clothes) are conditional on her remaining alive, and, in being conditional on her living on, they do not give her reason to live. Contrast a father who desires that his beloved daughter have a good start in life. His desire is not conditional on his remaining alive. In this sense, it is, Williams says, categorical. In fact, his desire gives him reason to live, because he can see to her well-being if he survives. Williams thinks that our categorical desires are not only what motivate us to live on, they give meaning to our lives, and are important elements of our characters. He also thinks that it is by virtue of the fact that we will retain the same character until a later time that it is clear to us that we will be the same person until then.

The bearing on death, according to Williams, is, first, that we have good reason to condemn a death that is premature in the sense that it thwarts our categorical desires. Second, mortality is good, for if we live long enough, eventually we will lose our categorical desires. At that point we will no longer be motivated to live on, and oppressive boredom will set in. When we contemplate this fate from our vantage point in the present, we find it that it is not even clear to us that these bored seniors are us.

If we could find a way to extend our lives indefinitely, yet avoid the ravages of senescence, and remain healthy and mentally competent, couldn’t we avoid becoming jaded with life by gradually varying our interests over time, adding to and perhaps replacing some of our categorical desires, again and again? Several theorists including Nagel (1986, p. 224, n. 3), Glover (1977, p. 57), and Fischer (1994), have argued that the lives of superseniors need not become dull and tedious. Williams’s view is that it is not possible to make eternal life desirable (which claim is not identical to the claim that eternal life would inevitably be bad for us). Varying my categorical desires will not work, because, to be desirable, the endless life I design for myself must meet two conditions: (1) “it should clearly be me who lives forever,” and (2) “the state in which I survive should be one that, to me looking forward, will be adequately related, in the life it presents, to those aims I now have in wanting to survive at all.” (1973, p. 83) If I replace my categorical desires, I fall afoul of at least one of these conditions. Life under the future desires is detached from life under my current categorical desires. Moreover, the desires I give myself in the future will be elements of a character that is very different from my current character; replacing my current character with an entirely different one later in life makes it far less clear, Williams appears to think, that the individual living that later life is me. “The degree of identification needed with the later life … is absolutely minimal.” (1973, p. 85)

Williams’s claim that immortality cannot be made desirable remains controversial. It is not obvious that eternal life is undesirable if it involves changing our categorical desires and characters (insofar as our characters are defined by the desires). Nor is it obvious that such changes must violate Williams’s two conditions for the desirability of continued life. Williams seems to think that the individual who is changed in this way will not clearly be the same person as before, but he stops short of saying that it clearly will not be the same person (indeed, he defends a bodily continuity criterion for identity in “The Self and the Future,” pp. 46–63, so he presumably thinks that a person does survive changes of desires and character). Concerning Williams’s second condition, his view is that if we replace our characters and desires, “there is nothing left by which he can judge” whether future life is desirable (1093, p. 85). Yet it seems reasonable to take the view now that it would be good for me to develop and fulfil desires in the future—desires I now lack. Many of us would welcome the prospect of gradually transforming our interests and projects over time. The gradual, continuous transformation of our desires and projects does not end our lives, or existence. It is distinct from, and preferable to, annihilation. If we could live endlessly, the stages of our lives would display reduced connectedness, yet remain continuous, which is a property that is important in the kind of survival most of us prize. Even after drinking from the fountain of eternal youth, we would tend to focus on relatively short stretches of our indefinitely extensive lives, being animated by the specific projects and relationships we have then. However, sometimes we would turn our attention to long stretches of life, and then, prizing continuity, we might well phase in new and worthwhile undertakings that build upon, and do not wholly replace, the old. (For further discussion of the desirability of eternal life, see Overall 2003, Bortolotti 2009, Smuts 2011, Luper 2012b, Altshuler 2016, Buben 2016, Cholbi 2016, and Fischer 2019.)

Even if death is usually bad for those of us who die, perhaps it need not be bad for us, if we prepare ourselves suitably. This might be possible if some form of preferentialism is true, and if, by altering our desires, we could cease to have any interests that dying would impair. For then we might be able to thanatize our desires, in this sense: we might abandon all desires that death might thwart. Among these are desires we can satisfy only if we live on for a few days, but also desires we cannot possibly satisfy within the span of a normal lifetime, and the desire for immortality itself. Instead of desiring that some project of mine succeed, which is a desire that might be thwarted by my death, I might instead adopt a conditionalized version of this desire, namely: should I live on, let my project succeed. If all goes well, thanatizing would insulate us from harm from death by leaving us with no interests with which dying interferes.

Unfortunately, this strategy will backfire. The main problem is that death can interfere with desire fulfillment not just by falsifying the objects of our desires but also by precluding our having desires (Luper 2013). So even if we resolve, from now on, to limit ourselves to desires whose objects cannot be falsified by death, we are still vulnerable to the harm death will do us if it precludes our having and fulfilling desires. Hence thanatizing would force us to avoid having any desires whose fulfillment would have benefitted us, and to deny ourselves such desires would be as bad for us as the harm we are trying to avoid.

However, the core idea of adapting our desires is useful, if not taken to an extreme. It is prudent to avoid taking on goals we cannot possibly attain, and hence prudent to eschew projects that cannot possibly be completed during the course of a normal lifetime.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Partridge, E., 1981. “ Posthumous Interest and Posthumous Respect ,” Ethics 91, no. 2. Reprint made available by the author.

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Tony Robbins: How To Invest Like a Multibillionaire

T ony Robbins is an expert on  building wealth . Throughout his career, he’s worked with some of the most financially successful people on the planet, including Paul Tudor Jones and Richard Branson.

But what can these multibillionaires teach the average person about investing? 

Read More: Tony Robbins: 10 Passive Income Ideas To Build Your Fortune

Find Out: 5 Genius Things All Wealthy People Do With Their Money

According to Robbins, there’s one philosophy that incredibly wealthy investors share. It’s a strategy called asymmetrical risk-reward, and you may be able to benefit from using it too .

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Asymmetrical Risk-Reward

In a video on Robbins’ website , he says most people who invest use the wrong risk-reward profile. They put most of their money into safe growth assets that may rise 10% to 20% in a good year. In other words, they risk a lot to make a little.

Asymmetrical investing flips that. It’s a strategy that focuses on risking a little to make a lot. Robbins says every multibillionaire he’s worked with uses asymmetrical investing and credits it as one of the main reasons they’ve become so wealthy.

The 5-to-1 Investment Strategy

Paul Tudor Jones is worth upward of $8 billion and has a firm that manages $13 billion in assets. His famous investment approach is the 5-to-1 strategy. It’s a great teaching point for asymmetrical investing.

The philosophy boils down to this: For every $1 Jones risks, he expects to earn $5. This means Jones can be wrong about his investment thesis 4 times out of 5 and still break even.

The 5-to-1 approach impacts how Jones approaches investing in two key ways. He buys only assets that he believes have significant room to increase in value, and he doesn’t sell them until they reach his target.

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A Real-World Example of Successful Asymmetrical Investing

Risking a little to earn a lot sounds great in theory, but you’re probably wondering whether it’s realistic. Although these investment opportunities are harder to find, there are plenty of real-world examples that show their potential.

David Tepper’s story is a great illustration of this. He’s worth about $20 billion and owns the NFL’s Carolina Panthers. 

Tepper’s biggest trade happened during the 2008 banking crisis. He invested heavily in Bank of America stock at a time when it looked like the bank could fail. Tepper bet that the U.S. government would not let that happen, and he was right. 

When the government approved a bailout for the banks, Bank of America’s stock price soared, and Tepper’s firm made $7 billion. He risked relatively little and made a fortune.

How To Start Investing Asymmetrically

Robbins says investing in asymmetric opportunities is the secret to getting wealthy. But he doesn’t offer advice for getting started in the video. And these opportunities are hard to find. If you could easily identify them by looking for a shared characteristic, everyone would do it. 

So how do you actually embrace this philosophy and begin investing like a multibillionaire? Here are a few tips.

Set Cash Aside

Asymmetric opportunities are rare. When you identify one, you have to be prepared to invest in it. The easiest way to ensure that is by setting aside some cash to use for these opportunities. You could put the funds in a  high-yield savings account to earn interest while you wait.

Let Your Winners Run

The next key to a successful asymmetric investing strategy is holding on to your winners long term. It takes time to turn $1 into $5, as no asset increases its value in a straight line. You may need to sit through multiple drawdowns before reaching your target.

Know What Invalidates Your Thesis

Finally, make sure that you have a concrete thesis for any asymmetric bet you place. This is the reason you believe the asset you’re purchasing has the potential to significantly increase in price.

For example, people who bought Tesla stock early thought the company could become a major player in the growing electric vehicle space. If the company pivoted away from EVs, that thesis would be invalidated, and it would probably be time to sell the stock.

You need to know when your thesis is invalidated so you know when to cut your losers.

Robbins’ main point is that multibillionaires make financial bets only when the odds are heavily in their favor. They don’t necessarily pick stocks correctly more consistently than the average investor. They instead follow an approach that lets them make money while being wrong more often. Still, this is just one angle to consider as you work to increase your wealth.

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Arne Slot: the overachiever and ‘good guy’ who can spark a revolution

Frontrunner to take charge at Liverpool did not make a big impression as a player but has resemblances to Jürgen Klopp

L iverpool’s move for the Feyenoord coach, Arne Slot, has been described by Ajax fans as “the best news of the year”. Troubled Ajax have been blown away this season, losing 4-0 at home and 6-0 away against their arch-rivals .

So superior were Feyenoord in every area – tactics, intensity, power, unity, intelligence – that it could have been worse for Ajax. Only in their finishing might Feyenoord have done better.

Their growth over the past three seasons bears the signature of Slot, who came to the club in 2021. When he arrived, Feyenoord were in a situation similar to Ajax’s now: they had finished fifth (Ajax’s position), had no money or remaining prestige and had embarrassed themselves in the Europa League, losing twice to Austria’s Wolfsberger. Players were not fit, there was uncertainty about the style of play, and their captain and top scorer Steven Berghuis had left (for Ajax). In short, there was no real hope.

Slot has changed everything. In his first season, with a mix of revitalised, loaned and cheap players, Feyenoord reached the Europa Conference League final before losing narrowly to Roma .

That campaign marked the start of Orkun Kökcü’s transformation, perhaps the best example of Slot’s impact. The Turkey international had never fulfilled his talent but realised if he wanted to survive in Slot’s high-speed game he had to become fitter, better and more versatile. Kökcü lifted the Eredivisie trophy in Slot’s second season, as captain, and within a month his transfer to Benfica had earned Feyenoord a record fee of €25m plus add-ons.

This season, Feyenoord could end with more points than when taking that title and have won the KNVB Cup. Barring an improbable set of results they will finish second behind PSV and qualify again for the Champions League. They provide more players for the Netherlands (Mats Wieffer, Quinten Timber, Quilindschy Hartman, Lutsharel Geertruida) than any other club.

Slot is an overachiever who can spark a revolution. In many respects he resembles Jürgen Klopp. He is intelligent, relies on attacking football and high pressing, is didactically strong, surrounds himself with skilled assistants, brings wit into his media dealings and is searingly ambitious. His voice in transfer politics has grown at Feyenoord.

Just like Klopp, Slot did not make a big impression as a player. He was a slow, old-fashioned No 10 who played at mediocre clubs (PEC Zwolle, NAC Breda and Sparta Rotterdam).

Slot grew up in Bergentheim, a small village in the Netherlands’ so-called Bible belt. Ali Boussaboun, a former teammate at NAC, says: “I never heard him swear, never heard him say goddamn. In that self-control I could already see a coach.”

The “good guy” from the small village was toughened at NAC most notably by Henk ten Cate, a streetwise former assistant coach at Barcelona and Chelsea. “Ten Cate demanded more aggressiveness,” Boussaboun says. “Arne had to stretch his limits to the maximum at NAC and even then he did not always play.”

After Slot retired as a player in 2013, he considered studying but started a company selling captain’s armbands with his brother Jakko while working as a youth coach at PEC. The coaching grew on him, which is perhaps no coincidence. From the age of five he had spent Saturdays listening in changing rooms to how his father, Arend, a school teacher, instructed the amateur teams he coached.

Slot, a perfectionist and control freak, has built an impressive football media library of documentation and images of “interesting things”. He constantly tries to widen his horizons, even by watching games at a local basketball club.

Everybody with an interest in football who visits Slot can’t wait for the coach to open his laptop to “just briefly” show a new discovery. At which point he can easily go on for an hour or so about the places Manchester City send in the most crosses, the way teams coached by Jorge Sampaoli put pressure on their opponents or Napoli’s buildup play.

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AZ gave Slot his first chance as a head coach, in 2019, and after impressive attacking wins at Feyenoord (3-0), PSV (4-0) and Ajax (2-0) comparisons were drawn to Louis van Gaal. AZ finished joint top with Ajax under Slot in the season cut short by Covid.

He has said of his philosophy: “I want as many good football players as possible in the team and I want to make them work as hard as possible. I believe that when we work to perfect our habits every day, we have more chance to cut out luck.”

That his teams are almost always a joy to watch is important to Slot. During press conferences he sometimes asks whether someone has watched Manchester City or Liverpool the day before. “There are two people who have really enriched football in recent decades, who have never disappointed me,” he said two years ago. “Those are Lionel Messi and Pep Guardiola.

“Messi has everything. Guardiola’s teams always play good, dominant, well-thought-out football. Then of course you have Jürgen Klopp. Manchester City-Liverpool for me is the ultimate game.”

His idolisation of the way Guardiola lets his teams play provoked José Mourinho to such an extent that he snapped at Slot last April after Roma had beaten Feyenoord in the Europa League: “You should watch Roma instead of City or Napoli.”

Mourinho later said Slot was “a great coach” and Marco van Basten, the Dutch legend and former Netherlands and Ajax coach agrees. “I’ve spoken to him a few times and what he does and how he sees the game is very impressive,” he said on the Dutch football talkshow Rondo.

“He gets along very well with the group of players, has excellent tactical skills, can explain things well and is calm and intelligent. I think he can go to any club, even the very difficult clubs, because he is so intelligent.”

Van Basten sees no reason for Slot to fear failure. “If you get AZ and Feyenoord to play [good] football, you will also get the big clubs to play [good] football. I think it would only become easier for him because you have better players who understand what you want sooner. They are often also more stubborn players, but I think Slot is smart enough to manage that.”

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'A rip the band-aid off quarter': Here's what Wall Street expects from Tesla earnings amid an epic stock skid

• Tesla is set to report first-quarter earnings results after the market close on Tuesday.
• The earnings report comes amid a sharp stock decline for Tesla, with shares down 43% year to date.
• Detailed below is what four Wall Street firms expect from Tesla's upcoming earnings report.

Tesla has a lot to prove when it reports its first-quarter earnings results after the market close on Tuesday.

The company has been hammered by a barrage of negative news over the past month.

From a big first-quarter delivery miss , to a recall of 4,000 Cybertrucks , to a potential big shift away from a low-cost Model 2 toward a robo-taxi, Tesla CEO Elon Musk will have to calm the nerve of investors who have experienced painful volatility in recent weeks.

Tesla stock hit a new 52-week low on Monday at $138.80 . The stock is down 43% year to date and off 66% from its record high, reached in November 2021.

Here's what Wall Street expects from Tesla when it reports its first-quarter earnings results on Tuesday.

Barclays: 'Facing an investment thesis pivot'

Barclays said in a note last week it expected Tesla's earnings call to be a negative catalyst for the stock as investors came to terms with the company's potential strategic redirection away from a low-cost Model 2.

"Facing an investment thesis pivot and a sea of uncertainty, this Tesla call is extra highly anticipated," a Barclays analyst, Dan Levy, said. "Expect negative catalyst."

Levy said he thought Tesla's closely watched first-quarter gross margins would be below consensus estimates on Wall Street.

"Moreover, we expect little commentary from Tesla to dissuade investors that near-term fundamentals remain weak," Levy said. "FCF may be negative, marking the first quarter since 1Q20 of negative FCF. There could be some shock factor to this result."

Finally, Levy said that while investor questions on the call would be largely focused on Tesla's long-term strategy, "these questions may be unanswered."

Barclays rates Tesla at "neutral," with a $180 price target.

Bank of America: 'Results matter, but growth factors may matter more'

Bank of America said Tesla's headwinds were well known and likely fully reflected in the stock price. That will make the company's commentary about the state of electric-vehicle demand and its growth plans all the more important.

That could set the stock up for a positive price reaction, a recent note from the bank said.

"Despite near term pressures, the unveiling of future growth drives has the potential to support the stock," Bank of America said. "Results matter, but growth factors may matter more."

While the bank doesn't expect Tesla to make any big product announcements during its earnings call, it could provide some hints on the highly anticipated robo-taxi event scheduled for August 8. Tesla could also reiterate its intention to launch a low-cost Model 2 in 2025 or 2026, which would likely be met with a positive price reaction in the stock.

Bank of America rates Tesla at "neutral," with a $220 price target.

Wedbush: 'A rip the band-aid off quarter'

The Wedbush analyst Dan Ives said Tesla's upcoming earnings report was "a moment of truth" for the company, according to a recent note.

Ives said the environment for Tesla was reminiscent of the challenges and uncertainty the company faced in 2015, 2018, and 2020, but it could result in a loss of long-term shareholders.

"This time is clearly a bit different as for the first time many long time Tesla believers are giving up on the story and throwing in the white towel," Ives said.

It's crucial, Ives said, for Musk to confirm that a low-cost Model 2 is still on the company's product road map. He added that first-quarter results would likely take a back seat to any updates on the company's long-term vision.

"While we and the Street are expecting a rip the band-aid off quarter and a softer outlook, Musk needs to do 5 things on the conference call to start to change the narrative in the Tesla story," Ives said. "If Musk is flippant again and there is no adult in the room on this conference call with no answers then darker days are ahead."

You can read more about those five things Ives said Tesla must do on the earnings call here .

Wedbush rates Tesla at "outperform," with a $300 price target.

JPMorgan: '>10% global layoff undermines hypergrowth narrative'

Tesla's recent layoffs suggest the company's long-term growth prospects are dwindling, a recent note from JPMorgan said.

The bank said: ">10% global layoff undermines hypergrowth narrative and should further dispel notion big 1Q delivery miss was somehow supply-driven." 

Instead, Tesla's big first-quarter delivery miss was likely driven by a concerning decline in demand for electric vehicles, the note said.

And the company's premium valuation is at substantial risk if growth is stuttering.

"Despite Tesla shares falling -61% from the all-time high reached in November 2021, its market capitalization is still equivalent to the combined $593 billion valuation of the world's two largest automakers, Toyota and Volkswagen, plus General Motors and Ford, despite those automakers collectively delivering over 30 million vehicles in 2023 vs. Tesla less than 2 million," JPMorgan said. "Clearly, valuation remains extremely demanding."

JPMorgan rates Tesla at "underweight," with a $115 price target.

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University protests

Trump's hush money trial

April 25, 2024 - US university protests

By Elise Hammond, Chandelis Duster, Kathleen Magramo, Elizabeth Wolfe, Aya Elamroussi, Lauren Mascarenhas and Tori B. Powell, CNN

At least two professors detained during Emory University protests

From CNN's Nick Valencia

A CNN crew witnessed at least two professors detained by Atlanta police, including Emory University economics professor Caroline Fohlin and Noëlle McAfee, chair of the philosophy department.

CNN filmed video of women being detained. During her interaction with police, Professor Fohlin could be heard expressing concern about the violent arrests and use of force by police against individuals she identified as students. 

CAIR condemns “use of force and arrests” at Emory University

From CNN's Chandelis Duster, Devon Sayers and Nick Valencia

The Council on American-Islamic Relations chapter in Georgia on Thursday condemned the “use of force and arrests” by police officers against protesters at Emory University in Atlanta.

“Protesters shared a day of cultural learning and community despite which Emory deployed excessive use of force, tear gas, and rubber bullets,” the organization said in a statement. “Emory University and APD fully bear responsibility for the violence we are seeing at the Emory campus right now. Students and protesters must be allowed their full constitutional rights.”

Protesters were arrested on the campus of Emory University after an encampment was formed in the university quad area Thursday morning.

Video from the scene showed law enforcement officers wrangling protesters to the ground and forcefully putting people in zip-tie handcuffs.

Law enforcement officers used pepper spray to help clear the area of demonstrators, a CNN team on the scene reported. They also deployed pepper balls against a crowd gathered around protesters that had been detained by police. 

ACLU of Texas calls on state officials to create safe spaces for students to protest

From CNN's Lauren Mascarenhas and Jeremy Grisham 

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Texas warned against state and university officials deploying law enforcement to “violently censor” protests held by pro-Palestinian demonstrations at the University of Texas at Austin and other universities across the nation.

“The First Amendment guarantees people in Texas and across the nation the right to protest, including those who advocate for Palestinians,” a statement from the group read. “However, state leaders rapidly escalated a planned day of peaceful demonstrations by deploying law enforcement in riot gear against students and the press. Public officials don’t get to forcefully suppress the voices of people they disagree with.”

Dozens of protesters were arrested at UT Austin Wednesday.

In its statement, the ACLU of Texas called on state officials to create safe spaces for students, staff and faculty to protest.

Emerson president offers grief counseling to students after protests lead to more than 100 arrests

From CNN's Samantha Delouya

Emerson College President Jay Bernhardt said he "recognizes and respects the civic activism and passion that sparked the protest" in a statement Thursday after law enforcement officials cleared a pro-Palestinian tent encampment at the school, leading to dozens of arrests on Wednesday night.

"Emerson staff and administrators were at the scene, focused on supporting our students through this highly stressful situation and seeking to de-escalate the conflict," Bernhardt said. "Today, Emerson officials were at the police precincts and courthouses with the arrested students, and the College will receive them back on campus when they are released."

More than 100 people were arrested and four police officers were injured during the encampment clearing at the Boston liberal arts college, according to the Boston Police Department.

Bernhardt said that he understood that the encampment clearing "has significantly and adversely impacted our community" and offered students the support of grief counselors on campus on Thursday.

Prosecutor drops charges against dozens of protesters arrested at UT-Austin Wednesday

From CNN's Ashley Killough

Following Wednesday’s arrests of dozens of protesters on the campus of the University of Texas at Austin, the local prosecutor’s office says 46 cases have already been dismissed.

“The Travis County Attorney’s Office received several cases yesterday and throughout the evening as a result of yesterday’s demonstration at the University of Texas,” said spokesperson Diana Melendez with the Travis County Attorney’s Office Thursday. “Legal concerns were raised by defense counsel. We individually reviewed each case that was presented and agreed there were deficiencies in the probable cause affidavits.” 

The prosecutor’s office says the court ordered those protesters to be released. “We will continue to individually review all cases presented to our office to determine whether prosecution is factually and legally appropriate,” said Melendez.

Students rally at Georgetown University, march to encampment at George Washington University

From CNN's Lauren Koenig

At Georgetown University in Washington, DC, a crowd of pro-Palestinian protesters filled about one-third of the circular driveway in front of Healy Hall, the main administrative building on campus.

The crowd remained peaceful as organizers spoke and led chants of "free Palestine" and "from the river to the sea." The crowd then marched to the encampment at George Washington University, led by several professors wearing graduation regalia.

At the GW encampment, dozens of tents filled about one-quarter of the campus' University Yard.

“There is only one solution, intifada revolution, intifada intifada, long live the intifada," the demonstrators chanted, holding signs reading "Resistance is justified when people are occupied!" "Stop the invasion!" and "Ceasefire now!"

Cheers erupted when the marchers from Georgetown arrived on GW's campus, with continued chants for "intifada revolution." The Georgetown students were escorted into the GW encampment.

Two arrested for trespassing at Princeton University Thursday during protest

From CNN's Samantha Kelly and Taylor Romine

Two graduate students at Princeton University in New Jersey were arrested Thursday morning for trespassing, the university said in a statement.

People started gathering for a protest Thursday when "a small number began erecting about a half-dozen tents," the statement said.

"After repeated warnings from the Department of Public Safety to cease the activity and leave the area, two graduate students were arrested for trespassing," the statement said, adding that the students are not allowed on campus pending a disciplinary process.

The tents were taken down by protesters, they said, but protests at the university are still underway.

On Wednesday, the university  put out a message to students  sharing the university's policy on protests.

"In addition to disrupting University operations, some types of protest actions (including occupying or blocking access to buildings, establishing outdoor encampments and sleeping in any campus outdoor space) are inherently unsafe for both those involved and for bystanders, and they increase the potential for escalation and confrontation," the message said.

NYPD Chief: “Good SAT scores and self-entitlement do not supersede the law”

From CNN’s Chris Boyette and Caroll Alvarado

As the deadline for negotiations between protesters and Columbia University officials about clearing the encampment on its lawn nears, one high-ranking New York Police Department chief said the students are learning an important lesson.

“Columbia decided to hold its students accountable to the laws of the school. They are seeing the consequences of their actions. Something these kids were most likely never taught,” Chief John Chell, NYPD Chief of Patrol, wrote in a lengthy  post on X . “Good SAT scores and self-entitlement do not supersede the law.” 

The chief’s message came in response to an  X post  from Democratic Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, in which the New York congresswoman questioned Columbia’s decision to call the NYPD on their own students.

Chell also expressed frustration at what he said were students' “hateful anti-Semitic speech and vile language towards our cops.”

CNN has reached out to the NYPD for comment on the chief’s statements and Ocasio-Cortez’s office for reaction.

Pro-Palestinian encampment forms at George Washington University

From CNN's Taylor Romine 

George Washington University has joined a growing list of schools across the nation where Pro-Palestinian demonstrators are forming encampments on school campuses, according to videos posted by The GW Hatchet student newspaper.

The encampment was organized by students at multiple universities across the District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia, a group representing the coalition of Students for Justice in Palestine  said in a post on Instagram .

The encampment is a “united demonstration of our power, uplifting our collective demands for financial transparency, boycotts and divestment from the zionist state, and an end to the racist repression pro-Palestine students," the post said.

In a statement to CNN, George Washington University said it is aware of about 50 students gathering on the University Yard with about 20 tents, in addition to non-students. The university said the protest has remained peaceful.

George Washington Police Department officers and other university officials have responded to the protest, and the school said it is coordinating with the DC Metropolitan Police Department.

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