what is the contribution of studying language in logic and critical thinking

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Published: 19 June 2024

Language is primarily a tool for communication rather than thought

Evelina Fedorenko ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-3823-514X 1 , 2 ,
Steven T. Piantadosi 3 &
Edward A. F. Gibson 1

Nature volume 630 , pages 575–586 ( 2024 ) Cite this article

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Language is a defining characteristic of our species, but the function, or functions, that it serves has been debated for centuries. Here we bring recent evidence from neuroscience and allied disciplines to argue that in modern humans, language is a tool for communication, contrary to a prominent view that we use language for thinking. We begin by introducing the brain network that supports linguistic ability in humans. We then review evidence for a double dissociation between language and thought, and discuss several properties of language that suggest that it is optimized for communication. We conclude that although the emergence of language has unquestionably transformed human culture, language does not appear to be a prerequisite for complex thought, including symbolic thought. Instead, language is a powerful tool for the transmission of cultural knowledge; it plausibly co-evolved with our thinking and reasoning capacities, and only reflects, rather than gives rise to, the signature sophistication of human cognition.

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what is the contribution of studying language in logic and critical thinking

The language network as a natural kind within the broader landscape of the human brain

An investigation across 45 languages and 12 language families reveals a universal language network

Two views on the cognitive brain

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Acknowledgements

The authors thank A. Ivanova, R. Jackendoff, N. Kanwisher, K. Mahowald, R. Seyfarth, C. Shain and N. Zaslavsky for helpful comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript; N. Caselli, M. Coppola, A. Hillis, L. Menn, R. Varley and S. Wilson for comments on specific sections; C. Casto, T. Regev, F. Mollica and R. Futrell for help with the figures; and S. Swords, N. Jhingan, H. S. Kim and A. Sathe for help with references. E.F. was supported by NIH awards DC016607 and DC016950 from NIDCD, NS121471 from NINDS, and from funds from MIT’s McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Simons Center for the Social Brain, and Quest for Intelligence.

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Fedorenko, E., Piantadosi, S.T. & Gibson, E.A.F. Language is primarily a tool for communication rather than thought. Nature 630 , 575–586 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-024-07522-w

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Do We Need Language to Think?

A group of neuroscientists argue that our words are primarily for communicating, not for reasoning.

Two computer images of brains with various parts of each highlighted in red, orange and yellow.

By Carl Zimmer

For thousands of years, philosophers have argued about the purpose of language. Plato believed it was essential for thinking. Thought “is a silent inner conversation of the soul with itself,” he wrote.

Many modern scholars have advanced similar views. Starting in the 1960s, Noam Chomsky, a linguist at M.I.T., argued that we use language for reasoning and other forms of thought. “If there is a severe deficit of language, there will be severe deficit of thought,” he wrote .

As an undergraduate, Evelina Fedorenko took Dr. Chomsky’s class and heard him describe his theory. “I really liked the idea,” she recalled. But she was puzzled by the lack of evidence. “A lot of things he was saying were just stated as if they were facts — the truth,” she said.

Dr. Fedorenko went on to become a cognitive neuroscientist at M.I.T., using brain scanning to investigate how the brain produces language. And after 15 years, her research has led her to a startling conclusion: We don’t need language to think.

“When you start evaluating it, you just don’t find support for this role of language in thinking,” she said.

When Dr. Fedorenko began this work in 2009, studies had found that the same brain regions required for language were also active when people reasoned or carried out arithmetic.

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Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking

(10 reviews)

Matthew Van Cleave, Lansing Community College

Publisher: Matthew J. Van Cleave

Language: English

Formats Available

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Learn more about reviews.

Reviewed by "yusef" Alexander Hayes, Professor, North Shore Community College on 6/9/21

Formal and informal reasoning, argument structure, and fallacies are covered comprehensively, meeting the author's goal of both depth and succinctness. read more

Comprehensiveness rating: 5 see less

Formal and informal reasoning, argument structure, and fallacies are covered comprehensively, meeting the author's goal of both depth and succinctness.

Content Accuracy rating: 5

The book is accurate.

Relevance/Longevity rating: 5

While many modern examples are used, and they are helpful, they are not necessarily needed. The usefulness of logical principles and skills have proved themselves, and this text presents them clearly with many examples.

Clarity rating: 5

It is obvious that the author cares about their subject, audience, and students. The text is comprehensible and interesting.

Consistency rating: 5

The format is easy to understand and is consistent in framing.

Modularity rating: 5

This text would be easy to adapt.

Organization/Structure/Flow rating: 5

The organization is excellent, my one suggestion would be a concluding chapter.

Interface rating: 5

I accessed the PDF version and it would be easy to work with.

Grammatical Errors rating: 5

The writing is excellent.

Cultural Relevance rating: 5

This is not an offensive text.

Reviewed by Susan Rottmann, Part-time Lecturer, University of Southern Maine on 3/2/21

Comprehensiveness rating: 4 see less

I reviewed this book for a course titled "Creative and Critical Inquiry into Modern Life." It won't meet all my needs for that course, but I haven't yet found a book that would. I wanted to review this one because it states in the preface that it fits better for a general critical thinking course than for a true logic course. I'm not sure that I'd agree. I have been using Browne and Keeley's "Asking the Right Questions: A Guide to Critical Thinking," and I think that book is a better introduction to critical thinking for non-philosophy majors. However, the latter is not open source so I will figure out how to get by without it in the future. Overall, the book seems comprehensive if the subject is logic. The index is on the short-side, but fine. However, one issue for me is that there are no page numbers on the table of contents, which is pretty annoying if you want to locate particular sections.

Content Accuracy rating: 4

I didn't find any errors. In general the book uses great examples. However, they are very much based in the American context, not for an international student audience. Some effort to broaden the chosen examples would make the book more widely applicable.

Relevance/Longevity rating: 4

I think the book will remain relevant because of the nature of the material that it addresses, however there will be a need to modify the examples in future editions and as the social and political context changes.

Clarity rating: 3

The text is lucid, but I think it would be difficult for introductory-level students who are not philosophy majors. For example, in Browne and Keeley's "Asking the Right Questions: A Guide to Critical Thinking," the sub-headings are very accessible, such as "Experts cannot rescue us, despite what they say" or "wishful thinking: perhaps the biggest single speed bump on the road to critical thinking." By contrast, Van Cleave's "Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking" has more subheadings like this: "Using your own paraphrases of premises and conclusions to reconstruct arguments in standard form" or "Propositional logic and the four basic truth functional connectives." If students are prepared very well for the subject, it would work fine, but for students who are newly being introduced to critical thinking, it is rather technical.

It seems to be very consistent in terms of its terminology and framework.

Modularity rating: 4

The book is divided into 4 chapters, each having many sub-chapters. In that sense, it is readily divisible and modular. However, as noted above, there are no page numbers on the table of contents, which would make assigning certain parts rather frustrating. Also, I'm not sure why the book is only four chapter and has so many subheadings (for instance 17 in Chapter 2) and a length of 242 pages. Wouldn't it make more sense to break up the book into shorter chapters? I think this would make it easier to read and to assign in specific blocks to students.

Organization/Structure/Flow rating: 4

The organization of the book is fine overall, although I think adding page numbers to the table of contents and breaking it up into more separate chapters would help it to be more easily navigable.

Interface rating: 4

The book is very simply presented. In my opinion it is actually too simple. There are few boxes or diagrams that highlight and explain important points.

The text seems fine grammatically. I didn't notice any errors.

The book is written with an American audience in mind, but I did not notice culturally insensitive or offensive parts.

Overall, this book is not for my course, but I think it could work well in a philosophy course.

Reviewed by Daniel Lee, Assistant Professor of Economics and Leadership, Sweet Briar College on 11/11/19

This textbook is not particularly comprehensive (4 chapters long), but I view that as a benefit. In fact, I recommend it for use outside of traditional logic classes, but rather interdisciplinary classes that evaluate argument read more

Comprehensiveness rating: 3 see less

To the best of my ability, I regard this content as accurate, error-free, and unbiased

The book is broadly relevant and up-to-date, with a few stray temporal references (sydney olympics, particular presidencies). I don't view these time-dated examples as problematic as the logical underpinnings are still there and easily assessed

Clarity rating: 4

My only pushback on clarity is I didn't find the distinction between argument and explanation particularly helpful/useful/easy to follow. However, this experience may have been unique to my class.

To the best of my ability, I regard this content as internally consistent

I found this text quite modular, and was easily able to integrate other texts into my lessons and disregard certain chapters or sub-sections

The book had a logical and consistent structure, but to the extent that there are only 4 chapters, there isn't much scope for alternative approaches here

No problems with the book's interface

The text is grammatically sound

Cultural Relevance rating: 4

Perhaps the text could have been more universal in its approach. While I didn't find the book insensitive per-se, logic can be tricky here because the point is to evaluate meaningful (non-trivial) arguments, but any argument with that sense of gravity can also be traumatic to students (abortion, death penalty, etc)

No additional comments

Reviewed by Lisa N. Thomas-Smith, Graduate Part-time Instructor, CU Boulder on 7/1/19

The text covers all the relevant technical aspects of introductory logic and critical thinking, and covers them well. A separate glossary would be quite helpful to students. However, the terms are clearly and thoroughly explained within the text,... read more

The content is excellent. The text is thorough and accurate with no errors that I could discern. The terminology and exercises cover the material nicely and without bias.

The text should easily stand the test of time. The exercises are excellent and would be very helpful for students to internalize correct critical thinking practices. Because of the logical arrangement of the text and the many sub-sections, additional material should be very easy to add.

The text is extremely clearly and simply written. I anticipate that a diligent student could learn all of the material in the text with little additional instruction. The examples are relevant and easy to follow.

The text did not confuse terms or use inconsistent terminology, which is very important in a logic text. The discipline often uses multiple terms for the same concept, but this text avoids that trap nicely.

The text is fairly easily divisible. Since there are only four chapters, those chapters include large blocks of information. However, the chapters themselves are very well delineated and could be easily broken up so that parts could be left out or covered in a different order from the text.

The flow of the text is excellent. All of the information is handled solidly in an order that allows the student to build on the information previously covered.

The PDF Table of Contents does not include links or page numbers which would be very helpful for navigation. Other than that, the text was very easy to navigate. All the images, charts, and graphs were very clear

I found no grammatical errors in the text.

Cultural Relevance rating: 3

The text including examples and exercises did not seem to be offensive or insensitive in any specific way. However, the examples included references to black and white people, but few others. Also, the text is very American specific with many examples from and for an American audience. More diversity, especially in the examples, would be appropriate and appreciated.

Reviewed by Leslie Aarons, Associate Professor of Philosophy, CUNY LaGuardia Community College on 5/16/19

This is an excellent introductory (first-year) Logic and Critical Thinking textbook. The book covers the important elementary information, clearly discussing such things as the purpose and basic structure of an argument; the difference between an argument and an explanation; validity; soundness; and the distinctions between an inductive and a deductive argument in accessible terms in the first chapter. It also does a good job introducing and discussing informal fallacies (Chapter 4). The incorporation of opportunities to evaluate real-world arguments is also very effective. Chapter 2 also covers a number of formal methods of evaluating arguments, such as Venn Diagrams and Propositional logic and the four basic truth functional connectives, but to my mind, it is much more thorough in its treatment of Informal Logic and Critical Thinking skills, than it is of formal logic. I also appreciated that Van Cleave’s book includes exercises with answers and an index, but there is no glossary; which I personally do not find detracts from the book's comprehensiveness.

Overall, Van Cleave's book is error-free and unbiased. The language used is accessible and engaging. There were no glaring inaccuracies that I was able to detect.

Van Cleave's Textbook uses relevant, contemporary content that will stand the test of time, at least for the next few years. Although some examples use certain subjects like former President Obama, it does so in a useful manner that inspires the use of critical thinking skills. There are an abundance of examples that inspire students to look at issues from many different political viewpoints, challenging students to practice evaluating arguments, and identifying fallacies. Many of these exercises encourage students to critique issues, and recognize their own inherent reader-biases and challenge their own beliefs--hallmarks of critical thinking.

As mentioned previously, the author has an accessible style that makes the content relatively easy to read and engaging. He also does a suitable job explaining jargon/technical language that is introduced in the textbook.

Van Cleave uses terminology consistently and the chapters flow well. The textbook orients the reader by offering effective introductions to new material, step-by-step explanations of the material, as well as offering clear summaries of each lesson.

This textbook's modularity is really quite good. Its language and structure are not overly convoluted or too-lengthy, making it convenient for individual instructors to adapt the materials to suit their methodological preferences.

The topics in the textbook are presented in a logical and clear fashion. The structure of the chapters are such that it is not necessary to have to follow the chapters in their sequential order, and coverage of material can be adapted to individual instructor's preferences.

The textbook is free of any problematic interface issues. Topics, sections and specific content are accessible and easy to navigate. Overall it is user-friendly.

I did not find any significant grammatical issues with the textbook.

The textbook is not culturally insensitive, making use of a diversity of inclusive examples. Materials are especially effective for first-year critical thinking/logic students.

I intend to adopt Van Cleave's textbook for a Critical Thinking class I am teaching at the Community College level. I believe that it will help me facilitate student-learning, and will be a good resource to build additional classroom activities from the materials it provides.

Reviewed by Jennie Harrop, Chair, Department of Professional Studies, George Fox University on 3/27/18

While the book is admirably comprehensive, its extensive details within a few short chapters may feel overwhelming to students. The author tackles an impressive breadth of concepts in Chapter 1, 2, 3, and 4, which leads to 50-plus-page chapters that are dense with statistical analyses and critical vocabulary. These topics are likely better broached in manageable snippets rather than hefty single chapters.

The ideas addressed in Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking are accurate but at times notably political. While politics are effectively used to exemplify key concepts, some students may be distracted by distinct political leanings.

The terms and definitions included are relevant, but the examples are specific to the current political, cultural, and social climates, which could make the materials seem dated in a few years without intentional and consistent updates.

While the reasoning is accurate, the author tends to complicate rather than simplify -- perhaps in an effort to cover a spectrum of related concepts. Beginning readers are likely to be overwhelmed and under-encouraged by his approach.

Consistency rating: 3

The four chapters are somewhat consistent in their play of definition, explanation, and example, but the structure of each chapter varies according to the concepts covered. In the third chapter, for example, key ideas are divided into sub-topics numbering from 3.1 to 3.10. In the fourth chapter, the sub-divisions are further divided into sub-sections numbered 4.1.1-4.1.5, 4.2.1-4.2.2, and 4.3.1 to 4.3.6. Readers who are working quickly to master new concepts may find themselves mired in similarly numbered subheadings, longing for a grounded concepts on which to hinge other key principles.

Modularity rating: 3

The book's four chapters make it mostly self-referential. The author would do well to beak this text down into additional subsections, easing readers' accessibility.

The content of the book flows logically and well, but the information needs to be better sub-divided within each larger chapter, easing the student experience.

The book's interface is effective, allowing readers to move from one section to the next with a single click. Additional sub-sections would ease this interplay even further.

Grammatical Errors rating: 4

Some minor errors throughout.

For the most part, the book is culturally neutral, avoiding direct cultural references in an effort to remain relevant.

Reviewed by Yoichi Ishida, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Ohio University on 2/1/18

This textbook covers enough topics for a first-year course on logic and critical thinking. Chapter 1 covers the basics as in any standard textbook in this area. Chapter 2 covers propositional logic and categorical logic. In propositional logic, this textbook does not cover suppositional arguments, such as conditional proof and reductio ad absurdum. But other standard argument forms are covered. Chapter 3 covers inductive logic, and here this textbook introduces probability and its relationship with cognitive biases, which are rarely discussed in other textbooks. Chapter 4 introduces common informal fallacies. The answers to all the exercises are given at the end. However, the last set of exercises is in Chapter 3, Section 5. There are no exercises in the rest of the chapter. Chapter 4 has no exercises either. There is index, but no glossary.

The textbook is accurate.

The content of this textbook will not become obsolete soon.

The textbook is written clearly.

The textbook is internally consistent.

The textbook is fairly modular. For example, Chapter 3, together with a few sections from Chapter 1, can be used as a short introduction to inductive logic.

The textbook is well-organized.

There are no interface issues.

I did not find any grammatical errors.

This textbook is relevant to a first semester logic or critical thinking course.

Reviewed by Payal Doctor, Associate Professro, LaGuardia Community College on 2/1/18

This text is a beginner textbook for arguments and propositional logic. It covers the basics of identifying arguments, building arguments, and using basic logic to construct propositions and arguments. It is quite comprehensive for a beginner book, but seems to be a good text for a course that needs a foundation for arguments. There are exercises on creating truth tables and proofs, so it could work as a logic primer in short sessions or with the addition of other course content.

The books is accurate in the information it presents. It does not contain errors and is unbiased. It covers the essential vocabulary clearly and givens ample examples and exercises to ensure the student understands the concepts

The content of the book is up to date and can be easily updated. Some examples are very current for analyzing the argument structure in a speech, but for this sort of text understandable examples are important and the author uses good examples.

The book is clear and easy to read. In particular, this is a good text for community college students who often have difficulty with reading comprehension. The language is straightforward and concepts are well explained.

The book is consistent in terminology, formatting, and examples. It flows well from one topic to the next, but it is also possible to jump around the text without loosing the voice of the text.

The books is broken down into sub units that make it easy to assign short blocks of content at a time. Later in the text, it does refer to a few concepts that appear early in that text, but these are all basic concepts that must be used to create a clear and understandable text. No sections are too long and each section stays on topic and relates the topic to those that have come before when necessary.

The flow of the text is logical and clear. It begins with the basic building blocks of arguments, and practice identifying more and more complex arguments is offered. Each chapter builds up from the previous chapter in introducing propositional logic, truth tables, and logical arguments. A select number of fallacies are presented at the end of the text, but these are related to topics that were presented before, so it makes sense to have these last.

The text is free if interface issues. I used the PDF and it worked fine on various devices without loosing formatting.

1. The book contains no grammatical errors.

The text is culturally sensitive, but examples used are a bit odd and may be objectionable to some students. For instance, President Obama's speech on Syria is used to evaluate an extended argument. This is an excellent example and it is explained well, but some who disagree with Obama's policies may have trouble moving beyond their own politics. However, other examples look at issues from all political viewpoints and ask students to evaluate the argument, fallacy, etc. and work towards looking past their own beliefs. Overall this book does use a variety of examples that most students can understand and evaluate.

My favorite part of this book is that it seems to be written for community college students. My students have trouble understanding readings in the New York Times, so it is nice to see a logic and critical thinking text use real language that students can understand and follow without the constant need of a dictionary.

Reviewed by Rebecca Owen, Adjunct Professor, Writing, Chemeketa Community College on 6/20/17

This textbook is quite thorough--there are conversational explanations of argument structure and logic. I think students will be happy with the conversational style this author employs. Also, there are many examples and exercises using current events, funny scenarios, or other interesting ways to evaluate argument structure and validity. The third section, which deals with logical fallacies, is very clear and comprehensive. My only critique of the material included in the book is that the middle section may be a bit dense and math-oriented for learners who appreciate the more informal, informative style of the first and third section. Also, the book ends rather abruptly--it moves from a description of a logical fallacy to the answers for the exercises earlier in the text.

The content is very reader-friendly, and the author writes with authority and clarity throughout the text. There are a few surface-level typos (Starbuck's instead of Starbucks, etc.). None of these small errors detract from the quality of the content, though.

One thing I really liked about this text was the author's wide variety of examples. To demonstrate different facets of logic, he used examples from current media, movies, literature, and many other concepts that students would recognize from their daily lives. The exercises in this text also included these types of pop-culture references, and I think students will enjoy the familiarity--as well as being able to see the logical structures behind these types of references. I don't think the text will need to be updated to reflect new instances and occurrences; the author did a fine job at picking examples that are relatively timeless. As far as the subject matter itself, I don't think it will become obsolete any time soon.

The author writes in a very conversational, easy-to-read manner. The examples used are quite helpful. The third section on logical fallacies is quite easy to read, follow, and understand. A student in an argument writing class could benefit from this section of the book. The middle section is less clear, though. A student learning about the basics of logic might have a hard time digesting all of the information contained in chapter two. This material might be better in two separate chapters. I think the author loses the balance of a conversational, helpful tone and focuses too heavily on equations.

Consistency rating: 4

Terminology in this book is quite consistent--the key words are highlighted in bold. Chapters 1 and 3 follow a similar organizational pattern, but chapter 2 is where the material becomes more dense and equation-heavy. I also would have liked a closing passage--something to indicate to the reader that we've reached the end of the chapter as well as the book.

I liked the overall structure of this book. If I'm teaching an argumentative writing class, I could easily point the students to the chapters where they can identify and practice identifying fallacies, for instance. The opening chapter is clear in defining the necessary terms, and it gives the students an understanding of the toolbox available to them in assessing and evaluating arguments. Even though I found the middle section to be dense, smaller portions could be assigned.

The author does a fine job connecting each defined term to the next. He provides examples of how each defined term works in a sentence or in an argument, and then he provides practice activities for students to try. The answers for each question are listed in the final pages of the book. The middle section feels like the heaviest part of the whole book--it would take the longest time for a student to digest if assigned the whole chapter. Even though this middle section is a bit heavy, it does fit the overall structure and flow of the book. New material builds on previous chapters and sub-chapters. It ends abruptly--I didn't realize that it had ended, and all of a sudden I found myself in the answer section for those earlier exercises.

The simple layout is quite helpful! There is nothing distracting, image-wise, in this text. The table of contents is clearly arranged, and each topic is easy to find.

Tiny edits could be made (Starbuck's/Starbucks, for one). Otherwise, it is free of distracting grammatical errors.

This text is quite culturally relevant. For instance, there is one example that mentions the rumors of Barack Obama's birthplace as somewhere other than the United States. This example is used to explain how to analyze an argument for validity. The more "sensational" examples (like the Obama one above) are helpful in showing argument structure, and they can also help students see how rumors like this might gain traction--as well as help to show students how to debunk them with their newfound understanding of argument and logic.

The writing style is excellent for the subject matter, especially in the third section explaining logical fallacies. Thank you for the opportunity to read and review this text!

Reviewed by Laurel Panser, Instructor, Riverland Community College on 6/20/17

This is a review of Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking, an open source book version 1.4 by Matthew Van Cleave. The comparison book used was Patrick J. Hurley’s A Concise Introduction to Logic 12th Edition published by Cengage as well as... read more

Competing with Hurley is difficult with respect to comprehensiveness. For example, Van Cleave’s book is comprehensive to the extent that it probably covers at least two-thirds or more of what is dealt with in most introductory, one-semester logic courses. Van Cleave’s chapter 1 provides an overview of argumentation including discerning non-arguments from arguments, premises versus conclusions, deductive from inductive arguments, validity, soundness and more. Much of Van Cleave’s chapter 1 parallel’s Hurley’s chapter 1. Hurley’s chapter 3 regarding informal fallacies is comprehensive while Van Cleave’s chapter 4 on this topic is less extensive. Categorical propositions are a topic in Van Cleave’s chapter 2; Hurley’s chapters 4 and 5 provide more instruction on this, however. Propositional logic is another topic in Van Cleave’s chapter 2; Hurley’s chapters 6 and 7 provide more information on this, though. Van Cleave did discuss messy issues of language meaning briefly in his chapter 1; that is the topic of Hurley’s chapter 2.

Van Cleave’s book includes exercises with answers and an index. A glossary was not included.

Reviews of open source textbooks typically include criteria besides comprehensiveness. These include comments on accuracy of the information, whether the book will become obsolete soon, jargon-free clarity to the extent that is possible, organization, navigation ease, freedom from grammar errors and cultural relevance; Van Cleave’s book is fine in all of these areas. Further criteria for open source books includes modularity and consistency of terminology. Modularity is defined as including blocks of learning material that are easy to assign to students. Hurley’s book has a greater degree of modularity than Van Cleave’s textbook. The prose Van Cleave used is consistent.

Van Cleave’s book will not become obsolete soon.

Van Cleave’s book has accessible prose.

Van Cleave used terminology consistently.

Van Cleave’s book has a reasonable degree of modularity.

Van Cleave’s book is organized. The structure and flow of his book is fine.

Problems with navigation are not present.

Grammar problems were not present.

Van Cleave’s book is culturally relevant.

Van Cleave’s book is appropriate for some first semester logic courses.

Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments

1.1 What is an argument?
1.2 Identifying arguments
1.3 Arguments vs. explanations
1.4 More complex argument structures
1.5 Using your own paraphrases of premises and conclusions to reconstruct arguments in standard form
1.6 Validity
1.7 Soundness
1.8 Deductive vs. inductive arguments
1.9 Arguments with missing premises
1.10 Assuring, guarding, and discounting
1.11 Evaluative language
1.12 Evaluating a real-life argument

Chapter 2: Formal methods of evaluating arguments

2.1 What is a formal method of evaluation and why do we need them?
2.2 Propositional logic and the four basic truth functional connectives
2.3 Negation and disjunction
2.4 Using parentheses to translate complex sentences
2.5 “Not both” and “neither nor”
2.6 The truth table test of validity
2.7 Conditionals
2.8 “Unless”
2.9 Material equivalence
2.10 Tautologies, contradictions, and contingent statements
2.11 Proofs and the 8 valid forms of inference
2.12 How to construct proofs
2.13 Short review of propositional logic
2.14 Categorical logic
2.15 The Venn test of validity for immediate categorical inferences
2.16 Universal statements and existential commitment
2.17 Venn validity for categorical syllogisms

Chapter 3: Evaluating inductive arguments and probabilistic and statistical fallacies

3.1 Inductive arguments and statistical generalizations
3.2 Inference to the best explanation and the seven explanatory virtues
3.3 Analogical arguments
3.4 Causal arguments
3.5 Probability
3.6 The conjunction fallacy
3.7 The base rate fallacy
3.8 The small numbers fallacy
3.9 Regression to the mean fallacy
3.10 Gambler's fallacy

Chapter 4: Informal fallacies

4.1 Formal vs. informal fallacies
4.1.1 Composition fallacy
4.1.2 Division fallacy
4.1.3 Begging the question fallacy
4.1.4 False dichotomy
4.1.5 Equivocation
4.2 Slippery slope fallacies
4.2.1 Conceptual slippery slope
4.2.2 Causal slippery slope
4.3 Fallacies of relevance
4.3.1 Ad hominem
4.3.2 Straw man
4.3.3 Tu quoque
4.3.4 Genetic
4.3.5 Appeal to consequences
4.3.6 Appeal to authority

Answers to exercises Glossary/Index

Ancillary Material

About the book.

This is an introductory textbook in logic and critical thinking. The goal of the textbook is to provide the reader with a set of tools and skills that will enable them to identify and evaluate arguments. The book is intended for an introductory course that covers both formal and informal logic. As such, it is not a formal logic textbook, but is closer to what one would find marketed as a “critical thinking textbook.”

About the Contributors

Matthew Van Cleave , PhD, Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, 2007. VAP at Concordia College (Moorhead), 2008-2012. Assistant Professor at Lansing Community College, 2012-2016. Professor at Lansing Community College, 2016-

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Working with sources
What Is Critical Thinking? | Definition & Examples

What Is Critical Thinking? | Definition & Examples

Published on May 30, 2022 by Eoghan Ryan . Revised on May 31, 2023.

Critical thinking is the ability to effectively analyze information and form a judgment .

To think critically, you must be aware of your own biases and assumptions when encountering information, and apply consistent standards when evaluating sources .

Critical thinking skills help you to:

Identify credible sources
Evaluate and respond to arguments
Assess alternative viewpoints
Test hypotheses against relevant criteria

Why is critical thinking important, critical thinking examples, how to think critically, other interesting articles, frequently asked questions about critical thinking.

Critical thinking is important for making judgments about sources of information and forming your own arguments. It emphasizes a rational, objective, and self-aware approach that can help you to identify credible sources and strengthen your conclusions.

Critical thinking is important in all disciplines and throughout all stages of the research process . The types of evidence used in the sciences and in the humanities may differ, but critical thinking skills are relevant to both.

In academic writing , critical thinking can help you to determine whether a source:

Is free from research bias
Provides evidence to support its research findings
Considers alternative viewpoints

Outside of academia, critical thinking goes hand in hand with information literacy to help you form opinions rationally and engage independently and critically with popular media.

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Critical thinking can help you to identify reliable sources of information that you can cite in your research paper . It can also guide your own research methods and inform your own arguments.

Outside of academia, critical thinking can help you to be aware of both your own and others’ biases and assumptions.

Academic examples

However, when you compare the findings of the study with other current research, you determine that the results seem improbable. You analyze the paper again, consulting the sources it cites.

You notice that the research was funded by the pharmaceutical company that created the treatment. Because of this, you view its results skeptically and determine that more independent research is necessary to confirm or refute them. Example: Poor critical thinking in an academic context You’re researching a paper on the impact wireless technology has had on developing countries that previously did not have large-scale communications infrastructure. You read an article that seems to confirm your hypothesis: the impact is mainly positive. Rather than evaluating the research methodology, you accept the findings uncritically.

Nonacademic examples

However, you decide to compare this review article with consumer reviews on a different site. You find that these reviews are not as positive. Some customers have had problems installing the alarm, and some have noted that it activates for no apparent reason.

You revisit the original review article. You notice that the words “sponsored content” appear in small print under the article title. Based on this, you conclude that the review is advertising and is therefore not an unbiased source. Example: Poor critical thinking in a nonacademic context You support a candidate in an upcoming election. You visit an online news site affiliated with their political party and read an article that criticizes their opponent. The article claims that the opponent is inexperienced in politics. You accept this without evidence, because it fits your preconceptions about the opponent.

There is no single way to think critically. How you engage with information will depend on the type of source you’re using and the information you need.

However, you can engage with sources in a systematic and critical way by asking certain questions when you encounter information. Like the CRAAP test , these questions focus on the currency , relevance , authority , accuracy , and purpose of a source of information.

When encountering information, ask:

Who is the author? Are they an expert in their field?
What do they say? Is their argument clear? Can you summarize it?
When did they say this? Is the source current?
Where is the information published? Is it an academic article? Is it peer-reviewed ?
Why did the author publish it? What is their motivation?
How do they make their argument? Is it backed up by evidence? Does it rely on opinion, speculation, or appeals to emotion ? Do they address alternative arguments?

Critical thinking also involves being aware of your own biases, not only those of others. When you make an argument or draw your own conclusions, you can ask similar questions about your own writing:

Am I only considering evidence that supports my preconceptions?
Is my argument expressed clearly and backed up with credible sources?
Would I be convinced by this argument coming from someone else?

If you want to know more about ChatGPT, AI tools , citation , and plagiarism , make sure to check out some of our other articles with explanations and examples.

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Critical thinking refers to the ability to evaluate information and to be aware of biases or assumptions, including your own.

Like information literacy , it involves evaluating arguments, identifying and solving problems in an objective and systematic way, and clearly communicating your ideas.

Critical thinking skills include the ability to:

You can assess information and arguments critically by asking certain questions about the source. You can use the CRAAP test , focusing on the currency , relevance , authority , accuracy , and purpose of a source of information.

Ask questions such as:

Who is the author? Are they an expert?
How do they make their argument? Is it backed up by evidence?

A credible source should pass the CRAAP test and follow these guidelines:

The information should be up to date and current.
The author and publication should be a trusted authority on the subject you are researching.
The sources the author cited should be easy to find, clear, and unbiased.
For a web source, the URL and layout should signify that it is trustworthy.

Information literacy refers to a broad range of skills, including the ability to find, evaluate, and use sources of information effectively.

Being information literate means that you:

Know how to find credible sources
Use relevant sources to inform your research
Understand what constitutes plagiarism
Know how to cite your sources correctly

Confirmation bias is the tendency to search, interpret, and recall information in a way that aligns with our pre-existing values, opinions, or beliefs. It refers to the ability to recollect information best when it amplifies what we already believe. Relatedly, we tend to forget information that contradicts our opinions.

Although selective recall is a component of confirmation bias, it should not be confused with recall bias.

On the other hand, recall bias refers to the differences in the ability between study participants to recall past events when self-reporting is used. This difference in accuracy or completeness of recollection is not related to beliefs or opinions. Rather, recall bias relates to other factors, such as the length of the recall period, age, and the characteristics of the disease under investigation.

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Ryan, E. (2023, May 31). What Is Critical Thinking? | Definition & Examples. Scribbr. Retrieved June 24, 2024, from https://www.scribbr.com/working-with-sources/critical-thinking/

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Curtis Silver

The Importance of Logic and Critical Thinking

Image may contain Landscape Outdoors Nature Scenery Transportation Vehicle and Train

"Critical thinking is a desire to seek, patience to doubt, fondness to meditate, slowness to assert, readiness to consider, carefulness to dispose and set in order; and hatred for every kind of imposture." - Francis Bacon (1605)

As parents, we are tasked with instilling a plethora of different values into our children. While some parents in the world choose to instill a lack of values in their kids, those of us that don't want our children growing up to be criminals and various misfits try a bit harder. Values and morality are one piece of the pie. These are important things to mold into a child's mind, but there are also other items in life to focus on as well. It starts with looking both ways to cross the street and either progresses from there, or stops.

If you stopped explaining the world to your children after they learned to cross the street, then perhaps you should stop reading and go back to surfing for funny pictures of cats. I may use some larger words that you might not understand, making you angry and causing you to leave troll-like comments full of bad grammar and moronic thought processes. However, if you looked at the crossing the street issue as I did – as a logical problem with cause and effect and a probable solution – then carry on. You are my target audience.

Or perhaps the opposite is true, as the former are the people that could benefit from letting some critical thinking into their lives. So what exactly is critical thinking? This bit by Linda Elder in a paper on CriticalThinking.org pretty much sums it up:

Through critical thinking, as I understand it, we acquire a means of assessing and upgrading our ability to judge well. It enables us to go into virtually any situation and to figure out the logic of whatever is happening in that situation. It provides a way for us to learn from new experiences through the process of continual self-assessment. Critical thinking, then, enables us to form sound beliefs and judgments, and in doing so, provides us with a basis for a 'rational and reasonable' emotional life. — Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, Winter, 1996. Vol. XVI, No. 2.

The rationality of the world is what is at risk. Too many people are taken advantage of because of their lack of critical thinking, logic and deductive reasoning. These same people are raising children without these same skills, creating a whole new generation of clueless people.

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To wit, a personal tale of deductive reasoning:

Recently I needed a new transmission for the family van. The warranty on the power train covers the transmission up to 100,000 miles. The van has around 68,000 miles on it. Therefore, even the logic-less dimwit could easily figure that the transmission was covered. Well, this was true until the dealership told me that it wasn't, stating that because we didn't get the scheduled transmission service (which is basically a fluid change) at 30,000 and 60,000 miles the warranty was no longer valid. Now, there are many people that would argue this point, but many more that would shrug, panic, and accept the full cost of repairs.

I read the warranty book. I had a receipt that said the fluid was checked at 60,000 but not replaced. A friend on Twitter pointed out the fact that they were using 100,000 mile transmission fluid. So logically, the fluid would not have to be replaced under 100,000 miles if it wasn't needed, right? So why the stipulation that it needed to be replaced at 60,000 and the loose assumption that not doing that would void the warranty? So I asked the warranty guy to show me in the book where the two items are related. Where it explicitly says that if you don't get the service, the transmission isn't covered. There were portions where it said the service was recommended, but never connecting to actual repairs. Finally the warranty guy shrugged, admitted I was right and said the service was covered.

In this case, valid logic equaled truth and a sound argument. I used very simple reasoning and logic to determine that I was being inadvertently screwed. I say "inadvertently" because I truly believe based on their behavior that they were not intentionally trying to screw me. They believed the two items were related, they had had this argument many times before and were not prepared to be questioned. While both the service manager and the warranty guy seemed at least junior college educated, proving my argument to them took longer than it should have between three adults.

However, valid logic does not always guarantee truth or a sound argument. This is where it gets a little funky. Valid logic is when the structure of logic is correct in the way of syntax and semantics rather than truth. Truth comes from deductive reasoning of said logic. For example:

All transmissions are covered parts. All covered parts are free. Therefore, all transmissions are free. This logic is technically valid, and if the premises are true, then of course the conclusion must be true. You can see here however that it's not always true, though in some situations it could be. While the logic is valid, not all transmissions are free, only those covered by the warranty. So based on that, saying all transmissions are free is not sound logic.

To take it one step further:

All Daleks are brown. Some brown things are Cylons . Therefore, some Daleks are Cylons. Sci-fi fan or not, you probably know that this is not true. The basic lesson here is that, while the logic above might seem valid because of the structure of the statement, it takes a further understanding to figure out why it's not necessarily true: That is, based on the first two statements it's possible that some Daleks are Cylons, but it's not logically concludable. That's where deductive reasoning comes on top of the logic. The underlying lesson here is not to immediately assume everything you read or are told is true, something all children need to and should learn.

This is the direct lesson that needs to be passed on to our children: that of not accepting the immediately visible logic. While not all problems are complex enough to require the scientific method, some of them need some deduction to determine if they are true. Take the example above — how many kids would immediately be satisfied with the false conclusion? Sure, it's a bit geeky with the examples, but switch out bears for Daleks and puppies for Cylons. That makes it easier, and takes the actual research out of it (to find out what Daleks and Cylons are respectively) but many people would just accept that in fact some bears are puppies, if presented with this problem in the context of a textbook or word problem.

Maybe I'm being paranoid or thinking too doomsday, whatever, but I think this is an epidemic. Children are becoming lazier and not as self sufficient because their parents have a problem with watching a three year old cry after they tell her to remove her own jeans, or ask her to put away her own toys (yes, organizational logic falls under the main topic). These are the same parents who do their kid's science project while the kid is playing video games. These kids grow up lacking the simple problem solving skills that make navigating life much easier. Remember when you were growing up and you had the plastic stacking toys ? Well, instead of toys for early development like that, parents are just plopping their kids down in front of the television. While there is some educational type programming on television, it's just not the same as hands-on experience.

My father is an engineer, and he taught me logic and reasoning by making me solve simple, then complex, problems on my own. Or at least giving me the opportunity to solve them on my own. This helped develop critical thinking and problem solving skills, something a lot of children lack these days. Too often I see children that are not allowed to solve problems on their own; instead their parents simply do it for them without argument or discussion. Hell, I am surrounded by adults every day that are unable to solve simple problems, instead choosing to immediately ask me at which point I have to fill the role that their parents never did and – knowing the solution – tell them to solve it themselves, or at least try first.

One of the things I like to work on with my kids is math. There is nothing that teaches deductive reasoning and logic better than math word problems. They are at the age where basic algebra can come into play, which sharpens their reasoning skills because they start to view real world issues with algebraic solutions. Another thing is logic puzzles , crossword puzzles and first person shooters. Actually, not that last one. That's just the reward.

Since I weeded out the folks that don't teach their kids logic in the first two paragraphs, as representatives of the real world it's up to the rest of us to spread the knowledge. It won't be easy. The best thing we can do is teach these thought processes to our children, so that they may look at other children with looks of bewilderment when other children are unable to solve simple tasks. Hopefully, they will not simply do the task for them, but teach them to think. I'm not saying we need to build a whole new generation of project managers and analysts, but it would be better than a generation of task-oriented mindless office drones with untied shoelaces, shoving on a door at the Midvale School for the Gifted .

h/t to @aubreygirl22 for the logical conversation. Image: Flickr user William Notowidagdo. Used under Creative Commons License.

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How might language affect critical thinking performance?

School of Creative Science and Engineering

Research output : Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

This study examined whether language structure or language proficiency might affect students' critical thinking performance. Previous research has claimed that many non-Western students struggle with the demands of demonstrating critical thought. Two language-related causes have been suggested: one concerning structural limitations in the non-Western students' first language, and the other concerning their second language proficiency. In Study 1 described here, reports written by 110 Japanese second year university students, who had received instruction in academic discourse for critical evaluation (which is one aspect of critical thinking), were analyzed for use of evaluative statements. No disadvantage was found for use of the Japanese language, which is considered as having a more indirect structure that may make critical evaluation more difficult. Measurements of language proficiency in English and Japanese, however, were found to correlate with production of evaluative statements in those respective languages suggesting that language proficiency could affect critical evaluation use. In Study 2, the same task was given to 43 first year students who had not yet received the same instruction. Analysis revealed similar patterns in their written work but at a lower level, suggesting that the second year students had benefitted from the skills instruction. Furthermore, unlike the second year students, the first year students evidenced no correlations between their language proficiency scores and their production of evaluative statements, suggesting that proficiency on its own is inadequate: students need instruction on the specific language forms and structures to use to demonstrate critical thinking in their written work.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	41-49
Number of pages	9
Journal
Volume	21
DOIs
Publication status	Published - 2016 Sept 1

Cognitive cost
Critical evaluation
Critical thinking skills instruction
Language proficiency
Language structure

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to document.

10.1016/j.tsc.2016.05.005

Fingerprint

instruction Social Sciences 48%
first-year student Social Sciences 40%
evaluation Social Sciences 26%
cause Social Sciences 11%
discourse Social Sciences 10%
university Social Sciences 9%

T1 - How might language affect critical thinking performance?

AU - Manalo, Emmanuel

AU - Sheppard, Chris

N1 - Funding Information: This research was supported by a grant-in-aid (23243071) received from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. Publisher Copyright: © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. Copyright: Copyright 2016 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2016/9/1

Y1 - 2016/9/1

N2 - This study examined whether language structure or language proficiency might affect students' critical thinking performance. Previous research has claimed that many non-Western students struggle with the demands of demonstrating critical thought. Two language-related causes have been suggested: one concerning structural limitations in the non-Western students' first language, and the other concerning their second language proficiency. In Study 1 described here, reports written by 110 Japanese second year university students, who had received instruction in academic discourse for critical evaluation (which is one aspect of critical thinking), were analyzed for use of evaluative statements. No disadvantage was found for use of the Japanese language, which is considered as having a more indirect structure that may make critical evaluation more difficult. Measurements of language proficiency in English and Japanese, however, were found to correlate with production of evaluative statements in those respective languages suggesting that language proficiency could affect critical evaluation use. In Study 2, the same task was given to 43 first year students who had not yet received the same instruction. Analysis revealed similar patterns in their written work but at a lower level, suggesting that the second year students had benefitted from the skills instruction. Furthermore, unlike the second year students, the first year students evidenced no correlations between their language proficiency scores and their production of evaluative statements, suggesting that proficiency on its own is inadequate: students need instruction on the specific language forms and structures to use to demonstrate critical thinking in their written work.

AB - This study examined whether language structure or language proficiency might affect students' critical thinking performance. Previous research has claimed that many non-Western students struggle with the demands of demonstrating critical thought. Two language-related causes have been suggested: one concerning structural limitations in the non-Western students' first language, and the other concerning their second language proficiency. In Study 1 described here, reports written by 110 Japanese second year university students, who had received instruction in academic discourse for critical evaluation (which is one aspect of critical thinking), were analyzed for use of evaluative statements. No disadvantage was found for use of the Japanese language, which is considered as having a more indirect structure that may make critical evaluation more difficult. Measurements of language proficiency in English and Japanese, however, were found to correlate with production of evaluative statements in those respective languages suggesting that language proficiency could affect critical evaluation use. In Study 2, the same task was given to 43 first year students who had not yet received the same instruction. Analysis revealed similar patterns in their written work but at a lower level, suggesting that the second year students had benefitted from the skills instruction. Furthermore, unlike the second year students, the first year students evidenced no correlations between their language proficiency scores and their production of evaluative statements, suggesting that proficiency on its own is inadequate: students need instruction on the specific language forms and structures to use to demonstrate critical thinking in their written work.

KW - Cognitive cost

KW - Critical evaluation

KW - Critical thinking skills instruction

KW - Language proficiency

KW - Language structure

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84974603780&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84974603780&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.tsc.2016.05.005

DO - 10.1016/j.tsc.2016.05.005

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84974603780

SN - 1871-1871

JO - Thinking Skills and Creativity

JF - Thinking Skills and Creativity

Critical Thinking & Language Learning

From a very young age, learning a language is of utmost importance. Starting from our mother tongue, we then learn another language (usually English, Spanish, German or French). Learning – and teaching- methods though, don’t always work as expected. Conventional teaching and learning techniques are starting to become a feature of the past now, as new methods are considered to be more efficient. One of these techniques is critical thinking.

Critical Thinking Defined

When we discuss Critical thinking, we refer to some specific practices. First of all, critical thinking occurs when we doubt something- a text, an idea, a political statement, a speech, a piece of information, an article.

Second of all, it also occurs when we look at a specific issue or problem, from more than one perspective. Third of all, it also occurs when we criticize something, in a constructive way. For example, disagreeing with the words of a journalist, while pointing out the problem and supporting our opinion with arguments. Also, when critically viewing new information, we can find more meanings that might be indirect.

Therefore, it becomes apparent why Critical Thinking is necessary when learning a language.

Critical thinking affecting Language Learning

In addition, learning a language can be achieved by many practical activities that combine critical thinking with the material taught in class. Hence, learning becomes more inclusive and practical.

Critical thinking improving Language Learning

Furthermore, when a student participates in such activities, he/she becomes an “active participant”, as he/she interacts with other students while constructing his/her learning. Through this process, the student perceives the knowledge learned at the moment in his/her own way, and because of this fact, this knowledge is remembered – and used- more easily (learning stops being too theoretical and is applied in practice).

As critical thinking affects language learning, language learning affects critical thinking too. Learning a language requires the ability to learn a whole new ideology, a very different culture – in many cases-, and practically, a different language from yours ( in many cases). That means that you learn a set of grammatic and syntactic rules that might not be the same as the ones of your own language.

Language learning improving Critical Thinking Skills

In addition, problem-solving and conflict can also improve critical thinking skills. For example, in a conversation where you have to support your argument without been affected by the potential disagreement and annoyance of the other participant (during a language learning-related activity), proper selection of language is needed. This can be accomplished by applying your knowledge and by using your critical thinking skills.

The kind of relationship between Critical thinking and language learning

In other words, critical thinking is not dependent on language learning, when it comes to its improvement and formation whereas language learning needs critical thinking, as it has the goal of being as much efficient as possible.

On An Ending Note

https://unitec.researchbank.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10652/3680/revised-critical-thinking-paper-May-2016-.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Critical Thinking and Decision-Making - What is Critical Thinking?

Critical thinking and decision-making -, what is critical thinking, critical thinking and decision-making what is critical thinking.

Critical Thinking and Decision-Making: What is Critical Thinking?

Lesson 1: what is critical thinking, what is critical thinking.

Critical thinking is a term that gets thrown around a lot. You've probably heard it used often throughout the years whether it was in school, at work, or in everyday conversation. But when you stop to think about it, what exactly is critical thinking and how do you do it ?

Watch the video below to learn more about critical thinking.

Simply put, critical thinking is the act of deliberately analyzing information so that you can make better judgements and decisions . It involves using things like logic, reasoning, and creativity, to draw conclusions and generally understand things better.

illustration of the terms logic, reasoning, and creativity

This may sound like a pretty broad definition, and that's because critical thinking is a broad skill that can be applied to so many different situations. You can use it to prepare for a job interview, manage your time better, make decisions about purchasing things, and so much more.

The process

illustration of "thoughts" inside a human brain, with several being connected and "analyzed"

As humans, we are constantly thinking . It's something we can't turn off. But not all of it is critical thinking. No one thinks critically 100% of the time... that would be pretty exhausting! Instead, it's an intentional process , something that we consciously use when we're presented with difficult problems or important decisions.

Improving your critical thinking

illustration of the questions "What do I currently know?" and "How do I know this?"

In order to become a better critical thinker, it's important to ask questions when you're presented with a problem or decision, before jumping to any conclusions. You can start with simple ones like What do I currently know? and How do I know this? These can help to give you a better idea of what you're working with and, in some cases, simplify more complex issues.

Real-world applications

illustration of a hand holding a smartphone displaying an article that reads, "Study: Cats are better than dogs"

Let's take a look at how we can use critical thinking to evaluate online information . Say a friend of yours posts a news article on social media and you're drawn to its headline. If you were to use your everyday automatic thinking, you might accept it as fact and move on. But if you were thinking critically, you would first analyze the available information and ask some questions :

What's the source of this article?
Is the headline potentially misleading?
What are my friend's general beliefs?
Do their beliefs inform why they might have shared this?

illustration of "Super Cat Blog" and "According to survery of cat owners" being highlighted from an article on a smartphone

After analyzing all of this information, you can draw a conclusion about whether or not you think the article is trustworthy.

Critical thinking has a wide range of real-world applications . It can help you to make better decisions, become more hireable, and generally better understand the world around you.

illustration of a lightbulb, a briefcase, and the world

/en/problem-solving-and-decision-making/why-is-it-so-hard-to-make-decisions/content/

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19 Logic and Critical Thinking

Introduction [1].

This chapter is a primer on basic logical concepts that often appear in various critical thinking textbooks—concepts such as entailment, contraries, contradictories, necessary and sufficient conditions, etc. The chapter will not provide a historical genealogy of these concepts—in some sense critical thinking, argumentation theory, and formal logic all trace their roots back to at least Aristotle over two thousand years ago. As a result, for many of these concepts, determining whether the concept was a logic concept co-opted by critical thinking, or a critical thinking concept co-opted and changed by logic and then co-opted back again, is extremely difficult. Regardless, a brief orientation of the relationship of critical thinking and logic is in order.

Critical thinking, at least as it is most often justified, is a practical, skill-building exercise with the goal of improving our reasoning. This motivation, of understanding and improving our reasoning, has also been the motivation behind the development of logic over the past several thousand years. While we could study and understand each piece of reasoning individually, it is much more efficient to look for reasoning patterns that recur over and over again, to distinguish those patterns that are good from those that are bad, and so to find principles underpinning our reasoning that help us distinguish good reasoning from bad reasoning across the board. This push to generalize and theorize with the patterns of reasoning generated numerous formal logical systems, including the syllogistic and modal logics of Aristotle.

However, logic, especially formal logic, has not been constrained solely by the goal of understanding and improving our reasoning. Like abstract mathematics, the formal structures underpinning logical systems, are rich and complex enough to generate study all their own, with no concern for the original motivation that may have pushed us to study patterns of human reasoning. Regardless, many of logic’s concepts are still useful in organizing any study of reasoning.

In what follows I begin with a fairly substantial discussion of the core concept needed to understand the traditional logical concepts such as entailment or contradictory or necessary condition—the concept of a possibility. Once we have this notion in play, the definitions of the standard logical concepts, which I provide in Section 2, are quite straightforward. In the final section, I discuss the potential for misapplication of various concepts or distinctions.

1. Possibilities

1.1 possibility and reasoning.

The core concept of logic is the concept of a possibility (a case, a scenario, an option, a way things could be). While logicians and philosophers continue to work on illuminating the nature of possibilities, we can, even without a precise definition, still intuitively grasp the notion. You could stop reading right now or you could keep going. England didn’t win, but England could have won, if they had scored their penalty kick. That die, when rolled, will land on one of six possible sides. There are many things that might happen if the bill is passed into law. According to 18th century philosopher Gottfried Leibniz, God surveyed all the possible ways the universe might be and, being omnibenevolent, chose to create the best one (this one!?).

We appeal to possibilities all the time in our reasoning. Indeed, if there were but one way things could be and we knew completely what that way was like, then we would not need to reason at all—we would just know how things were going to unfold. But given that (i) we do not know completely how things are or how the future is going to unfold and (ii) we assume there are multiple possibilities for how the future might unfold, we need to reason about the ways things could be in order to learn how things are and how to best manage whatever the future brings. For example, the detective investigating a suspicious death gets a new piece of evidence—the deceased was killed by a rare poison. As a result, some scenarios are closed off as viable explanations of the death—e.g., the deceased was deliberately killed by someone who did not have access to the poison. Other scenarios, ones that may not have been in the detective’s awareness before the new piece of evidence was acquired, become relevant—e.g., that someone who knew or at least had access to the poison was responsible for the death. As a result, a new line of inquiry opens for the detective: find out who had access to the poison. Similarly, a doctor runs a series of tests to try to eliminate certain possible explanations for a given patient’s symptoms. Given certain results the possible explanations get narrowed down to one (and hopefully a treatment is available); given other results multiple possibilities remain and the doctor has to decide which tests may be required for progress to be made; unexpected results, while eliminating some possibilities may open up new possibilities that the doctor had not originally been considering. Finally, you are trying to decide when and in which order to run a list of errands. You take into account the likely lines at each location at different times of day, and the likely traffic at different times of day. After evaluating the possibilities, you choose the best option for you.

1.2 Types of possibil i ties

1.2 .1 physical & epistemic possibilities.

Given the ubiquity of possibilities in our reasoning, theorists often classify the possibilities. For example, physicists are interested in distinguishing the physical possibilities (the possibilities consistent with the laws of physics) from the physical impossibilities (the possibilities inconsistent with the laws of physics). Other general types of possibilities include epistemic possibilities—scenarios consistent with what we know; moral possibilities—those consistent with a given moral code; legal possibilities—situations consistent with what is permitted by a given legal code. We can even combine these types—epistemic physical possibilities are those that are consistent with the laws of physics as we currently know them. If what we know about the world changes at a fundamental level, what once was epistemically physically possible (measuring time independently of motion or gravity) may become epistemically physically impossible. Like for the detective and the doctor above, new, unexpected evidence may require an adjustment by the scientist in what possibilities are under consideration as viable explanations.

1.2 .2 Equally probable possibilities

Two other sorts of possibilities deserve mention. Probabilistic reasoning depends on possibilities of a very special sort—equally probable possibilities. To determine the probability that a fair coin will come up heads we assume that there are two equally likely possibilities, “heads’’ and “tails” (we usually ignore the extremely unlikely, though still physically possible situation in which the coin lands and stays on its edge). Failing to consider the relevant equally likely possibilities can make our probabilistic reasoning go awry. You will either win the lottery or you will not. There are two possibilities here, but treating them as equally likely is certainly an obvious mistake. Assuming the lottery is fair, the relevant equally likely possibilities are that each individual ticket (or set of numbers) will be the winner. If your ticket is one of many, then the probability you will win the lottery is much lower than the probability of your losing. Less obvious, but equally problematic is the following sort of case:

Three drawers contain the following mixture of coins—one contains two gold coins, one contains two silver coins, and one contains one gold coin and one silver coin. Without looking you pick a drawer, open it, and pick out a coin. When you open your eyes, you see the coin is gold. What is the probability that the other coin in that drawer is gold?

Many will reason as follows. The coin came from either the gold/gold drawer or the gold/silver drawer. Each drawer is equally likely and if it came from the gold/gold drawer the other coin is gold. But if it came from the gold/silver drawer the other coin is silver. Hence, the probability the other coin is gold is ½ or 50%. Unfortunately, the two possible drawers are not the relevant equally likely possibilities (no more than your winning or losing were the relevant equally likely possibilities in the lottery case). The relevant possibilities are opening a drawer and picking out a coin without looking. There are six different equally likely ways that could happen, one for each coin. Once you gain the new evidence that the coin you picked is gold when you open your eyes, you can eliminate three of the six possibilities, i.e. the ones in which you pick a silver coin. Of the three possibilities left two are such that the other coin is gold, i.e., the two possibilities in which you pick one of the two coins from the gold/gold drawer. Only in the gold/silver case is the other coin silver. Hence, the probability of the other coin being gold is 2/3. The moral here is that accurate probabilistic reasoning requires identifying and using the relevant equally likely possibilities from amongst all the sorts of possibilities that may present themselves—not always an easy task.

1.2 .3 Practical possibilities

Another significant type of possibility, especially in our everyday reasoning, is practical possibility—possibilities that are consistent with our means, desires, and will (or perhaps our epistemic practical possibilities—the possibilities that, given what we know or believe, are consistent with our means, desires, and will). When deciding how to get to an important meeting across town you are likely to not even consider the possibility that you flap your arms and fly, or the possibility that you use your personal matter/energy transport device, or even the possibility that you sprint all the way there. The first is physically impossible; the second, while perhaps physically possible, is beyond our current technological means; and the third, while certainly physically possible, is quite likely beyond your will and most certainly contrary to your strong desire to not arrive at the important meeting sweating profusely and gasping for breath. Instead you consider what your actual transportation options are (your own car, Uber, taxi, walk, subway, or some combination), how much time you have, how much money you are willing to spend, and then you try to find the optimal possibility (usually constrained by the desire to not spend too much time actually calculating the optimal possibility). Mundane decisions about which possibility to actualize like this happen all the time: what to eat this week, which movie to go see, what to do after dinner, when to get your hair cut, etc. Though mundane, they are still of interest to critical thinking or argumentation theorists since businesses and advertisers spend billions of dollars and devote millions of work-hours to trying to influence your desires and will in order to persuade you to choose their product.

Of more social significance are your individual choices that impact larger groups—in particular (if you live in a democracy) your voting choices, your decisions about how much effort you put into monitoring the outcome of your voting choices, and what the individuals or policies you voted for end up doing. In an optimal world, your political representatives would enact policies that benefit the most people in the most cost efficient, affordable, and just way. Of course, there may be little agreement about what is the most affordable, or just, or beneficial option, especially if what elected representatives take to be the best option is what will get them re-elected rather than what is actually good for their constituents. Regardless of the complexities and intricacies of public policy debate and decision-making, at the core is an attempt to find and agree upon a practical possibility, from amongst the myriad available, to actualize for our mutual benefit.

Given so many types of overlapping sets of possibilities, many of which differ for different individuals or groups of individuals—your set of practical possibilities does not likely match that of your neighbor even if the two sets overlap significantly; compare your set with someone of quite different socio-economic means and the sets overlap even less—and it is no surprise that numerous problems can arise when reasoning with and about possibilities. Individuals can consider too many possibilities, or more commonly, fail to consider all the relevant possibilities. For example, human beings are quite prone to confirmation bias—taking confirming instances as justifying an already-accepted theory or explanation rather than actively seeking out or testing for disconfirming instances. Detectives, or doctors, or researchers can become so fixated on the explanation they already believe to be correct that they are blind to the alternate explanations that are still consistent with the evidence available. In the case of probabilistic reasoning, we already saw cases of considering the wrong set of possibilities. Reasoners can also illegitimately shift the set of possibilities under consideration or shift the value assigned to various possibilities mid-reasoning. An egregious example can occur in public policy debates over the negative consequences of potential policies. When negative consequence X is a potential consequence of the opposition’s preferred policy it is judged to be likely enough to count as a reason against the policy, but when negative consequence X is a potential consequence of one’s own preferred policy, it is judged not to be likely enough to count as a reason against the policy. Identifying the correct set of possibilities and correct relative values of those possibilities is essential to reasoning correctly in numerous situations and yet identifying and ranking possibilities is often an extremely difficult task.

1.2 .4 Logical possibilities

One way to try to sidestep some of these problems is to determine what reasoning holds no matter what the possibilities in question are—to determine the patterns of reasoning that work in all the possibilities. After all, if a piece of reasoning works no matter what possibility you are considering, then you do not need to worry whether you are considering the right set of possibilities or not. Hence, one goal of formal logic is to be able to identify the structure that defines all the ways things could be, i.e., the logical possibilities.

The rough and ready notion of a “logical possibility” is a possibility that has no contradiction in it. Whilst it is not logically possible for an individual to both exist at a particular time and place and not exist at that time and place, which is contradictory, it is logically possible that the person exist in Montana in one instant, and then exist on one of the moons of Jupiter, say Io, in the next. There is no contradiction in the possibility that you exist in Montana in one instant and on Io in the next. But this possibility, while logically possible, is not physically possible. Given the distance from Montana to Io, we would need to violate the physical restriction on moving matter or energy (currently travelling below the speed of light) faster than the speed of light to get from Montana to Io from one instant to the next, so such travel is physically impossible.

Earlier I said that philosophers are still investigating and debating the nature of possibilities. But, whatever they are, there is one actualized one and lots of unactualized ones. In Leibniz’s argument that this world is the best of all possibilities, God examines all the possibilities and then actualizes the best one. Even if you doubt Leibniz’s argument, of all the myriad ways this universe could be, it is in fact one way, namely, the possibility that is actualized. The detective has numerous possibilities in mind about who is responsible for the deceased’s death; the detective hopes that by finding more evidence the possibilities can be reduced to one, the actual one. When you are deciding what to do tomorrow, you consider numerous possibilities and then engage in actions that make one (hopefully the one you wanted) actual.

But since there are lots of unactualized possibilities and only one actual possibility, how do we distinguish the unactualized possibilities from each other? Quite simply by what is true and false at each possibility. I flip a coin twice. There are four possible outcomes. Heads for the first flip and heads for the second; heads for the first and tails for the second; tails for the first, and heads for the second; and tails for both. Suppose the coin comes up tails on the first and heads on the second—that is the possibility that got actualized. How do we distinguish the three non-actualized possibilities? Well, in the first and second it is true that the coin first came up heads, but in fourth it is false that the coin first came up heads. But possibilities one and two differ in what is true and false of the second coin flip.

1.3 Declarative sentences and propositions

Given that we distinguish possibilities by what is true and false if they are actualized, one proposal for understanding possibilities is just as sets of declarative sentences. For example, the first coin flip possibility would be the set {“the first flip of the coin came up heads”, “the second flip of the coin came up heads”}. While initially appealing, the problem with this proposal is that sentences are not as well behaved as is needed to demarcate possibilities. Why?

Sometimes different sentences describe the same possibility or state of affairs. For example, “George is a bachelor” and “George is an unmarried male of marriageable age” describe the same state of affairs, but are different sentences since they are composed of different words. But since they are different sentences, sets that differ only in regards to which of these two sentences they contain are still different sets, and so different possibilities. Yet, we agreed the sentences were just two different ways of talking about the same possibility.

Alternatively, sometimes the same sentence can be used in different ways to describe different possibilities. For example, the sentence “The movie was a bomb” used in the United States likely describes a state of affairs in which the movie was bad, but the same sentence used in the United Kingdom likely describes a state of affairs in which the movie was good. But if one sentence can be used in different ways to describe different possibilities, then, once again, we cannot identify possibilities merely with sets of sentences.

To avoid the vagaries of sentences, logicians usually resort to propositions—what it is that declarative sentences express. “George is a bachelor” and “George is an unmarried male of marriageable age” express the same proposition about George’s marital status. “England won the World Cup in 1966” expresses a true proposition about the English national soccer team; “2+2 = 5” expresses a false proposition about the sum of 2 and 2. We use declarative sentences to express propositions directly, but other language use often involves them. For instance, when we ask, “did Hungary win the World Cup in 1938?” we wonder whether the proposition that Hungary won the 1938 World Cup is true or false. If we get the correct answer (they did not win—they lost to Italy 4-2 in the finals), then we stop wondering whether it is true or false and start believing it is false (and if the belief if strong enough and acquired in the correct way, we might even know that the proposition is false).

Instead of treating possibilities as sets of sentences, many logicians treat possibilities (or at least model possibilities) as sets of propositions. There are technical details that might require modifying even this proposal, but since the resolution of these details is unlikely to be relevant to the critical thinking project, we can take possibilities to be sets of propositions. The propositions that are members of a particular possibility are said to be true or obtain at that possibility. Propositions that are not members of a particular possibility are false at that possibility or do not obtain at that possibility. Armed with the concepts of (i) a possibility and (ii) propositions being true at or obtaining at possibilities, we can define many of the logical concepts that pervade logic and critical thinking textbooks. So even though some of the logical concepts that are forthcoming are, in some textbooks, defined in terms of sentences, the more common way is to define them in terms of propositions.

2. Logical concepts

2.1 types of propositions.

I begin by discussing some common types of propositions that arise in our reasoning. The most basic is a simple proposition, propositions expressed by such declarative sentences as “George is a bachelor” or “the sky is blue” or “Romeo loves Juliet.” Simple propositions attribute something to some object(s) or thing(s). In the first case, of George, that he is a bachelor, and in the third case, of Romeo, that he loves another object, namely Juliet. N egations of simple propositions, propositions expressed by such declarative sentences as “George is not a bachelor” or “Hungary did not win the 1938 World Cup” say that the simple proposition does not obtain. Of course, we do not speak declaratively solely by affirming either simple propositions or the denial of simple propositions; we combine or modify our simple propositions such as in:

“George is a bachelor, and so is Todd”;
“Mary loves Antonio, but he does not love her back”;
“George went to Sophie’s house or he went to the movies”;
“If the butler did not do it, then the cook did”;
“If I take the subway, I will be on time for my meeting”;
“Every student in this class is eligible”;
“Someone deliberately killed the deceased”;
“In order to be on time for your meeting, you must take the subway”;
“England did not win the game, but they might have if they had scored their penalty kick in the last minute.”

The first two sentences express conjunctions . For a conjunction to be true, both sub-parts of the conjunction have to be true. So for “George is a bachelor and so is Todd” to be true, both “George is a bachelor” and “Todd is a bachelor” must be true. [For ease of exposition I will often omit the phrase “the proposition expressed by” before mentioning sentences as I just did above.]

The sentence “George went to Sophie’s house or he went to the movies” expresses a disjunction. There are two sorts of disjunctions—inclusive and exclusive. For an inclusive disjunction to be true, at least one of the sub-parts must be true. For an exclusive di s junction to be true, exactly one of the sub-parts must be true. If our sentence about George expresses an exclusive disjunction, then for it to be true George needs to be in exactly one of two places—at Sophie’s house or at the movies. This is likely to be the usage of someone trying to tell us where George is at a particular moment. If, on the other hand, the sentence expresses an inclusive disjunction, then it will be true if George went to one of those locations and is still true if George went to both. This is likely to be the usage of someone just trying to lay out where George might have gone over a period of time. While some languages have different words for expressing inclusive and exclusive disjunctions. English relies on context or background knowledge, sometimes with limited success, to try to distinguish which type of disjunction is being expressed. Legal documents, in order to avoid the ambiguity of ‘or’ in English, often spell out exclusive disjunctions as “A or B and not both A and B” while representing inclusive disjunctions as “A and/or B”.

Sentences such as: “ If the butler did not do it, then the cook did” and “ If I take the subway, [ then ] I will be on time for my meeting,” express onditional propositions. Conditionals are frequently used in natural languages such as English, yet there is little agreement on how they are to be analyzed logically. (Some theorists even go so far as to deny that conditional sentences express propositions at all.) Usually the disagreement concerns determining exactly what it takes for conditionals to be true, but there is widespread agreement that declarative conditionals are false if the ‘if’–part, the antecedent , is true, and the ‘then’–part, the consequent , is false. If it is true that I take the subway, and false that I will be on time for my meeting, then the conditional “If I take the subway, I will be on time for my meeting,” is false. As a consequence, logic has defined a minimal version of the conditional, called the material conditional . Material conditionals are false if the antecedent is true and the consequent is false, but true otherwise—in other words, material conditionals are the most permissive when considering what it takes for a conditional to be true. There has been much debate about whether indicative conditionals such as “If the butler did not do it, then the cook did” just express material conditionals or rather express something stronger. Despite the disagreement, the most common articulation of conditionals in introductory logic texts is in terms of material conditionals, and it is most often this sort of conditional that is coopted into critical thinking texts. One merely needs to keep in mind that the work on understanding conditionals is far from finished.

“ Every student in this class is eligible” expresses a universal proposition—a proposition that attributes something to every member of a specified group. For a universal proposition to be true there can be no instance of a member of the group not having the specified attribute. If “Every student in this class is eligible” is true, then there is no student in the class who is not eligible. Oftentimes the group is not fully identified in the sentence used to express the proposition. For example, saying “All the beer is in the fridge” or “All horses have heads” are unlikely to be taken as expressing that every single beer in the universe is in a particular fridge or that there is no single instance of a headless horse anywhere. Depending on the context of use, likely plausible interpretations of those sentences would be: “All the beer we brought home from the store (and which has not already been drunk) is in the fridge” and “Typical, normal live horses have heads.” But once the group is fully specified, for a universal proposition to be true, every member of the group must have the attributed property or properties.

Instead of saying that everything in a given group has a stated attribute, we often merely want to convey that at least one thing or some things in the group have a particular property as in “Someone deliberately killed the deceased.” Such propositions are existential propositions. They are true when at least one object in a specified group has a specified attribute. For example, “Some student is eligible” is true just so long as at least one student is indeed eligible.

So far, most of our examples of propositions can be true or false given a single possibility. Suppose we restrict ourselves to just the actual possibility—then it is either true that George is a bachelor at the actual possibility or it is not; if, at the actual possibility, there is no student in the class who is not eligible, then the universal “Every student in class is eligible” is true at the actual possibility and otherwise false. But some of our declarative sentences are not just about one possibility; rather, they depend on multiple possibilities. Sentences such as the last two on our list, which express modal propositions are examples. (They are called “modal” because expressions such as “must”, “can”, “might”, “would”, etc., were said to indicate the “mode” of the component proposition.)

Different modal expressions have different truth conditions. Consider, for example, the sentence—“In order to be on time for your meeting you must take the subway.” For it to be true, all the possible ways (probably some set of practical possibilities constrained by the background in which the sentence is uttered) in which you make the meeting on time include your taking the subway. In the case of England losing, but winning if they’d scored their penalty, the first part is a negation that is true just so long as England won is false. So the first part tells us what the actual possibility is like. But the second part tells us what the relevantly similar possibilities except for England scoring their penalty, are like—namely, that England won in at least one of those possibilities. Compare that with the stronger claim that England would have won if they had scored their penalty—that claim will be true just so long as England wins in all the relevantly similar possibilities. (Part of the debate about conditionals is whether even conditionals without explicit modal terms, such as ‘might’ or ‘would’ or ‘must’, etc. are really expressing propositions concerning multiple possibilities, and not just the actual one—again, a debate I will not be able to resolve here.)

This list is not at all meant to be exhaustive of the type of propositions we express via our declarative sentences. Rather, it is meant to give a flavor for the sorts of propositions dealt with in first and second logic courses, the sorts of propositions that logicians attempt to model and define clearly and precisely in their basic systems. Why are logicians interested in these sorts of propositions? Because they show up in many of the reasoning patterns that we use over and over. For example, if I tell you George is either at Sophie’s or at the movies, and you tell me he is not at movies, we both hopefully reason that we should check for George at Sophie’s house. Another example: If the IRS says that all taxpayers satisfying their three specified conditions can claim a particular deduction, and you determine that you satisfy those three conditions, you should reason that you can take that particular deduction. It is by recognizing these types of propositions, and the patterns that result in combining them, that formal logic, which focuses on the patterns, gets its impetus. But regardless of whether one is focusing on the goodness of patterns or more generally on the patterns and content of reasoning, both critical thinking theorists and logicians need to take special care in determining what proposition a given sentence in a particular context expresses, for without understanding the correct proposition we will not be considering and evaluating the correct possibilities.

Even though understanding and classifying what propositions various declarative sentences express is an ongoing project, there is another classification scheme that logicians often appeal to—necessary truths (also called tautologies), necessary falsehoods (also called contradictions), and contingent propositions. The definitions are as follows:

Necessary Truth : A proposition that is true in all possibilities.

Necessary Falsehood : A proposition that is false in all possibilities.

Contingent Proposition : A proposition that is true in some, but not all, possibilities.

Sentences such as: “Either Socrates corrupts the youth of Athens or he does not”, or “If it is raining, then it is raining” express necessary truths. For every possibility there is, either Socrates corrupts the youth of Athens in that possibility or he does not. Some have wondered if there any non-trivial tautologies, since the standard examples, such as the ones I just gave, seem to be pretty trivial, uninformative sentences. Many theoreticians hold that the truths of mathematics are all necessary truths and many of those truths are certainly non-trivial—they often take a lot of work for us to know that they are true. Others point out that even if many necessary truths seem trivial or uninformative, they are still very useful. Plato, for example, uses the Socrates sentence in part of his dialogue concerning whether Socrates should have been found guilty of a particular offense. Plato starts with the obvious truth that either Socrates corrupts the youth or he does not, but proceeds to argue that in either case, Socrates should not be found guilty.

Sentences such as “At a particular moment in time, Socrates is over six-feet tall and Socrates is not over six-feet tall” express necessary falsehoods. For any possibility, and any moment of time in that possibility, Socrates cannot be both over six-feet tall and not over six-feet tall. Necessary falsehoods, or contradictions as they are more commonly called, are useful as sign-posts of something having gone drastically wrong in our reasoning. If we can show that someone’s position contains or leads to a contradiction, then we show that they aren’t even talking about a genuine possibility at all, but rather an impossibility. Good reasoners generally want to avoid being committed to impossibilities, so they try to avoid being committed to contradictions in their reasoning.

Most of the propositions we deal with in our everyday reasoning are contingent ones. “The coin landed heads on the first flip” is true in some possibilities, but false in others. “George will arrive on time” is true in some, but false in others. Even complex propositions, such as “If I take the subway, I will make it to the meeting on time” are likely to be true in some possibilities (smooth running reliable subway system) and false in others (an unreliable or scanty subway system). The challenge for good reasoners, of course, is to try to figure out, on the basis of what we already know, and the acquisition of new evidence, which propositions are in fact true at the actual possibility and which are not true. The detective, the doctor, the scientist, the everyday reasoner, are all reasoning using various possibilities in order to try to determine which propositions are true or false at the actual possibility.

2.2 Relations amongst propositions

Given that reasoning is the moving from given propositions to other propositions, and logicians are trying to understand correct reasoning, many of the important concepts of logic concern not just types of propositions, but the relations amongst propositions, I finish this section with definitions, examples, and discussion of eight such relations.

Necessary condition

One proposition, A , is a necessary condition for another propos i tion , B, if there is no possibility in which B obtains and A does not.

If A is a necessary condition for B, then you cannot have B without A. For example, if it is true that meeting the eligibility requirements is a necessary condition for legitimately holding office, then there is no possibility in which one legitimately holds office and does not meet the eligibility requirements. But if it is false that meeting the eligibility requirements is a necessary condition for legitimately holding office, then there is at least one possibility in which one legitimately holds office and does not meet the eligibility requirements.

Sufficient condition

One proposition, A , is a sufficient condition for another propos i tion B, if there is no possibility in which A obtains and B does not.

If A is a sufficient condition for B, then A guarantees B. For example, if it is true that getting a perfect score on every assessment is sufficient for passing the course, then there is no possibility in which one gets a perfect score on every assessment and one does not pass the course. If it is false, then there is at least one possibility in which one gets a perfect score on every assessment and still does not pass the course.

In many elementary logic or critical thinking textbooks, necessary and sufficient conditions are treated as material conditionals. For example, “George attending class is sufficient for George passing the course” is treated as “If George attends class, then George passes the course.” But necessary and sufficient conditions cannot be material conditionals, since denying a sufficient or necessary condition is not the same as denying a material conditional. For example, saying “George attending class is not sufficient for George passing” is not the same as denying the material conditional “If George attends class, then George passes the course” is true. Denying the material conditional is just saying that it is actually the case that George attends class, but does not pass the course, i.e., that the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. But denying that George’s attending is sufficient for George’s passing is not saying that George attends and does not pass, but rather says that there is a possibility, not necessarily the actual one, in which George attends, but does not pass. In other words, necessary and sufficient conditions are describing what is true of a range of possibilities.

Equivalence

Two propositions are equivalent just so long as there is no poss i bility in which one is true and the other is false .

In other words, for each possibility, the two propositions are either both true or both false. For example, “All Euclidean triangles have three sides” and “All Euclidean triangles have three interior angles” are both true in all possibilities and false in none, so they are logically equivalent to each other. Similarly, “Either Peter failed to make the team or Abigail failed to make the team” is logically equivalent to “Abigail and Peter did not both make the team.” If the first proposition is true, then, on an inclusive disjunction reading, at least one of the two did not make the team, so it is true that they did not both make the team. If on the other hand the first proposition is false, then it is false Pater failed to make the team (and so made it) and it is false Abigail failed to make the team (and so also made it), in which case both made the team and the second proposition is also false. Since the propositions are true in the same possibilities and false in the same possibilities they are logically equivalent.

Equivalence of proposition is not to be confused with the equivalence of sentences. Two sentences are equivalent, such as “George is a bachelor” and “George is a unmarried male of marriageable age” just in case they express the same proposition. Two distinct propositions, on the other hand, are equivalent just in case they are true or false in exactly the same possibilities. Of course, without a clear notion of the identity conditions of propositions, it is often hard to determine whether we have two sentences expressing one proposition, or two sentences expressing two distinct propositions that are equivalent to each other. [Like possibilities, theorists are still debating how to understand propositions. For example, here I have defined possibilities as sets of propositions, but some theorists reverse the order of dependence and define propositions as sets of possibilities, i.e., the possibilities at which they are true. Either way, having defined one concept in the terms of the other, the theorist still owes us an account of the undefined concept—a task theorists continue to pursue.]

Consistency

Two propositions are consistent with each other just in case there is at least one possibility in which both are true.

For example, “Sphere A is completely red” is consistent with “Cube B is completely blue” just so long as there is a possibility in which both are true. But “Sphere A is completely red” is inconsistent with “Sphere A is partly blue” since there is no possibility in which both are true.

Two propositions are contrary to each other if there is no possibi l ity in which both are true.

Contrariness is a kind of inconsistency. As we just saw, “Sphere A is completely red” is inconsistent with “Sphere A is partly blue” because there is no possibility in which both are true, i.e., because they are contrary to each other. But even though both propositions cannot be true together, they both could be false together, such as in possibilities in which “Sphere A is completely green” is true. But there is an even stronger kind of inconsistency, than mere contrariness.

Contradictor y

Two propositions are contradictory to each other if there is no possibility in which both are true or both are false .

“Sphere A is completely red” is contradictory to “Sphere A is not completely red” since if one is true, the other is false and if one is false, the other is true. Similarly, if it is true that “Snow guarantees skiing” then it is false that “There is a possibility in which there is snow and no skiing” and vice versa.

One important reason to keep these two kinds of inconsistency separate is that reasoners sometimes treat inconsistency as if it were just the same as being contradictory—they reason that if two states of affairs are inconsistent, then if one is false, the other one must be true. But such reasoners miss or ignore the possibility that two inconsistent propositions might still both be false, and as we saw in the previous section, ignoring or missing relevant possibilities is prone to generate reasoning errors. Hence, knowing whether two propositions are consistent, or contrary, or contradictory gives us important information about which possibilities are still relevant to whatever inquiry or reasoning we are pursuing using those propositions.

Since logicians are motivated by the goal of distinguishing good reasoning from bad reasoning and at least one part of good reasoning is that what we reason from adequately supports what we reason to, logicians are very interested in relations of adequate support. One very special kind of adequate support is entailment.

Entailmen t

P roposition A entails proposition B just so long as there is no po s sibility in which A is true and B is false.

For example, “Sam’s car weighs over 1000kg” entails “Sam’s car weighs at least 500kg”—any possibility in which Sam’s car is over 1000kg it is clearly at least 500kg. “Sam’s car is a red hatchback” entails “Sam’s car is red” and “Sam possesses a car” and “Sam’s car is a hatchback”. Instead of talking about what a single proposition entails, logicians are often interested in what a group or set of propositions entails. [A set of propositions entails another proposition just so long as there is no possibility in which all members of the set are true and the other proposition is false.] For example, “George went to Sophie’s house or to the movies” and “George did not go to the movies” entail “George went to Sophie’s house.” On the other hand, “If Sally attends class, then she passes the course” and “Sally passes the course” does not entail “Sally attends class,” since there are possibilities in which Sally can study well enough on her own and there is no attendance requirement, such that while it is true that “If Sally attends, then she passes the course” and true that “she passes the course”, it is false that “she attends class”.

Logic, especially formal logic, is primarily interested in entailment and other consequence relations. But at the elementary levels of logic at least the concept of entailment is applied to a concept that is also of interest to critical thinking and argumentation theorists—the concept of an argument. In logic, arguments are often modeled as a set of a set of propositions (the premises) and another proposition (the conclusion). [But see Chapters 8 and 9 of this volume for a more detailed discussion of the concept of an argument.] Logicians define validity , a property of arguments, in terms of whether or not the entailment relation holds between the premises and the other proposition, the conclusion. If the premises entail the conclusion, then the argument is valid, i.e., there is no possibility in which the premises are true and the conclusion false, and otherwise the argument is invalid. [Validity here is not to be confused with the notion of ‘valid’ that is used in everyday speech to signify that something is “good” or “worthy of further consideration”, as in: “She made a valid point, when she said ….”. Nor is it to be confused with the notion of ‘valid’ that is used in survey research to signify the goodness or utility of a measuring instrument or the results of such an instrument—for that concept see Chapter 19 of this volume.]

In the previous section, I said that one of the motivations for studying logic was to try to find properties of good reasoning that would hold in all the possibilities. Entailment (and so validity) is one such property. If the arguments you make are valid, i.e. if your reasons entail your conclusion, then your reasoning, at least in terms of support, is good reasoning. Of course, other aspects of that reasoning might be problematic, but at least you know that your reasons, if true, guarantee your conclusion, no matter what set of possibilities is the relevant set.

But consider: Most of the coins on the table are heads-up and that quarter is a coin on the table, so it is heads up. “Most of the coins on the table are heads-up” and “That quarter is a coin on the table” do not entail that “That quarter is heads up” and yet in many situations we would likely say that the first two propositions give very strong reasons to believe the third. In other words while entailment is a sure sign of inferential goodness in reasoning, the lack of entailment does not necessarily mean there is a lack of inferential goodness. Sometimes we say our reasoning is good enough, even if our reasons do not entail what we infer from them. If, in the possibilities in which our reasons are true, enough of them also have what we infer to be true, then we can say that the inferential link is good because the reasons sufficiently support our conclusion. The general definition of sufficient support is as follows:

Sufficient Support

Propostion A (or a set of propositions) sufficiently supports a proposition B just so long as, in enough of the possibilities in which A (or the set of propositions) is true, B is also true.

What counts as “enough” often varies from context to context. For example, in civil litigation, the conclusion of wrongdoing has to be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, i.e., the possibilities in which the defendant did what they are accused of, should be the case in more than 50% of the possibilities in which the provided evidence is true. But in criminal cases, the conclusion of wrongdoing should be supported beyond a reasonable doubt (which, at least if we take the vast majority of judges’ views on what that means, is above 80%). Statistical significance for supporting various hypotheses in the sciences is often set at 95% or higher. Determining what should count as “enough” in various contexts is often extremely challenging. At the very least, some of what counts as “enough” depends on the importance of the outcome. For example, since criminal sanctions are so much higher than civil sanctions, we demand more assurance that the evidence supports the conclusion of wrongdoing in the criminal case than in the civil case.

Logicians, I said, are primarily interested in consequence relations such as entailment. Different types of logic study these relations in different domains. For example, temporal or tense logics are interested in determining the consequence relations amongst uses of temporal phrases, such as, “in the future”, “in the past” and “now”. Modal logics study the consequence relations amongst propositions containing modal terms such as “must”, “can”, etc. But in addition to distinguishing types of logics by the types of propositions being modeled, logics are also categorized in terms of the type of consequence relation being studied. At the most general level, there are two types of logic—deductive and inductive. Deductive logic is concerned with entailment. Inductive logic is concerned with consequence relations weaker than entailment. Unsurprisingly, since there are many consequence relations weaker than entailment, inductive logic is a much less unified field of study than deductive logic. As we shall see in the next section, there are other uses of the terms ‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’, but these are generally misuses—the key difference between inductive and deductive logic is the type of consequence relation being studied.

I conclude this section with a final point about these eight definitions. They have all been given in terms of possibilities in general, i.e., logical possibilities. But for each definition, we could restrict the possibilities we are talking about and get restricted versions of these definitions. For example, physically necessary truths are those that hold in all the possibilities in which the physical laws hold. Morally necessary truths are those that are true in all the possibilities with the same moral code, etc. A set of propositions would physically entail another proposition if there is no physical possibility in which the propositions in the set are true and the other proposition is false. Two propositions are morally contradictory if there is no moral possibility in which both are true or both are false.

Even though explicit talk of these restricted kinds of logical concepts is rare, the theoretical apparatus is available and useful for trying to get clear on what various reasoners or arguers are in fact claiming. For example, in common discourse, when someone says that A entails B, I suspect they rarely mean that there is no possibility whatsoever in which A obtains and B does not; rather, for some contextually determined (though usually unspecified) group of possibilities there is no possibility in which A obtains and B does not. Similarly, for necessary and sufficient conditions; when someone says that snow is necessary for skiing, they probably do not mean that there is no possibility whatsoever in which there is skiing but no snow (there are in fact numerous possibilities—water skiing, roller skiing, sand skiing, skiing on artificial pellets, etc.), but rather that our typical conception of skiing requires snow. In the sciences, they are rarely concerned with logically necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather with causally necessary and sufficient conditions—conditions that require or guarantee something else in all the possibilities consistent with the causal laws. The moral for critical thinking is that even when one encounters terms such as ‘entails’ or ‘contradictory’ or ‘necessary condition’ they may not be being used in their strictly logical sense, but rather being used over a subset of relevant possibilities.

3. Logic and the activity of reasoning

3.1 logic and reasoning.

I conclude with some final comments about the application, and misapplication, of logical concepts in the study of reasoning. Logical systems are models. In particular, they are models of consequence relations between propositions. Some of the models are quite limited. For example, standard sentential or propositional logic systems ignore the internal structure of simple propositions and focus solely on connectives such as ‘and’, ‘or’ or ‘if,…then’. Others add elements to model ‘must’ and ‘can’ while still ignoring everything else, and so on. The hope is to ultimately get a model, or group of models, that illuminates the standards of good reasoning, at least with regards to inferential support. Like most models, logical models can be very helpful when properly applied within the domain they model. Trying to use the model outside the proper domain, however, can have drastic consequences. For example, claiming that the standard sentential logic system is a good model for explaining instances of good reasoning utilizing modal claims is clearly a mistake. (This is true not just for logical models. For example, using the “model” of the north star as a fixed point is extremely useful for general terrestrial navigation, but using the same model for routing certain sorts of messages, which requires quite precise location determination, gets poor results.) Similarly, since logic focuses on support relations and good reasoning usually involves not just adequate support, but good reasons as well, it is a mistake to think logic is the whole story of good reasoning. Indeed, logic has little to nothing to say about what makes reasons good reasons, but rather focuses on what can legitimately be inferred from whatever good reasons we find.

3.2 Arguments and explanations

Clearly the target domain we are trying to understand and improve—the activities of reasoning, arguing, justifying, persuading, etc., are much more complicated than any of the various logical systems that logicians produce to model certain aspects of those activities. And yet many theorists still try to find distinctions in the models that are really only distinctions in the activities and not really the concern of logic at all. For example, logicians and argumentation theorists have spent a lot of time trying to distinguish arguments from explanations. But suppose I lay out several reasons (including some reasons about what I think will happen in the next six months) why you should believe a particular company will fail in the next six months. Six months go by and the company fails and someone else asks “Why?” and I trot out my reasons again. Nothing has changed about the propositions involved, so, from the perspective of logic, there is one object, one set of propositions, here. Yet, how that object has been used has changed. Initially the reasons are used to argue that the company will fail. After the fact, the reasons are used to explain the company’s failure. We argue for propositions we are not sure of (or to convince others of propositions they are not sure of), but we explain propositions we are sure of, some of which may have been proved to us by argument, in order to understand why they are true. [Note that unlike my example, there are plenty of cases where the reasons one might give to argue for a proposition, which turns out to be true, need not be the reasons given when explaining why the proposition is true. For example, if something unexpected happens in the six months that contributes to the company’s failure that is likely to be a part of the act of explaining even though it was not part of the act of arguing.] The fact that there is a difference between acts of arguing and acts of explaining does not mean that, in the domain of logic, we should find separate kinds of things—arguments on the one hand and explanations on the other.

3.3 Inferring and implying

Going in the other direction, no one doubts that, considered in terms of propositions and support relations the inference from A to B and the implication of B by A are the same thing. But it is a mistake to think that the act of inferring is the same as the act of implying. You assert a group of facts (with the intention that I draw conclusions from those facts). I, being a good reasoner, draw those conclusions. You imply those conclusions and I infer those conclusions. Put another way, if I ask someone what they are inferring, I am asking about reasoning going on in their head, but if I ask someone what they are implying, I am asking about reasoning they hope to be going on in other people’s heads. Put yet another way, reasons do not infer conclusions, but rather imply them. People, when considering those reasons on their own, infer those conclusions, but do not imply them.

3.4 Deductive and inductive

Sometimes concepts are misapplied in both the model and the target domain. For example, some logic textbooks and critical thinking textbooks try to distinguish deductive arguments from inductive arguments, but from the perspective of logic there is nothing about the sets of propositions that compose arguments that make one kind of set deductive and another set inductive. For every group of reasons and a given conclusion we can ask whether the reasons entail the conclusion or not (the domain of deductive logic) or whether those very same reasons offer some support weaker than entailment or not (the domain of inductive logic.) Nor is it clear that we reason deductively or inductively—when we reason, we infer one or more propositions from others. Of that reasoning we did, we might wonder whether it is good or bad. The answer to that question will, in part, depend on what counts as good enough support in the situation in which I am using the reasoning. If the context requires entailment and the reasons do entail the conclusion, then the reasoning is adequate with regards to its support relation. If the reasons do not entail the conclusion, then it will fail to be adequate in such a situation. Similarly for a required support relation weaker than entailment—if reasons support the conclusion at or above the required level, then the support relation is adequate, whereas if it is below the required level the support relation is not adequate. The reasoning is one act of reasoning—whether the actual support relation of that reasoning is adequate or not depends on the situation. But none of this suddenly makes it the case that there are two distinct kinds of reasoning going on (even if there is a felt difference between realizing some reasons entail a conclusion versus realizing some premises only strongly support a conclusion.)

3.5 Linked vs. convergent arguments

One final example. The push for general principles often takes something that may track a real distinction or property in a certain specific set of cases and try to generalize it to all cases. For example, there is a strong intuition that reasons such as: “If you pass the test, then you will pass the course” and “You pass the test” work together to support the conclusion “you will pass the course” whereas reasons such as “You read all the supplemental material” and “You took good notes” and “You went to the tutor consistently” independently support the conclusion that “You are prepared for the test.” This intuition is strong enough, that numerous textbooks, especially those that use argument diagramming as a tool, try to distinguish arguments with linked premise structures from arguments with convergent premise structures. The problem here is two-fold. On the one hand, attempts to actually provide a rule for determining when a set (or subset) of reasons are linked or not have, to date, all failed, at least if we trust the intuitions that generated the drive to generalize the phenomena in the first place. On the other hand, the underlying judgments of whether premises are working together or are independent seem to vary from person to person and context to context enough to suspect that the distinction may not be tracking a real phenomenon that deserves to be represented or captured in our logical models.

4. Last word

Despite these injunctions to take care with the proper application of various concepts that have made their way into various textbooks, the core logical concepts of Section 2, such as sufficient support or co n sistency or necessary condition are useful in any study of reasoning. Even if good reasoners need to be careful and work diligently to determine which propositions are being expressed, and which possibilities are relevant, and what the needed standard of sufficient support is in a given situation, once these tasks are accomplished, we can evaluate our reasoning for inconsistencies and determine whether our reasons entail or at least adequately support our conclusions.

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Why Study Logic? Learning Outcomes and Teaching Advice

When you think of studying logic, what comes to mind? Often, logic is one of those subjects — perhaps along with Latin and philosophy — that many associate with an outdated model of education or, if studied today, maybe even with a hint of pretension. As a homeschooling family, is it really necessary for your child to learn logic?

We believe the answer is an emphatic, “Yes!” In this post, we’ll cover the many benefits of learning logic — from developing critical thinking and decision-making skills to building good character — as well as several pieces of advice for teaching your student logic in your home school.

Formal vs. Informal Logic

Formal logic has been called ‘math with words.’” – Leigh Bortins, The Question

Before diving into three learning outcomes that answer why we should study logic, it’s important to make a quick note on the term logic used in this post. Generally, the study of logic is categorized into informal and formal logic. The type of logic we encourage families to study is formal logic — often referred to as traditional logic — which deals with forms of reasoning. As Classical Conversations founder, Leigh Bortins, describes in her book The Question , “Formal logic has been called ‘math with words.’”

Why Study Logic? 3 Learning Outcomes of Formal Logic

Logic studies enable us to experience the world in richer, more meaningful ways; in short, logic studies make us free.” – Leigh Bortins, The Question

Studying logic is something everybody should do. This includes both homeschool students and parents . In short, there are three reasons why we should learn logic: it encourages clear thinking, empowers us to be truly in the image of God, and builds good character.

1. Studying Logic Develops Critical Thinking Skills

Studying logic involves learning the skills of critical thinking . As you and your student analyze sound reasoning through studying arguments, syllogisms, and fallacies, you’ll develop a sort of “truth compass.” In other words, you’ll be able to apply these reasoning skills to recognize truth from falsehood, whether that’s in an advertisement, a political campaign, a persuasive speech, a news article, or a social media post.

These same critical thinking skills practiced in logic can also be applied to sound decision-making, a skill every parent wants their child to develop. Finally, it’s important to study logic to become an effective communicator. After all, logic is also the backbone necessary for crafting compelling arguments in speech and writing that point others toward truth.

2. Studying Logic Empowers Us to be Truly in the Image of God

As Christians, the God we worship is a God of form . Just look in Genesis, Chapter 1. The universe God created is the ultimate example of order, structure, and form.

Similarly, we too create forms, from math and science formulas to sentence forms to logical arguments. By using forms to indicate order from disorder and truth from uncertainty, we establish ourselves as made in the image of God.

3. Studying Logic Builds Good Character

For many parents and students, studying logic isn’t easy. Often, along with learning logic come times of frustration and befuddlement. Still, the goal of learning logic is to become better thinkers, which is a worthwhile end to strive toward no matter how strenuous the journey may become. Following through with your study of logic will empower you and your student with confidence in your abilities to learn something challenging and use critical thinking skills to make sound judgments and arrive at the truth in other areas of life.

How to Teach Logic: 3 Pieces of Advice for the Homeschool Parent

Logic trains the brain to think clearly about all subjects by ordering information into usable form. This is a skill we all need to acquire.” – Leigh Bortins, The Question

Convinced why your student should learn logic? Although the learning outcomes of studying logic are noble and inspiring, many parents struggle when it comes to actually teaching the subject. With its forms, structure, and objectivity, logic can appear intimidating. Hopefully, these three pieces of advice will help and encourage you to take on the worthy task of homeschooling your child in logic!

1. Stay Persistent!

Although this may not be what you want to hear, all difficult subjects — logic included — require persistence and hard work . Constantly remind yourself that the end goal of your student learning logic is to equip them with the skills to think critically. So, be persistent in teaching your student logic. In time, your student will learn to apply critical thinking skills to make good decisions and to detect truth from falsehood in everyday situations and encounters. It’s worth every difficult moment to see these fruits of your labor!

Times when homeschooling is hard are a natural part of this journey. Still, that doesn’t mean you have to go at it alone. Find other homeschool parents whom you can rely on for support, guidance, and advice in teaching your child logic, whether in your Classical Conversations local community , a homeschool co-op, or elsewhere. Homeschooling in isolation is never a good idea!

2. Spend Time Learning the Basics of Logic

The road to becoming a skilled logician begins with an understanding of the grammar — or foundational knowledge — of the subject. Make sure to spend time with your student repeating the basics of logic over and over before moving on to complex problems and concepts.

What are these foundations of logic? Well, there are logic vocabulary terms and definitions to commit to memory, like argument , syllogism , conclusion , major premise , minor premise , and fallacy . In addition, you and your student should understand the principles of logic, or “how logic works.” That is, spend time studying the basic rules and procedures associated with clear thinking and reasoning.

Moving on to advanced exercises and ideas before establishing a firm foundation will only lead to discouragement with this subject. For instance, don’t feel guilty if you have to spend several more weeks studying the basics of logic. In the end, this actually might end up saving you time, not to mention a good deal of frustration!

3. Apply Logic to Other Subjects

One of the tenets of classical education is the idea that all subjects are interconnected . Thus, subjects shouldn’t be studied as if they are islands, unrelated to each other.

A great benefit of learning logic is that it trains students to think clearly in all subjects by helping them organize, make connections, and draw conclusions about all types of information. So, encourage your student to utilize what they are learning in their study of logic to understand why Hester Prynne made the decisions she did in The Scarlett Letter or what events motivated American colonialists to wage war against England in the American Revolution.

The truth is that the skills of logic are applicable to all areas of life, and not just if your student goes on to study math or computer science in college. From literature and art to history and science, logic can be used everywhere. Encouraging your student to use logical reasoning in their other subjects will show them that logic is useful and an important skill to master.

The Beauty of Learning Formal Logic

Sure, learning and teaching formal logic can be intimidating. But still, there’s something equally attractive about the study of logic. Arriving at objective truth, knowing that which can be known, making good decisions — these are beautiful goals that make the study of logic well worth the effort.

If you’re on the search for a homeschool logic curriculum, consider our Traditional Logic series designed to make homeschooling logic doable with daily practice exercises to help your student develop powerful critical thinking skills.

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Logic and Critical thinking for fresh students Chapter Three logic and language by Afan Oromo
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6 Main Types of Critical Thinking Skills (With Examples)

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COMMENTS

Language is primarily a tool for communication rather than thought
The specific hypotheses about the role of language in thinking have ranged from strong claims that language is necessary for all forms of (at least propositional) thought 14,15, to weaker claims ...
How might language affect critical thinking performance?
Abstract. This study examined whether language structure or language proficiency might affect students' critical thinking performance. Previous research has claimed that many non-Western students struggle with the demands of demonstrating critical thought. Two language-related causes have been suggested: one concerning structural limitations ...
PDF Language is primarily a tool for communication rather than thought
A comprehensive review of prior claims about the ro le of language in thinking is outside the scope of this Perspectiv e (for reviews, see for example 9,10,12 ,16,71,178-182). However, we emphasize the diversity of perspectives on this issue and the complexity of th e theoretical landscape. Proposals about the role of language in thinking vary
PDF Questions, Critical Thinking, and Language Proficiency
learning and other disciplines that have the potential to transform the world language classroom into a vibrant, learner-active space where students use critical thinking to solve problems. Keywords: questioning, critical thinking, proficiency Introduction There are legitimate reasons that critical thinking remains a topic of faculty
Bridging critical thinking and transformative learning: The role of
In recent decades, approaches to critical thinking have generally taken a practical turn, pivoting away from more abstract accounts - such as emphasizing the logical relations that hold between statements (Ennis, 1964) - and moving toward an emphasis on belief and action.According to the definition that Robert Ennis (2018) has been advocating for the last few decades, critical thinking is ...
How Our Brain Produces Language and Thought, According to
"When you start evaluating it, you just don't find support for this role of language in thinking," she said. When Dr. Fedorenko began this work in 2009, studies had found that the same brain ...
2.5: Functions of Language and Precision in Speech
Patience. Good philosophical thinking takes time. Progress in good critical thinking is often very slow. The process of critical thinking can't be called successful if it efficiently maximizes its inputs and outputs in the shortest measure of time: we do not produce thoughts in the mind like widgets in a factory.
Learning how to think like a linguist: Linguistic reasoning as a focal
This focus on thinking like an expert ties in with a broader educational trend of subject-specific reasoning, following debates about critical thinking (or reasoning) in which it is argued that while critical thinking inherently has generic characteristics, these general skills are invariably executed in a specific subject (Moore, 2004; Renaud ...
1: Introduction to Critical Thinking, Reasoning, and Logic
It may seem strange to begin a logic textbook with this question. 'Thinking' is perhaps the most intimate and personal thing that people do. Yet the more you 'think' about thinking, the more mysterious it can appear. It is the sort of thing that one intuitively or naturally understands, and yet cannot describe to others without great ...
What Are Critical Thinking Skills and Why Are They Important?
It makes you a well-rounded individual, one who has looked at all of their options and possible solutions before making a choice. According to the University of the People in California, having critical thinking skills is important because they are [ 1 ]: Universal. Crucial for the economy. Essential for improving language and presentation skills.
2: Language, Meaning, and Definition
Thinking Well - A Logic And Critical Thinking Textbook 4e (Lavin) ... Language, Meaning, and Definition is shared under a CC BY 4.0 license ... the California State University Affordable Learning Solutions Program, and Merlot. We also acknowledge previous National Science Foundation support under grant numbers 1246120, 1525057, and 1413739. ...
PDF Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking
This is an introductory textbook in logic and critical thinking. Both logic and critical thinking centrally involve the analysis and assessment of arguments. "Argument" is a word that has multiple distinct meanings, so it is important to be clear from the start about the sense of the word that is relevant to the study of logic.
Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking
This is an introductory textbook in logic and critical thinking. The goal of the textbook is to provide the reader with a set of tools and skills that will enable them to identify and evaluate arguments. The book is intended for an introductory course that covers both formal and informal logic. As such, it is not a formal logic textbook, but is closer to what one would find marketed as a ...
What Is Critical Thinking?
Critical thinking is the ability to effectively analyze information and form a judgment. To think critically, you must be aware of your own biases and assumptions when encountering information, and apply consistent standards when evaluating sources. Critical thinking skills help you to: Identify credible sources. Evaluate and respond to arguments.
The Importance of Logic and Critical Thinking
"Critical thinking is a desire to seek, patience to doubt, fondness to meditate, slowness to assert, readiness to consider, carefulness to dispose and set in order; and hatred for every kind of ...
How might language affect critical thinking performance?
This study examined whether language structure or language proficiency might affect students' critical thinking performance. Previous research has claimed that many non-Western students struggle with the demands of demonstrating critical thought. Two language-related causes have been suggested: one concerning structural limitations in the non ...
Critical thinking and language learning
Language learning is a procedure, that needs critical thinking. In other words, critical thinking is not dependent on language learning, when it comes to its improvement and formation whereas language learning needs critical thinking, as it has the goal of being as much efficient as possible. Overall, it is a unique relationship during which ...
Critical Thinking and Decision-Making
Simply put, critical thinking is the act of deliberately analyzing information so that you can make better judgements and decisions. It involves using things like logic, reasoning, and creativity, to draw conclusions and generally understand things better. This may sound like a pretty broad definition, and that's because critical thinking is a ...
Logic and Critical Thinking
Regardless, a brief orientation of the relationship of critical thinking and logic is in order. Critical thinking, at least as it is most often justified, is a practical, skill-building exercise with the goal of improving our reasoning. This motivation, of understanding and improving our reasoning, has also been the motivation behind the ...
PDF The Relationship between Critical Thinking and Language Learning
Language learning strategies are being used highly frequently by higher level students (Carol Griffiths, 2003). As a result EAP promotes students' critical thinking which ends in increasing the LLS use. Accordingly, those students with higher use of LLS are proved to be the better language learners. Chart 2.
Why Study Logic? Learning Outcomes and Teaching Advice
Studying Logic Develops Critical Thinking Skills. Studying logic involves learning the skills of critical thinking. As you and your student analyze sound reasoning through studying arguments, syllogisms, and fallacies, you'll develop a sort of "truth compass." In other words, you'll be able to apply these reasoning skills to recognize ...
Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking Specialization
This specialization introduces general standards of good reasoning and offers tools to improve your critical thinking skills. These skills will help you determine when an argument is being given, what its crucial parts are, and what it assumes implicitly. You will also learn how to apply deductive and inductive standards for assessing arguments ...
PDF Critical Thinking in Second Language Learning: Students ...
Abstract. Researches revealed that critical thinking is a solely appraised learning outcome in higher education. However, the study related to students' perceptions of critical thinking in online learning is not greatly expanded. This study explored students' attitudes and beliefs of critical thinking within asynchronous learning environments.
(PDF) Critical Thinking for Language Learning and ...
The problem of development of student's critical and creative thinking skills in the process of teaching and learning a foreign language is reflected in numerous studies on enhancing the cognitive ...
THE ROLE OF LOGIC IN CRITICAL THINKING
Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (Kyiv, U kraine) e-mail: [email protected], ORCID 0000 -0002-3931-3755. THE ROLE OF LOGIC IN CRITICAL THINKING. Introduction. Habitually people ...
The Importance of Logic and Critical Thinking
It enables us to go into virtually any situation and to figure out the logic of whatever is happening in that situation. It provides a way for us to learn from new experiences through the process of continual self-assessment. Critical thinking, then, enables us to form sound beliefs and judgments, and in doing so, provides us with a basis for a ...