bertrand russell essay on appearance and reality

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From alexandra's desk, appearance versus reality in russell’s “the problems of philosophy”.

Bertrand Russell’s method of approaching his subject in Problems of Philosophy embraces the Cartesian technique of radical doubt, in which the author revokes any former assumptions about certain reality and existence. In the first chapters, Russell’s enquiry into the nature of reality in comparison to appearance begins with the observation of his immediate surroundings. By examining a table, for example, he determines that the table’s colour, texture, and shape are sufficient to prompt doubt as to whether or not the table exists. The sensations of these qualities are not fixed by a reality; they are apparent possibilities and each depends on the conditions of observation, and thus an individual loses confidence in the senses.

These observations lead to Russell’s first distinction between appearance and reality: “The real table, if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known.” (11) The reality of the table, he explains, depends on a process of inference based on a knowable part of reality, the part Russell calls “sense-data.” Sense-data are not the same as our sensations, but rather are the impressions that the appearance of reality offers our senses. . Sense-data, as Russell says, are “the things that are immediately known to us in sensation” (Russell, 11). For instance, we have a sensation of greenness when we see a patch of green. “Thus, whenever we see a colour, we have a sensation of the colour, but the colour itself is sense-datum, not a sensation.” (12)

Sense-data is therefore an important concept distinguished from the physical world full of physical objects; it is the only part of the world with which we have direct acquaintance. (To Russell, like most philosophers, a “physical object” is comprised of matter, and exists independently of the mind.) Although sense-data causes sensations of qualities in physical objects, the object and its sense-data are not co-dependent. While we doubt the physical existence of an object, we are not doubting the sense-data, which initially inspired the idea of the object’s existence.

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Works Cited

• Russell, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy . Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1997.

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• Bertrand Russell’s View on Philosophy Words: 1133

“The Problems of Philosophy” by Bertrand Russell

The arguments of the author in ‘Problems of Philosophy’ were neither for direct realism nor against indirect realism. As a result, the author described the existence of reality and appearance using the Cartesian technique (Russell 6). To approach the argument on appearance and reality, he suggested that we must avoid skepticism. As a result, our belief system must compliment the state of mind.

Thus, the first section of the article described his immediate surroundings as it relates to the concept of reality and appearance (Lovejoy 122). The author’s observations were based on sense data from the environment. However, the first premise states that the shape of the immediate environment is guided by experience (Russell 13). Thus, the apparent belief that images are real and in existence is influenced by sense data and observation (Lovejoy 122).

However, the reality of his environment influenced the confidence in his judgements. Thus, the author believed that inference plays a significant part between reality and appearance. However, what we know and understand may change based on our thought and perception.

Thus, sense data and sensation can influence our judgement only if the realities exist. Russell suggested that appearance and reality have been connected when the individual combines sense data and sensation. What we see and believe depends on the components of our belief system.

Russell’s view of the problems of philosophy was based on the ultimate meaning of human existence. Thus, an individual must answer questions using practical ideas of philosophy. The article described sceptics and direct realism as the challanges of philosophy. Thus, reality and appearance may exist differently from one individual to another. However, experience and reality may limit the ultimate truth and appearance (Alston 186).

Thus, sense data and sensation may differ across environment and experience. However, absurdity must be eliminated from experience to ensure that we answer the ultimate question of existence. The author suggested that the appearance of physical objects affects the reality of its existence. Thus, the features of appearance simulate the existence of the table experience. We can be objective to reality by asking questions about our experience.

As a result, the shape of the table may differ by position, sense data, and sensation. Thus, the apparent appearance of the table influences our judgement concerning its existence. As a result, sense data connect reality with experience. The existence of a physical object may compound the misery of reality, but sense data will stimulate our experience.

The author utilised the Cartesian philosophy to analyse appearance and reality. Thus, the illusory view of physical objects was countered by radical doubt. The author revealed that perception influenced the existence of sense data and sensation. What we see may be objective only when we doubt our experience.

Perception and experience defines the concept of direct idealism. Similar observations by different people will change the results. Thus, perception is an illusion of our experience. As a result, the experience of a blind man will be different from a drunkard. Perception determines the existence of appearance from reality. When an object is placed behind glass, we may see that object differently or inversely (Lovejoy 122).

Thus, the appearance of physical objects is influenced by sensation, data sense, and experience. However, if we try to analyse sense data and sensation, we may doubt the appearance of the physical object. The author used this argument to distinguish between direct and indirect realism. Russell believed that the class alternatives of direct realism, sense data theories, phenomenalism, and representationlism eliminated scepticism.

Direct realism describes physical objects with sense data, sensation, and experience. However, indirect realism describes the sensation that stimulates our experience. Common sense judgement divides our experience into the description and perception of physical objects. The shape of the table may be of less value to an individual, however, a philosopher understands its relevance to the existence of reality and appearance.

Thus, the perception of physical matter may vary. The properties of a physical object may change our perception if we see from a different angle. The author used vision of the microscope to validate the changes in perception and experience. Thus, when we doubt the reality of an existence, we do so in compliance with our experience or ignorance. What we know and accept may differ with others.

The limitation of Russell’s argument on appearance and reality lies in sense data. He believed that experience differs across individual. However, we cannot limit experience to perception and the reality of physical objects. Consequently, the properties of physical objects may be temporal depending on the matter.

Thus, matter, sense data, and sensation affect experience and perception. The author believed that a physical object might form the context of our experience. As a result, we lose touch with reality by appearance rather than observation (Russell 22). To answer the questions of appearance and reality, we must accept the state of wholeness to ensure the confidence of the mind. Consequently, the concept of reality and appearance transcends common sense and existence (Russell 13).

Another issue results from the perception of how real objects connect to sense data. In his review, Russell explained that it is not possible for an individual to comprehend the dynamics of realism. One must be able to understand the tangibility of the table and understand what type of object the table is.

The connection between the actual table and sense data is an important subject of study. Russell used the table experience to explain that the table is real when it is a physical object. Tangible objects can be perceived as something physical (Russell 22). The argument then becomes the analysis of the tangible object and the nature of the tangible object.

Russell suggested an explanation to the objections raised by Berkeley’s perspective on direct realism. The state of mind affects our experience and perception. It explains the ability to see things different. As a result, the perception of various shapes and objects are influenced by a person’s mind. Berkeley suggested that matter is non-existent when it contradicts our experience. What people call tangible matter are thoughts and mental objects that transforms into reality.

The reality of these items that relates to people’s sensations is doubtful on this perspective. The analysis of the table experience is similar to the perspective of Berkeley because the premise supports his idea that items that exist freely of people are not direct objects of feelings. Berkeley’s suggestions provided in-depth philosophical perspective and conviction of the impracticality of man being liberated from realism.

Russell then combines a significant differentiation of what the term “matter” actually mean. A shared idea of a physical object describes an item opposite to the mind; an object that occupies space in the actual world is incompetent of cognizance (Berkeley 33).

Berkeley argued the theory using the sense data, physical object, and sensation. Although Berkeley’s perception is not a direct contradiction of the presence of matter, his views of sense data, which indicates the presence of objects independent of people suggested that independence is impossible.

Berkeley suggested that the level of persistence when people shut eyes or leave an enclosed environment vary with space and location. He suggested that feeling depends on the mind and experience. As a result, feeling could be autonomous and psychological. The object must be independent of observation, however, it must be dependent on individual observation. Therefore, Berkeley considered the realism of an observed object as ideas in God’s mind. Things may exist autonomously provided they are not difficult to understand.

Berkeley’s perception is a good instance of idealism, however, the belief that nothing can be real, except thoughts and ideologies supports Russell’s vision. Ideas that support this perspective emphasised that anything that can be pondered is a concept in the mind of the individual that thinks about it. Thus, no subject or object can be pondered aside from thoughts and ideas. Unimaginable objects lack merit in appearance and reality.

Thinkers believe that tangible matters of the world are simply dependent on experience and belief system God. In his view, Leibniz believed that tangible objects existed because they are perceived by mutual mind, which is similar to the dynamics of life. Thus, the properties of a physical object may change our perception if we see them from a different angle. The author used vision of the microscope to validate the changes in perception and experience.

Russell suggested that an object exist if we accept or refute people’s experience. He questioned the existence of a real table to highlight the views of Leibniz and Berkeley in perceiving that the table is real. However, the author disagreed with the objections of the table experience.

Russell explained that many philosophers conform to the suggestion that the table experience affects sense data and sensation. What we perceive can be altered with appearance and reality. Thus, objects describe the belief system that stimulates our experience. As a result, sense data, physical object, and sensation can alter our experience.

Russell explained that although philosophy may not be able to provide answers to all questions, it is capable of developing other questions that boost curiosity, and indicate the weirdness and phenomenon of most common events. He emphasised the importance of awareness on appearance and reality.

Thus, we can explain what is real from what it appears to be. He tries to create a system of philosophy that promotes responsible knowledge utilisation and ensured that knowledge is established based on evidence and explanation. Russell also used his sense data language as an important reference in his proposals.

The table experience is the descriptive analysis of sense data, physical object, and sensation. The property of physical object is influenced by our experience and perception. What we believe depends on what we see in space and time. We can alter our belief system when we change space, time, and position. Finally, the limitations of the article may affect the belief system of appearance and reality.

Works Cited

Alston, William. “Back to the Theory of Appearing.” Philosophical Perspectives 13. 1 (1999): 181-203. Print

Berkeley, George. Philosophical Writings, New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1969.Print.

Lovejoy, Arthur. The Revolt against Dualism: An Inquiry Concerning the  Existence of Ideas , New York: Transaction Publications, 1930. Print.

Russell, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1989.Print.

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Chapter 1 -Appearance and Reality

Russell begins by asking his reader to consider what knowledge exists that can be known beyond reasonable doubt. His purpose is to produce the realization that radical doubt soon brings even the most self-evident assumptions in our everyday lives under reconsideration. In this beginning chapter, Russell describes a scene: "I am now sitting in a chair, at a table of a certain shape, on which I see sheets of paper with writing or print." All of these "facts" are easily called into question. Russell engages in his discussion to find out how knowledge of such things is possible at all. In order to lay bare the ordinary assumptions at issue, Russell concentrates on one example, the table before him. Walking around the table, he discerns different colors from different points of view: in places seeming to reflect more light, a brighter shade of brown appears. In reality we assume that there is only one color of the table, yet the appearance of many colors contradicts our assumption. The color seems to be a relation depending on the observer, his point of view, and conditions like "the way the light falls on the table." Since it seems clear that no two people could share one identical point of view, Russell registers a doubt as to whether one real color of the table even exists. Russell continues his investigation of color by reasoning that in ordinary language usage, when we refer to the color of an object, we actually refer to something perceived from the usual perspective of observer. However, he continues, there is no reason to assume that the usual perspective should be considered real and other perspectives, under other conditions, be considered less real. Russell does not think that the most usual brown should be considered the brown of the table, to the exclusion of other apparent browns. As with color, the existence of just one texture of the table is ambiguous, because "to the naked eye, the table appears to be smooth and hard. Aided by microscope, the grain of the wood enlarges to appear as a mountainous range of different roughnesses and textures." Russell argues that one cannot consider one texture more real than another. The shape of the table, a rectangle, also changes immediate shape as one walks around it. Sensation of pressure depends on the force we exert on the table, as does the production of sound when we rap on the wood. Thus, the sensations of touch and sound, like sight, are not fixed by a reality; they are apparent possibilities and each depends on the conditions of observation. These observations lead to Russell's first distinction between appearance and reality, "between what things seem to be and what they are." Russell proposes that we are not struck with these discontinuities in our daily life because in practical experience, one learns "to construct the 'real' shape from the apparent shape." The real shape exists in so much as we infer it from our senses. He writes, "the real table, if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known." The reality of the table, in the sense that there is a table, depends on a process of inference based on a knowable part of reality, the part Russell calls "sense-data". Sense-data are not the same as our sensations. Sense-data are "the things that are immediately known to us in sensation." Variations in our sensations indicate that sensation does not directly reveal the reality of an object like the table. Instead, it is probable that our sensations are "signs of some property which perhaps causes all the sensations." To fully grasp Russell's distinction, consider sensation as an act belonging to the realm of experience and consider the object of that direct experience to be sense-data. The object, a patch of red, produces the sensation or experience of redness. Since we have seen that certain knowledge of

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