critical thinking vs ethics

Leading in Context

Unleash the Positive Power of Ethical Leadership

How Is Critical Thinking Different From Ethical Thinking?

By Linda Fisher Thornton

Ethical thinking and critical thinking are both important and it helps to understand how we need to use them together to make decisions. 

• Critical thinking helps us narrow our choices.  Ethical thinking includes values as a filter to guide us to a choice that is ethical.
• Using critical thinking, we may discover an opportunity to exploit a situation for personal gain.  It’s ethical thinking that helps us realize it would be unethical to take advantage of that exploit.

Develop An Ethical Mindset Not Just Critical Thinking

Critical thinking can be applied without considering how others will be impacted. This kind of critical thinking is self-interested and myopic.

“Critical thinking varies according to the motivation underlying it. When grounded in selfish motives, it is often manifested in the skillful manipulation of ideas in service of one’s own, or one’s groups’, vested interest.” Defining Critical Thinking, The Foundation For Critical Thinking

Critical thinking informed by ethical values is a powerful leadership tool. Critical thinking that sidesteps ethical values is sometimes used as a weapon. 

When we develop leaders, the burden is on us to be sure the mindsets we teach align with ethical thinking. Otherwise we may be helping people use critical thinking to stray beyond the boundaries of ethical business. 

Unl eash the Positive Power of Ethical Leadership

© 2019-2024 Leading in Context LLC

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Standards of Critical Thinking

Thinking towards truth..

Posted June 11, 2012 | Reviewed by Ekua Hagan

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What is critical thinking? According to my favorite critical thinking text , it is disciplined thinking that is governed by clear intellectual standards.

This involves identifying and analyzing arguments and truth claims, discovering and overcoming prejudices and biases, developing your own reasons and arguments in favor of what you believe, considering objections to your beliefs, and making rational choices about what to do based on your beliefs.

Clarity is an important standard of critical thought. Clarity of communication is one aspect of this. We must be clear in how we communicate our thoughts, beliefs, and reasons for those beliefs.

Careful attention to language is essential here. For example, when we talk about morality , one person may have in mind the conventional morality of a particular community, while another may be thinking of certain transcultural standards of morality. Defining our terms can greatly aid us in the quest for clarity.

Clarity of thought is important as well; this means that we clearly understand what we believe, and why we believe it.

Precision involves working hard at getting the issue under consideration before our minds in a particular way. One way to do this is to ask the following questions: What is the problem at issue? What are the possible answers? What are the strengths and weaknesses of each answer?

Accuracy is unquestionably essential to critical thinking. In order to get at or closer to the truth, critical thinkers seek accurate and adequate information. They want the facts because they need the right information before they can move forward and analyze it.

Relevance means that the information and ideas discussed must be logically relevant to the issue being discussed. Many pundits and politicians are great at distracting us away from this.

Consistency is a key aspect of critical thinking. Our beliefs should be consistent. We shouldn’t hold beliefs that are contradictory. If we find that we do hold contradictory beliefs, then one or both of those beliefs are false. For example, I would likely contradict myself if I believed both that " Racism is always immoral" and "Morality is entirely relative." This is a logical inconsistency.

There is another form of inconsistency, called practical inconsistency, which involves saying you believe one thing while doing another. For example, if I say that I believe my family is more important than my work, but I tend to sacrifice their interests for the sake of my work, then I am being practically inconsistent.

The last three standards are logical correctness, completeness, and fairness. Logical correctness means that one is engaging in correct reasoning from what we believe in a given instance to the conclusions that follow from those beliefs. Completeness means that we engage in deep and thorough thinking and evaluation, avoiding shallow and superficial thought and criticism. Fairness involves seeking to be open-minded, impartial, and free of biases and preconceptions that distort our thinking.

Like any skill or set of skills, getting better at critical thinking requires practice. Anyone wanting to grow in this area might think through these standards and apply them to an editorial in the newspaper or on the web, a blog post, or even their own beliefs. Doing so can be a useful and often meaningful exercise.

Michael W. Austin, Ph.D. , is a professor of philosophy at Eastern Kentucky University.

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Moral Reasoning

While moral reasoning can be undertaken on another’s behalf, it is paradigmatically an agent’s first-personal (individual or collective) practical reasoning about what, morally, they ought to do. Philosophical examination of moral reasoning faces both distinctive puzzles – about how we recognize moral considerations and cope with conflicts among them and about how they move us to act – and distinctive opportunities for gleaning insight about what we ought to do from how we reason about what we ought to do.

Part I of this article characterizes moral reasoning more fully, situates it in relation both to first-order accounts of what morality requires of us and to philosophical accounts of the metaphysics of morality, and explains the interest of the topic. Part II then takes up a series of philosophical questions about moral reasoning, so understood and so situated.

1.1 Defining “Moral Reasoning”

1.2 empirical challenges to moral reasoning, 1.3 situating moral reasoning, 1.4 gaining moral insight from studying moral reasoning, 1.5 how distinct is moral reasoning from practical reasoning in general, 2.1 moral uptake, 2.2 moral principles, 2.3 sorting out which considerations are most relevant, 2.4 moral reasoning and moral psychology, 2.5 modeling conflicting moral considerations, 2.6 moral learning and the revision of moral views, 2.7 how can we reason, morally, with one another, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the philosophical importance of moral reasoning.

This article takes up moral reasoning as a species of practical reasoning – that is, as a type of reasoning directed towards deciding what to do and, when successful, issuing in an intention (see entry on practical reason ). Of course, we also reason theoretically about what morality requires of us; but the nature of purely theoretical reasoning about ethics is adequately addressed in the various articles on ethics . It is also true that, on some understandings, moral reasoning directed towards deciding what to do involves forming judgments about what one ought, morally, to do. On these understandings, asking what one ought (morally) to do can be a practical question, a certain way of asking about what to do. (See section 1.5 on the question of whether this is a distinctive practical question.) In order to do justice to the full range of philosophical views about moral reasoning, we will need to have a capacious understanding of what counts as a moral question. For instance, since a prominent position about moral reasoning is that the relevant considerations are not codifiable, we would beg a central question if we here defined “ morality ” as involving codifiable principles or rules. For present purposes, we may understand issues about what is right or wrong, or virtuous or vicious, as raising moral questions.

Even when moral questions explicitly arise in daily life, just as when we are faced with child-rearing, agricultural, and business questions, sometimes we act impulsively or instinctively rather than pausing to reason, not just about what to do, but about what we ought to do. Jean-Paul Sartre described a case of one of his students who came to him in occupied Paris during World War II, asking advice about whether to stay by his mother, who otherwise would have been left alone, or rather to go join the forces of the Free French, then massing in England (Sartre 1975). In the capacious sense just described, this is probably a moral question; and the young man paused long enough to ask Sartre’s advice. Does that mean that this young man was reasoning about his practical question? Not necessarily. Indeed, Sartre used the case to expound his skepticism about the possibility of addressing such a practical question by reasoning. But what is reasoning?

Reasoning, of the sort discussed here, is active or explicit thinking, in which the reasoner, responsibly guided by her assessments of her reasons (Kolodny 2005) and of any applicable requirements of rationality (Broome 2009, 2013), attempts to reach a well-supported answer to a well-defined question (Hieronymi 2013). For Sartre’s student, at least such a question had arisen. Indeed, the question was relatively definite, implying that the student had already engaged in some reflection about the various alternatives available to him – a process that has well been described as an important phase of practical reasoning, one that aptly precedes the effort to make up one’s mind (Harman 1986, 2).

Characterizing reasoning as responsibly conducted thinking of course does not suffice to analyze the notion. For one thing, it fails to address the fraught question of reasoning’s relation to inference (Harman 1986, Broome 2009). In addition, it does not settle whether formulating an intention about what to do suffices to conclude practical reasoning or whether such intentions cannot be adequately worked out except by starting to act. Perhaps one cannot adequately reason about how to repair a stone wall or how to make an omelet with the available ingredients without actually starting to repair or to cook (cf. Fernandez 2016). Still, it will do for present purposes. It suffices to make clear that the idea of reasoning involves norms of thinking. These norms of aptness or correctness in practical thinking surely do not require us to think along a single prescribed pathway, but rather permit only certain pathways and not others (Broome 2013, 219). Even so, we doubtless often fail to live up to them.

Our thinking, including our moral thinking, is often not explicit. We could say that we also reason tacitly, thinking in much the same way as during explicit reasoning, but without any explicit attempt to reach well-supported answers. In some situations, even moral ones, we might be ill-advised to attempt to answer our practical questions by explicit reasoning. In others, it might even be a mistake to reason tacitly – because, say, we face a pressing emergency. “Sometimes we should not deliberate about what to do, and just drive” (Arpaly and Schroeder 2014, 50). Yet even if we are not called upon to think through our options in all situations, and even if sometimes it would be positively better if we did not, still, if we are called upon to do so, then we should conduct our thinking responsibly: we should reason.

Recent work in empirical ethics has indicated that even when we are called upon to reason morally, we often do so badly. When asked to give reasons for our moral intuitions, we are often “dumbfounded,” finding nothing to say in their defense (Haidt 2001). Our thinking about hypothetical moral scenarios has been shown to be highly sensitive to arbitrary variations, such as in the order of presentation. Even professional philosophers have been found to be prone to such lapses of clear thinking (e.g., Schwitzgebel & Cushman 2012). Some of our dumbfounding and confusion has been laid at the feet of our having both a fast, more emotional way of processing moral stimuli and a slow, more cognitive way (e.g., Greene 2014). An alternative explanation of moral dumbfounding looks to social norms of moral reasoning (Sneddon 2007). And a more optimistic reaction to our confusion sees our established patterns of “moral consistency reasoning” as being well-suited to cope with the clashing input generated by our fast and slow systems (Campbell & Kumar 2012) or as constituting “a flexible learning system that generates and updates a multidimensional evaluative landscape to guide decision and action” (Railton, 2014, 813).

Eventually, such empirical work on our moral reasoning may yield revisions in our norms of moral reasoning. This has not yet happened. This article is principally concerned with philosophical issues posed by our current norms of moral reasoning. For example, given those norms and assuming that they are more or less followed, how do moral considerations enter into moral reasoning, get sorted out by it when they clash, and lead to action? And what do those norms indicate about what we ought to do do?

The topic of moral reasoning lies in between two other commonly addressed topics in moral philosophy. On the one side, there is the first-order question of what moral truths there are, if any. For instance, are there any true general principles of morality, and if so, what are they? At this level utilitarianism competes with Kantianism, for instance, and both compete with anti-theorists of various stripes, who recognize only particular truths about morality (Clarke & Simpson 1989). On the other side, a quite different sort of question arises from seeking to give a metaphysical grounding for moral truths or for the claim that there are none. Supposing there are some moral truths, what makes them true? What account can be given of the truth-conditions of moral statements? Here arise familiar questions of moral skepticism and moral relativism ; here, the idea of “a reason” is wielded by many hoping to defend a non-skeptical moral metaphysics (e.g., Smith 2013). The topic of moral reasoning lies in between these two other familiar topics in the following simple sense: moral reasoners operate with what they take to be morally true but, instead of asking what makes their moral beliefs true, they proceed responsibly to attempt to figure out what to do in light of those considerations. The philosophical study of moral reasoning concerns itself with the nature of these attempts.

These three topics clearly interrelate. Conceivably, the relations between them would be so tight as to rule out any independent interest in the topic of moral reasoning. For instance, if all that could usefully be said about moral reasoning were that it is a matter of attending to the moral facts, then all interest would devolve upon the question of what those facts are – with some residual focus on the idea of moral attention (McNaughton 1988). Alternatively, it might be thought that moral reasoning is simply a matter of applying the correct moral theory via ordinary modes of deductive and empirical reasoning. Again, if that were true, one’s sufficient goal would be to find that theory and get the non-moral facts right. Neither of these reductive extremes seems plausible, however. Take the potential reduction to getting the facts right, first.

Contemporary advocates of the importance of correctly perceiving the morally relevant facts tend to focus on facts that we can perceive using our ordinary sense faculties and our ordinary capacities of recognition, such as that this person has an infection or that this person needs my medical help . On such a footing, it is possible to launch powerful arguments against the claim that moral principles undergird every moral truth (Dancy 1993) and for the claim that we can sometimes perfectly well decide what to do by acting on the reasons we perceive instinctively – or as we have been trained – without engaging in any moral reasoning. Yet this is not a sound footing for arguing that moral reasoning, beyond simply attending to the moral facts, is always unnecessary. On the contrary, we often find ourselves facing novel perplexities and moral conflicts in which our moral perception is an inadequate guide. In addressing the moral questions surrounding whether society ought to enforce surrogate-motherhood contracts, for instance, the scientific and technological novelties involved make our moral perceptions unreliable and shaky guides. When a medical researcher who has noted an individual’s illness also notes the fact that diverting resources to caring, clinically, for this individual would inhibit the progress of my research, thus harming the long-term health chances of future sufferers of this illness , he or she comes face to face with conflicting moral considerations. At this juncture, it is far less plausible or satisfying simply to say that, employing one’s ordinary sensory and recognitional capacities, one sees what is to be done, both things considered. To posit a special faculty of moral intuition that generates such overall judgments in the face of conflicting considerations is to wheel in a deus ex machina . It cuts inquiry short in a way that serves the purposes of fiction better than it serves the purposes of understanding. It is plausible instead to suppose that moral reasoning comes in at this point (Campbell & Kumar 2012).

For present purposes, it is worth noting, David Hume and the moral sense theorists do not count as short-circuiting our understanding of moral reasoning in this way. It is true that Hume presents himself, especially in the Treatise of Human Nature , as a disbeliever in any specifically practical or moral reasoning. In doing so, however, he employs an exceedingly narrow definition of “reasoning” (Hume 2000, Book I, Part iii, sect. ii). For present purposes, by contrast, we are using a broader working gloss of “reasoning,” one not controlled by an ambition to parse out the relative contributions of (the faculty of) reason and of the passions. And about moral reasoning in this broader sense, as responsible thinking about what one ought to do, Hume has many interesting things to say, starting with the thought that moral reasoning must involve a double correction of perspective (see section 2.4 ) adequately to account for the claims of other people and of the farther future, a double correction that is accomplished with the aid of the so-called “calm passions.”

If we turn from the possibility that perceiving the facts aright will displace moral reasoning to the possibility that applying the correct moral theory will displace – or exhaust – moral reasoning, there are again reasons to be skeptical. One reason is that moral theories do not arise in a vacuum; instead, they develop against a broad backdrop of moral convictions. Insofar as the first potentially reductive strand, emphasizing the importance of perceiving moral facts, has force – and it does have some – it also tends to show that moral theories need to gain support by systematizing or accounting for a wide range of moral facts (Sidgwick 1981). As in most other arenas in which theoretical explanation is called for, the degree of explanatory success will remain partial and open to improvement via revisions in the theory (see section 2.6 ). Unlike the natural sciences, however, moral theory is an endeavor that, as John Rawls once put it, is “Socratic” in that it is a subject pertaining to actions “shaped by self-examination” (Rawls 1971, 48f.). If this observation is correct, it suggests that the moral questions we set out to answer arise from our reflections about what matters. By the same token – and this is the present point – a moral theory is subject to being overturned because it generates concrete implications that do not sit well with us on due reflection. This being so, and granting the great complexity of the moral terrain, it seems highly unlikely that we will ever generate a moral theory on the basis of which we can serenely and confidently proceed in a deductive way to generate answers to what we ought to do in all concrete cases. This conclusion is reinforced by a second consideration, namely that insofar as a moral theory is faithful to the complexity of the moral phenomena, it will contain within it many possibilities for conflicts among its own elements. Even if it does deploy some priority rules, these are unlikely to be able to cover all contingencies. Hence, some moral reasoning that goes beyond the deductive application of the correct theory is bound to be needed.

In short, a sound understanding of moral reasoning will not take the form of reducing it to one of the other two levels of moral philosophy identified above. Neither the demand to attend to the moral facts nor the directive to apply the correct moral theory exhausts or sufficiently describes moral reasoning.

In addition to posing philosophical problems in its own right, moral reasoning is of interest on account of its implications for moral facts and moral theories. Accordingly, attending to moral reasoning will often be useful to those whose real interest is in determining the right answer to some concrete moral problem or in arguing for or against some moral theory. The characteristic ways we attempt to work through a given sort of moral quandary can be just as revealing about our considered approaches to these matters as are any bottom-line judgments we may characteristically come to. Further, we may have firm, reflective convictions about how a given class of problems is best tackled, deliberatively, even when we remain in doubt about what should be done. In such cases, attending to the modes of moral reasoning that we characteristically accept can usefully expand the set of moral information from which we start, suggesting ways to structure the competing considerations.

Facts about the nature of moral inference and moral reasoning may have important direct implications for moral theory. For instance, it might be taken to be a condition of adequacy of any moral theory that it play a practically useful role in our efforts at self-understanding and deliberation. It should be deliberation-guiding (Richardson 2018, §1.2). If this condition is accepted, then any moral theory that would require agents to engage in abstruse or difficult reasoning may be inadequate for that reason, as would be any theory that assumes that ordinary individuals are generally unable to reason in the ways that the theory calls for. J.S. Mill (1979) conceded that we are generally unable to do the calculations called for by utilitarianism, as he understood it, and argued that we should be consoled by the fact that, over the course of history, experience has generated secondary principles that guide us well enough. Rather more dramatically, R. M. Hare defended utilitarianism as well capturing the reasoning of ideally informed and rational “archangels” (1981). Taking seriously a deliberation-guidance desideratum for moral theory would favor, instead, theories that more directly inform efforts at moral reasoning by we “proletarians,” to use Hare’s contrasting term.

Accordingly, the close relations between moral reasoning, the moral facts, and moral theory do not eliminate moral reasoning as a topic of interest. To the contrary, because moral reasoning has important implications about moral facts and moral theories, these close relations lend additional interest to the topic of moral reasoning.

The final threshold question is whether moral reasoning is truly distinct from practical reasoning more generally understood. (The question of whether moral reasoning, even if practical, is structurally distinct from theoretical reasoning that simply proceeds from a proper recognition of the moral facts has already been implicitly addressed and answered, for the purposes of the present discussion, in the affirmative.) In addressing this final question, it is difficult to overlook the way different moral theories project quite different models of moral reasoning – again a link that might be pursued by the moral philosopher seeking leverage in either direction. For instance, Aristotle’s views might be as follows: a quite general account can be given of practical reasoning, which includes selecting means to ends and determining the constituents of a desired activity. The difference between the reasoning of a vicious person and that of a virtuous person differs not at all in its structure, but only in its content, for the virtuous person pursues true goods, whereas the vicious person simply gets side-tracked by apparent ones. To be sure, the virtuous person may be able to achieve a greater integration of his or her ends via practical reasoning (because of the way the various virtues cohere), but this is a difference in the result of practical reasoning and not in its structure. At an opposite extreme, Kant’s categorical imperative has been taken to generate an approach to practical reasoning (via a “typic of practical judgment”) that is distinctive from other practical reasoning both in the range of considerations it addresses and its structure (Nell 1975). Whereas prudential practical reasoning, on Kant’s view, aims to maximize one’s happiness, moral reasoning addresses the potential universalizability of the maxims – roughly, the intentions – on which one acts. Views intermediate between Aristotle’s and Kant’s in this respect include Hare’s utilitarian view and Aquinas’ natural-law view. On Hare’s view, just as an ideal prudential agent applies maximizing rationality to his or her own preferences, an ideal moral agent’s reasoning applies maximizing rationality to the set of everyone’s preferences that its archangelic capacity for sympathy has enabled it to internalize (Hare 1981). Thomistic, natural-law views share the Aristotelian view about the general unity of practical reasoning in pursuit of the good, rightly or wrongly conceived, but add that practical reason, in addition to demanding that we pursue the fundamental human goods, also, and distinctly, demands that we not attack these goods. In this way, natural-law views incorporate some distinctively moral structuring – such as the distinctions between doing and allowing and the so-called doctrine of double effect’s distinction between intending as a means and accepting as a by-product – within a unified account of practical reasoning (see entry on the natural law tradition in ethics ). In light of this diversity of views about the relation between moral reasoning and practical or prudential reasoning, a general account of moral reasoning that does not want to presume the correctness of a definite moral theory will do well to remain agnostic on the question of how moral reasoning relates to non-moral practical reasoning.

2. General Philosophical Questions about Moral Reasoning

To be sure, most great philosophers who have addressed the nature of moral reasoning were far from agnostic about the content of the correct moral theory, and developed their reflections about moral reasoning in support of or in derivation from their moral theory. Nonetheless, contemporary discussions that are somewhat agnostic about the content of moral theory have arisen around important and controversial aspects of moral reasoning. We may group these around the following seven questions:

• How do relevant considerations get taken up in moral reasoning?
• Is it essential to moral reasoning for the considerations it takes up to be crystallized into, or ranged under, principles?
• How do we sort out which moral considerations are most relevant?
• In what ways do motivational elements shape moral reasoning?
• What is the best way to model the kinds of conflicts among considerations that arise in moral reasoning?
• Does moral reasoning include learning from experience and changing one’s mind?
• How can we reason, morally, with one another?

The remainder of this article takes up these seven questions in turn.

One advantage to defining “reasoning” capaciously, as here, is that it helps one recognize that the processes whereby we come to be concretely aware of moral issues are integral to moral reasoning as it might more narrowly be understood. Recognizing moral issues when they arise requires a highly trained set of capacities and a broad range of emotional attunements. Philosophers of the moral sense school of the 17th and 18th centuries stressed innate emotional propensities, such as sympathy with other humans. Classically influenced virtue theorists, by contrast, give more importance to the training of perception and the emotional growth that must accompany it. Among contemporary philosophers working in empirical ethics there is a similar divide, with some arguing that we process situations using an innate moral grammar (Mikhail 2011) and some emphasizing the role of emotions in that processing (Haidt 2001, Prinz 2007, Greene 2014). For the moral reasoner, a crucial task for our capacities of moral recognition is to mark out certain features of a situation as being morally salient. Sartre’s student, for instance, focused on the competing claims of his mother and the Free French, giving them each an importance to his situation that he did not give to eating French cheese or wearing a uniform. To say that certain features are marked out as morally salient is not to imply that the features thus singled out answer to the terms of some general principle or other: we will come to the question of particularism, below. Rather, it is simply to say that recognitional attention must have a selective focus.

What will be counted as a moral issue or difficulty, in the sense requiring moral agents’ recognition, will again vary by moral theory. Not all moral theories would count filial loyalty and patriotism as moral duties. It is only at great cost, however, that any moral theory could claim to do without a layer of moral thinking involving situation-recognition. A calculative sort of utilitarianism, perhaps, might be imagined according to which there is no need to spot a moral issue or difficulty, as every choice node in life presents the agent with the same, utility-maximizing task. Perhaps Jeremy Bentham held a utilitarianism of this sort. For the more plausible utilitarianisms mentioned above, however, such as Mill’s and Hare’s, agents need not always calculate afresh, but must instead be alive to the possibility that because the ordinary “landmarks and direction posts” lead one astray in the situation at hand, they must make recourse to a more direct and critical mode of moral reasoning. Recognizing whether one is in one of those situations thus becomes the principal recognitional task for the utilitarian agent. (Whether this task can be suitably confined, of course, has long been one of the crucial questions about whether such indirect forms of utilitarianism, attractive on other grounds, can prevent themselves from collapsing into a more Benthamite, direct form: cf. Brandt 1979.)

Note that, as we have been describing moral uptake, we have not implied that what is perceived is ever a moral fact. Rather, it might be that what is perceived is some ordinary, descriptive feature of a situation that is, for whatever reason, morally relevant. An account of moral uptake will interestingly impinge upon the metaphysics of moral facts, however, if it holds that moral facts can be perceived. Importantly intermediate, in this respect, is the set of judgments involving so-called “thick” evaluative concepts – for example, that someone is callous, boorish, just, or brave (see the entry on thick ethical concepts ). These do not invoke the supposedly “thinner” terms of overall moral assessment, “good,” or “right.” Yet they are not innocent of normative content, either. Plainly, we do recognize callousness when we see clear cases of it. Plainly, too – whatever the metaphysical implications of the last fact – our ability to describe our situations in these thick normative terms is crucial to our ability to reason morally.

It is debated how closely our abilities of moral discernment are tied to our moral motivations. For Aristotle and many of his ancient successors, the two are closely linked, in that someone not brought up into virtuous motivations will not see things correctly. For instance, cowards will overestimate dangers, the rash will underestimate them, and the virtuous will perceive them correctly ( Eudemian Ethics 1229b23–27). By the Stoics, too, having the right motivations was regarded as intimately tied to perceiving the world correctly; but whereas Aristotle saw the emotions as allies to enlist in support of sound moral discernment, the Stoics saw them as inimical to clear perception of the truth (cf. Nussbaum 2001).

That one discerns features and qualities of some situation that are relevant to sizing it up morally does not yet imply that one explicitly or even implicitly employs any general claims in describing it. Perhaps all that one perceives are particularly embedded features and qualities, without saliently perceiving them as instantiations of any types. Sartre’s student may be focused on his mother and on the particular plights of several of his fellow Frenchmen under Nazi occupation, rather than on any purported requirements of filial duty or patriotism. Having become aware of some moral issue in such relatively particular terms, he might proceed directly to sorting out the conflict between them. Another possibility, however, and one that we frequently seem to exploit, is to formulate the issue in general terms: “An only child should stick by an otherwise isolated parent,” for instance, or “one should help those in dire need if one can do so without significant personal sacrifice.” Such general statements would be examples of “moral principles,” in a broad sense. (We do not here distinguish between principles and rules. Those who do include Dworkin 1978 and Gert 1998.)

We must be careful, here, to distinguish the issue of whether principles commonly play an implicit or explicit role in moral reasoning, including well-conducted moral reasoning, from the issue of whether principles necessarily figure as part of the basis of moral truth. The latter issue is best understood as a metaphysical question about the nature and basis of moral facts. What is currently known as moral particularism is the view that there are no defensible moral principles and that moral reasons, or well-grounded moral facts, can exist independently of any basis in a general principle. A contrary view holds that moral reasons are necessarily general, whether because the sources of their justification are all general or because a moral claim is ill-formed if it contains particularities. But whether principles play a useful role in moral reasoning is certainly a different question from whether principles play a necessary role in accounting for the ultimate truth-conditions of moral statements. Moral particularism, as just defined, denies their latter role. Some moral particularists seem also to believe that moral particularism implies that moral principles cannot soundly play a useful role in reasoning. This claim is disputable, as it seems a contingent matter whether the relevant particular facts arrange themselves in ways susceptible to general summary and whether our cognitive apparatus can cope with them at all without employing general principles. Although the metaphysical controversy about moral particularism lies largely outside our topic, we will revisit it in section 2.5 , in connection with the weighing of conflicting reasons.

With regard to moral reasoning, while there are some self-styled “anti-theorists” who deny that abstract structures of linked generalities are important to moral reasoning (Clarke, et al. 1989), it is more common to find philosophers who recognize both some role for particular judgment and some role for moral principles. Thus, neo-Aristotelians like Nussbaum who emphasize the importance of “finely tuned and richly aware” particular discernment also regard that discernment as being guided by a set of generally describable virtues whose general descriptions will come into play in at least some kinds of cases (Nussbaum 1990). “Situation ethicists” of an earlier generation (e.g. Fletcher 1997) emphasized the importance of taking into account a wide range of circumstantial differentiae, but against the background of some general principles whose application the differentiae help sort out. Feminist ethicists influenced by Carol Gilligan’s path breaking work on moral development have stressed the moral centrality of the kind of care and discernment that are salient and well-developed by people immersed in particular relationships (Held 1995); but this emphasis is consistent with such general principles as “one ought to be sensitive to the wishes of one’s friends”(see the entry on feminist moral psychology ). Again, if we distinguish the question of whether principles are useful in responsibly-conducted moral thinking from the question of whether moral reasons ultimately all derive from general principles, and concentrate our attention solely on the former, we will see that some of the opposition to general moral principles melts away.

It should be noted that we have been using a weak notion of generality, here. It is contrasted only with the kind of strict particularity that comes with indexicals and proper names. General statements or claims – ones that contain no such particular references – are not necessarily universal generalizations, making an assertion about all cases of the mentioned type. Thus, “one should normally help those in dire need” is a general principle, in this weak sense. Possibly, such logically loose principles would be obfuscatory in the context of an attempt to reconstruct the ultimate truth-conditions of moral statements. Such logically loose principles would clearly be useless in any attempt to generate a deductively tight “practical syllogism.” In our day-to-day, non-deductive reasoning, however, such logically loose principles appear to be quite useful. (Recall that we are understanding “reasoning” quite broadly, as responsibly conducted thinking: nothing in this understanding of reasoning suggests any uniquely privileged place for deductive inference: cf. Harman 1986. For more on defeasible or “default” principles, see section 2.5 .)

In this terminology, establishing that general principles are essential to moral reasoning leaves open the further question whether logically tight, or exceptionless, principles are also essential to moral reasoning. Certainly, much of our actual moral reasoning seems to be driven by attempts to recast or reinterpret principles so that they can be taken to be exceptionless. Adherents and inheritors of the natural-law tradition in ethics (e.g. Donagan 1977) are particularly supple defenders of exceptionless moral principles, as they are able to avail themselves not only of a refined tradition of casuistry but also of a wide array of subtle – some would say overly subtle – distinctions, such as those mentioned above between doing and allowing and between intending as a means and accepting as a byproduct.

A related role for a strong form of generality in moral reasoning comes from the Kantian thought that one’s moral reasoning must counter one’s tendency to make exceptions for oneself. Accordingly, Kant holds, as we have noted, that we must ask whether the maxims of our actions can serve as universal laws. As most contemporary readers understand this demand, it requires that we engage in a kind of hypothetical generalization across agents, and ask about the implications of everybody acting that way in those circumstances. The grounds for developing Kant’s thought in this direction have been well explored (e.g., Nell 1975, Korsgaard 1996, Engstrom 2009). The importance and the difficulties of such a hypothetical generalization test in ethics were discussed the influential works Gibbard 1965 and Goldman 1974.

Whether or not moral considerations need the backing of general principles, we must expect situations of action to present us with multiple moral considerations. In addition, of course, these situations will also present us with a lot of information that is not morally relevant. On any realistic account, a central task of moral reasoning is to sort out relevant considerations from irrelevant ones, as well as to determine which are especially relevant and which only slightly so. That a certain woman is Sartre’s student’s mother seems arguably to be a morally relevant fact; what about the fact (supposing it is one) that she has no other children to take care of her? Addressing the task of sorting what is morally relevant from what is not, some philosophers have offered general accounts of moral relevant features. Others have given accounts of how we sort out which of the relevant features are most relevant, a process of thinking that sometimes goes by the name of “casuistry.”

Before we look at ways of sorting out which features are morally relevant or most morally relevant, it may be useful to note a prior step taken by some casuists, which was to attempt to set out a schema that would capture all of the features of an action or proposed action. The Roman Catholic casuists of the middle ages did so by drawing on Aristotle’s categories. Accordingly, they asked, where, when, why, how, by what means, to whom, or by whom the action in question is to be done or avoided (see Jonsen and Toulmin 1988). The idea was that complete answers to these questions would contain all of the features of the action, of which the morally relevant ones would be a subset. Although metaphysically uninteresting, the idea of attempting to list all of an action’s features in this way represents a distinctive – and extreme – heuristic for moral reasoning.

Turning to the morally relevant features, one of the most developed accounts is Bernard Gert’s. He develops a list of features relevant to whether the violation of a moral rule should be generally allowed. Given the designed function of Gert’s list, it is natural that most of his morally relevant features make reference to the set of moral rules he defended. Accordingly, some of Gert’s distinctions between dimensions of relevant features reflect controversial stances in moral theory. For example, one of the dimensions is whether “the violation [is] done intentionally or only knowingly” (Gert 1998, 234) – a distinction that those who reject the doctrine of double effect would not find relevant.

In deliberating about what we ought, morally, to do, we also often attempt to figure out which considerations are most relevant. To take an issue mentioned above: Are surrogate motherhood contracts more akin to agreements with babysitters (clearly acceptable) or to agreements with prostitutes (not clearly so)? That is, which feature of surrogate motherhood is more relevant: that it involves a contract for child-care services or that it involves payment for the intimate use of the body? Both in such relatively novel cases and in more familiar ones, reasoning by analogy plays a large role in ordinary moral thinking. When this reasoning by analogy starts to become systematic – a social achievement that requires some historical stability and reflectiveness about what are taken to be moral norms – it begins to exploit comparison to cases that are “paradigmatic,” in the sense of being taken as settled. Within such a stable background, a system of casuistry can develop that lends some order to the appeal to analogous cases. To use an analogy: the availability of a widely accepted and systematic set of analogies and the availability of what are taken to be moral norms may stand to one another as chicken does to egg: each may be an indispensable moment in the genesis of the other.

Casuistry, thus understood, is an indispensable aid to moral reasoning. At least, that it is would follow from conjoining two features of the human moral situation mentioned above: the multifariousness of moral considerations that arise in particular cases and the need and possibility for employing moral principles in sound moral reasoning. We require moral judgment, not simply a deductive application of principles or a particularist bottom-line intuition about what we should do. This judgment must be responsible to moral principles yet cannot be straightforwardly derived from them. Accordingly, our moral judgment is greatly aided if it is able to rest on the sort of heuristic support that casuistry offers. Thinking through which of two analogous cases provides a better key to understanding the case at hand is a useful way of organizing our moral reasoning, and one on which we must continue to depend. If we lack the kind of broad consensus on a set of paradigm cases on which the Renaissance Catholic or Talmudic casuists could draw, our casuistic efforts will necessarily be more controversial and tentative than theirs; but we are not wholly without settled cases from which to work. Indeed, as Jonsen and Toulmin suggest at the outset of their thorough explanation and defense of casuistry, the depth of disagreement about moral theories that characterizes a pluralist society may leave us having to rest comparatively more weight on the cases about which we can find agreement than did the classic casuists (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988).

Despite the long history of casuistry, there is little that can usefully be said about how one ought to reason about competing analogies. In the law, where previous cases have precedential importance, more can be said. As Sunstein notes (Sunstein 1996, chap. 3), the law deals with particular cases, which are always “potentially distinguishable” (72); yet the law also imposes “a requirement of practical consistency” (67). This combination of features makes reasoning by analogy particularly influential in the law, for one must decide whether a given case is more like one set of precedents or more like another. Since the law must proceed even within a pluralist society such as ours, Sunstein argues, we see that analogical reasoning can go forward on the basis of “incompletely theorized judgments” or of what Rawls calls an “overlapping consensus” (Rawls 1996). That is, although a robust use of analogous cases depends, as we have noted, on some shared background agreement, this agreement need not extend to all matters or all levels of individuals’ moral thinking. Accordingly, although in a pluralist society we may lack the kind of comprehensive normative agreement that made the high casuistry of Renaissance Christianity possible, the path of the law suggests that normatively forceful, case-based, analogical reasoning can still go on. A modern, competing approach to case-based or precedent-respecting reasoning has been developed by John F. Horty (2016). On Horty’s approach, which builds on the default logic developed in (Horty 2012), the body of precedent systematically shifts the weights of the reasons arising in a new case.

Reasoning by appeal to cases is also a favorite mode of some recent moral philosophers. Since our focus here is not on the methods of moral theory, we do not need to go into any detail in comparing different ways in which philosophers wield cases for and against alternative moral theories. There is, however, an important and broadly applicable point worth making about ordinary reasoning by reference to cases that emerges most clearly from the philosophical use of such reasoning. Philosophers often feel free to imagine cases, often quite unlikely ones, in order to attempt to isolate relevant differences. An infamous example is a pair of cases offered by James Rachels to cast doubt on the moral significance of the distinction between killing and letting die, here slightly redescribed. In both cases, there is at the outset a boy in a bathtub and a greedy older cousin downstairs who will inherit the family manse if and only if the boy predeceases him (Rachels 1975). In Case A, the cousin hears a thump, runs up to find the boy unconscious in the bath, and reaches out to turn on the tap so that the water will rise up to drown the boy. In Case B, the cousin hears a thump, runs up to find the boy unconscious in the bath with the water running, and decides to sit back and do nothing until the boy drowns. Since there is surely no moral difference between these cases, Rachels argued, the general distinction between killing and letting die is undercut. “Not so fast!” is the well-justified reaction (cf. Beauchamp 1979). Just because a factor is morally relevant in a certain way in comparing one pair of cases does not mean that it either is or must be relevant in the same way or to the same degree when comparing other cases. Shelly Kagan has dubbed the failure to take account of this fact of contextual interaction when wielding comparison cases the “additive fallacy” (1988). Kagan concludes from this that the reasoning of moral theorists must depend upon some theory that helps us anticipate and account for ways in which factors will interact in various contexts. A parallel lesson, reinforcing what we have already observed in connection with casuistry proper, would apply for moral reasoning in general: reasoning from cases must at least implicitly rely upon a set of organizing judgments or beliefs, of a kind that would, on some understandings, count as a moral “theory.” If this is correct, it provides another kind of reason to think that moral considerations could be crystallized into principles that make manifest the organizing structure involved.

We are concerned here with moral reasoning as a species of practical reasoning – reasoning directed to deciding what to do and, if successful, issuing in an intention. But how can such practical reasoning succeed? How can moral reasoning hook up with motivationally effective psychological states so as to have this kind of causal effect? “Moral psychology” – the traditional name for the philosophical study of intention and action – has a lot to say to such questions, both in its traditional, a priori form and its newly popular empirical form. In addition, the conclusions of moral psychology can have substantive moral implications, for it may be reasonable to assume that if there are deep reasons that a given type of moral reasoning cannot be practical, then any principles that demand such reasoning are unsound. In this spirit, Samuel Scheffler has explored “the importance for moral philosophy of some tolerably realistic understanding of human motivational psychology” (Scheffler 1992, 8) and Peter Railton has developed the idea that certain moral principles might generate a kind of “alienation” (Railton 1984). In short, we may be interested in what makes practical reasoning of a certain sort psychologically possible both for its own sake and as a way of working out some of the content of moral theory.

The issue of psychological possibility is an important one for all kinds of practical reasoning (cf. Audi 1989). In morality, it is especially pressing, as morality often asks individuals to depart from satisfying their own interests. As a result, it may appear that moral reasoning’s practical effect could not be explained by a simple appeal to the initial motivations that shape or constitute someone’s interests, in combination with a requirement, like that mentioned above, to will the necessary means to one’s ends. Morality, it may seem, instead requires individuals to act on ends that may not be part of their “motivational set,” in the terminology of Williams 1981. How can moral reasoning lead people to do that? The question is a traditional one. Plato’s Republic answered that the appearances are deceiving, and that acting morally is, in fact, in the enlightened self-interest of the agent. Kant, in stark contrast, held that our transcendent capacity to act on our conception of a practical law enables us to set ends and to follow morality even when doing so sharply conflicts with our interests. Many other answers have been given. In recent times, philosophers have defended what has been called “internalism” about morality, which claims that there is a necessary conceptual link between agents’ moral judgment and their motivation. Michael Smith, for instance, puts the claim as follows (Smith 1994, 61):

If an agent judges that it is right for her to Φ in circumstances C , then either she is motivated to Φ in C or she is practically irrational.

Even this defeasible version of moral judgment internalism may be too strong; but instead of pursuing this issue further, let us turn to a question more internal to moral reasoning. (For more on the issue of moral judgment internalism, see moral motivation .)

The traditional question we were just glancing at picks up when moral reasoning is done. Supposing that we have some moral conclusion, it asks how agents can be motivated to go along with it. A different question about the intersection of moral reasoning and moral psychology, one more immanent to the former, concerns how motivational elements shape the reasoning process itself.

A powerful philosophical picture of human psychology, stemming from Hume, insists that beliefs and desires are distinct existences (Hume 2000, Book II, part iii, sect. iii; cf. Smith 1994, 7). This means that there is always a potential problem about how reasoning, which seems to work by concatenating beliefs, links up to the motivations that desire provides. The paradigmatic link is that of instrumental action: the desire to Ψ links with the belief that by Φing in circumstances C one will Ψ. Accordingly, philosophers who have examined moral reasoning within an essentially Humean, belief-desire psychology have sometimes accepted a constrained account of moral reasoning. Hume’s own account exemplifies the sort of constraint that is involved. As Hume has it, the calm passions support the dual correction of perspective constitutive of morality, alluded to above. Since these calm passions are seen as competing with our other passions in essentially the same motivational coinage, as it were, our passions limit the reach of moral reasoning.

An important step away from a narrow understanding of Humean moral psychology is taken if one recognizes the existence of what Rawls has called “principle-dependent desires” (Rawls 1996, 82–83; Rawls 2000, 46–47). These are desires whose objects cannot be characterized without reference to some rational or moral principle. An important special case of these is that of “conception-dependent desires,” in which the principle-dependent desire in question is seen by the agent as belonging to a broader conception, and as important on that account (Rawls 1996, 83–84; Rawls 2000, 148–152). For instance, conceiving of oneself as a citizen, one may desire to bear one’s fair share of society’s burdens. Although it may look like any content, including this, may substitute for Ψ in the Humean conception of desire, and although Hume set out to show how moral sentiments such as pride could be explained in terms of simple psychological mechanisms, his influential empiricism actually tends to restrict the possible content of desires. Introducing principle-dependent desires thus seems to mark a departure from a Humean psychology. As Rawls remarks, if “we may find ourselves drawn to the conceptions and ideals that both the right and the good express … , [h]ow is one to fix limits on what people might be moved by in thought and deliberation and hence may act from?” (1996, 85). While Rawls developed this point by contrasting Hume’s moral psychology with Kant’s, the same basic point is also made by neo-Aristotelians (e.g., McDowell 1998).

The introduction of principle-dependent desires bursts any would-be naturalist limit on their content; nonetheless, some philosophers hold that this notion remains too beholden to an essentially Humean picture to be able to capture the idea of a moral commitment. Desires, it may seem, remain motivational items that compete on the basis of strength. Saying that one’s desire to be just may be outweighed by one’s desire for advancement may seem to fail to capture the thought that one has a commitment – even a non-absolute one – to justice. Sartre designed his example of the student torn between staying with his mother and going to fight with the Free French so as to make it seem implausible that he ought to decide simply by determining which he more strongly wanted to do.

One way to get at the idea of commitment is to emphasize our capacity to reflect about what we want. By this route, one might distinguish, in the fashion of Harry Frankfurt, between the strength of our desires and “the importance of what we care about” (Frankfurt 1988). Although this idea is evocative, it provides relatively little insight into how it is that we thus reflect. Another way to model commitment is to take it that our intentions operate at a level distinct from our desires, structuring what we are willing to reconsider at any point in our deliberations (e.g. Bratman 1999). While this two-level approach offers some advantages, it is limited by its concession of a kind of normative primacy to the unreconstructed desires at the unreflective level. A more integrated approach might model the psychology of commitment in a way that reconceives the nature of desire from the ground up. One attractive possibility is to return to the Aristotelian conception of desire as being for the sake of some good or apparent good (cf. Richardson 2004). On this conception, the end for the sake of which an action is done plays an important regulating role, indicating, in part, what one will not do (Richardson 2018, §§8.3–8.4). Reasoning about final ends accordingly has a distinctive character (see Richardson 1994, Schmidtz 1995). Whatever the best philosophical account of the notion of a commitment – for another alternative, see (Tiberius 2000) – much of our moral reasoning does seem to involve expressions of and challenges to our commitments (Anderson and Pildes 2000).

Recent experimental work, employing both survey instruments and brain imaging technologies, has allowed philosophers to approach questions about the psychological basis of moral reasoning from novel angles. The initial brain data seems to show that individuals with damage to the pre-frontal lobes tend to reason in more straightforwardly consequentialist fashion than those without such damage (Koenigs et al. 2007). Some theorists take this finding as tending to confirm that fully competent human moral reasoning goes beyond a simple weighing of pros and cons to include assessment of moral constraints (e.g., Wellman & Miller 2008, Young & Saxe 2008). Others, however, have argued that the emotional responses of the prefrontal lobes interfere with the more sober and sound, consequentialist-style reasoning of the other parts of the brain (e.g. Greene 2014). The survey data reveals or confirms, among other things, interesting, normatively loaded asymmetries in our attribution of such concepts as responsibility and causality (Knobe 2006). It also reveals that many of moral theory’s most subtle distinctions, such as the distinction between an intended means and a foreseen side-effect, are deeply built into our psychologies, being present cross-culturally and in young children, in a way that suggests to some the possibility of an innate “moral grammar” (Mikhail 2011).

A final question about the connection between moral motivation and moral reasoning is whether someone without the right motivational commitments can reason well, morally. On Hume’s official, narrow conception of reasoning, which essentially limits it to tracing empirical and logical connections, the answer would be yes. The vicious person could trace the causal and logical implications of acting in a certain way just as a virtuous person could. The only difference would be practical, not rational: the two would not act in the same way. Note, however, that the Humean’s affirmative answer depends on departing from the working definition of “moral reasoning” used in this article, which casts it as a species of practical reasoning. Interestingly, Kant can answer “yes” while still casting moral reasoning as practical. On his view in the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason , reasoning well, morally, does not depend on any prior motivational commitment, yet remains practical reasoning. That is because he thinks the moral law can itself generate motivation. (Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals and Religion offer a more complex psychology.) For Aristotle, by contrast, an agent whose motivations are not virtuously constituted will systematically misperceive what is good and what is bad, and hence will be unable to reason excellently. The best reasoning that a vicious person is capable of, according to Aristotle, is a defective simulacrum of practical wisdom that he calls “cleverness” ( Nicomachean Ethics 1144a25).

Moral considerations often conflict with one another. So do moral principles and moral commitments. Assuming that filial loyalty and patriotism are moral considerations, then Sartre’s student faces a moral conflict. Recall that it is one thing to model the metaphysics of morality or the truth conditions of moral statements and another to give an account of moral reasoning. In now looking at conflicting considerations, our interest here remains with the latter and not the former. Our principal interest is in ways that we need to structure or think about conflicting considerations in order to negotiate well our reasoning involving them.

One influential building-block for thinking about moral conflicts is W. D. Ross’s notion of a “ prima facie duty”. Although this term misleadingly suggests mere appearance – the way things seem at first glance – it has stuck. Some moral philosophers prefer the term “ pro tanto duty” (e.g., Hurley 1989). Ross explained that his term provides “a brief way of referring to the characteristic (quite distinct from that of being a duty proper) which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind (e.g., the keeping of a promise), of being an act which would be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of another kind which is morally significant.” Illustrating the point, he noted that a prima facie duty to keep a promise can be overridden by a prima facie duty to avert a serious accident, resulting in a proper, or unqualified, duty to do the latter (Ross 1988, 18–19). Ross described each prima facie duty as a “parti-resultant” attribute, grounded or explained by one aspect of an act, whereas “being one’s [actual] duty” is a “toti-resultant” attribute resulting from all such aspects of an act, taken together (28; see Pietroski 1993). This suggests that in each case there is, in principle, some function that generally maps from the partial contributions of each prima facie duty to some actual duty. What might that function be? To Ross’s credit, he writes that “for the estimation of the comparative stringency of these prima facie obligations no general rules can, so far as I can see, be laid down” (41). Accordingly, a second strand in Ross simply emphasizes, following Aristotle, the need for practical judgment by those who have been brought up into virtue (42).

How might considerations of the sort constituted by prima facie duties enter our moral reasoning? They might do so explicitly, or only implicitly. There is also a third, still weaker possibility (Scheffler 1992, 32): it might simply be the case that if the agent had recognized a prima facie duty, he would have acted on it unless he considered it to be overridden. This is a fact about how he would have reasoned.

Despite Ross’s denial that there is any general method for estimating the comparative stringency of prima facie duties, there is a further strand in his exposition that many find irresistible and that tends to undercut this denial. In the very same paragraph in which he states that he sees no general rules for dealing with conflicts, he speaks in terms of “the greatest balance of prima facie rightness.” This language, together with the idea of “comparative stringency,” ineluctably suggests the idea that the mapping function might be the same in each case of conflict and that it might be a quantitative one. On this conception, if there is a conflict between two prima facie duties, the one that is strongest in the circumstances should be taken to win. Duly cautioned about the additive fallacy (see section 2.3 ), we might recognize that the strength of a moral consideration in one set of circumstances cannot be inferred from its strength in other circumstances. Hence, this approach will need still to rely on intuitive judgments in many cases. But this intuitive judgment will be about which prima facie consideration is stronger in the circumstances, not simply about what ought to be done.

The thought that our moral reasoning either requires or is benefited by a virtual quantitative crutch of this kind has a long pedigree. Can we really reason well morally in a way that boils down to assessing the weights of the competing considerations? Addressing this question will require an excursus on the nature of moral reasons. Philosophical support for this possibility involves an idea of practical commensurability. We need to distinguish, here, two kinds of practical commensurability or incommensurability, one defined in metaphysical terms and one in deliberative terms. Each of these forms might be stated evaluatively or deontically. The first, metaphysical sort of value incommensurability is defined directly in terms of what is the case. Thus, to state an evaluative version: two values are metaphysically incommensurable just in case neither is better than the other nor are they equally good (see Chang 1998). Now, the metaphysical incommensurability of values, or its absence, is only loosely linked to how it would be reasonable to deliberate. If all values or moral considerations are metaphysically (that is, in fact) commensurable, still it might well be the case that our access to the ultimate commensurating function is so limited that we would fare ill by proceeding in our deliberations to try to think about which outcomes are “better” or which considerations are “stronger.” We might have no clue about how to measure the relevant “strength.” Conversely, even if metaphysical value incommensurability is common, we might do well, deliberatively, to proceed as if this were not the case, just as we proceed in thermodynamics as if the gas laws obtained in their idealized form. Hence, in thinking about the deliberative implications of incommensurable values , we would do well to think in terms of a definition tailored to the deliberative context. Start with a local, pairwise form. We may say that two options, A and B, are deliberatively commensurable just in case there is some one dimension of value in terms of which, prior to – or logically independently of – choosing between them, it is possible adequately to represent the force of the considerations bearing on the choice.

Philosophers as diverse as Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill have argued that unless two options are deliberatively commensurable, in this sense, it is impossible to choose rationally between them. Interestingly, Kant limited this claim to the domain of prudential considerations, recognizing moral reasoning as invoking considerations incommensurable with those of prudence. For Mill, this claim formed an important part of his argument that there must be some one, ultimate “umpire” principle – namely, on his view, the principle of utility. Henry Sidgwick elaborated Mill’s argument and helpfully made explicit its crucial assumption, which he called the “principle of superior validity” (Sidgwick 1981; cf. Schneewind 1977). This is the principle that conflict between distinct moral or practical considerations can be rationally resolved only on the basis of some third principle or consideration that is both more general and more firmly warranted than the two initial competitors. From this assumption, one can readily build an argument for the rational necessity not merely of local deliberative commensurability, but of a global deliberative commensurability that, like Mill and Sidgwick, accepts just one ultimate umpire principle (cf. Richardson 1994, chap. 6).

Sidgwick’s explicitness, here, is valuable also in helping one see how to resist the demand for deliberative commensurability. Deliberative commensurability is not necessary for proceeding rationally if conflicting considerations can be rationally dealt with in a holistic way that does not involve the appeal to a principle of “superior validity.” That our moral reasoning can proceed holistically is strongly affirmed by Rawls. Rawls’s characterizations of the influential ideal of reflective equilibrium and his related ideas about the nature of justification imply that we can deal with conflicting considerations in less hierarchical ways than imagined by Mill or Sidgwick. Instead of proceeding up a ladder of appeal to some highest court or supreme umpire, Rawls suggests, when we face conflicting considerations “we work from both ends” (Rawls 1999, 18). Sometimes indeed we revise our more particular judgments in light of some general principle to which we adhere; but we are also free to revise more general principles in light of some relatively concrete considered judgment. On this picture, there is no necessary correlation between degree of generality and strength of authority or warrant. That this holistic way of proceeding (whether in building moral theory or in deliberating: cf. Hurley 1989) can be rational is confirmed by the possibility of a form of justification that is similarly holistic: “justification is a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view” (Rawls 1999, 19, 507). (Note that this statement, which expresses a necessary aspect of moral or practical justification, should not be taken as a definition or analysis thereof.) So there is an alternative to depending, deliberatively, on finding a dimension in terms of which considerations can be ranked as “stronger” or “better” or “more stringent”: one can instead “prune and adjust” with an eye to building more mutual support among the considerations that one endorses on due reflection. If even the desideratum of practical coherence is subject to such re-specification, then this holistic possibility really does represent an alternative to commensuration, as the deliberator, and not some coherence standard, retains reflective sovereignty (Richardson 1994, sec. 26). The result can be one in which the originally competing considerations are not so much compared as transformed (Richardson 2018, chap. 1)

Suppose that we start with a set of first-order moral considerations that are all commensurable as a matter of ultimate, metaphysical fact, but that our grasp of the actual strength of these considerations is quite poor and subject to systematic distortions. Perhaps some people are much better placed than others to appreciate certain considerations, and perhaps our strategic interactions would cause us to reach suboptimal outcomes if we each pursued our own unfettered judgment of how the overall set of considerations plays out. In such circumstances, there is a strong case for departing from maximizing reasoning without swinging all the way to the holist alternative. This case has been influentially articulated by Joseph Raz, who develops the notion of an “exclusionary reason” to occupy this middle position (Raz 1990).

“An exclusionary reason,” in Raz’s terminology, “is a second order reason to refrain from acting for some reason” (39). A simple example is that of Ann, who is tired after a long and stressful day, and hence has reason not to act on her best assessment of the reasons bearing on a particularly important investment decision that she immediately faces (37). This notion of an exclusionary reason allowed Raz to capture many of the complexities of our moral reasoning, especially as it involves principled commitments, while conceding that, at the first order, all practical reasons might be commensurable. Raz’s early strategy for reconciling commensurability with complexity of structure was to limit the claim that reasons are comparable with regard to strength to reasons of a given order. First-order reasons compete on the basis of strength; but conflicts between first- and second-order reasons “are resolved not by the strength of the competing reasons but by a general principle of practical reasoning which determines that exclusionary reasons always prevail” (40).

If we take for granted this “general principle of practical reasoning,” why should we recognize the existence of any exclusionary reasons, which by definition prevail independently of any contest of strength? Raz’s principal answer to this question shifts from the metaphysical domain of the strengths that various reasons “have” to the epistemically limited viewpoint of the deliberator. As in Ann’s case, we can see in certain contexts that a deliberator is likely to get things wrong if he or she acts on his or her perception of the first-order reasons. Second-order reasons indicate, with respect to a certain range of first-order reasons, that the agent “must not act for those reasons” (185). The broader justification of an exclusionary reason, then, can consistently be put in terms of the commensurable first-order reasons. Such a justification can have the following form: “Given this agent’s deliberative limitations, the balance of first-order reasons will likely be better conformed with if he or she refrains from acting for certain of those reasons.”

Raz’s account of exclusionary reasons might be used to reconcile ultimate commensurability with the structured complexity of our moral reasoning. Whether such an attempt could succeed would depend, in part, on the extent to which we have an actual grasp of first-order reasons, conflict among which can be settled solely on the basis of their comparative strength. Our consideration, above, of casuistry, the additive fallacy, and deliberative incommensurability may combine to make it seem that only in rare pockets of our practice do we have a good grasp of first-order reasons, if these are defined, à la Raz, as competing only in terms of strength. If that is right, then we will almost always have good exclusionary reasons to reason on some other basis than in terms of the relative strength of first-order reasons. Under those assumptions, the middle way that Raz’s idea of exclusionary reasons seems to open up would more closely approach the holist’s.

The notion of a moral consideration’s “strength,” whether put forward as part of a metaphysical picture of how first-order considerations interact in fact or as a suggestion about how to go about resolving a moral conflict, should not be confused with the bottom-line determination of whether one consideration, and specifically one duty, overrides another. In Ross’s example of conflicting prima facie duties, someone must choose between averting a serious accident and keeping a promise to meet someone. (Ross chose the case to illustrate that an “imperfect” duty, or a duty of commission, can override a strict, prohibitive duty.) Ross’s assumption is that all well brought-up people would agree, in this case, that the duty to avert serious harm to someone overrides the duty to keep such a promise. We may take it, if we like, that this judgment implies that we consider the duty to save a life, here, to be stronger than the duty to keep the promise; but in fact this claim about relative strength adds nothing to our understanding of the situation. Yet we do not reach our practical conclusion in this case by determining that the duty to save the boy’s life is stronger. The statement that this duty is here stronger is simply a way to embellish the conclusion that of the two prima facie duties that here conflict, it is the one that states the all-things-considered duty. To be “overridden” is just to be a prima facie duty that fails to generate an actual duty because another prima facie duty that conflicts with it – or several of them that do – does generate an actual duty. Hence, the judgment that some duties override others can be understood just in terms of their deontic upshots and without reference to considerations of strength. To confirm this, note that we can say, “As a matter of fidelity, we ought to keep the promise; as a matter of beneficence, we ought to save the life; we cannot do both; and both categories considered we ought to save the life.”

Understanding the notion of one duty overriding another in this way puts us in a position to take up the topic of moral dilemmas . Since this topic is covered in a separate article, here we may simply take up one attractive definition of a moral dilemma. Sinnott-Armstrong (1988) suggested that a moral dilemma is a situation in which the following are true of a single agent:

• He ought to do A .
• He ought to do B .
• He cannot do both A and B .
• (1) does not override (2) and (2) does not override (1).

This way of defining moral dilemmas distinguishes them from the kind of moral conflict, such as Ross’s promise-keeping/accident-prevention case, in which one of the duties is overridden by the other. Arguably, Sartre’s student faces a moral dilemma. Making sense of a situation in which neither of two duties overrides the other is easier if deliberative commensurability is denied. Whether moral dilemmas are possible will depend crucially on whether “ought” implies “can” and whether any pair of duties such as those comprised by (1) and (2) implies a single, “agglomerated” duty that the agent do both A and B . If either of these purported principles of the logic of duties is false, then moral dilemmas are possible.

Jonathan Dancy has well highlighted a kind of contextual variability in moral reasons that has come to be known as “reasons holism”: “a feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason at all, or an opposite reason, in another” (Dancy 2004). To adapt one of his examples: while there is often moral reason not to lie, when playing liar’s poker one generally ought to lie; otherwise, one will spoil the game (cf. Dancy 1993, 61). Dancy argues that reasons holism supports moral particularism of the kind discussed in section 2.2 , according to which there are no defensible moral principles. Taking this conclusion seriously would radically affect how we conducted our moral reasoning. The argument’s premise of holism has been challenged (e.g., Audi 2004, McKeever & Ridge 2006). Philosophers have also challenged the inference from reasons holism to particularism in various ways. Mark Lance and Margaret Olivia Little (2007) have done so by exhibiting how defeasible generalizations, in ethics and elsewhere, depend systematically on context. We can work with them, they suggest, by utilizing a skill that is similar to the skill of discerning morally salient considerations, namely the skill of discerning relevant similarities among possible worlds. More generally, John F. Horty has developed a logical and semantic account according to which reasons are defaults and so behave holistically, but there are nonetheless general principles that explain how they behave (Horty 2012). And Mark Schroeder has argued that our holistic views about reasons are actually better explained by supposing that there are general principles (Schroeder 2011).

This excursus on moral reasons suggests that there are a number of good reasons why reasoning about moral matters might not simply reduce to assessing the weights of competing considerations.

If we have any moral knowledge, whether concerning general moral principles or concrete moral conclusions, it is surely very imperfect. What moral knowledge we are capable of will depend, in part, on what sorts of moral reasoning we are capable of. Although some moral learning may result from the theoretical work of moral philosophers and theorists, much of what we learn with regard to morality surely arises in the practical context of deliberation about new and difficult cases. This deliberation might be merely instrumental, concerned only with settling on means to moral ends, or it might be concerned with settling those ends. There is no special problem about learning what conduces to morally obligatory ends: that is an ordinary matter of empirical learning. But by what sorts of process can we learn which ends are morally obligatory, or which norms morally required? And, more specifically, is strictly moral learning possible via moral reasoning?

Much of what was said above with regard to moral uptake applies again in this context, with approximately the same degree of dubiousness or persuasiveness. If there is a role for moral perception or for emotions in agents’ becoming aware of moral considerations, these may function also to guide agents to new conclusions. For instance, it is conceivable that our capacity for outrage is a relatively reliable detector of wrong actions, even novel ones, or that our capacity for pleasure is a reliable detector of actions worth doing, even novel ones. (For a thorough defense of the latter possibility, which intriguingly interprets pleasure as a judgment of value, see Millgram 1997.) Perhaps these capacities for emotional judgment enable strictly moral learning in roughly the same way that chess-players’ trained sensibilities enable them to recognize the threat in a previously unencountered situation on the chessboard (Lance and Tanesini 2004). That is to say, perhaps our moral emotions play a crucial role in the exercise of a skill whereby we come to be able to articulate moral insights that we have never before attained. Perhaps competing moral considerations interact in contextually specific and complex ways much as competing chess considerations do. If so, it would make sense to rely on our emotionally-guided capacities of judgment to cope with complexities that we cannot model explicitly, but also to hope that, once having been so guided, we might in retrospect be able to articulate something about the lesson of a well-navigated situation.

A different model of strictly moral learning puts the emphasis on our after-the-fact reactions rather than on any prior, tacit emotional or judgmental guidance: the model of “experiments in living,” to use John Stuart Mill’s phrase (see Anderson 1991). Here, the basic thought is that we can try something and see if “it works.” For this to be an alternative to empirical learning about what causally conduces to what, it must be the case that we remain open as to what we mean by things “working.” In Mill’s terminology, for instance, we need to remain open as to what are the important “parts” of happiness. If we are, then perhaps we can learn by experience what some of them are – that is, what are some of the constitutive means of happiness. These paired thoughts, that our practical life is experimental and that we have no firmly fixed conception of what it is for something to “work,” come to the fore in Dewey’s pragmatist ethics (see esp. Dewey 1967 [1922]). This experimentalist conception of strictly moral learning is brought to bear on moral reasoning in Dewey’s eloquent characterizations of “practical intelligence” as involving a creative and flexible approach to figuring out “what works” in a way that is thoroughly open to rethinking our ultimate aims.

Once we recognize that moral learning is a possibility for us, we can recognize a broader range of ways of coping with moral conflicts than was canvassed in the last section. There, moral conflicts were described in a way that assumed that the set of moral considerations, among which conflicts were arising, was to be taken as fixed. If we can learn, morally, however, then we probably can and should revise the set of moral considerations that we recognize. Often, we do this by re-interpreting some moral principle that we had started with, whether by making it more specific, making it more abstract, or in some other way (cf. Richardson 2000 and 2018).

So far, we have mainly been discussing moral reasoning as if it were a solitary endeavor. This is, at best, a convenient simplification. At worst, it is, as Jürgen Habermas has long argued, deeply distorting of reasoning’s essentially dialogical or conversational character (e.g., Habermas 1984; cf. Laden 2012). In any case, it is clear that we often do need to reason morally with one another.

Here, we are interested in how people may actually reason with one another – not in how imagined participants in an original position or ideal speech situation may be said to reason with one another, which is a concern for moral theory, proper. There are two salient and distinct ways of thinking about people morally reasoning with one another: as members of an organized or corporate body that is capable of reaching practical decisions of its own; and as autonomous individuals working outside any such structure to figure out with each other what they ought, morally, to do.

The nature and possibility of collective reasoning within an organized collective body has recently been the subject of some discussion. Collectives can reason if they are structured as an agent. This structure might or might not be institutionalized. In line with the gloss of reasoning offered above, which presupposes being guided by an assessment of one’s reasons, it is plausible to hold that a group agent “counts as reasoning, not just rational, only if it is able to form not only beliefs in propositions – that is, object-language beliefs – but also belief about propositions” (List and Pettit 2011, 63). As List and Pettit have shown (2011, 109–113), participants in a collective agent will unavoidably have incentives to misrepresent their own preferences in conditions involving ideologically structured disagreements where the contending parties are oriented to achieving or avoiding certain outcomes – as is sometimes the case where serious moral disagreements arise. In contexts where what ultimately matters is how well the relevant group or collective ends up faring, “team reasoning” that takes advantage of orientation towards the collective flourishing of the group can help it reach a collectively optimal outcome (Sugden 1993, Bacharach 2006; see entry on collective intentionality ). Where the group in question is smaller than the set of persons, however, such a collectively prudential focus is distinct from a moral focus and seems at odds with the kind of impartiality typically thought distinctive of the moral point of view. Thinking about what a “team-orientation” to the set all persons might look like might bring us back to thoughts of Kantian universalizability; but recall that here we are focused on actual reasoning, not hypothetical reasoning. With regard to actual reasoning, even if individuals can take up such an orientation towards the “team” of all persons, there is serious reason, highlighted by another strand of the Kantian tradition, for doubting that any individual can aptly surrender their moral judgment to any group’s verdict (Wolff 1998).

This does not mean that people cannot reason together, morally. It suggests, however, that such joint reasoning is best pursued as a matter of working out together, as independent moral agents, what they ought to do with regard to an issue on which they have some need to cooperate. Even if deferring to another agent’s verdict as to how one morally ought to act is off the cards, it is still possible that one may licitly take account of the moral testimony of others (for differing views, see McGrath 2009, Enoch 2014).

In the case of independent individuals reasoning morally with one another, we may expect that moral disagreement provides the occasion rather than an obstacle. To be sure, if individuals’ moral disagreement is very deep, they may not be able to get this reasoning off the ground; but as Kant’s example of Charles V and his brother each wanting Milan reminds us, intractable disagreement can arise also from disagreements that, while conceptually shallow, are circumstantially sharp. If it were true that clear-headed justification of one’s moral beliefs required seeing them as being ultimately grounded in a priori principles, as G.A. Cohen argued (Cohen 2008, chap. 6), then room for individuals to work out their moral disagreements by reasoning with one another would seem to be relatively restricted; but whether the nature of (clearheaded) moral grounding is really so restricted is seriously doubtful (Richardson 2018, §9.2). In contrast to what such a picture suggests, individuals’ moral commitments seem sufficiently open to being re-thought that people seem able to engage in principled – that is, not simply loss-minimizing – compromise (Richardson 2018, §8.5).

What about the possibility that the moral community as a whole – roughly, the community of all persons – can reason? This possibility does not raise the kind of threat to impartiality that is raised by the team reasoning of a smaller group of people; but it is hard to see it working in a way that does not run afoul of the concern about whether any person can aptly defer, in a strong sense, to the moral judgments of another agent. Even so, a residual possibility remains, which is that the moral community can reason in just one way, namely by accepting or ratifying a moral conclusion that has already become shared in a sufficiently inclusive and broad way (Richardson 2018, chap. 7).

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agency: shared | intentionality: collective | moral dilemmas | moral particularism | moral particularism: and moral generalism | moral relativism | moral skepticism | practical reason | prisoner’s dilemma | reflective equilibrium | value: incommensurable

Acknowledgments

The author is grateful for help received from Gopal Sreenivasan and the students in a seminar on moral reasoning taught jointly with him, to the students in a more recent seminar in moral reasoning, and, for criticisms received, to David Brink, Margaret Olivia Little and Mark Murphy. He welcomes further criticisms and suggestions for improvement.

Copyright © 2018 by Henry S. Richardson < richardh @ georgetown . edu >

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Titus Stahl

Alessandra Imperio

Il pensiero critico (CT) è considerato un'abilità chiave per il successo nel 21° secolo. Le politiche educative mondiali sostengono la promozione del CT e ricercatori di diverse aree disciplinari sono stati coinvolti in un ampio dibattito sulla sua definizione, senza raggiungere un accordo. Al giorno d'oggi, la ricerca non ha affron-tato compiutamente la valutazione del CT, né il modo in cui dovrebbe essere insegnato. Nel presente lavoro, viene fornita una panoramica sull'argomento, nonché una valutazione delle pratiche, al fine di fornire a ricercatori o professionisti (in particolare quelli della scuola primaria) un riferimento per lo sviluppo di ulteriori teorie e metodi sull'educazione al CT. Il CT è considerato dal punto di vista della filosofia, della psicologia co-gnitiva e delle scienze dell'educazione. Inoltre proponiamo l'inclusione di una quarta prospettiva, che potrebbe essere definita della pedagogia socio-culturale, per le sue importanti implicazioni sull'insegnamento e nelle pratiche valutative. Critical thinking (CT) is considered a key skill for success in the 21st century. Worldwide educational policies advocate the promotion of CT, and scholars across different fields have been involved in a wide debate on its definition, without reaching an agreement. Currently, research has not adequately addressed CT assessment, nor the way in which it should be taught. In the present work, an overview of the topic is provided, as well as an evaluation of the practices, in order to provide researchers or practitioners (particularly those involved in primary school education) a reference for the development of further theories and methods about CT in education. CT is considered from the perspective of philosophy, cognitive psychology, and education sciences. In addition, we propose the inclusion of a fourth perspective, which could be referred as socio-cultural pedagogic perspective, due to its important implications in teaching and assessment practices.

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Critical Thinking pp 57–86 Cite as

Ethical Thinking

• Dirk Jahn 3 &
• Michael Cursio 4  
• First Online: 10 December 2023

66 Accesses

The word “ethics,” which gives its name to the corresponding philosophical discipline, derives from the ancient Greek “ethos,” in which three different yet related meanings can be distinguished. Firstly, it simply means the place where one lives; secondly, the socially established habits, customs, and traditions; and thirdly, the personal attitude or the character of a person.

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A little more detail on this (Safranski, 1997 ).

Normative validity claims in the sense of regulations, e.g., of a methodological nature, however, also played a role above. Here we concentrate on moral norms.

That there is also a descriptive ethics in the sense of the investigation of factually found moral concepts, we leave out of consideration here.

In order not to complicate the idea, we will refrain from arguing normatively in a non-moral sense, i.e., rationally in terms of purpose, e.g., that such arms deliveries damage Germany’s reputation. This in turn presupposes that the purpose towards which the argument is being made here (Germany’s positive reputation) is desirable. In justifying this purpose, in turn, we would have to reach a point at some point that can no longer be justified by higher-level purposes, but is good “par excellence”. This claim is what distinguishes moral norms from other norms.

Although utilitarianism, which is close to such a view, also has adherents in our time, we will go into this later.

The example comes from Robert Spaemann’s book Moral Basic Concepts (Spaemann, 1999 ), which, despite its age, is highly recommended as an introduction to ethics.

We must largely leave aside the significant approaches of antiquity.

The following description is largely based on Höffe ( 1992 ).

On this also (Höffe, 1992 ).

The following consideration is inspired by Forschner ( 1998 ).

Reference should be made here to the presentation in (Gebauer et al., 2009 ), which is excellently suited for teaching purposes and which is included here, among others.

However, Jonas does not yet emphasize the intrinsic value of nature as vehemently as other authors, e.g., Spaemann, do.

For example, Höffe advises a rational and sober balance that sensibly weighs opportunities and risks (Höffe, 1993 ).

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Jahn, D., Cursio, M. (2023). Ethical Thinking. In: Critical Thinking. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41543-3_3

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EthicsBowl.org

International Hub for all things Ethics Bowl

Critical Thinking and Ethics

I’d like to thank Matt Deaton for introducing me to Ethics Bowl at this year’s American Philosophical Association (APA) Eastern Division conference. 

Given my own mission to help students (of any age) develop their critical-thinking skills (through books like Critical Thinking from MIT Press and my LogicCheck site that uses the news of the day to teach critical-thinking techniques) I’m drawn to situations where facts alone cannot provide answers on what to do.

In situations when we have to decide what to do in the future, we can’t fact-check things that haven’t happened yet, but we can argue over which choice to make. We can also never know with certainty what is going on inside other people’s heads, which requires us to argue over motives and motivations, rather than claim to know them without doubt.  

Similarly, only the most trivial ethical dilemmas can be resolved by appealing to facts of the matter.  For the kind of complex dilemmas we face in the real world, such as those students grapple with when they participate in Ethics Bowl, we need to argue things out.  And arguing well is what you learn by studying critical thinking.

With that in mind, I was inspired to start a series over at LogicCheck that applies different critical-thinking principles to specific cases in this year’s Ethics Bowl national case set .  The first looks at how the ability to peer through persuasive language (commonly referred to as rhetoric) to see through wording that might pre-suppose an answer to a problem.  A second piece shows how hidden premises , statements implied but not stated in arguments, often contain the most important points we are need to discuss. 

I hope to continue this series by looking at other cases in light of the critical-thinker’s toolkit that involves skills such as controlling for bias and media and information literacy.  In each of these postings, I will endeavor to introduce students to productive ways of thinking about ethical issues and avoid telling them what to think about them.

So thanks again to Matt for letting me post here at his Ethics Bowl site.  Thanks as well to everyone involved with this fantastic program, and to all the students and teachers participating in it.

Happy deliberating!

~Jonathan Haber~

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The Connection between Critical Thinking and Ethics: Unraveling the Link

The connection between critical thinking and ethics is a significant one, as both concepts play crucial roles in decision-making and problem-solving. Critical thinking is the process of evaluating and analyzing information to reach well-founded conclusions, while ethics involves the principles and standards that guide our behavior.

Both critical thinking and ethics are closely related, as the former enables individuals to discern between right and wrong, fact and fiction, and develop a deeper understanding of complex issues. By using critical thinking skills, individuals can approach ethical dilemmas from diverse perspectives and make informed decisions based on logic and reason. This relationship is essential in helping us navigate the world around us and make morally responsible choices.

Developing a strong sense of critical thinking and ethical awareness is crucial for individuals to become responsible citizens and decision-makers. When applied together, these skills allow people to engage in a balanced and rational examination of various ethical issues, thereby promoting fair judgment and responsible action within their personal and professional lives.

The Concepts of Critical Thinking and Ethics

Defining critical thinking.

Critical thinking is a widely accepted educational goal, but its definition is contested. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , critical thinking can be understood as careful thinking directed toward a goal. It involves the ability to analyze information, identify biases, and evaluate the credibility of sources, ultimately leading to better decision-making.

Defining Ethics

Ethics, on the other hand, deals with moral principles that govern an individual’s or group’s behavior. It is the study of what is right or wrong and how we should act in various situations. Ethical reasoning involves the application of moral values to guide actions and decisions in various contexts.

When combined, critical thinking and ethics create a powerful framework for evaluating multiple perspectives and making informed choices. The development of these skills is crucial for both personal and professional growth. The interconnected nature of these concepts is crucial in understanding their relevance in various aspects of life.

The Importance of Critical Thinking in Ethical Decision-Making

Critical thinking plays a vital role in ethical decision-making by providing the tools needed to carefully evaluate situations, examine various perspectives, and make informed choices that align with personal and professional values without making exaggerated or false claims.

Recognizing Ethical Issues

Utilizing critical thinking skills enables individuals to examine situations from multiple perspectives , identify potential issues and risks, and recognize ethical dilemmas by reducing the impact of cognitive biases. By analyzing situations and questioning assumptions, critical thinking allows people to recognize ethical problems that may otherwise go unnoticed.

Evaluating Ethical Choices

In the process of ethical decision-making, critical thinking plays a key role in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of each available option. It helps individuals to determine whether or not something is right or wrong , taking into account both facts and values. This evaluation helps in understanding the basis of one’s beliefs and decisions and in considering alternative solutions before making choices.

Implementing Ethical Solutions

Once ethical issues have been recognized and evaluated, critical thinking aids in the implementation of ethical solutions. It allows individuals to weigh the consequences of each action, taking into account the possible impacts on stakeholders and the broader society. Critical thinking promotes conscious, well-informed decisions that are in line with personal and professional beliefs, ensuring that the chosen solutions consider all possible outcomes and adhere to the principles of ethical decision-making.

Section 4: Developing Critical Thinking and Ethical Reasoning Skills

The connection between critical thinking and ethics is crucial in fostering a questioning mindset and promoting reasoned decision-making. To develop these skills, we will discuss the role of education and curricula, as well as exercises and practice in cultivating ethical critical thinkers.

Education and Curricula

Integrating ethical reasoning into education is an essential step for promoting fairminded critical thinking. Teachers must be aware of the risk of inadvertently fostering sophistic critical thinking if ethics are not addressed in the curriculum (source) . To develop students’ ethical understanding, educators should use inquiry-based learning methods, which encourage a questioning mindset (source) .

By incorporating ethical reasoning into educational programs, students learn to operationalize their reflective questioning skills as the basis for ethical decision-making. Understanding the various ethical frameworks and perspectives can help students think critically and make well-reasoned decisions in complex situations (source) .

Exercises and Practice

Regular practice in dealing with ethical dilemmas and ambiguities allows students to strengthen their critical thinking and ethical reasoning skills. Exercises that ask students to define problems, examine evidence, analyze assumptions and biases, and consider other interpretations are effective in fostering critical thinking (source) .

Using real-life ethical dilemmas in activities not only helps students to engage with the material but also promotes reasoning and justification skills vital for informed citizenship (source) . Some exercises that can be utilized include:

• Debates on controversial ethical issues
• Case studies and role-playing exercises
• Reflection papers and group discussions
• Analysis of ethical dilemmas in various scenarios

Frequent practice of these activities will help students develop a strong foundation in critical thinking and ethical reasoning, enabling them to make well-informed decisions in their personal and professional lives.

Section 5: Challenges and Limitations

Cognitive biases.

One of the challenges of integrating critical thinking with ethics is addressing cognitive biases. Cognitive biases can cloud our judgment and affect our ability to make ethical decisions. Developing critical thinking skills can help reveal these biases and enable us to make more objective decisions.

Emotional Influence

Another challenge in connecting critical thinking and ethics is emotional influence. Our emotions can significantly impact our ability to think critically and ethically. Emotional experiences may lead to hasty decisions without considering ethical implications. To overcome this challenge, individuals must learn to balance emotion and reason, allowing them to maintain a neutral perspective during decision-making processes.

Cultural Differences

Lastly, cultural differences can create a barrier when trying to foster the relationship between critical thinking and ethics. Different cultures often have unique ethical values and practices, making it difficult to establish universal ethical principles. Understanding and respecting these differences is crucial in mitigating the potential for miscommunication and ethical conflicts.

By addressing challenges such as cognitive biases, emotional influence, and cultural differences, individuals can further strengthen the connection between critical thinking and ethics. This integration is essential for making informed, ethical decisions within diverse global communities.

In conclusion, the relationship between critical thinking and ethics is a fundamental aspect of how we make decisions in our daily lives. Critical thinking allows us to see the world from different perspectives and to make ethical decisions based on our understanding and analysis of facts.

As we develop our critical thinking skills, we become better at distinguishing right from wrong , which in turn helps us navigate complex ethical situations. This process involves analyzing and observing our own biases and beliefs, as well as evaluating the facts at hand.

The importance of this relationship cannot be understated, as it influences the choices we make and their impact on ourselves and others. Developing a strong foundation in critical thinking not only allows us to make informed and ethical decisions but also contributes to a deeper understanding of the world and the various perspectives within it.

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10.1: Ethics vs. Morality

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There’s no standard distinction between the ‘ethical’ and the ‘moral.’ Which are ethical questions? Which are moral questions? Who knows?

I like to think about them the following way:

The ethical (from Greek ethos ) is a really broad category encompassing questions about everything we do. The ethical is about your relationship with yourself (and if you’re a theist about your relationship with God).

The moral (from Latin mores or customs) is a narrower category encompassing only questions about our relations with one another. Moral questions are like the morality of abortion, murder, theft, lying, etc. They’re about how we interact with other agents/actors.

A sub-set of moral questions are political : how should we govern our society? What taxation schemes are fair/just/moral? What is a moral policing strategy? Etc.

On this conception, the ethical encompasses the moral and political because ethical questions are questions about the good life and what we ought to do, whereas moral questions are about what we ought to do to and with one another.

It’s important to note, though, that this isn’t an authoritative way to draw the distinction. There are other ways to do so. In this class, I tend to just use ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ interchangeably.

A Framework for Ethical Decision Making

• Markkula Center for Applied Ethics
• Ethics Resources

This document is designed as an introduction to thinking ethically. Read more about what the framework can (and cannot) do .  

We all have an image of our better selves—of how we are when we act ethically or are “at our best.” We probably also have an image of what an ethical community, an ethical business, an ethical government, or an ethical society should be. Ethics really has to do with all these levels—acting ethically as individuals, creating ethical organizations and governments, and making our society as a whole more ethical in the way it treats everyone.

What is Ethics?

Ethics refers to standards and practices that tell us how human beings ought to act in the many situations in which they find themselves—as friends, parents, children, citizens, businesspeople, professionals, and so on. Ethics is also concerned with our character. It requires knowledge, skills, and habits. 

It is helpful to identify what ethics is NOT:

• Ethics is not the same as feelings . Feelings do provide important information for our ethical choices. However, while some people have highly developed habits that make them feel bad when they do something wrong, others feel good even though they are doing something wrong. And, often, our feelings will tell us that it is uncomfortable to do the right thing if it is difficult.
• Ethics is not the same as religion . Many people are not religious but act ethically, and some religious people act unethically. Religious traditions can, however, develop and advocate for high ethical standards, such as the Golden Rule.
• Ethics is not the same thing as following the law. A good system of law does incorporate many ethical standards, but law can deviate from what is ethical. Law can become ethically corrupt—a function of power alone and designed to serve the interests of narrow groups. Law may also have a difficult time designing or enforcing standards in some important areas and may be slow to address new problems.
• Ethics is not the same as following culturally accepted norms . Cultures can include both ethical and unethical customs, expectations, and behaviors. While assessing norms, it is important to recognize how one’s ethical views can be limited by one’s own cultural perspective or background, alongside being culturally sensitive to others.
• Ethics is not science . Social and natural science can provide important data to help us make better and more informed ethical choices. But science alone does not tell us what we ought to do. Some things may be scientifically or technologically possible and yet unethical to develop and deploy.

Six Ethical Lenses

If our ethical decision-making is not solely based on feelings, religion, law, accepted social practice, or science, then on what basis can we decide between right and wrong, good and bad? Many philosophers, ethicists, and theologians have helped us answer this critical question. They have suggested a variety of different lenses that help us perceive ethical dimensions. Here are six of them:

The Rights Lens

Some suggest that the ethical action is the one that best protects and respects the moral rights of those affected. This approach starts from the belief that humans have a dignity based on their human nature per se or on their ability to choose freely what they do with their lives. On the basis of such dignity, they have a right to be treated as ends in themselves and not merely as means to other ends. The list of moral rights—including the rights to make one's own choices about what kind of life to lead, to be told the truth, not to be injured, to a degree of privacy, and so on—is widely debated; some argue that non-humans have rights, too. Rights are also often understood as implying duties—in particular, the duty to respect others' rights and dignity.

( For further elaboration on the rights lens, please see our essay, “Rights.” )

The Justice Lens

Justice is the idea that each person should be given their due, and what people are due is often interpreted as fair or equal treatment. Equal treatment implies that people should be treated as equals   according to some defensible standard such as merit or need, but not necessarily that everyone should be treated in the exact same way in every respect. There are different types of justice that address what people are due in various contexts. These include social justice (structuring the basic institutions of society), distributive justice (distributing benefits and burdens), corrective justice (repairing past injustices), retributive justice (determining how to appropriately punish wrongdoers), and restorative or transformational justice (restoring relationships or transforming social structures as an alternative to criminal punishment).

( For further elaboration on the justice lens, please see our essay, “Justice and Fairness.” )

The Utilitarian Lens

Some ethicists begin by asking, “How will this action impact everyone affected?”—emphasizing the consequences of our actions. Utilitarianism, a results-based approach, says that the ethical action is the one that produces the greatest balance of good over harm for as many stakeholders as possible. It requires an accurate determination of the likelihood of a particular result and its impact. For example, the ethical corporate action, then, is the one that produces the greatest good and does the least harm for all who are affected—customers, employees, shareholders, the community, and the environment. Cost/benefit analysis is another consequentialist approach.

( For further elaboration on the utilitarian lens, please see our essay, “Calculating Consequences.” )

The Common Good Lens

According to the common good approach, life in community is a good in itself and our actions should contribute to that life. This approach suggests that the interlocking relationships of society are the basis of ethical reasoning and that respect and compassion for all others—especially the vulnerable—are requirements of such reasoning. This approach also calls attention to the common conditions that are important to the welfare of everyone—such as clean air and water, a system of laws, effective police and fire departments, health care, a public educational system, or even public recreational areas. Unlike the utilitarian lens, which sums up and aggregates goods for every individual, the common good lens highlights mutual concern for the shared interests of all members of a community.

( For further elaboration on the common good lens, please see our essay, “The Common Good.” )

The Virtue Lens

A very ancient approach to ethics argues that ethical actions ought to be consistent with certain ideal virtues that provide for the full development of our humanity. These virtues are dispositions and habits that enable us to act according to the highest potential of our character and on behalf of values like truth and beauty. Honesty, courage, compassion, generosity, tolerance, love, fidelity, integrity, fairness, self-control, and prudence are all examples of virtues. Virtue ethics asks of any action, “What kind of person will I become if I do this?” or “Is this action consistent with my acting at my best?”

( For further elaboration on the virtue lens, please see our essay, “Ethics and Virtue.” )

The Care Ethics Lens

Care ethics is rooted in relationships and in the need to listen and respond to individuals in their specific circumstances, rather than merely following rules or calculating utility. It privileges the flourishing of embodied individuals in their relationships and values interdependence, not just independence. It relies on empathy to gain a deep appreciation of the interest, feelings, and viewpoints of each stakeholder, employing care, kindness, compassion, generosity, and a concern for others to resolve ethical conflicts. Care ethics holds that options for resolution must account for the relationships, concerns, and feelings of all stakeholders. Focusing on connecting intimate interpersonal duties to societal duties, an ethics of care might counsel, for example, a more holistic approach to public health policy that considers food security, transportation access, fair wages, housing support, and environmental protection alongside physical health.

( For further elaboration on the care ethics lens, please see our essay, “Care Ethics.” )

Using the Lenses

Each of the lenses introduced above helps us determine what standards of behavior and character traits can be considered right and good. There are still problems to be solved, however.

The first problem is that we may not agree on the content of some of these specific lenses. For example, we may not all agree on the same set of human and civil rights. We may not agree on what constitutes the common good. We may not even agree on what is a good and what is a harm.

The second problem is that the different lenses may lead to different answers to the question “What is ethical?” Nonetheless, each one gives us important insights in the process of deciding what is ethical in a particular circumstance.

Making Decisions

Making good ethical decisions requires a trained sensitivity to ethical issues and a practiced method for exploring the ethical aspects of a decision and weighing the considerations that should impact our choice of a course of action. Having a method for ethical decision-making is essential. When practiced regularly, the method becomes so familiar that we work through it automatically without consulting the specific steps.

The more novel and difficult the ethical choice we face, the more we need to rely on discussion and dialogue with others about the dilemma. Only by careful exploration of the problem, aided by the insights and different perspectives of others, can we make good ethical choices in such situations.

The following framework for ethical decision-making is intended to serve as a practical tool for exploring ethical dilemmas and identifying ethical courses of action.

Identify the Ethical Issues

• Could this decision or situation be damaging to someone or to some group, or unevenly beneficial to people? Does this decision involve a choice between a good and bad alternative, or perhaps between two “goods” or between two “bads”?
• Is this issue about more than solely what is legal or what is most efficient? If so, how?

Get the Facts

• What are the relevant facts of the case? What facts are not known? Can I learn more about the situation? Do I know enough to make a decision?
• What individuals and groups have an important stake in the outcome? Are the concerns of some of those individuals or groups more important? Why?
• What are the options for acting? Have all the relevant persons and groups been consulted? Have I identified creative options?

Evaluate Alternative Actions

• Evaluate the options by asking the following questions:
• Which option best respects the rights of all who have a stake? (The Rights Lens)
• Which option treats people fairly, giving them each what they are due? (The Justice Lens)
• Which option will produce the most good and do the least harm for as many stakeholders as possible? (The Utilitarian Lens)
• Which option best serves the community as a whole, not just some members? (The Common Good Lens)
• Which option leads me to act as the sort of person I want to be? (The Virtue Lens)
• Which option appropriately takes into account the relationships, concerns, and feelings of all stakeholders? (The Care Ethics Lens)

Choose an Option for Action and Test It

• After an evaluation using all of these lenses, which option best addresses the situation?
• If I told someone I respect (or a public audience) which option I have chosen, what would they say?
• How can my decision be implemented with the greatest care and attention to the concerns of all stakeholders?

Implement Your Decision and Reflect on the Outcome

• How did my decision turn out, and what have I learned from this specific situation? What (if any) follow-up actions should I take?

This framework for thinking ethically is the product of dialogue and debate at the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics at Santa Clara University. Primary contributors include Manuel Velasquez, Dennis Moberg, Michael J. Meyer, Thomas Shanks, Margaret R. McLean, David DeCosse, Claire André, Kirk O. Hanson, Irina Raicu, and Jonathan Kwan.  It was last revised on November 5, 2021.

Want to create or adapt books like this? Learn more about how Pressbooks supports open publishing practices.

11 The Basics of Ethical Reasoning

The Basics of Ethical Reasoning

Radford University, Radford University Core Handbook, https://lcubbison.pressbooks.com/

Let’s begin by refreshing our memory on what is meant by “ethics.”

Ethics is the study of the standards of right and wrong that inform us as to how we ought to behave. These standards relate to unwritten rules that are necessary for humans to live amongst each other, such as “don’t hurt others.” We function better as a society when we treat each other well.

Ethics can also refer to the standards themselves. They often pertain to rights, obligations, fairness, responsibilities, and specific virtues like honesty and loyalty.

They are supported by consistent and well-founded reasons; as such, they have universal appeal. It’s never good to have a society that supports hurting others as a general rule; honesty and loyalty are positive attributes.

Can we think of instances when hurting others is condoned (such as in war) and where honesty or loyalty may be misplaced? Of course! That’s one of the reasons why ethics are so complicated.

Next, let’s briefly look at what is not “ethics.”

We need to distinguish ethics from what it is not. It’s easier if you can remember that ethics doesn’t change:

Ethics is not what’s legal.  The law often puts into writing our ethical standards (don’t hurt others=don’t commit homicide) but it also usually reflects our cultural beliefs at the time. For example, hunting is legal in Virginia, but it would be difficult to say that everyone agrees that it is ethical to hunt. Some people will argue that hunting is ethical because it manages the wildlife population, while others will argue that it is never ethical because it creates pain and suffering.

Ethics is not what you feel . In fact, most times our feelings are very egocentric: what’s best for me and my nearest and dearest? But making judgments based on these sentiments could be detrimental to society as a whole,

Ethics is not religion.  Religions may teach ethical standards, and you may personally use religion to guide your beliefs, but people can have ethics without necessarily belonging to a religion. Therefore, ethics and religion are not interchangeable.

Ethics is not a political ideology.  A political party may share your values and offer ethical arguments to supports its policies, but your decisions aren’t automatically ethical, just because you belong to one political party or another. In fact, many, if not most, political debates are built from arguments that claim one aspect of an ethical dilemma is more significant than another.

What does it mean to be ethical?

When we explore what it means to be ethical, we are looking at what is rationally “right” and “wrong.” We need to have such conversations so that we can live with other people in society. Philosophers would also argue that the best way to achieve our fullest potential is by being ethical.

In this course, we are not teaching you what to believe. We are building on the skills you learned in Core 201 to identify, evaluate, create and analyze ethical arguments.

Again, let’s look at the terms “ethical” and “moral”  and examine if they mean the same thing.

For the purposes of this course, the answer is ‘yes’. The terms ethical and moral are often used as synonyms, and we will adopt this convention and use these terms interchangeably. For most purposes this works fine, but some authors and teachers do see a distinction between these ideas. Usually when the terms are distinguished it is because “morals” can connote very culture-specific norms or expectations. Hence “the mores of the Azande” describes the moral norms of that particular tribe or culture, but without expectation that these norms are universally valid. When “ethics” is contrasted with “morals,” the writer is usually discussing certain normative ethical theories that maintain that certain principles, rules, or virtues have universal ethical validity. A slightly more comprehensive answer would describe the difference; say from an ethical relativist positions definition, as hinging on ethical standards being subjected to the scrutiny of reason or rationality as its fundamental method.

What do we mean by “values”?

Frequently when used in discussions of ethics the term values is used to refer to the fundamental ideals that an individual relies on to describe praise-worthy behavior. A person’s values are the bedrock concepts used to determine their ethical decisions. Most generally speaking values represent aspirational goals common within your culture or society. Values such as honesty, benevolence, wisdom, duty, or compassion are universally recognized laudable and desirable features of a well-developed character. But which values are most important may differ from individual to individual, or across cultures. We could refer to the values of the feudal Japanese samurai culture placing the highest emphasis on the concept of personal honor. We could compare and contrast that with the European knightly virtues as a similar yet distinctively different set of cultural values. We could draw on political beliefs to describe the concepts of equality and freedom at the heart of democratic ideals, contrasting them with a constitutional monarchy that perhaps places the highest importance on duty and tradition as its central political ideals

Let’s examine a few examples of ethical issues.

Ethical issues abound in contemporary society. Ethical issues involve questions of the ethical rightness or wrongness of public policy or personal behavior.  Actions or policies that affect other people always have an ethical dimension, but while some people restrict ethical issues to actions that can help or harm others (social ethics) others include personal and self-regarding conduct (personal ethics).

Many of today’s most pressing issues of social ethics are complex and multifaceted and require clear and careful thought. Some of these issues include:

• Should states allow physician-assisted suicide?
• Is the death penalty an ethically acceptable type of punishment?
• Should animals have rights?
• Is society ever justified in regulating so-called victimless crimes like drug use, not wearing a helmet or a seatbelt, etc.?
• What are our responsibilities to future generations?
• Are affluent individuals and countries obligated to try to prevent starvation, malnutrition, and poverty wherever we find them in the world?
• Is there such a thing as a just war?
• How does business ethics relate to corporate responsibility?

To reach careful conclusions, these public policy issues require people to engage in complicated ethical reasoning, but the ethical reasoning involving personal issues can be just as complex and multifaceted:

• What principles do I apply to the way I treat other people?
• What guides my own choices and my own goals in life?
• Should I have the same expectations of others in terms of their behavior and choices as I have of myself?
• Is living ethically compatible or incompatible with what I call living well or happily?

Now you might be asking, “How can I effectively apply critical reasoning to an ethical issue?”

People care quite a bit about ethical issues and often voice varied and even sharply opposed perspectives. So when looking at how we debate ethical issues publicly, it is not surprising to find debate ranging from formal to informal argumentation, and from very carefully constructed arguments with well-qualified conclusions, to very biased positions and quite fallacious forms of persuasion. It’s easy to be dismayed by the discord we find over volatile issues like gun control, immigration policy, and equality in marriage or in the workplace, gender and race equality, abortion and birth control, jobs versus environment, freedom versus security, free speech and censorship, and so on. But it is also easy to go the other direction and be drawn into the often fallacious reasoning we hear all around us.

Critical thinkers want to conduct civil, respectful discourse, and to build bridges in ways that allow progress to be made on difficult issues of common concern. Progress and mutual understanding is not possible when name-calling, inflammatory language, and fallacies are the norm. Some mutual respect, together with the skill of being able to offer a clearly-structured argument for one’s position, undercuts the need to resort to such tactics. So critical thinkers resist trading fallacy for fallacy, and try to introduce common ground that can help resolve disputes by remaining respectful of differences, even about issues personally quite important to them. When we support a thesis (such as a position on one of the above ethical issues) with a clear and well-structured argument, we allow and invite others to engage with us in more constructive fashion. We say essentially, “Here is my thesis and here are my reasons for holding it. If you don’t agree with my claim, then show me what is wrong with my argument, and I will reconsider my view, as any rational person should.”

Another question you may be asking is, “When I debate ethical issues, what is my responsibility to people who are part of the dialogue?”

When we evaluate (analyze) somebody else’s position on an ethical issue, we are not free to simply reject out-of-hand a conclusion we don’t initially agree with. To be reasonable, we must accept the burden of showing where the other person errs in his facts or reasoning. If we cannot show that there are errors in the person’s facts or reasoning, to be reasonable we must reconsider whether we should reject the other person’s conclusion.

By applying the common standards of critical thinking to our reasoning about ethical issues, our arguments will become less emotionally driven and more rational. Our reasoning will become less dependent upon unquestioned beliefs or assumptions that the other people in the conversation may not accept. We become better able to contribute to progressive public debate and conflict resolution through a well-developed ability to articulate a well-reasoned position on an ethical issue.

And, you might be thinking, “What are ethical judgments?”

Ethical judgments are a subclass of value judgments. A value judgment involves an argument as to what is correct, superior, or preferable. In the case of ethics, the value judgment involves making a judgment, claim, or statement about whether an action is morally right or wrong or whether a person’s motives are morally good or bad. Ethical judgments often prescribe as well as evaluate actions, so that to state that someone (or perhaps everyone) ethically “should” or “ought to” do something is also to make an ethical judgment.

And you may be asking yourself, “How can I distinguish ethical judgments from other kinds of value judgments?”

If ethical judgments are a subclass of value judgments, how do we distinguish them?  Ethical judgments typically state that some action is good or bad, or right or wrong, in a specifically ethical sense. It is usually not difficult to distinguish non-ethical judgments of goodness and badness from ethical ones. When someone says “That was a good action, because it was caring,” or “That was bad action, because it was cruel” they are clearly intending goodness or badness in a distinctly ethical sense.

By contrast, non-moral value judgments typically say that something is good (or bad) simply for the kind of thing it is; or that some action is right or wrong, given the practical goal or purpose that one has in mind. “That’s a good car” or “That’s a bad bike” would not be considered to moral judgments about those objects. Goodness and badness here are still value judgments, but value judgments that likely track features like comfort, styling, reliability, safety and mileage ratings, etc.

The use of “should” or “ought to” for non-moral value judgments is also easy to recognize. “You ought to enroll early” or “You made the right decision to go to college” are value-judgments, but no one would say they are ethical judgments. They reflect a concern with wholly practical aims rather than ethical ones and with the best way to attain those practical aims.

Let’s end by looking at what is meant by  the term “ethical arguments.”

Ethical arguments are arguments whose conclusion makes an ethical judgment. Ethical arguments are most typically arguments that try to show a certain policy or behavior to be either ethical or unethical. Suppose you want to argue that “The death penalty is unjust (or just) punishment” for a certain range of violent crimes. Here we have an ethical judgment, and one that with a bit more detail could serve as the thesis of a position paper on the death penalty debate.

An ethical judgment rises above mere opinion and becomes the conclusion of an ethical argument when you support it with ethical reasoning. You must say why you hold the death penalty to be ethically right or wrong, just or unjust. For instance, you might argue that it is unjust because of one or more of the reasons below:

• It is cruel, and cruel actions are wrong.
• Two wrongs don’t make a right.
• It disrespects human life.
• In some states the penalty falls unevenly on members of a racial group.
• The penalty sometimes results in the execution of innocent people.

Of course you could also give reasons to support the view that the death penalty is a just punishment for certain crimes. The point is that whichever side of the debate you take, your ethical argument should develop ethical reasons and principles rather than economic or other practical but non-moral concerns. To argue merely that the death penalty be abolished because that would save us all money is a possible policy-position, but it is essentially an economic argument rather than an ethical argument.

This work ( The Basics of Ethical Reasoning by Radford University, Radford University Core Handbook, https://lcubbison.pressbooks.com/) is free of known copyright restrictions.

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• What Is Critical Thinking? | Definition & Examples

What Is Critical Thinking? | Definition & Examples

Published on May 30, 2022 by Eoghan Ryan . Revised on May 31, 2023.

Critical thinking is the ability to effectively analyze information and form a judgment .

To think critically, you must be aware of your own biases and assumptions when encountering information, and apply consistent standards when evaluating sources .

Critical thinking skills help you to:

• Identify credible sources
• Evaluate and respond to arguments
• Assess alternative viewpoints
• Test hypotheses against relevant criteria

Table of contents

Why is critical thinking important, critical thinking examples, how to think critically, other interesting articles, frequently asked questions about critical thinking.

Critical thinking is important for making judgments about sources of information and forming your own arguments. It emphasizes a rational, objective, and self-aware approach that can help you to identify credible sources and strengthen your conclusions.

Critical thinking is important in all disciplines and throughout all stages of the research process . The types of evidence used in the sciences and in the humanities may differ, but critical thinking skills are relevant to both.

In academic writing , critical thinking can help you to determine whether a source:

• Is free from research bias
• Provides evidence to support its research findings
• Considers alternative viewpoints

Outside of academia, critical thinking goes hand in hand with information literacy to help you form opinions rationally and engage independently and critically with popular media.

Prevent plagiarism. Run a free check.

Critical thinking can help you to identify reliable sources of information that you can cite in your research paper . It can also guide your own research methods and inform your own arguments.

Outside of academia, critical thinking can help you to be aware of both your own and others’ biases and assumptions.

Academic examples

However, when you compare the findings of the study with other current research, you determine that the results seem improbable. You analyze the paper again, consulting the sources it cites.

You notice that the research was funded by the pharmaceutical company that created the treatment. Because of this, you view its results skeptically and determine that more independent research is necessary to confirm or refute them. Example: Poor critical thinking in an academic context You’re researching a paper on the impact wireless technology has had on developing countries that previously did not have large-scale communications infrastructure. You read an article that seems to confirm your hypothesis: the impact is mainly positive. Rather than evaluating the research methodology, you accept the findings uncritically.

Nonacademic examples

However, you decide to compare this review article with consumer reviews on a different site. You find that these reviews are not as positive. Some customers have had problems installing the alarm, and some have noted that it activates for no apparent reason.

You revisit the original review article. You notice that the words “sponsored content” appear in small print under the article title. Based on this, you conclude that the review is advertising and is therefore not an unbiased source. Example: Poor critical thinking in a nonacademic context You support a candidate in an upcoming election. You visit an online news site affiliated with their political party and read an article that criticizes their opponent. The article claims that the opponent is inexperienced in politics. You accept this without evidence, because it fits your preconceptions about the opponent.

There is no single way to think critically. How you engage with information will depend on the type of source you’re using and the information you need.

However, you can engage with sources in a systematic and critical way by asking certain questions when you encounter information. Like the CRAAP test , these questions focus on the currency , relevance , authority , accuracy , and purpose of a source of information.

When encountering information, ask:

• Who is the author? Are they an expert in their field?
• What do they say? Is their argument clear? Can you summarize it?
• When did they say this? Is the source current?
• Where is the information published? Is it an academic article? Is it peer-reviewed ?
• Why did the author publish it? What is their motivation?
• How do they make their argument? Is it backed up by evidence? Does it rely on opinion, speculation, or appeals to emotion ? Do they address alternative arguments?

Critical thinking also involves being aware of your own biases, not only those of others. When you make an argument or draw your own conclusions, you can ask similar questions about your own writing:

• Am I only considering evidence that supports my preconceptions?
• Is my argument expressed clearly and backed up with credible sources?
• Would I be convinced by this argument coming from someone else?

If you want to know more about ChatGPT, AI tools , citation , and plagiarism , make sure to check out some of our other articles with explanations and examples.

• ChatGPT vs human editor
• ChatGPT citations
• Is ChatGPT trustworthy?
• Using ChatGPT for your studies
• What is ChatGPT?
• Chicago style
• Paraphrasing

 Plagiarism

• Types of plagiarism
• Self-plagiarism
• Avoiding plagiarism
• Academic integrity
• Consequences of plagiarism
• Common knowledge

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Critical thinking refers to the ability to evaluate information and to be aware of biases or assumptions, including your own.

Like information literacy , it involves evaluating arguments, identifying and solving problems in an objective and systematic way, and clearly communicating your ideas.

Critical thinking skills include the ability to:

You can assess information and arguments critically by asking certain questions about the source. You can use the CRAAP test , focusing on the currency , relevance , authority , accuracy , and purpose of a source of information.

Ask questions such as:

• Who is the author? Are they an expert?
• How do they make their argument? Is it backed up by evidence?

A credible source should pass the CRAAP test  and follow these guidelines:

• The information should be up to date and current.
• The author and publication should be a trusted authority on the subject you are researching.
• The sources the author cited should be easy to find, clear, and unbiased.
• For a web source, the URL and layout should signify that it is trustworthy.

Information literacy refers to a broad range of skills, including the ability to find, evaluate, and use sources of information effectively.

Being information literate means that you:

• Know how to find credible sources
• Use relevant sources to inform your research
• Understand what constitutes plagiarism
• Know how to cite your sources correctly

Confirmation bias is the tendency to search, interpret, and recall information in a way that aligns with our pre-existing values, opinions, or beliefs. It refers to the ability to recollect information best when it amplifies what we already believe. Relatedly, we tend to forget information that contradicts our opinions.

Although selective recall is a component of confirmation bias, it should not be confused with recall bias.

On the other hand, recall bias refers to the differences in the ability between study participants to recall past events when self-reporting is used. This difference in accuracy or completeness of recollection is not related to beliefs or opinions. Rather, recall bias relates to other factors, such as the length of the recall period, age, and the characteristics of the disease under investigation.

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The Ethics of Corporate Critical Thinking

Corporate Ethics for Turbulent Markets

ISBN : 978-1-78756-192-2 , eISBN : 978-1-78756-191-5

Publication date: 30 April 2019

Executive Summary

“The unexamined life is not worth living” (Socrates). That is, without critically inquiring into the knowledge of life which is well-being and valuable, life is not worth living. Critical thinking questions existing theories and their unexamined and obsessive assumptions and generalizations, constraints, and “best” practices of the prevailing system of management and tries to replace them with more valid assumptions and generalizations that uphold the dignity, uniqueness, and inalienable rights of the individual person and the community. Better outcomes result from asking the right questions than from having the right answers. In the diverse, pluralist cultural environment of today, the promise of a truly generative dialog among Occidental (Western) and Oriental (Eastern) cultures and civilizations holds great hope for the future. Critical thinking (CT) is an “inclusive” thinking system that can facilitate this dialog such that all of us have a meaningful space and place in this universe. After defining CT and arguing its importance for executives, this chapter introduces CT in two parts: Part 1: Various Approaches to Critical Thinking; Part 2: Major Theories of Critical Thinking. Several contemporary business cases will be invoked to illustrate the need, nature, and scope of corporate CT.

Oswald A. J. Mascarenhas, S.J. (2019), "The Ethics of Corporate Critical Thinking", Corporate Ethics for Turbulent Markets ( Corporate Ethics for Turbulent Markets ), Emerald Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 151-182. https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-78756-191-520191006

Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2019 Oswald A. J. Mascarenhas

Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Licence (CC BY 4.0). Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create derivative works of this book (for both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full attribution to the original publication and authors. The full terms of this licence may be seen at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

5.1. Introduction

The word critical (from the Greek word kritikos ) means to question, to make sense of, or able to analyze. It is by questioning, by making sense of things, events, and people, and by analyzing them that we examine and improve our thinking and the thinking of others (Chaffee, 1988, p. 29). The word critical is also related to the word criticize that implies questioning and evaluation in a constructive way. Thus, at an initial and etymological level, critical thinking is thinking that questions and challenges our past and present thinking on subjects and objects, their properties, and events . Critical thinking (CT) is constructive thinking about the world of ours that questions and evaluates its operations, history, and management.

The word “critical” is closely associated with the concept of a threshold or a critical point . For instance, in physics, the critical point is the point above or below which certain physical changes will not occur. In thermodynamics, the properties of the substance at this point are called its critical constants . There are numerous other instances of this application of the word critical as “limiting.” Applied to business knowledge, critical point would mean a critical threshold beyond which we want the students to emerge free from their “critical constants” of management orthodoxy, apathy and malaise, value-hibernation, self-centered rigidity and individuality to thinking for others, for the six billion that are poor in the world, and the masses that our business education or capitalist system does not directly benefit.

CT thinks beyond the short-term to the long-term goals and consequences of our thinking, decisions, choices, and actions. CT, therefore, thinks beyond revenues, market share, profits, and shareholder value to other bottom lines that include the intended and unintended long-term consequences of corporate decision-making, strategies, and implementations.

CT is a discipline that questions and challenges “our prevailing system of management” and its assumptions and generalizations. In the process, it is an attempt in transforming the prevailing system of management. Dr. William Edwards Deming (1900-1993), author of Total Quality Management (TQM) believed that a “common system of management” governed our modern institutions and, in particular, formed a deep connection between work and school. From early infancy, we have been socialized in ways of thinking and acting that are embedded in our most formative institutional experiences. The relationship between a boss and subordinate is the same as the relationship between a teacher and student. The teacher sets the goals; the students respond to them. The teacher has the answer; the students work to get the answer. Students know when they have succeeded because the teacher tells them so. By the time the children are 10, they all know what it takes to get ahead in school and please the teacher – a lesson they carry forward in their later academic and management careers. Hence, Deming would often say, “We will never transform the prevailing system of management without transforming our prevailing system of education. They are the same system.” In a broader role, CT questions and challenges our current system of education.

5.2. Why Do We Need Critical Thinking?

We need to own and respond to problems that we are or that we create before we pass the buck on to others. Stephen Covey said it eloquently: “If you think the problem is out there , that very thought is the problem.” Lack of CT makes us either incapable of recognizing problems and their severity in ourselves or the organizations we work for, or we flatly trace their origin to others.

We have never critiqued our education and learning systems: what are we teaching, how do we teach, what do students learn, how do they use this knowledge, and what are the long-term good outcomes of our education systems on society? This is CT and its application. David Orr (1991), an environmental educator, reminded us long back that our education system could unwittingly create monsters like Hitler and Stalin. These perpetrators of the Holocaust were heirs of Kant and Goethe. In most respects, the Germans were the most educated people on earth, but their education did not serve them as an adequate barrier to barbarity. This is lack of CT of our education system.

David Orr (1991) argues that education is no guarantee of decency, prudence, or wisdom. More of the same kind of education will only compound our problems. This is not an argument for ignorance, but rather a statement that the worth of education must now be measured against the standards of decency and human survival – the issues now looming so large before us in the decade of the 1990s and beyond. It is not education that will save us, but education of a certain kind. It should be an education that can stand the scrutiny of CT.

The role of a teacher , a professional role, can be kept analytically separate from the role of a scholar . Scholarship implies realized expertise or developing expertise in one’s field, regular updating of one’s skills, intellectual honesty, and respecting intellectual property. The role of a teacher is to communicate one’s expertise and skills, and advances of knowledge to one’s students. Both roles assume and imply ethical responsibilities.

Critical filtering of one’s knowledge before it is communicated to others is important. CT makes us good and professional scholars that become the “conscience” of our discipline or field. A good scholar owes it to his/her profession to be its own objective critic. A scholar who loves his/her profession is not afraid to criticize it. A good person who loves his/her institution is not afraid to criticize it.

5.3. A Moral Canvas for Critical Thinking

The Prevailing System of Management with its Constraints and Regimentation.

GAIL Pipeline Blast Kills

An explosion in a Gas Authority of India Ltd (GAIL) pipeline around 5:00 a.m. Friday, June 27, 2014, near Nagaram Village, East Godavari District, Andhra Pradesh, India, killed at least 20 people while injuring 18 others and damaging 50 houses. Massive fires gutted houses, vehicles, and coconut orchards, leaving a trail of destruction in the village. Coconut orchards were reduced to ashes and several other crops were damaged too. Over 300 birds which included several species like cormorant, pond heron, and common crane (Eurasian crane) were also killed. The injured were rushed to different hospitals nearby in the district. Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh (AP), N. Chandrababu Naidu, who was then in Delhi, and Petroleum Minister Dharmendra Pradhan visited Nagaram and also the hospitals where the injured were being treated.

Once the blast was reported, there was almost no time to act as the damages were caused almost instantaneously. Though GAIL officials were successful in cutting off the gas supply to the suspect pipeline within 15 minutes, this duration was enough for the crisis to wreak enormous damage to the area affected, in terms of both losses to the local populace and also destruction of property and resources. GAIL dispatched multiple teams to undertake foot-patrol of every inch of its pipeline network in the KG basin to check on its deficiencies.

Allegedly, GAIL had not paid attention to the many complaints on gas leaks that were made by the Nagaram villagers. They said that the pipelines were laid 15–20 years ago and had become corroded and defective. The Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD), under the petroleum ministry, carries out periodical safety checks and audits of oil and gas installations across the country. Apparently, they did not detect the GAIL pipeline defects near Nagaram village. Moreover, OISD has only powers of recommendation. It is not a statutory body. Often, its recommendations have not been taken seriously. There have been talks now of giving it such an authority, but it has not materialized yet.

GAIL is a Government of India undertaking and is India’s largest state-owned natural gas processing and distribution company. It procures natural gas from ONGC, Reliance Industries, and Cairn Energy. It has 850 kilometers of gas pipelines in Andhra Pradesh and supplies natural gas to 37 industrial units. A winner of the prestigious award Maharatna, GAIL is known for high standards in terms of quality. As per industry rules, GAIL did follow all statutory and safety guidelines in their operations. They also had ensured that the pipeline had been certified safe by various national and international agencies. The probability of a leak being present in their pipeline for so long without any action being taken would therefore have been very small.There are over a dozen gas-gathering stations in the area. GAIL supplies gas to 37 industrial units in Andhra Pradesh, including the Lanco Kondapalli power project near Vijayawada. Operations at Lanco, however, were not affected as they resumed gas supply through an alternative pipeline. Supply to the 1,466 megawatt Lanco power station was restored within a few hours. GAIL supplies 0.7 million British thermal units (BTU) a day to the Lanco plant.

The sudden stoppage of supply of natural gas to industries in Kakinada from the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation’s (ONGC) Tatipaka terminal seems to have an adverse impact on the urea production. However, the absence of the supply of natural gas has forced the Nagarjuna Fertilizers and Chemicals Limited (NFCL), the largest manufacturer of fertilizer, to stop production forcibly in its plants located in the city. The firm that produces 4,600 tons of urea a day was in idle mode for the next two weeks, which cost Rs 1.5 crore a day in terms of halted production.

GAIL faced a dilemma as to how to address this situation in the future. Even though there is a valve at every 40 km of the pipeline and it gets shut in case of a leak, layout of pipelines through the residential area is protested by people. Though they reestablished supply to the various industries in the neighboring regions through an alternate pipeline quite briskly, their goodwill and industry standing had taken a battering. Further, the blast also resulted in major capital losses through the destruction of the pipeline and loss of the gas that is transported.

The Petroleum Minister Pradhan has ordered an inquiry into this debacle by a committee headed by a joint secretary and with representatives from the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, the OISD, and the National Disaster Management Authority.

A public interest litigation was filed in the High Court seeking directions to the GAIL to shift the gas control station (GCS) located in the midst of a habitation to an isolated place with immediate effect. The Hyderabad High Court on Monday, June 30, 2014, directed the central government to file its reply within three weeks to a petition that sought the shifting of gas collecting station (GCS) and pipelines of GAIL from Nagaram area of East Godavari district.

In a late-evening press release on Friday, June 27, 2014, ONGC said there could be minor gas leaks in the trunk line, which due to zero wind in the vicinity get settled over the area. During the early hours, when someone lights a stove for daily chores, the settled gas could trigger fire amounting to a pipeline explosion. The GAIL terminal was closed instantly, but it took 15 minutes for the gas source to cease. In the intervening time, the remaining gas in the pipeline might have caught fire and caused the burst of the GAIL’s trunk line.

Ethical Questions

Define the GAIL pipeline disaster as an ethical organizational crisis. Describe its antecedents, determinants, symptoms, concomitants, and consequences in relation to GAIL.

Some crises can be recurrent and non-preventable, whether they are system breakdowns, human interventions, or natural disasters. To which type does GAIL pipeline blast belong and why? To what extent is ONGC’s explanation of this blast a crisis that is recurrent and non-preventable, and why?

Other crises are rare but their organizational impact is high. Effective management of such a crisis is difficult and often partial. Does the GAIL pipeline blast belong to this category?

In general, most organizational crises imply and/or accompany losses of capital, human resources, revenues, and reputation. Assess these losses for the Nagarjuna village and for GAIL. Assess GAIL’s moral responsibility to prevent such disasters.

Hence, argue, develop, and justify an ethics of organizational crisis by content, goals, and objectives. Compare it to the Bhopal Spill of December 2–3, 1984.

Apply CT principles: which did GAIL violate most and why?

Apply ethical theory principles of teleology, deontology, distributive justice, and corrective justice: which ethical theory and its principles did GAIL (together with OISD and ONGC) compromise most and why?

Hence, how would you detect, avert, and preempt such disasters in the future, especially in relation to the powerless poor villages of India?

Andy Fastow’s Critical Thinking After His Prison Sentence Experience

For six years in a row, Fortune magazine named Enron the “Most Innovative Company,” and Fastow himself was praised for his creative use of structured finance and off-balance sheet accounting.

Released from the Prison in 2011 after serving a sentence for six years, Andy Fastow, ex-CFO Enron, addressed University of New Mexico (UNM) B-students. The presentation, titled “Rules versus Principles,” was put on by the Daniels Fund Ethics Initiative at UNM, which supports business ethics education. In a rare public lecture, Andy Fastow held up his “CFO of the Year” award in one hand, and his federal prison ID card in the other and said: “I got both of these for doing the exact same thing,” he said before a crowd of eager UNM business students.

Fastow went on to talk about his role in the biggest corporate scandal of the century and the lessons he learned about the ethics of business. In 2001, the Securities and Exchange Commission investigated Fastow’s role in hiding massive amounts of Enron’s debt using off-balance sheet accounting and special-purpose entities. Fastow was eventually convicted of fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy and was forced to forfeit nearly US$24 million in assets. He was sentenced to six years in federal prison and was released in December 2011.

The collapse of Enron was a dramatic example of the failure of business people to put principles before rules, Fastow explained – a mistake that corporations and governments still make to this day. “I didn’t set out to commit fraud,” Fastow said. “I cannot remember any time that I ever considered I was committing fraud.”

Fastow described the strange world that a CFO operates in, a gray area where the rules set by regulators are complex, vague, and sometimes nonexistent. This gray area can be seen as an opportunity, a chance for businesses to interpret the rules to suit their needs, he said. In these situations, it is incredibly important for individuals and organizations to recognize unethical behavior and determine the best ways to proceed, he said. “I thought I was so smart; I thought I was a hero for bending the rules,” Fastow said. “It comes down to individual people making a decision – we always asked ‘is it allowed?’ not ‘is it the right thing to do?’”

His message to the students was simple: rules and regulations are not enough. Only employees can make a difference by standing up and saying “no” when they encounter unethical practices in their business careers.

“You can always find an attorney to get you the answer you want. You can always find an accountant to get you the answer you want,” Fastow said. “There’s only one gatekeeper – you.”

Source : Baca, Jonathan (2014, November 25). Ex-Enron CFO gives ethics lecture. DailyLobo.Com . Retrieved from http://www.dailylobo.com/article/2014/11/11-25-enron-cfo-speech . Jonathan Baca is the news editor at the Daily Lobo. He can be contacted at [email protected] , or on Twitter@JonGabrielB .

5.4. Part 1: Various Approaches to Critical Thinking

The concept of “critical thinking” is variedly defined in the relevant literature. We select a few thematic views of CT, especially as they relate to business and ethics of business education.

5.4.1. Critical Thinking as Making Better Sense of the World Around Us

Chaffee (1988, p. 26) views CT as an active and organized effort to make a better sense of the world around us. Thinking represents “our active, purposeful, organized efforts to make sense of the world.” Thinking critically is “our active, purposeful, organized efforts to make sense of the world by carefully examining our thinking and the thinking of others in order to clarify and improve our understanding” (Chaffee, 1988, p. 27). Thinking is the way we make sense of the world; thinking critically is thinking about our thinking so that we can clarify and improve it.

CT is not simply one way of thinking. It is a total holistic approach to understanding how we make sense of the world and the universe. When we think critically, we are actively using our intelligence, knowledge, and skills to effectively deal with our life’s situations and ourselves (Chaffee, 1988, p. 30). CT involves taking an active attitude toward the situations encountered in life. Thinking critically does not mean simply having thoughts and waiting for things to happen. This would be passive thinking – we would be letting events, others, and their thinking to control us and define us. Watching too much television or indulging in social media, for instance, is passive thinking; we allow ourselves to be influenced by the thinking and acting of others. CT is active, proactive, and interactive dialog with our world of people, properties, and events.

5.4.2. Critical Thinking as Reflective Thinking

According to Paul and Elder (2002), CT is reflective thinking or thinking critically. Thinking critically is reflection – to think back on what we are thinking or feeling. It is thinking back on thinking. To think critically is to think carefully about our thinking and the thinking of others. It is a serious study of thinking. It is serious thinking about thinking. You become the “critic” of your own thinking.

CT is to improve your thinking. “Critical thinking is the disciplined art of ensuring that you use the best thinking you are capable of in any set of circumstances” (Paul & Elder, 2002, p. 7). Our thinking influences everything we do, want, or feel. CT refuses biases, prejudices or stereotypes, false beliefs, myths, or illusions to influence our thinking.

There is what we might call a first-order thinking that is our everyday thinking, spontaneous and non-reflective thinking. It contains insights, prejudices, truth and errors, good and bad reasoning, misconceptions, and ideological rigidities. CT is second-order thinking : it reflects on, reconstructs, analyzes, and assesses the first-order thinking (Paul & Elder, 2002, p. 14). CT is “self-directed, self-disciplined, self-monitored, and self-corrective thinking. It presupposes assent to rigorous standards of excellence and is a careful command of their use. CT implies and empowers effective communication and problem-solving abilities” (Paul & Elder, 2002, p. 15).

5.4.3. Critical Thinking as Questioning and Challenging

According to Collins (2001), CT is questioning and challenging what you learn . CT is letting students question and challenge what you teach. The best students are those who never quite believe their professors (Collins, 2001, p. 16).

CT does not reject the data merely because one does not like what the data imply. CT confronts the implications. CT does not reject the data merely because it rejects the theory one espouses. CT questions one’s espoused theory. CT does not reject the data merely because it rejects one’s assumptions and presuppositions. CT questions and challenges one’s assumptions and presuppositions about oneself, the society, and the world.

CT does not reject the theory merely because the data do not confirm it. CT sifts the data and questions its reliability, validity, and objectivity or veracity. CT is prepared to revise the theory if the data justify it. CT does not generalize when there is no evidence to back the generalization.

5.4.4. Critical Thinking as Spiritual Intelligence

According to Stephen Covey (2004), the four magnificent parts of our nature consist of body, mind, heart, and spirit that have corresponding four capacities or intelligences: physical or body intelligence (PQ), mental intelligence (IQ), emotional intelligence (EQ), and spiritual intelligence (SQ).

PQ is something that happens within our body controlling the respiratory, circulatory, metabolic, nervous, and other vital systems. PQ constantly scans our environment, adjusts to it, destroys diseased cells, and fights for survival. PQ controls and coordinates the function of roughly seven trillion cells of our body with a mind-boggling level of biochemical and biophysical coordination that controls our reflexes, instincts, drives, passions, habits, manual skills, and body routines. PQ manages the entire system, much of it unconscious. IQ or mental intelligence is our ability to reason, analyze our reasons and reasoning, think abstractly, use language, visualize, conceptualize, theorize, and comprehend. EQ is one’s self-knowledge, self-awareness, social sensitivity, empathy, and ability to communicate successfully with others. It is a sense of timing and social appropriateness, having the courage to acknowledge weaknesses, and express and respect differences. Abilities such as leadership, successful communications, and relationships are primarily a function of EQ than IQ (Covey, 2004, pp. 50–51).

SQ is today becoming mainstream in scientific inquiry, philosophical, and psychological discussion. SQ is the central and the most fundamental of all four intelligences because it becomes the source of guidance of the other three. SQ represents our drive for meaning and connection with the infinite. SQ is “thinking with your soul” (Wolman, 2001, p. 26) and represents the ancient and abiding human quest for connectedness with something larger and trust-worthier than our world and us. Unlike IQ that computers and robots have, and EQ that higher mammals possess, SQ is uniquely human and most fundamental. It stands for our quest for our longing for meaning, vision, and value; it allows us to dream and to strive; it underlies the things we believe in and hope for; it makes us human.

SQ relates to the whole reality and dimension that is bigger, more creative, more loving, more powerful, more visionary, wiser, and more mysterious – than the materialistic daily human existence. While IQ relates to becoming more knowledgeable, PQ to becoming healthier and strong, EQ relates to becoming more relational and sensitive, and SQ relates to becoming a person (see Rogers, 1961).

High IQ is not enough: brilliance is not necessarily humanizing. High PQ is not enough: athletes, boxers, and heavyweight fighters have it and it did not necessarily humanize them. High EQ is good but not sufficient: it provides passion but not humanity. High IQ may provide vision, high PQ may imply discipline, and high EQ may mean passion. Adolph Hitler had all three but produced shockingly different result (Collins, 2001, p. 69). High IQ, EQ, and SQ are a great combination: Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King, Jr., and a few others had them. High IQ, PQ, EQ, and SQ are a perfect combination. The prophets and patriarchs of the Old and New Testaments are good examples. A contemporary example is Mohandas Gandhi or Mother Teresa.

5.4.5. Critical Thinking as Valuing Resources Hierarchically

A fact is defined as “a statement of the way the world is” (p. 348), the way of the world being independent of our knowledge.

Knowledge can be of facts, known, or at times unknown but speculated.

Understanding consists of knowledge that is integrated in some unified way and evaluated.

Information is sometimes used to include data, facts, and knowledge, as when we speak of information systems.

Data : Information that is entered or fed into the (computer) information system by way of codes as numbers, words, letters, or symbols.

Any individual may appropriate facts without depriving anyone else from them. In this sense, facts, information, and knowledge are infinitely shareable. However, the discovery of some facts, collecting and sorting them, often involves time and expense, and this provides a basis for claims of “intellectual property” in relation to some “facts” as proprietary, at least for a short time period. That is, while facts are common property and cannot be owned, data representing facts may be owned to the extent that one painstakingly collected and verified facts and entered such facts into the computer as classified and organized data. Data are not owned as tangible objects are owned, but printout of data can be owned to the extent one has collected, organized, and classified them and made available in a package form usable for a given target market.

Facts cannot be falsified, but data can be. Data may represent falsehood as well as facts. Such distinctions have legal implications. For instance, to what extent are mailing lists (collection of names, addresses, social security numbers, credit card numbers, and the like) stored and sorted in computers by an information broker are data that can be owned, and hence sold as a commodity? (These problems deal with the Ethics of Consumer Privacy; see, for example, Mascarenhas, Kesavan, & Bernacchi, 2003).

Data/events : Facts, figures, events, anecdotes, vignettes, information, narratives, descriptions, history, and statistics.

Information/meaning : Analysis and interpretation of “data” in terms of finding trends, patterns and connections between “data,” deriving inferences or conclusions from “data,” and thus, seeking meaning and significance of “data.”

Experience/knowledge : Based on “analysis” and interpretation of data from various fields, disciplines, and domains, one derives intelligent (or empirically verifiable) propositions, hypotheses, connections, and conclusions and accordingly, builds theories, axioms, and paradigms. Knowledge can grow from theory that is verified by data ( deductive : theory to data) or from data that ground theory ( inductive : data to theory), and based on both theory and data to forecasting the future ( predictive : from the past to the future).

Values/principles : What are the lasting, enhancing, and humanizing values or principles in the data, and our analysis of and knowledge from it, which will make life better for all? What are also the temporal, degrading, and dehumanizing values that could make life worse for all?

Wisdom/freedom : Based on data, experience, analysis, knowledge, and values, one finally derives or absorbs and cumulatively stores wisdom that discerns what is truth from error and falsehood, what is right from wrong, good from evil, just from unjust, ethical from the unethical, moral from the immoral, virtue from vice, grace from sin, life from death, lasting values from the ephemeral, and from earth to heaven, and from time to eternity.

Ethical and moral strategy : Based on right discernment derived from wisdom of the previous stage, we should have the moral courage and pertinacity to speak and affirm the truth while denouncing falsehood, of doing what is right and avoiding what is wrong, of doing what is good, just, and fair and rejecting what is wrong, unjust, and unfair, of doing what is ethical and moral and desist from what is unethical and immoral, of pursuing virtue and resisting vice, of seeking grace and life as opposed to sin and death, and persistently seek perennial and universal values while downplaying the ephemeral and temporal, and thus, peacefully and collectively journey from earth to heaven, from time to eternity.

CT-based education should lead us from data/events to analysis that generates information and meaning, from information and meaning to experience and knowledge, from experience/knowledge to lasting values and universal principles, from values and principles to wisdom and freedom to pursue wisdom, and from wisdom to ethical and moral actions and outcomes.

Mere increase in knowledge does not imply a proportionate increase in human goodness, argues Orr (1991). The current information explosion in terms of increased data, numbers, words, paper, and the like do not imply an increase in knowledge, wisdom, and virtue. Such learning does not make us better people, ethical people, especially if the knowledge of the good, of ecology, of land health, etc., is excluded from our curricula by default, if not by design. Our education may make us ignorant of things we must know to live well and sustainably on the earth.

Good CT is many sequential intellectual activities such as analyzing, conceptualizing, defining, examining, inferring, listening, questioning, reasoning and synthesizing, doing and reflecting, and growing and becoming. All these activities combined will help us to evaluate information and evaluate and refine our thought processes in a disciplined way. Thus, CT helps us to think more comprehensively and more able to identify and reject false ideas and ideologies, our flaws of thinking, our biases and prejudices of our culture and upbringing, our assumptions, presumptions, and presuppositions of cherished doctrines and beliefs, and thus to seek to be guided by true knowledge and evidence that fits with reality, and even refutes our cherished beliefs and dogmas.

CT is curiosity that widens our perspective and knowledge; it empowers us to do all the work required and to keep ourselves properly informed. CT is healthy skepticism that does not discriminate against people but doubts and suspends judgment in order to understand people better, to explain things better by testing, evidence, factual claims, and sound reasoning.

CT does not seek 100% clarity and certainty; it can handle uncertainty of knowledge, ambiguity of not-knowing, ambivalence of goals and objectives, and tolerate current levels of ignorance. CT waits for valid evidence, for evidence-based answers, and awaits further research from scientists and scholars. CT does not rely on only one solution to a problem, but investigates multiple problem formulations and multiple solutions, and finally, converges to one solution based on solid irrefutable evidence. Thus, CT avoids errors (types I, II, III, and IV) and flawed thinking. CT is prepared to make unavoidable mistakes and absorb risk so that we can learn from our mistakes. CT takes the risk of being wrong, is prepared to be wrong. If we are not prepared to be wrong, we are not prepared to be creative.

In general, type I error refers to rejecting a hypothesis, candidate, product, or a service when it is good or true; type II error relates to accepting a hypothesis, candidate, product, or a service when it is bad or false; type III error is to define a problem wrongly in terms of what is good or false in judging a hypothesis, candidate, or statement as good or false; and type IV error is finding a wrong solution to a right problem.

Type I is producer risk (e.g., a good but rejected product or market is a producer’s loss); type II error is consumer risk; e.g., a wrong product or service accepted and sold can harm consumers. Type III and type IV errors are social risks or scientific flaws, as they affect consumers and producers, markets, and industries. Good CT seeks to reduce all four types of errors and their associated producer and consumer risks.

5.4.6. Critical Thinking as Building on Your Strengths

Guided by the belief that good is the opposite of bad, or right the opposite of wrong, we have unduly focused on our faults and failures in building our strengths. For instance, doctors study diseases and its symptoms in order to learn about health; psychologists investigate sadness in exploring joy; marriage therapists study causes of divorce in identifying characteristics of a happy marriage; in schools and workplaces, we are advised to look into our faults and weaknesses assuming that we can build strengths by eliminating weaknesses. Buckingham and Clifton (2001) disagree with this approach. According to these authors, faults and failing deserve investigation, but they reveal little about strengths. Strengths have their own patterns. To excel in your chosen field and to find lasting satisfaction in doing so, you will need to understand your strengths and their unique patterns.

HR managers must not only accommodate the fact that each employee is different, they must capitalize on these differences. They must watch for clues to each employee’s natural talents and then position and develop each employee so that his or her talents transform into bona fide strengths. By changing the way you select, measure, develop, and channel the careers of your people, your organization can be revolutionary and could build your entire enterprise around the strengths of each person. To spur high-margin growth and thereby increase their value, great organizations need only focus inward to find the wealth of unrealized capacity that resides in every single employee (Buckingham & Clifton, 2001, p. 6).

Most organizations are built on two flawed assumptions about people: (1) each person can learn to be competent in almost anything, and (2) each person’s greatest room for growth is in his or her areas of greatest weakness. Thus, if everyone can learn to be competent in almost anything, those who have learned the most must be most valuable, and hence, by design, the organization gives the most prestige, respect, and promotions based on the skills or experiences they have acquired in the company. Hence, organizations spend more money in training people once they hire them than on selecting them properly in the first place. They spend most of their training time and money on trying to plug the gaps in employee’s skills or competencies, calling the latter weaknesses as “areas of opportunity.” In training the incompetent, organizations prescribe work styles by emphasizing on work rules, policies, procedures, and behavioral competencies. Most organizations take their employees’ strengths for granted and focus on minimizing their weaknesses. Most HRD learning experiments focus on fixing each employee’s weaknesses than building on their strengths. Most often, however, this is not human development, but just damage control . Damage control is a poor strategy for elevating either the employee or the organization to world-class performance.

Buckingham and Clifton (2001, p. 8) offer alternative counter-assumptions: (1) each person’s talents are enduring and unique, and (2) each person’s greatest room for growth is in the areas of his or her greatest strength. These two assumptions should guide HR managers to select, develop, measure, and channel the strengths and careers of their people. These assumptions should explain why great managers are careful to look for talent in every role, why they focus performance on outcomes than on work styles, why they treat each person differently, and finally, why they spend most time with their best people.

Hence, in this context, a CT exercise should start with yourself: What are my strengths? How can I capitalize on them? How can I combine them? What are my most powerful combinations? Where do they take me? The real tragedy of life is not that each of us does not have enough strengths but that we fail to use the ones we have. Benjamin Franklin called wasted strengths “sundials in the shade.” Hence, identify your sundials in the shade. Look inside yourself and identify your strongest strengths, reinforce them by practice, learning and training, and then carve out a role that draws on these strengths everyday. When you do, you will be more productive, more fulfilled, and more successful (Buckingham & Clifton, 2001, p. 21).

Tiger Woods had a different strength – his length with his woods and his irons and tremendous accuracy in his putting. His ability to chip out of a bunker was no good; he did not need it either; and much less did he cultivate it. Instead, he deliberately played to his strengths. He loved what he did because he deliberately worked on his strengths.

Bill Gates’s strength was at taking information technology (IT) inventions to the market and transforming them into user-friendly applications and marketing them effectively. His ability to maintain and build an enterprise in the face of legal and commercial assault was his weakness – he let Steve Ballmer handle that.

Talents, knowledge, and skills are raw materials to building strengths, but most important among these are talents. Talents are innate, while knowledge and skills can be learned and cultivated. You can never possess strengths (e.g., salesmanship, closing a sale) without requisite talents (e.g., gift of persuasion, talent for negotiation). The key to building your strengths is to identify your dominant talents and then refine them with knowledge and skills. Skills determine if you can do something, whereas talents reveal how well and how often you do it.

5.5. Part 2: Some Theories of Critical Thinking

CT is a nascent science and tradition. Part 1 has suggested various approaches to CT. We now present some doctrines that could be used as emerging theories of CT.

5.5.1. Critical Thinking and Defensive Routines

(See Peter Senge, 2006, The Fifth Discipline , pp. 232–240)

For more than 40 years, Chris Argyris and his colleagues have studied the dilemma why bright capable managers often fail to learn effectively in management teams. Their work suggests that success of team learning and productivity is dependent upon how a manager faces conflict and deals with the defensiveness that invariably surrounds conflict. Argyris (1985) coined the concept in this regard and proposed the theory of “Defensive Routines” that can help us further hone our CT skills. Writes Argyris, “We are programmed to create defensive routines, and cover them up with further defensive routines. […] This programming occurs early in life.”

Defensive routines are mental models that express our entrenched habits of thinking, deciding, and acting that we use to protect ourselves from the embarrassment and threat that come with exposing our thinking. Defensive routines are our deepest assumptions that not only defend us against pain but also keep us from learning about the causes of pain. The source of our defensive routines is the fear of exposing the thinking that lies behind our views. “Defensive reasoning” protects us from learning about the validity of our reasoning. We often feel that exposing our thinking is very threatening because we are afraid that people will find flaws and errors in it. This perceived threat from exposing our thinking starts early in life at home and is steadily reinforced in schools, colleges, and the workplace. Other things being equal, most of our defensive routines surround our thinking about religion, caste, color, creed, races, ethnicity, gender and age discrimination, cultural enclaves, and national exclusivity.

Top executives or senior managers, who pride themselves as skilled communicators and risk takers, may be, in fact, so brilliant at articulating their vision that they intimidate everyone around them. Consequently, their subordinates rarely challenge their views publicly. Further, people feel afraid to express their own views and opinions around them. Such CEOs may not see their own entrenchment and forcefulness as a defensive strategy, but they function in exactly that way. This strategy has become the CEOs’ most effective defensive routine. Presumably, the CEOs hoped to provoke others into expressing their thoughts, but their overbearing behavior prevented them from doing so, thereby further protecting their views from challenge.

Defensive routines are a response to a problem. In general, a problem is a need to learn, arising from the “learning gap” between what a company knows and what the company should know. The “fundamental solution” is objective inquiry that eventually generates new understanding about the problem and new behavior – that is, organizational learning. However, the need for learning also creates a threat, which, in turn, leads to “symptomatic solutions” or “quick-fix band-aid solutions” prompted by defensive routines that apparently reduce the learning gap by reducing perceived need for learning.

Problems caused by defensive routines compound in organizations where to have incomplete or faulty understanding is a sign of weakness or incompetence. Deep within the mental models of managers in many organizations is the belief that managers must know what is going on. All managers are expected to know the causes of problems within their organization. Some managers respond to this expectation by internalizing an air of confidence that makes their subordinates believe they know the right answers to the most important problems in their division or company. Often, to protect their air of confidence, they will close themselves to alternative views, become rigid, and make themselves un-influenceable, even though deep down they may be fully conscious of the uncertainty in their understanding of the problems and the solutions. Alternatively, to maintain a façade of confidence they may even obscure their ignorance. In short, managers who must take on the burden of having to know the answers become highly skilled in their defensive routines. They play political games in their organizations. Defensive routines are like diseases – the top executives carry them, and the organizations are the hosts. Soon the organizations are infected, and they too become carriers.

To illustrate how defensive routines function within an organization, consider the case of ATP Products , a young division of an innovative and highly decentralized company. Tim Tabor, 33, was the divisional president, deeply committed to the corporate values of freedom and local autonomy. He believed strongly in the state-of-the-art technology products (e.g., new printed circuit boards) of ATP, rallied tremendous support from his subordinates, who in turn shared Tim’s enthusiasm for their prospects. Divisional bookings grew rapidly – 30% to 50% each year until sales reached US$50 million in 1994. Accordingly, ATP doubled its capacity. In 1995, with the disastrous downturn in the minicomputer industry, ATP experienced a 50% shortfall on projected bookings. The industry did not bounce back in 1996. Tim Tabor was fired from division president to an ordinary engineering manager.

What happened? Tim’s locked-in strategy was flawed owing to several defensive routines. His team had set aggressive growth targets, in part, to please the top management; he strongly believed in the product without letting his beliefs challenged; meeting these targets, he put too much pressure on his subordinates that they had no time to question what they were doing, and they relied on a few major customers upon whom they became very dependent. When the business of these customers failed, ATP was doomed.

Why did not the top management at ATP sanction a strategy that was so vulnerable, and force Tim to diversify its customer base? The top management had its own defensive routines. Although the CEO had recognized the problem of the narrow customer base, he did not want to violate the corporation’s decentralized policy or interfere with the forceful strategy of the young ATP division president. Moreover, Tim had questions that he was reluctant to discuss with his superiors, as he did not want to let them down, nor was he prepared to face criticism from them. Hence, there were defensive routines throughout the organization that did not enable free inquiry and reflection.

The more effective defensive routines are: the more effectively do they cover up underlying problems, the less effectively do you face the problems, and the worse the problems tend to become. The paradox, writes Argyris, is that when defensive routines succeed in preventing immediate pain they also prevent us from learning how to reduce what causes pain in the first place. Defensive routines are “self-sealing” – they obscure their own existence. If you cannot easily identify or state your defensive routines, you do not have leverage for reducing them either.

One of the most useful skills of a learning team is the ability to recognize when we are not reflecting on our own assumptions, when we are not objectively inquiring into each other’s thinking, and when we are not exposing our thinking in a way that encourages others to inquire into it. This is CT. It is to dismantle our defensive routines and defensive reasoning and have everything exposed for checks and balances.

CT enables us to acknowledge our own defensiveness without provoking more defensiveness. Often, the stronger the defensiveness, the more important is the issue or the problem around which we defend or protect our views. If these views are made transparent, they will provide windows onto each other’s thinking. It is not the absence of defensiveness that characterizes learning teams, but the way defensiveness is faced. A team committed to learning must be committed to tell the truth about our thinking and about the assumptions underlying the forceful strategies we propose. To see reality of the markets more clearly, we must also assess and see our strengths for obscuring reality.

5.5.2. Critical Thinking Applied to Human Resource Management

The most important asset in a company is the right people – the ones who provide the team and customer service behavior the organization needs. Employees represent a company’s first market. If companies are not investing in and listening to their employees, as well as their customers, they are probably missing opportunities to create competitive advantage (Jones, 2000).

High turnover is a major problem that can be addressed through trust. If employees do not trust their organization to provide equitable pay, training, and advancement, they will not stay long enough to become effective and affective team members. When a company focuses on creating quality for employees and competence in employees, they can be empowered to create happy customers. And, happy customers buy more (Jones, 2000).

Human resource planning is an essential part of successful customer service, because to a customer anyone working for an organization represents the organization. Each employee is a potential customer service representative (Jones, 2000), and salespersons, particularly, are frontline company ambassadors (Sirdeshmukh et al., 2002). Customers truly enjoy having a well-trained, knowledgeable person to deal with their concerns and orders. An organization needs to know how it impresses on its customers who contact it. Much of the impression would depend upon how the organization’s employees interact with the customers. Value-chain involvement enables this knowledge.

Organizational theory : This theory believes that human needs are either so irrational or so varied and adjustable to specific situations that the major function of personnel management is to be pragmatic as occasion demands. Hence, if jobs are organized and structured in terms of clarity of job goals and objectives, favorable worker attitudes will follow.

Industrial engineering : Humankind is mechanistically inclined and economically motivated and human needs are best met by attuning the individual to the most efficient work process. Personnel managers should therefore concoct the most appropriate incentive systems and design specific working conditions that maximally utilize the human machine, and worker attitudes will follow.

Behavioral science : Mankind is basically social, group-oriented. Hence, personnel managers should work on group sentiments, organizational, psychological, and social culture and climate. Personnel managers should focus on human values and human relations, and these in turn will generate healthy employee attitudes.

All three theories duly applied should motivate employees as evidenced by a significant reduction in absenteeism, errors, and violation of safety rules, strikes, restriction of output, higher wages, greater fringe benefits, and labor turnover.

Herzberg (1968) motivation-hygiene theory works on the same principle of industrial engineering but for opposite goals. Rather than rationalizing work to increase efficiency, his theory suggests that work be enriched to bring about effective utilization of employees. The theory advocates a systematic manipulation of the motivation factors for motivating the employees.

Head : Where are we? What brought us here? Where are we going? What change of behavior can get us there?

Heart : Why are we here? Why do we want to go there? Why must we change? What is in it for me? Am I capable of change? Do I have the heart and the will to change?

Hands : What do I need to do? What skills should I train myself in? What behavior changes do I require? Do I have the energy and the team support to acquire those behavior changes and skills?

Critical Questions for Managing Required Change in Organizations.

Coming to grips with the problem : Do the people involved perceive and acknowledge the problem? Do they still resist or deny it? Have people’s mindsets changed? Do they intellectually recognize the need for change? Do they have a sense of how their organization must respond to the problem, and the change the problem demands?

Working it through : Are people intensely and honestly working to accept and internalize the required change and its implications? Have the things that must change been well communicated? How do people feel about the changes? Are they adequately ready in mind, heart, and hands for the change?

Maintaining momentum : Is the organization committed to bring about this change and support it with all its resources? Is the organization keeping the required pace of change? Is the organization ready to incorporate the change into its management practice, climate, and culture?

How do I know that my team, the organization, and I are really changing? Is there an appreciable difference between the “before” and the “after”? What is this difference? Is this the real change we want? Measuring change is a powerful change management technique. Implementing strategic change requires that people learn new ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving. We know that people learn and change much more efficiently when they receive fair and objective feedback on how they are doing.

Table 5.2 lists the critical questions when the three body-part arenas are crosschecked against the three stages of implementing change. One can develop a scorecard that measures progressive change in response to the relevant questions raised in each of the nine cells of Table 5.2 . This is a change process tracking scorecard and not an outcome realization scorecard. The change implementation scorecard can diagnose problems that arise while the people learn (head), internalize learning (heart) and live, witness, and communicate (hands) learning.

5.6. Critical Thinking as Identifying and Combating Biases, Prejudices, and Presumptions in Business Thinking

A quick analysis of all these definitions and approaches to CT reveals that CT identifies biases, prejudices, and presumptions in our thinking and rectifies them by replacing them with strong normative imperatives. Hence, our approach to CT is to identify typical biases, prejudices, presumptions, and presuppositions inherent in the Capitalist Free Enterprise System (CFES) that grounds our business enterprise, business schools, the MBA, and the PGDBM programs and to help executives and students to identify them, analyze them, and correct them. In the following sections, we analyze CFES from this perspective.

A bias is a mental leaning or inclination, partially bent. From a statistical viewpoint, a bias is any systematic error that contributes to the difference between statistical values in a population and a sample drawn from it. Hence, we define bias as the systematic leaning of one’s thinking that deviates from the norm.

A prejudice implies a judgment or opinion formed before the facts are known. It is a preconceived idea, mostly unfavorable, marked by a suspicion, intolerance, or irrational hatred for other races, creeds, and occupations.

An assumption is a more basic act of assuming a fact, property, or event for granted without critically assessing its accuracy and veracity, reliability, and validity.

A presumption is a subset of assumption and implies taking something for granted or unjustifiably accepting it as true, usually on the basis of improper evidence.

A supposition is the act of assuming something to be true for the sake of an argument or to illustrate a proof. It is regarding something as true without actual knowledge, hence, often tantamount to conjecture, guessing or mere imagination. In this sense, it is a subset of assumption.

A presupposition is an act or statement of supposing or assuming beforehand. It also means to require or imply as a preceding condition for something.

All of the above, biases, prejudices, assumptions and presumptions, and suppositions and presuppositions can be wrong inclinations or systematic errors in our thinking. CT intends to unearth them, confront them, and rectify them or eliminate them.

A Set of Biases, Prejudices, Presumptions, and Human Imperatives.

According to Godel’s theorem (Hofstadler, 1979), as a formal system, no theory can be both complete and consistent. Consistency is the condition under which symbols acquire meanings; consistency seeks to derive true statements. Completeness, on the other hand, is the confirmation of these meanings; completeness seeks all true statements. Formal theory systems have to balance inconsistency and incompleteness. No theory is intended to answer all questions. Theories that seek too much comprehensiveness can become so overextended as to become ambiguous and complicated. As a social science, marketing theory can best develop through layered assertions into an integral theory. Just as a collection of sentences does not necessarily make a story, nor can a collection of assertions, even when verified, necessarily becomes a theory (Sutton & Staw, 1995). CT accepts Godel’s theorem and its practical realism in formulating a comprehensive business turnaround management theory.

5.6.1. Legal, Ethical, and Moral Issues of GAIL (Case 5.1)

Legal : Agreed that the Laws of the Land were not technically and strictly violated, there are other ethical and moral obligations such as the duty and right of regular and quality maintenance of the pipeline and its environment, especially when GAIL was alerted by several complaints of the locals.

Ethical issues : No transfer of benefits to the locals except for employment of a few when the pipeline was routed through their village properties. Also no proactive responsibility was designed and executed even when it was known that explosive gas-bearing pipelines would jeopardize surrounding villages and their livelihoods.

Moral : The intention of ignoring the complaints of the poor smacks of power and might of big corporations. Not taking responsibility for the well-being of the local villages is a serious omission. Narrowing duty to mere law compliance regarding protecting pipes, and not considering it as a true safety issue, is lack of CT. Mere cost-containment and growth-expansion strategies at the expense of locals are exclusive and not inclusive growth strategies.

Giving statutory powers to OISD.

Merging Petroleum and Explosive Safety Organisation (PESO) to OISD.

Increasing the accountability of industries to the communities they impact.

Setting up quick action response teams for natural and man-made disasters.

Strong investigating and complaints body to address local concerns.

Awareness on safety and hazards to the locals living close to oil and petroleum set-ups.

Triple bottom should be implemented: ecology, safety, and profitability. Workplace and operational safety should be top priorities coupled with taking care of the community interests.

Consequences for all internal and external stakeholders should be foreseen and avoided.

The case of GAIL pipeline blast is clearly a question of moral lapse. Every organization has certain values that it needs to prioritize because its presence in the ecology itself is an intervention. Value is something which characterizes the way we behave. The very fact that the GAIL, OSID, PESO, and ONGC authorities treated the matter as a mere compliance issue and not a village safety issue made them overlook the very nature of the problem that jeopardized the lives of the powerless locals.

Lack of statutory obligations and regulations by government may partially explain lack luster behavior of GAIL, ONGC, PESO, and OSID regarding the GAIL pipeline consequences.

Mostly focused on short-term cost-containment and marginal maintenance strategies in relation to the pipelines, the officials did not plan nor try to check the safety or replace the pipelines wherever required.

Possibly, they did not foresee the impact any possible mishap could cause to the people living in the vicinity and how it would negatively impact the reputation of their public institutions.

Precautionary steps and proper maintenance could have averted the whole situation. Poor maintenance often leads to future breakdowns. Hazardous systems if not managed with due care can be very detrimental to human lives.

It is a collective responsibility of GAIL, ONGC, PESO, and OSID to detect and preempt disasters, failing which to own and compensate for the fatal consequences of the pipeline tragedy.

5.6.2. Ethical Analysis of Consequences

Teleological analysis : The GAIL pipeline service strategy is a moral action if it produced decidedly more benefits than costs to the largest number of stakeholders. Judged by the manifold harmful consequences to the villagers in terms of deaths, injuries, and environmental degradation, the unsupervised and unchecked GAIL pipeline project fails to be ethical and moral on teleological grounds. The final outcome was a huge systems breakdown or man-made disaster for the villagers, while pipeline project continues to be beneficial to the industrial units it was serving.

Deontological analysis : The GAIL pipeline service strategy is a moral action if it upholds the rights of the powerless much more than it upholds the rights of the powerful across the largest number of stakeholders. Judged by the violated rights of life, community life, safety, village property, village ecology, and the like in terms of harmful consequences of deaths, injuries, and environmental degradation, and disproportionate number of rights of GAIL and its industrial clients in Andhra Pradesh upheld, the GAIL pipeline strategy, unsupervised and unchecked, fails to be ethical and moral on deontological grounds. It is the right of the industrial clients to get essential supplies of Compressed Natural Gas(CNG) but that does not mean that they can sacrifice the safety and security of others. It is gross negligence of duties by the authority. Lack of responsibility of GAIL Authorities and the government led to deaths and loss of many who were not directly related to the whole business. The gainers did not do much to alleviate the lot of those who suffered untold damages.

Distributive justice-based analysis : Regardless of the nature and magnitude of the benefits and costs, rights and duties of the GAIL pipeline tragedy, the GAIL service strategy is a moral action if it distributes benefits and costs, rights and duties equitably across the largest number of internal and external stakeholders. Judged by the disproportionately high costs (including deaths, injuries, and environmental degradation) and duties (of safeguarding life, safety, property, ecology and livelihood of Nagarjuna) violated of a very great number in Nagarjuna village, and the disproportionately high benefits realized and many rights upheld of GAIL and its 37 industrial clients in Andhra Pradesh, the GAIL pipeline enterprise grossly violated distributive justice principles. Though the pipeline supplied essential CNG used for transportation in the surrounding cities including Hyderabad, and helped thereby GAIL earn profits and growth, it does not justify the miseries of families of several people who died and others who suffered injuries.

Corrective justice-based analysis : Regardless of the nature, magnitude, and distribution of the benefits and costs, and rights and duties of the GAIL pipeline tragedy, the GAIL service strategy is a moral action if it set up just processes and procedures to correct the existing violations of rights and duties, and unjust distribution of costs and benefits in relation to the largest numbers of internal and external stakeholders. Judged by the lack of any corrective processes and procedures, disproportionately high costs (including deaths, injuries, and environmental degradation) and duties (of safeguarding life, safety, property, ecology, and livelihood of Nagarjuna) violated of a very great number in Nagarjuna village, and the disproportionately high benefits realized and many rights upheld of GAIL and its 37 industrial clients in Andhra Pradesh, the GAIL pipeline enterprise grossly violated corrective justice principles.

First corrective step to take in this case is to stop using the pipeline any further until it has passed all health integrity checks and maintenance work. Lives can never be returned, but at least the government and GAIL authorities should take responsibility of the family members of the deceased by compensating them and providing them with livelihood. Precautionary steps and proper maintenance could have averted the whole situation. Poor maintenance always leads to final breakdown one day or the other. Hazardous things if not handled with enough care can be very detrimental to human lives. Second, for the disabled and injured, they should provide best medical and health care so that they can recover quickly and help them to get employment, either through jobs or through skill trainings. Third, all victims should be more than adequately compensated. However, instead of distributing huge compensation to the victims, if government and GAIL authorities had used the same money for maintenance and pipeline health integrity checks, we would not have to sacrifice 21 lives and accept sufferings of so many. Fourth, for all losses to crops and houses and other public utilities, they should rebuild all the facilities and houses of the people, help them rehabilitate, and also compensate at market rate all their losses.

As part of corrective justice procedures, government should form a high-priority committee to check all pipelines laid across the country immediately within next couple of months and the ones which are not fit should be replaced and repaired as necessary. Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board of India should come up with stringent guidelines for safety and security and penalize any corporation or firm whether public or private for any negligence in this regard. Officials handling such sensitive operations which can cause havoc if neglected should be periodically sensitized about all safety measures. More invigilation of pipelines and general awareness among people staying in areas where the pipeline is laid is also very important. Proper safety message boards should be installed at the major junctions all along the pipeline so as to make people aware of the risks in those areas and what are the preventive measures.

Virtue ethics-based analysis : Virtue ethics is a framework that focuses on the character of the moral agent rather than on the rightness of an action. In considering human relationships, emotional sensitivities, and motivations that are unique to human society, virtue ethics provides a fuller ethical analysis and encourages more flexible and creative solutions than deontological or consequentialist teleological analysis. In order to do something, we must first perceive that an action is necessary, and often, mere cost-benefits analysis (teleology), or rights-duty analysis (deontology) may not trigger quick action. We must observe what is going on and study a crisis situation like the GAIL pipeline disaster from a person-based ethical and moral perspective such as virtue ethics. Emotional reactions make us sensitive to particular circumstances, and virtue-based sensitivities illuminate our perceptions. It is possible to perceive a situation dispassionately but we would then have an incomplete appreciation of the circumstances. Thus, perception and affect are closely intertwined in informing our choices. Virtues of honesty, integrity, due care, and compassion would have precipitated proactive actions that were remedial, preemptive, and reactive.

Trust ethics-based analysis : Among virtues, one of paramount importance is the executive virtue of trust and the practice of building trusting relations among critical stakeholders. Trust has both intrinsic and instrumental value. Trust is intrinsically important because it is a core characteristic that affects the emotional and interpersonal aspects of owner/stakeholder relationship. As an instrumental value, trust is widely believed to be essential for effective emotional encounters. Sadly, in this situation, the executives did not pay heed to or trust the complaints of the local residents which led to the tragedy. The village of Nagarjuna might have gradually lost its trust in GAIL, OISD, PESO, and ONGC owing to their inactions, insensitivities to their concerns, and their general malaise in dealing with their GAIL pipeline-related problems and concerns. Lack of mutual trust and trusting relations can precipitate tragedy; the converse is also true.

5.7. Concluding Remarks

Does this thinking and your “best solution” make a better sense of the world? (Chaffee, 1988).

Does the best solution help me to be unbiased and unprejudiced in my thinking? (Paul & Elder, 2002).

Does it help me to understand the assumptions and presuppositions behind this thinking? (Collins, 2001; Collins & Porras, 1989).

Does it help me to appreciate the positive and normative content in this thinking? (Hunt, 1991, 2002).

Does it inspire me with spiritual meaning, vision, value, and motivation to reach out to others? (Covey, 1989).

Does it help me to rise beyond data, information, and knowledge to lasting values and wisdom? Does it empower me to be a servant leader for others? (Kahl & Donelan, 2004).

A hundred years from now, the economic system may be very different. Technology may be unrecognizable; education and consumption levels will be far greater. New information and media technologies will continuously modify human behavior. Will this be still a capitalist system? The present imbalance between a scarce supply of capital and employment opportunity and an abundant supply of labor is producing a substantial shift of income growth from wages to profits. The modern corporation has shown considerable ability to shift incremental taxes forward to customers through higher prices, shift them backward to workers through lower wages, or shift them to Washington by finding new loopholes to avoid taxes.

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The Thinker's Guide to Ethical Reasoning (Based on Critical Thinking Concepts & Tools)

Richard paul and linda elder, order from rowman & littlefield here., contact info for rowman & littlefield:.

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The proper role of ethical reasoning is to highlight acts of two kinds: those which enhance the well-being of others—that warrant our praise—and those that harm or diminish the well-being of others—and thus warrant our criticism. Developing one’s ethical reasoning abilities is crucial because there is in human nature a strong tendency toward egotism, prejudice, self-justification, and self-deception. These tendencies are exacerbated by pow­erful sociocentric cultural influences that shape our lives—not least of which is the mass media. These tendencies can be actively combated only through the systematic cultivation of fair-mindedness, honesty, integrity, self-knowledge, and deep concern for the welfare of others. We can never eliminate our egocentric tendencies absolutely and finally. But we can actively combat them as we learn to develop as ethical persons.

Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 The ultimate basis for ethics is clear: Human behavior has consequences for the welfare of others. We are capable of acting toward others in such a way as to increase or decrease the quality of their lives. We are capable of helping or harming. What is more, we are theoretically capable of understanding when we are doing the one and when the other. This is so because we have the capacity to put ourselves imaginatively in the place of others and recognize how we would be affected if someone were to act toward us as we are acting toward others.

Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 This mini-guide will not automatically make anyone an ethical person. But it does provide an essential foundation, without which ethical discussion will often end in hopeless disputation or discouraging contradiction and misunderstanding. Developing as an insightful ethical reasoner and person takes time and much practice.

Contents include:

• The Function of Ethics
• Egocentrism as a Fundamental Barrier to Ethical Reasoning
• The Problem of Pseudo-Ethics—the Sociocentric Counterfeits of Ethical Reasoning
• Religious Beliefs are Culturally Variant
• Socially or Culturally Variant Practices
• Ethics and Sexual Taboos
• Ethics and Political Ideology
• Ethics and the Law
• Acts that are Unethical In-and-Of Themselves
• Distinguishing Among Questions of Ethics, Social Conventions, Religion, and the Law
• How to Figure Out the Logic of an Ethical Question
• Language as a Guide to Ethical Reasoning
• Distinguishing Between Simple and Complex Ethical Questions
• Facts in Relationship to Ethical Perspectives
• Intellectual Standards for Assessing Ethical Reasoning
• Ethical Reasoning Abilities
• Essential Ethical Virtues

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Ethics Blog # 2 Critical Thinking and Perspectives regarding Copyright and Credits of my own and the design’s creator.

by Cesar Infante

March 26, 2024

Leave a comment on Ethics Blog # 2 Critical Thinking and Perspectives regarding Copyright and Credits of my own and the design’s creator.

As some of you may know, when creating content, it is very important to ensure that our designs are our own and not a copy from another person. That is an academic integrity violation in college, and it can bring several consequences. Furthermore, in the real world, it happens the same. According to AIGA, the Professional Association of Design, several parameters and important things must be considered when designing a professional logo or any content that will be published. It is our responsibility to report or credit the use of fonts, illustrations, photography, and any other content that will eventually be published to the audience.

It is imperative to report the ownership of the work. In the United States, we have an institution that handles the copyright claims, registrations, and information to the public; or any other idea that another person can copy without our knowledge, that is, indeed, the U.S. Copyright Office which is located in Washington, D.C.

After the reading, I will ensure that any work I do in the real world, knowing it will be publicly available, must be patented or copyrighted, primarily if I work for a worldwide audience or well-known agency.

Fairey vs. Associated Press Outcome (HOPE POSTER)

The two parties finally settled on January 12. In the end, neither side had to admit they were wrong. Instead, Fairey agreed not to use any other AP photos without a license, and he and the AP (associate press) will share profits derived from the sale of posters based on the image. Further, Fairey and the AP plan to collaborate on several other derivative works using the news organization’s collection of photographs.

All that controversy could have been avoided if the photographer had asked or followed proper copyright information and procedures to ensure that such artwork belonged to him. Although the “Hope” posters have now become one of the most iconic symbols of the 2008 presidential campaign, those pieces weren’t Fairey’s first foray into political art, and they are not his last.  

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Handbook: Revenue recognition

Handbooks | March 2024

Latest edition: Our in-depth guide to the revenue standard, ASC 606, with Q&As. interpretive guidance and examples.

This March 2024 edition includes new examples on determining the term of contracts with termination penalties, determining if promises are distinct in the context of the contract, when the bill-and-hold criteria are not met in a contract, and accounting for the exercise of a material right.

Applicability

• ASC 606, ASC 340-10, ASC 340-40 and ASC 610-20

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Key impacts

The application of ASC 606 is not a simple exercise – it requires significant judgment, estimation and disclosures. Changes in business practices and the economic environment continue to create new challenges to the accounting for revenue.

In response to these challenges, companies evaluate and may need to revisit a number of estimates and judgments to account for their revenue arrangements and related costs. Companies may also apply certain aspects of the guidance that they had not, or less frequently, applied in the past.

In this publication, we focus on the accounting and disclosure aspects of ASC 606. Questions continue to arise as companies enter into new or modified revenue arrangements or respond to a changing economic environment. The interpretation of the principles in ASC 606 continues to be informed by evolving practice issues and regulator views.

Our purpose in this updated publication is to assist you in gaining an in-depth understanding of the five-step revenue model by answering the questions that we are encountering in practice and providing examples to explain key concepts.

Report contents

• Step 1: identify the contract(s) with a customer
• Step 2: identify the performance obligations in the contract
• Step 3: determine the transaction price
• Step 4: allocate the transaction price to performance obligations
• Step 5: recognize revenue when (or as) the entity satisfies a performance obligation
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