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3 Sources of Knowledge: Rationalism, Empiricism, and the Kantian Synthesis

K. S. Sangeetha

Chapter Learning Outcomes

Upon completion of this chapter, readers will be able to:

Identify the main theories of the sources of knowledge, including rationalism, empiricism, and the Kantian synthesis.
Employ each theory to reconstruct the origins of a given instance of knowledge.
Differentiate the categories of knowledge that arise from the a priori / a posteriori , necessary/contingent, and analytic/synthetic distinctions.
Evaluate the merits of each theory.

Introduction

We all have many things going on in our minds, such as beliefs, desires, hopes, dreams, imaginary figures, knowledge, love, and hatred—to name a handful. Have you ever considered their source? How do they come to be part of the thinking process? How do they become ideas in our minds? Some philosophers attribute the source of our ideas to the senses, including the inward senses (such as emotions) and the five outward senses (sight, smell, hearing, taste, and touch). We might sense the world directly or indirectly through the thoughts of others. Some philosophers even claim that all our ideas must come from our senses. This claim holds that each of us is born with a mind that is like a tabula rasa (Latin for a “blank slate” or “blank tablet”) on which nothing is written and to which we add contents through experience as we become exposed to the world. Knowledge that is dependent on experience, or which arises after experience, is called a posteriori (Latin for “from the latter”). Since a posteriori knowledge is empirical (based on observation or experience), this view is called empiricism .

Opposed to empiricism is rationalism , the view that reason is the primary source of knowledge. Rationalists promote mathematical or logical knowledge as paradigm examples. Such knowledge can be grasped, they claim, through reason alone, without involving the senses directly. They argue that knowledge accessed through reasoning is eternal (i.e., it exists unchanged throughout the past, present, and future). For instance, two plus three remains five. Rationalists are impressed by the certainty and clarity of knowledge that reasoning provides, and they argue that this method should be applied to gaining knowledge of the world also. The evidence of the senses should be in conformity with the truths of reason, but it is not a prerequisite for the acquisition of these truths.

Knowledge that is independent of (or prior to) observation and experience is called a priori (Latin for “from the former”). Rationalists maintain that reason is the basis of a priori knowledge . But where do we ultimately get the ideas on which reason is based, if not from observation or experience? Rationalists tend to favor innatism , the belief that we are born with certain ideas already in our minds. That is, they are “innate” in us. Potential examples include mathematical or logical principles, moral sense, and the concept of God. While innatists claim that such ideas are present in us from birth, this does not guarantee our immediate awareness of their presence. Reason is the faculty that enables us to realize or access them. In what follows, innate ideas thus serve as the foundation of a model for rationalism. [1]

Rationalism’s Emphasis on A Priori Knowledge

French philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650) and German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), two important rationalist thinkers, support the existence of innate ideas and their realization through reason. They argue that the truths revealed by such ideas are eternal, necessary, and universal.

For Descartes, there are different modes through which we acquire knowledge: some ideas are innate, some are externally sourced, and others are constructed by us. Descartes gives the example of the idea of God as innate in us, as well as the idea of one’s own existence ([1641] 1985, Third Meditation). According to Descartes, innate ideas like truths of geometry and laws of logic are known through reason independently of experience, because experience gives us only particular instances from which the mind discovers the universal ideas contained in them. Therefore, they are a priori . Descartes’s innate ideas have been compared to the stored information in a book. The ideas are in us, though not always present to the mind. Once we start reading the book, the contents reveal themselves to us, just as reasoning reveals our innate ideas to us. In other words, it is only through careful “reading” (thinking) that we come to understand which ideas are innate and which come to us from elsewhere.

Leibniz calls innate ideas “principles.” Like Descartes, Leibniz maintains that principles are accessed by reason. The universal nature of mathematical truths, for example, is not revealed by the senses. It is the faculty of reason that acquires universal truths from individual instances. Leibniz argues that a collection of instances based on the senses cannot lead us to necessary truths. At the same time, it is also clear that we can grasp many necessary truths, such as mathematics. Therefore, the mind is the source, which means these truths are there innately. However, innate ideas are not full-fledged thoughts for Leibniz: he holds that our minds are structured so that certain ideas or principles will occur to us once prompted by the senses, although they are not derived from the senses. Ideas and truths are innate in us initially as dispositions or tendencies rather than as actual conscious thoughts ([1705] 2017, Preface).

Opposing A Priori Knowledge by Rejecting Innate Ideas

The empiricist claim that all our knowledge comes from experience is in stark contrast to the concept of innate ideas. For empiricists, all knowledge is a posteriori , meaning acquired through or after experience. John Locke (1632–1704), a British empiricist philosopher, adopts two approaches to question innate ideas as the basis of a priori knowledge. Firstly, he shows that innate ideas are based on dubious claims; secondly, along with Scottish empiricist David Hume (1711–1776), Locke shows how empiricism is able to offer a better theory of knowledge through the a posteriori .

Locke starts by questioning the “universal nature” of innate ideas. He opposes the claim that innate ideas are present in all of us by noting that sufficiently young children, and adults without the requisite education, lack a concept of God or knowledge of logical or mathematical principles. Therefore, it is baseless to say that innate ideas are universal. It is through experience and observation that we acquire such ideas. That is, they are a posteriori ([1690] 2017, Book I).

Here Leibniz defends the innatist view from Locke’s objection by showing how children and those without the requisite education are capable of employing logical and mathematical principles in their everyday lives without understanding what they are or being able to articulate them in words ([1705] 2017, Book I). A child, to use an example of my own, knows without any confusion that she cannot be sitting in both parents’ laps at the same time. Similarly, those without formal mathematical training could still know that two adjacent triangular cornfields separated by a fence on their longest side can make a square cornfield by removing the fence that divides them. Evidently, as Leibniz argues, general principles of logic and mathematics are innate. But this does not mean that all innate ideas are universally held. It is possible that we all have innate ideas yet some of us are unaware of them.

Locke further argues, however, that there can be nothing in the mind of which it is unaware ([1690] 2017, Book II). Having innate ideas without being aware of them is not a viable position for Locke. An idea first has to be experienced or thought. How else could it be “in” the mind? On this point Leibniz disagrees with Locke: it is possible to have a plethora of ideas in our minds without being aware of them ([1705] 2017, Preface). For instance, suppose you absorb a “tune” playing in the marketplace without being consciously aware of it. The tune is not readily accessible or transparent to your mind, in that you cannot recall it; however, it may be recognizable upon hearing it again. So, it must have been “in” you somewhere in some sense. Similarly, an innate idea could be in your mind, without you yet being aware of it. We are born with the facility to realize innate ideas when favorable conditions obtain later in life, such as the ideas of beauty, justice, and mathematical truths.

Locke’s reply is that the realization of ideas or capacities in the right circumstances is applicable to all ideas—not just those which are purportedly innate ([1690] 2017, Book I). He challenges innatists to produce a criterion to distinguish innate from non-innate ideas. Leibniz responds with such a criterion: innate ideas are necessary (they must be true, cannot be false), whereas non-innate ideas are merely contingent (possibly true, possibly false). We can distinguish truths that are necessary (and therefore eternal on Leibniz’s view) from contingent truths dependent on varying matters of fact ([1705] 2017, Preface).

Empiricism’s Emphasis on A Posteriori Knowledge

Locke claims to show how the mind, which is like a tabula rasa at birth, acquires knowledge. For empiricists, experience alone furnishes our mind with simple ideas , which are the basic elements of knowledge. Once shown that all ideas can come from experience, it would be redundant to additionally posit innate ideas. So, does a posteriori knowledge lead us to reject a priori knowledge? Let us find out.

For Locke, knowledge based on experience is easy to understand. He asks us to suppose that we have innate ideas of colors and that we can also see colors with our eyes. In this case, since we don’t need to rely upon both, we go with our senses, because it is easier and simpler to understand knowledge derived from sense experience than from knowledge derived from some source of which we are unaware ([1690] 2017, Book I, Chapter ii, Para. 1). Here Locke applies the principle of Ockham’s razor , which suggests that as far as possible we should adopt simple explanations rather than complicated ones. [2] Simple explanations have the advantage of being less prone to error and more friendly to testing than complicated ones that do not add explanatory value.

The next question is whether a posteriori knowledge alone gives us adequate knowledge of the world. Let us take an instance of experiencing and thereby knowing a flower, such as a rose. As we experience the rose, its particular color, texture, and fragrance are the ideas through which we become aware of the object. But when we are not experiencing or sensing the rose, we can still think about it. We can also recognize it the next time we see the flower and retain the belief that it is sweet smelling, beautiful to look at, and soft to the touch. This shows that, in addition to sensing, the ability to form concepts about the objects we encounter is crucial for knowing the world. Experience also makes it possible for us to imagine what we have not directly experienced, such as a mermaid ([1690] 2017, Book III, Chapter iii, Para. 19). Such imaginings are made possible because we have directly experienced different parts of this imagined object separately. Conjoining these experiences in the mind in an ordered manner yields the imagined object ([1690] 2017, Book II, Chapter iii, Para. 5). Had we not experienced and thereby formed the concepts of a fish and a woman separately before, we would not be able to imagine a mermaid at present.

These considerations lead Locke to categorize all our sense experiences into simple and complex ideas. Simple ideas are basic and indivisible, such as the idea of red. Complex ideas are formed by the mind, either from more than one simple idea or from complex impressions ([1690] 2017, Book II, Chapters ii & xii). Complex ideas are divisible because they have parts. Examples include golden streets, an army, and the universe. My idea or concept of an object, whether simple or complex, can be ultimately traced back to its corresponding sense impressions.

Hume, another important empiricist philosopher, writes of ideas as the “copies” of “impressions.” Impressions are “vivid” and “lively” as received directly from sense experience. Hume also allows inward impressions, including jealousy, indignation, and so on. Ideas are mental copies of inward or outward impressions, rendering them “faint” or “feeble” (try comparing a perceptual experience with recalling it from memory) ([1748] 2017, Sections 1 & 2). Hume argues that where there are no impressions, there can be no ideas. A blind man can have no notion of color, according to Hume. One cannot be born with ideas that are not derived from any impressions. So, there are no innate ideas for Hume. However, he agrees that our tendencies to avoid pain, or to seek many of our passions and desires, are innate. Here I would argue that even these tendencies are based on our sense impressions and the corresponding ideas we form from those impressions. The mental inclination to repeatedly seek pleasure or avoid pain comes to us only after the first incident of exposure to either sensation.

In contrast to Descartes, even the idea of God falls under the a posteriori for Hume. Since none of us has experienced God directly, Hume argues, there is no impression of God available to us from which to form the corresponding idea. In Hume’s view, our imagination forms this idea by lavishly extending our experience of the good qualities possessed by people around us ([1748] 2017, Sections 1 & 11). Given that even the idea of God can be derived from sense impressions, this lends further support to the empiricist claim that all our ideas are a posteriori . Therefore, according to Hume, the rationalist claims for the existence of innate ideas and a priori knowledge are mistaken.

The Inadequacy of the Tabula Rasa Theory

A weakness of the empiricist’s tabula rasa theory can be exposed if we can show that not all our ideas are derived from corresponding impressions. However, this would not mean we must return to the rationalist’s theory of innate ideas, as we shall see. The plan is to explore a third alternative.

The presence of general concepts in our minds shows there is not always a one-to-one relation between ideas and corresponding sense impressions. For example, we see different instances of the color blue around us, and from these instances we form a general concept of blue. This general concept is not copied from one particular impression of blue, nor even from a particular shade of blue. We also have abstract concepts (such as justice, kindness, and courage), which are not traceable to corresponding sense impressions. In such cases, we experience different acts or instances of justice, kindness, and courage. But if these abstract concepts are copied from their particular impressions, then only these instances—and not the concepts themselves—would be in our minds. It follows that concepts are formed or understood rather than copied . Similarly, relational concepts (such as “on”-ness, betweenness, sameness, and the like) are realized not by copying the impressions involved. In fact, there are no impressions at all corresponding to these relational concepts. We instead receive impressions of particulars standing in such relations—the cat sitting on the mat, the English Channel flowing between the United Kingdom and Europe, one minus one equaling zero, and so forth.

In sum, the formation of general, abstract, and relational concepts in our minds shows that an uninterrupted flow of impressions would not constitute all the ideas we have. Instead, it requires that from birth the mind is at least partially equipped with a structure or architecture that enables it to make sense of the raw impressions it receives and to form concepts where there is no one-to-one correspondence between impressions and ideas. It challenges the authenticity of a tabula rasa . This takes us to a stage where we need to figure out the indispensable third alternative, which can facilitate a more complete knowledge of the world. This necessitates a crossover between the a priori and the a posteriori , or a reconciliation of the two.

Percepts-Concepts Combination

The immediacy and direct nature of sensations, impressions, and perceptions make them certain. [3] Let us briefly unpack this idea. Consider whether we can ever be wrong about our sensations. It is commonly thought that while we can be wrong about what the world is like, we cannot be wrong about the fact that we are having particular sensations. Even if you are dreaming this very second, and there is no actual book before your eyes, you cannot deny that you are having certain sensations resembling a white page and black font in the shape of words. Therefore, our sensations are certain and we cannot doubt that they exist. However, it is possible that sometimes we are unsure how to characterize a particular sensation. For instance, you may see a flashy car and be unsure whether the color is metallic green or gray. So, you might get into confusion in describing your sensation, but that does not affect the certainty and indubitability of the sensation itself, of what is here and now for you.

German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) argues that for our perceptions to make sense to us, they should be received into concepts that exist within our minds.These structures of understanding allow our minds to process the impressions that we experience. Unless the manifold raw sensations we receive from experience are classified into different categories of understanding, we cannot make sense of them.

For instance, the mind should have the ability to recognize whether two sensations are similar or different, to say the least. Without this ability, we cannot make sense of experience. Or consider that we also perceive that objects are in space and time, stand in cause-effect relations, and belong to the categories of unity-plurality, assertion-negation, particular-universal, and the like. Here again, we are incapable of understanding any experience that is not processed through these categories. Kant argues, therefore, that space, time, causation, quantity, quality, and the like are represented to us in innate structures or concepts that our minds are fitted with prior to experience.

According to Kant, these categories are transcendental in the sense that they bridge the gap between mind and world. They are hidden structures, bridges, or concepts that occupy the otherwise blank slate and mold our way of thinking and experiencing the world. Of course, these concepts also require inputs, or percepts (the immediate objects of awareness delivered directly to us in perceptual experience through the senses). As Kant’s view is famously expressed, “Percepts without concepts are blind and concepts without percepts are empty” ([1781] 1998, 209).

So far, we have seen through various stages that rationalism and empiricism are incomplete. Kant’s transcendental idealism (as his view is called) strikes a balance, reconciling the two accounts. He combines sensory input and inborn concepts into a unified account of how we understand the world. Before we conclude the chapter with the final step in Kant’s approach, let us return to Descartes and Hume once again, the two philosophers who most influenced Kant.

Synthetic A Priori Knowledge

Descartes thinks that reason alone can provide certainty to all human knowledge. Intuition and deduction are tools through which the faculty of reason operates. Intuition is the capacity to look inward and comprehend intellectual objects and basic truths. Being a geometrician, Descartes thinks that deduction (the type of reasoning whereby the truth of the conclusion is guaranteed by the truth of the premises) should be used for gaining knowledge of the world, starting with the input of “clear and distinct” ideas. [4] Since intuition is dissociated from the evidence of the senses, the truths it unfurls can be known a priori . The result is that substantial knowledge of the world can be acquired a priori ([1701] 1985).

According to Hume, there are two ways in which reasoning aims to gain knowledge of the world: through “relations of ideas” and through “matters of fact” ([1748] 2017, Section 4). Hume thinks that the method of deduction establishes relations between the ideas we have already acquired through experience (e.g., that a mother is a woman parent). These relations of ideas are the kind of truths that we find in logic and mathematics (for instance, the proposition that a circle is round). They are true by definition. Such truths are necessary or certain (their denials lead to contradiction). They are also known a priori , since they do not rely on how the world is. For this reason, relations of ideas and deduction do not yield substantive new knowledge of the world; the knowledge they impart is already understood by us (as the above examples show), even if our understanding is merely implicit within the premises of a deductive argument whose conclusion makes it explicit.

Matters of fact , for Hume, are based on observation and experience. Some of them are generalizations arrived at by induction from particular instances. Inductive truths are uncertain. They are at best probable , since they are dependent on how the world is. For instance, we have the experience of heat from fire so far; but we cannot be certain that this will be the case tomorrow also (maybe we will unexpectedly feel some other sensation like cold from fire). We expect that the future will resemble the past, but we cannot be certain about it. [5] Matters of fact provide us with a posteriori truths, which are contingently true (their denials can be conceived without contradiction). Since matters of fact are not true by definition, they add substantive new information to our existing knowledge, unlike relations of ideas ([1748] 2017, Section 4).

A rationalist initially, Kant was influenced by the division in knowledge made by Hume. Only a combination of reason and experience can give us adequate knowledge, according to Kant. He begins by providing an account of relations of ideas, which he terms analytic truths . In sentences that express analytic truths, the predicate term is already “contained” in, or is the meaning of, the subject term. For example, in the sentence, “a circle is round,” the predicate “round” is contained in the subject, “circle.” To take another standard example, in “a bachelor is an unmarried man,” the predicate “unmarried man” is the meaning of the subject term, “bachelor.” We cannot deny such truths without contradiction. They are necessarily true, which means that they’re true regardless of how the world is. Since we do no need to examine the world to tell whether they’re true, analytic truths are knowable a priori ([1781] 1998, 146, 157). [6]

Kant terms matters of fact synthetic truths : the predicate term is neither contained within nor is the meaning of the subject term. Synthetic truths are not true by definition. As such, it stands to reason that they are based on observation, and therefore must be a posteriori (although, as we will soon see, Kant argues that this is not the case for all synthetic truths). For instance, consider the proposition, “George the bachelor is a writer.” We have new information here about a particular person named “George” being a bachelor and writer, and experience is required to find this out. Since the opposites of synthetic truths are not contradictory, they are contingent ([1781] 1998, 147, 157). [7]

Kant maintains that only synthetic truths are capable of providing substantive new information about the world. That said, our sense experiences do not passively enter our minds, but do conform to our innate mental structures to facilitate knowledge. Since these structures work independently of experience, they are a priori . These innate a priori structures of our minds—our concepts—are actively engaged in making sense of our experiences ([1781] 1998). They do so by discriminating and organizing the information received in experience. But again, the ability to perform this activity presupposes that the world which furnishes both the information and our concepts is itself structured in a way that enables intelligibility. The particular ways in which the world must be structured—its space-time and cause-effect relations, for example—yield substantive truths about reality. These truths hold not merely because of the meanings of words or the logical forms of sentences. They are synthetic. And since we arrived at this result by way of a priori reflection, Kant argues that we possess “synthetic a priori ” knowledge of the world—a previously unrecognized category of knowledge, now to be added to the standard categories of synthetic a posteriori and analytic a priori knowledge. (See Table 1 below for a summary of these categories.)

There remains the question of how our concepts discriminate and organize the information received from the senses. These goals are achieved through acts of synthesis. By “synthesis,” Kant means “the act of putting different representations [elements of cognition] together, and grasping what is manifold in them in one cognition” ([1781] 1998, 77).

Kant explains three types of synthesis: the process starts with “synthesis of apprehension in perception,” passes through “synthesis of reproduction in imagination,” and ends with “synthesis of recognition in a concept” ([1781] 1998, 228–34). For Kant, apprehension in perception involves locating an object in space and time. The synthesis of reproduction in imagination consists in connecting different elements in our minds to form an image. And synthesis of recognition in a concept requires memory of a past experience as well as recognizing its relation to present experience. By recognizing that the past and present experience both refer to the same object, we form a concept of it. To recognize something as a unified object under a concept is to attach meaning to percepts. This attachment of meaning is what Kant calls apperception (Guyer 1987).

Apperception is the point where the self and the world come together. For Kant, the possibility of apperception requires two kinds of unity. First, the various data received in experience must themselves represent a common subject, allowing the data to be combined and held together. Second, the data must be combined and held together by a unified self or what Kant calls a “unity of consciousness” or “unity of apperception.” Kant concludes that because of such unity, all of us are equally capable of making sense of the same public object in a uniform manner based on our individual, private experiences. That is, we are in an unspoken agreement regarding the mind-independent world in which we live, facilitated by our subjective experiences but regulated by the innate mental structures given to us by the world. In sum, Kant’s theory makes possible shared synthetic knowledge of objective reality. [8] In conclusion, by considering the debate between rationalists and empiricists culminating in Kant’s synthesis, this chapter has shed light on the issue of how we achieve substantive knowledge.

Box 1 – Kant’s Copernican Revolution in Epistemology

In his Critique of Pure Reason , Kant sums up his epistemology by drawing an analogy to the Copernican Revolution (the shift in astronomy from a geocentric to a heliocentric model of the universe, named after Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543), the sixteenth-century Polish mathematician and astronomer):

Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. Now in metaphysics we can try in a similar way regarding the intuition of objects. If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object (as an object of the senses) conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself. Yet because I cannot stop with these intuitions, if they are to become cognitions, but must refer them as representations to something as their object and determine this object through them, I can assume either that the concepts through which I bring about this determination also conform to the objects, and then I am once again in the same difficulty about how I could know anything about them a priori, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which alone they can be cognized (as given objects) conforms to those concepts, in which case I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree. ([1781] 1998, B xvi–B xviii)

Questions for Reflection

Given the assumption that the propositions below are known to be true, label each one as (i) analytic or synthetic, (ii) necessary or contingent, and (iii) a priori or a posteriori . If any are debatable, state your opinion and explain your reasons.
All triangles have three sides.
The figure drawn on the board is a triangle.
If the figure drawn on the board is a triangle, the figure has three sides.
It is not the case that [latex]1+2 = 5[/latex].
Some birds can fly.
All flying birds can fly.
The sun will rise tomorrow.
It is morally wrong to harm innocent people for personal gain.
The average apple is larger than the average grape.
“Mark Twain” and “Samuel Clemens” are different names for the same person.
Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens.
Water is H 2 0.
Water is more abundant on Earth than on other planets in our solar system.
God either exists or does not exist.
Choose your own example of a posteriori knowledge. Then write a mini-essay that carefully traces its origins in a plausible manner. Use as many of the terms in the word bank below as possible (but feel free to also use other terms that appear in the chapter, especially those in bold). For definitions, you may wish to consult the glossary.
Explain, in your own words, the main arguments for and against innatism.
Explain, in your own words, the main arguments for and against the tabula rasa theory.
How is it possible to avoid both innatism and the tabula rasa ? What is the third alternative?
Many philosophers view synthetic a priori knowledge in a skeptical light. Why might this be a difficult category to make sense of? How did Kant explain and defend it? Summarize his view in your own words.
Consider the claim that “There is no synthetic a priori knowledge.” If this claim were true, could it be analytic? If it were true, could it be known a posteriori ? If the claim is true but cannot be analytic or a posteriori , would it have to be synthetic a priori ? If so, is it possible to consistently hold this claim?
Which do you find most plausible—rationalism, empiricism, or the Kantian synthesis? Summarize your main reasons for thinking so.

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2 The Sources of Knowledge

Robert Audi is Professor of Philosophy and David E. Gallo Chair in Ethics at the University of Notre Dame. He works in ethics and in related philosophical fields, especially epistemology. His books include Action, Intention, and Reason (1993), The Structure of Justification (1993), Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character (1997), Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (2000), The Architecture of Reason (2001), The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (2004), and Moral Value and Human Diversity (2007).

Published: 02 September 2009
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This article identifies the sources from which one acquires knowledge or justified belief. It distinguishes the “four standard basic sources”: perception, memory, consciousness, and reason. A basic source yields knowledge or justified belief without positive dependence on another source. This article distinguishes each of the above as a basic source of knowledge, with the exception of memory. Memory, while a basic source of justification, plays a preservative rather than a generative role in knowledge. This article contrasts basic sources with nonbasic sources, concentrating on testimony. After clarifying the relationship between a source and a ground, or “what it is in virtue of which one knows or justifiedly believes,” this article evaluates the basic sources' individual and collective autonomy as well as their vulnerability to defeasibility. It examines the relationship of coherence to knowledge and justification, noting the distinction between a negative dependence on incoherence and a positive dependence on coherence.

Knowledge can be adequately explicated only in relation to its sources. This is in part why perception, intuition, and other generally recognized sources of knowledge have been so extensively discussed in epistemology. These and other apparent sources of knowledge are also widely considered sources of justification, and they can serve as such even if justification is not entailed by knowledge. My concern here will be primarily with sources of knowledge; but in order to bring out their epistemological importance, I will connect these sources with justification as well. I am speaking, of course, as if we may suppose that there is knowledge. Anyone who accepts some version of skepticism may simply take what is said to apply to what would be sources of knowledge or justification if there should be any knowledge or justification of the kind in question. I begin with what might be called the standard basic sources of knowledge, proceed to distinguish them from nonbasic sources and from grounds of knowledge, and, with the account of epistemic sources then before us, turn to questions of defeasibility and completeness.

I. Basic Sources of Knowledge and Justification

If, in the history of epistemology, any sources of knowledge deserve to be called the classical basic sources, the best candidates are perception, memory, consciousness (sometimes called introspection ), and reason (sometimes called intuition ). Some writers have shortened the list under the heading, “experience and reason.” This heading is apt insofar as it suggests that there might be some unity among the first three sources and indeed some possibility of other experiential sources; it is misleading insofar as it suggests that experience plays no role in the operation of reason as a source of knowledge. Any operation of reason that is an element in consciousness may be considered a kind of intellectual experience. The reflection or other exercise of understanding required for “reason” to serve as a source of knowledge is certainly one kind of experience.

Let us first explore what it is for a source to be basic and some of the conditions under which beliefs it yields constitute knowledge (these might be called success conditions ). We can then consider what kind of source might be nonbasic and whether the four standard basic sources are the only basic ones.

I take it that a source of knowledge (or justification) is roughly something in the life of the knower—such as perception or reflection—that yields beliefs constituting knowledge. To call a source of knowledge (or of justification) basic is to say that it yields knowledge without positive dependence on the operation of some other source of knowledge (or of justification). Thus, I might perceptually know that the clock says ten by virtue of seeing its face displaying that time; and I might know by brief reflection that if two people are first cousins, they share a pair of grandparents.

It may seem that the perceptual knowledge is possible only if I remember how to read a clock and that therefore perception cannot yield knowledge independently of memory. It is true that perceptual knowledge of the kind in question depends on memory in a certain way. But consider this. A being could acquire the concepts needed for reading a clock at the very time of seeing one, and hence would not need to remember anything in order to form the belief that the clock says ten. One possibility here is the creation of a duplicate of someone like me: reading a clock would be possible at his first moment of creation. It appears, then, that although perceptual knowledge ordinarily depends in a certain way on memory, neither the concept of perception nor that of perceptual knowledge is historical . That of memory, however, is historical, at least in this sense: one cannot remember something unless one has retained it in memory over some period of time.

The concept of a basic source can be better understood through a different kind of example, one that brings out how even a basic source can yield beliefs that fail to constitute knowledge and how its success in producing knowledge may depend on what we believe through other basic sources. Suppose that I see the clock on the wall only at dusk, but still make out the hands and come to believe (correctly) that it says ten. I now turn on a bright light that shows me a system of mirrors which I remember my son has installed to deceive me in ways that amuse him. I realize that it can display a different clock with the same appearance. I now may have good reason to doubt that the clock on the wall says ten; for I realize that I would believe it did, even if I did not actually see it, but saw only the mirror image of a similar clock that does say ten. Here my would‐be perceptual knowledge that the clock says ten is defeated by my realization that I might well be deceived. That realization, in turn, depends in part on my memory of my son's antics. We have, then, a case illustrating that, even ordinarily, I would not know the clock says ten unless there were no suitably strong “opposition” from a source different from perception. This dependence of perception on factors beyond perceptual experience, however, is what I call negative dependence ; it does not show that perception is not a source of knowledge, but only that (at least) on occasion the source can be in some way blocked. 1

One may now suggest that perception is not even a positively independent source because it depends on consciousness. The idea would be that one cannot perceive without being conscious; hence, perception cannot yield knowledge apart from the operation of another source of knowledge. Let us grant for the sake of argument that perception requires consciousness. 2 If it does, that is because it is a kind of consciousness: consciousness of an external object. We might then simply grant that perception is perceptual consciousness and treat only “internal consciousness” (consciousness of what is internal to the mind) as a source of knowledge distinct from perception. Internal consciousness, understood strictly, occurs only where the object is either internal in the way images and thoughts are (roughly phenomenal) or abstract, as in the case of concepts and (presumably) numbers. On a wider interpretation, we might have internal consciousness of dispositional mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and emotions. But even when we do, it seems to be through consciousness of their manifestations that we are conscious of them, as when we are conscious of anxiety through being aware of a sense of foreboding or of felt discomfort, or of unpleasant thoughts of failure, or the like.

To be sure, one might also treat consciousness as a kind of perception: external perception where the perceived object is outside the mind, internal where that is inside. But abstract objects are not “in” the mind, at least in the way thoughts and sensations are. In any case, it is preferable not to consider consciousness of these a kind of perception. One reason for this is that there is apparently a causal relation between the object of perception and whatever sensation or other mental element constitutes a perceptual response to it, and it is at least not clear that abstract entities have causal power, or at any rate the requisite kind. 3 This issue is too large to pursue here, but it may be enough to note that not all mental phenomena seem to be either perceptual in any sense or to be directed toward abstract objects. Consider daydreaming or planning. Neither need concern the abstract, nor must we suppose that there are objects in the mind having properties in their own right. 4 It would be unwise to assume that perception exhausts the activity of consciousness.

It does appear, however, that we may take perception to be a partly causal notion. If you see, hear, touch, taste, or smell something, then it affects you in some way. And if you may be said to perceive your own heartbeat or even your own anxiety, this is owing to their causing you to have some experiential impression analogous to a sense impression you might have through the five senses. Conceived in this way, perception is not a closed concept : it leaves room for hitherto unfamiliar kinds of experiential response to count as the mental side of perceiving an object and indeed for new or unusual kinds of objects to be perceptible. 5 This is not the place, however, to give an account of exactly what perception is. Any of the basic sources could be the subject of a deservedly long study. Let us proceed to memory as an epistemic or justificational source.

If, in speaking of perception, we are talking about a capacity to perceive, in speaking of memory we are talking about a capacity to remember. But remembering does not exhaust the operation of our memorial capacity to the extent that perceiving exhausts the operation of the perceptual capacity. There is also recalling , which entails but is not entailed by remembering; there is recollecting , which is similar to recalling but tends to imply an episode of (sometimes effortful) recall, usually of a sequence or a set of details; and there are memory beliefs , which may be mistaken and do not entail either remembering or even recalling. It is plausible to maintain, however, that remembering that p (where p is some arbitrarily chosen proposition) entails knowing it; and we also speak of knowing things from memory. When we do know things (wholly) in this way, it is not on the basis of other things we know. One may know a theorem from memory and on the basis of a simple proof from an axiom, but where one knows p wholly from memory—simply by virtue of remembering it—one does not at the time know it on the basis of knowing or believing anything else.

These points make it natural to think of memory as a basic source of knowledge. But I think it would be a mistake to claim that it is one. It is an epistemically essential source ; that is, what we think of as “our knowledge,” in an overall sense, would collapse if memory did not sustain it: we could know only what we could hold in consciousness at the time (at least this is so if what we know dispositionally at a time must be conceived as held in memory at that time, even though it is true then that if we were to try to bring any one of the propositions to consciousness then, we would normally have it there then 6 ). By virtue of playing this role, memory is an epistemic source in an important sense. But surely one cannot know anything from memory without coming to know it through some other source. If we remember it and thereby know it, we knew it, and we must have come to know it through, say, perception or reasoning. 7

If memory is not a basic source of knowledge, it surely is a basic source of justification. It is not easy to capture just how it plays this role. But consider believing that one sent a certain friend a holiday card. There is a way this belief—or at least its propositional object—can present itself to one that confers some degree of justification on the belief (I think it can confer enough to allow the belief to constitute knowledge if one is correct and there is no defeater of one's would‐be knowledge, but there is no need to try to show that here). Someone might object that it is only by virtue of knowledge, though consciousness, of one's memorial images that we can be justified in such beliefs, but I very much doubt this. 8 A remembered proposition can surface in consciousness without the help of images and, often, can spontaneously surface upon the need for the proposition as an answer to a question or as a premise for an inference one sets out to make or sees to be needed.

Given the points made about memory so far, I suggest that it is an essential source of knowledge and a basic source of justification. In the former case it is preservative , retaining knowledge already gained; in the latter it may be generative , producing justification not otherwise acquired.

It is worth noting here that we may not say ‘not otherwise acquirable ’. Whatever can be known or justifiedly believed by a given person on the basis of memory can also be known or justifiedly believed in some other way, say through the testimony of someone else. This indicates another notion we need in understanding sources of justification and knowledge. A basic source of justification need not be a unique source , even relative to a single kind of justification (or knowledge).

If, however, memory is not a unique source, it remains true that the non‐memorial source that is in principle available to one may depend, for its production of genuine knowledge, on memory or on knowledge of, or justification about, the past. If testimony is the source, for instance, the person attesting to a past event depends either on his own memory or on someone else's. If so, we might think that although memory is not a unique source for primary knowledge or primary justification regarding the past—where primary knowledge and justification are the kinds that do not (evidentially) depend on the knowledge or justification of anyone else—it is a unique source for secondary knowledge or justification regarding the past , as in the case in which I rely on someone's testimony about it. Perhaps, however, at the moment of his creation my duplicate could see smoke and know, by the visible facts, that there has been a fire. If so, then simultaneous testimony from him could give others such historical knowledge without dependence, for any of them, on (the operation of) their own memory. My duplicate would, arguably, “inherit” a capacity for induction from me, and I could not have acquired that capacity without relying on my memory; but he would still not actually have to rely on his own memory to know that there has been a fire. Here, then, we could have knowledge of the past that does not require the exercise of memory by the primary knower. Even if memory is not a unique source of any kind of knowledge or justification, the concept of such a source is significant, and it will surface again shortly.

Consciousness has already been mentioned as a basic source of knowledge. It seems clear that if any kind of experience of what is going on in the world can yield knowledge, it is introspective consciousness. Even philosophers who take pains to give skepticism its due, such as David Hume, do not deny that we have knowledge—presumably noninferential knowledge—of our own current mental life. 9 Granted, it is only consciousness of the inner world—or at least of whatever can exist “in” consciousness—that is a basic source if outer perception—consciousness of the external world—is not a basic source. But the inner world is a very important realm. It might include abstract objects, such as numbers and concepts, as well as sensations, thoughts, and other mental entities.

When we come to reason, there is, as with memory, a need to clarify what aspects of this general capacity are intended. Like ‘memory’, the term ‘reason’ can designate quite different things. One is reflection, another reasoning, another understanding, and still another, intuition. We reflect on a subject, reason from a premise, understand a concept or proposition, and intuit certain truths. These are only examples, and there is overlap: any of the objects in question must be understood (adequately, though not perfectly) if it is to be an object of reason, and one may need to reflect on a truth that one intuits in order to grasp its truth.

It will help to focus on a simple example, such as the logical truth that if all human beings are vulnerable and all vulnerable beings need protection, then all human beings need protection. We can reason from the “premises” (in the if‐clause) to the “conclusion” (in the then‐clause); but an assertive use of the if‐then sentence in question need not represent giving an argument. Moreover, the proposition it expresses is not the kind that would (normally) be known by reasoning. It would normally be known by “intuition” or, in the case in which such direct apprehension of the truth does not come to a person, by reflection that indirectly yields understanding. (The conclusion —that all human beings need protection—may of course be known wholly by reasoning from the premises. One's knowledge of it then depends on one's knowledge of them, which will surely require reliance on a different basic source. But the proposition in question is the conditional one connecting the premises with the conclusion, and knowledge of it does not require knowledge of either the former or the latter.)

I suggest, then, that “reasoning” is not a good heading under which to capture the ratiocinative basic source we are considering, and that indeed if we distinguish reasoning from reflection of a kind that yields knowledge that p apart from reliance on independent premises, it is best not to use the term ‘reasoning’ in explicating this source. What seems fundamental about the source is that when knowledge of, or justification for believing, a proposition comes from it, it derives from an exercise of reason regarding the proposition. This may take no time beyond that required to understand a sentence expressing the proposition (which may be virtually none; nor need we assume that all consideration of propositions is linguistically mediated, as opposed to conceptual in some sense). Here it is natural to speak of intuiting. But the proposition may not be so easily understood, as (for some people) in the case of the proposition that if p entails q and q entails r , and either not‐ q or not‐ r is the case, then it is false that p . Here it is more natural to speak of reflection. In either case the source seems to operate by yielding an adequate degree of understanding of the proposition in question and thereby knowledge. It does not appear to depend (positively) on any other source and is plausibly considered basic. 10

It also seems clear that reason is a basic source of justification. Such simple logical truths as those with the form of, ‘If all As are Bs and all Bs are Cs , then all As are Cs ’ can be justifiedly believed, as well as known, simply on the basis of (adequately) understanding them. In at least the vast majority of the kinds of cases in which reason yields knowledge it apparently also yields justification. It can, however, yield justification without knowledge. Careful reflection can make a proposition seem highly plausible even though it later turns out to be false. If we are talking only of prima facie (hence defeasible) justification, there are many examples in logic and mathematics. Consider Russell's paradox. There seems to be a class of nonteaspoons in addition to a class of teaspoons. The latter, however, is plainly not a teaspoon, since it is a class. So, it is a nonteaspoon and hence a member of itself. The same holds for the class of nonphilosophers: being a non‐philosopher, it is a member of itself. There must then be a class of such classes—a class of all and only those classes that are not members of themselves. But there cannot be one: this class would be a member of itself if and only if it is not a member of itself. Thus, what appears, on the basis of an exercise of reason, to be true may be false.

It may be objected that it is only inferentially that one could here believe there is a class of all and only classes that are not members of themselves and that therefore it is not only on the basis of the operation of reason that one would believe this. But surely we may take reasoning to be one kind of such operation, particularly deductive reasoning. It is true that the basic kind of knowledge or justification yielded by a source of either is noninferential; there is no good reason, however, to rule that inferential cases may not be included.

To be sure, there is still the question whether inference depends on the operation of memory, in the sense that one may draw an inference from a proposition only if one remembers it. But surely one can hold some simple premises before one's mind and at that very time draw an inference from them. If we allow that knowledge or justification deriving from simple inferences such as those in question here need not depend on memory, we may conclude that it can be on the basis of inferential reason that the proposition in question is believed. It is a contingent matter whether such an inference does depend on the operation of memory. If one must write down the premises to keep track of them, it would. If, however, one can entertain the premises and conclusion together and at that time see their logical relation, it does not. The distinction between these two cases is not sharp but is often quite clear. 11

Even regarding reason, then, we cannot say that we have an infallible source of knowledge: one whose every cognitive deliverance is a case of knowledge. To call a source basic is to affirm a measure of epistemic autonomy; it is not to affirm any wholesale epistemic guarantee. It is not even clear that every “deliverance” of a basic source has prima facie justification. But this is a plausible view, if (1) we take a deliverance of a source to be a belief based on it and not merely caused by it, and (2) we allow that a belief can be prima facie justified even when its justification is massively overridden. Let us suppose (1) and (2) hold. Plainly this would not entail indefeasible justification. If we suppose, then, that there would be no knowledge or justification without basic sources of them, we still cannot reasonably conclude that every belief those sources deliver is justified on balance or, if true, constitutes knowledge.

If we now return to the question of uniqueness, we find that, for reason, a plausible case for uniqueness is available, since some propositions, such as simple logical truths, seem (ultimately) knowable and justifiedly believable only on the basis of reason. To be sure, even simple logical truths can be known on the basis of testimony, as where someone who is logically slow first comes to know one through the testimony of a teacher. But can such truths be known or justifiedly believed without dependence on reason somewhere along the line? It would seem that the teacher must depend on it, or on testimony from someone who does, or who at least must rely on testimony from someone else who depends on reason, and so forth. 12 If this is right, then at least for primary knowledge and justification regarding simple logical truths, uniqueness holds.

Might we, however, make the parallel claim for perceptual and introspective cases? Could anyone (say) know the colors and feel of things if no one had perceptual knowledge? If we assume the possibility of an omnipotent and omniscient God, we might have to grant that God could know this sort of thing by virtue of (fully) knowing God's creation of things with these colors and textures. Still, wouldn't even God have to know what these properties are like in order to create the things in question with full knowledge of the nature of the things thus created? Suppose so. That knowledge is arguably of a phenomenal kind; if it is, the point would only show that consciousness is a unique source. Perhaps it is. If reason and consciousness are not only basic, but also the only unique sources, one can understand why both figure so crucially in the epistemology of Descartes or indeed any philosopher for whom what is accessible to conscious experience and to thought is epistemically fundamental in the far‐reaching way that is implied by the combination of basicality and uniqueness.

II. Testimony as an Essential Source

The four standard basic sources do not include testimony. At least since Thomas Reid, 13 however, there has been controversy over whether testimony belongs with these other sources or is nonbasic. There is no question of the importance of testimony. The issue is whether gaining knowledge or justification from it depends on the operation of another source.

It might seem that since to know that p on the basis of your testimony, I must perceptually know that you have attested to p , testimony‐based knowledge cannot be basic. I suggest that this admittedly natural assumption is a mistake: I do not even have to believe that you have attested to p , though to be sure I must be disposed to believe something to this effect and may not dis believe it. 14 But quite apart from whether I did have to believe this, perception would have to operate for me to receive your testimony. Granted, your attesting to p could cause a machine to produce the belief that p (perhaps even knowledge that p ) directly in me; but this would at best be a case of knowledge due to , not on the basis of , testimony. A mere cause of my knowing something is not a source of knowledge. A sudden curiosity can cause me to look up a phone number and thereby come to know it; the curiosity is not the source of my knowledge. If, by contrast, your attestation causes me to receive your testimony directly in my mind, like a message appearing in my interior monologue, I could acquire knowledge on the basis of the testimony; but this would show only that perception can be telepathic—or perhaps that there is a basic nonperceptual source of knowledge of other minds. There would still be no need for me to have my knowledge that p based (partly) on knowledge that you attested to it. 15

With justification, it seems equally clear that apart from perceptual justification for believing something to the effect that you attested to p , I cannot acquire justification for believing it on the basis of your testimony. If, however, I am right in thinking that one need not believe, as opposed to having grounds adequate for knowing or justifiedly believing, that the attester gave testimony that p , then something important about testimony emerges: it is a source of basic knowledge , that is, knowledge not grounded in other knowledge (or in justified belief of some other proposition). My knowledge that p need not be inferred from any premises nor based on a belief that p was attested to. The point that testimony is a source of basic knowledge distinguishes it from other nonbasic sources of knowledge, such as inference. (Even in the case of knowledge by virtue of an inferential operation of reason, the conclusion is known or believed on the basis of a premise, hence is not basic knowledge or basically justified.) The point also helps to explain why it is natural to consider testimony a basic source of knowledge; for it is typical of such sources that they yield noninferential knowledge.

There are four further points that distinguish testimony from the basic sources. First, one cannot test the reliability of a basic source or confirm a deliverance of it without relying on that very source. With perception one must, for instance, look again; with memory one must try harder to recall or must consult other memories—and one must remember the original belief being examined, lest the target of confirmation be lost from view. With testimony, one can check reliability using any of the basic sources.

The second point has already been suggested in connection with memory. Memory is central for our knowledge at any given moment in a way testimony is not. Even if knowledge could not be acquired without the benefit of testimony given to one at least to the extent one needs in order to learn a language (a process in which what parents or others attest to is crucial to acquiring a vocabulary), once we climb that linguistic ladder we can discard it and, given normal memory, retain what we know. With the other basic sources, reason in some minimal form is indispensable to possessing any knowledge (at least in protecting us from pervasive inconsistency), and to inferential development of knowledge, which depends on deductive and inductive logic. Consciousness and perception are essential for the development of new knowledge in their domains. There is, however, no domain (except possibly that of other minds) for which continued testimony is in principle needed for increase of knowledge. Similar (but not entirely parallel) points hold for justification.

The third point is perhaps even subtler. There is a sense in which testimonially based belief passes through the will—or at least through agency: the attester must select what to attest to and in the process can also lie, in which case the belief does not constitute knowledge (and the justification the recipient may get is, in a certain way we need not pursue here, objectively defective). For the basic sources, there is no analogue of such voluntary representation of information. Indeed, testimonially based beliefs normally pass through agency twice over, since one can normally withhold belief from the proposition in a way one cannot when it is fully supported directly by experience or reason (to be sure, even in those cases there is such a thing as double support, as where someone attests to a plainly self‐evident proposition one had not thought of but intuitively sees to be true on hearing it asserted).

Granted, it is a contingent matter when a person can withhold belief: some of us may be able to learn to withhold even beliefs that those speaking to us are people as opposed to robots. 16 But the normal level of control here is different from that applicable to testimony, where appraisal of credibility may always involve both the kinds of doubts we may have about basic sources and any we may have about the attester's response to them. To be sure, we sometimes speak of the “testimony of the senses.” But this is metaphor, at least insofar as it suggests that the senses derive knowledge from another source, as attesters must eventually do, since knowledge that p cannot derive from an infinite or circular chain in which no person giving testimony that p knows it even in part on a nontestimonial basis. 17

A fourth point of contrast between testimony and the standard basic sources has already been suggested. It concerns the need for grounds for the semantic interpretation of what is said on the basis of which it is taken to be that p . This is not a justificatory or epistemic burden intrinsic to the standard basic sources. Granted, much a priori knowledge and justification is acquired through consideration of linguistic expression of propositions. Still, on the most plausible account of the basis of such knowledge and justification, its object is nonlinguistic; the ground is apparently a kind of understanding of the proposition in question or, perhaps more directly, of the concepts figuring in or essential to it.

It must also be granted that a lack of semantic understanding will normally restrict the range propositions that are even candidates for one's a priori knowledge or justification, since one's comprehension of language will (for most of us, at least) limit the range of propositions we can get before our minds. Moreover, semantic misunderstanding —which is of course possible even in people of wide and deep semantic comprehension—may give us the wrong proposition or range of propositions. Nonetheless, neither of these defects need affect how good our grounds are once the right object is before us. To be sure, defeaters of knowledge or justification can come from semantically interpreted items and can afflict beliefs deriving from any of the standard sources; but none of those sources seems dependent on semantic grounds in the way that testimony is.

These contrasts between testimony and the basic sources are not meant to impugn the importance of testimony. In addition to being a source of basic knowledge, testimony is, like memory, an essential source of our overall knowledge. Our overall knowledge depends on it in far‐reaching ways, though not perhaps as much as, and certainly not in quite the same ways as, it depends on memory. The most important thing memory and testimony have in common may be that they transmit , rather than generate , knowledge (the case with justification is different, since memory is a basic source of that).

As to how testimony differs from both perception and memory, there is more to say than can be said here. It is not a question of reliability; it is only a contingent matter just how reliable each is. It is not even the semantic character of the deliverances of the source; one can see a sentence (as such), as one can hear testimony—indeed, the uttered sentence may constitute someone's testimony. A crucial point made earlier bears repeating: the acquisition of knowledge or even justified belief on the basis of testimony depends on the agency of another person. Normally, the attester must not lie, or seek to deceive, in attesting to p if we are to come to know that p on the basis of the testimony. By contrast, our responses to the deliverances of the basic sources is not normally mediated by anyone else's action. Testimony may be unreliable—or otherwise unworthy of one's acceptance—both because of natural connections between the state(s) of affairs the testimony concerns and because of the person's exercise of agency. This is not normally so for the testimony of the senses or of memory or of reason. The point is not that the exercise of agency cannot be a “natural” phenomenon—though philosophers who think that freedom is incompatible with determinism are likely to insist that it cannot—but that the concepts of knowledge and justification apparently presuppose that if it is a natural phenomenon, it is nonetheless special. 18

III. Sources and Grounds

To specify a source of knowledge is to indicate where it comes from, but it is also to do something more. I have already noted that to specify a mere cause of someone's knowing something is not to specify a source of the knowledge. In part this is because a source of something need not be a ground of it. As I am understanding sources of knowledge , and as they are generally conceived in philosophical literature, they are not just where knowledge comes from; they also provide the knower with grounds of knowledge. Grounds are what it is in virtue of which (roughly, on the basis of which) one knows or justifiedly believes. If you know that my knowledge that it is raining is perceptual, as opposed, say, to testimonial, you know not only that it comes from my perceiving something, but also that I have a perceptual ground, say a visual or auditory experience, for believing the proposition.

As this example makes clear, sources indicate the kinds of grounds to expect a person to have when the person has knowledge through that source. But the source is not itself the ground. We may of course call perception a ground of knowledge so long as we understand that so speaking of a ground does not specify just what it is. What about the converse question: Does specifying a ground of knowledge that p indicate the source of the knowledge? If the ground is experiential as opposed to propositional, then ordinarily it does. But we can speak of knowledge based on an impression that (say) a car is moving, while leaving open whether it is based on visual sensations or on inference from what one can see. It also seems possible for there to be grounds of knowledge that we cannot refer to any familiar source, as might be the case with certain religious experiences. Is this a kind of perception, or might there be a new nonperceptual source? There is probably no way to answer this in the abstract.

Suppose, however, one thought that a person could have knowledge simply implanted by virtue of a true belief 's being reliably caused, where the person's brain is directly affected by a calculator and one comes to believe a truth of arithmetic that would ordinarily require calculation. If we think knowledge is possible for the idiot savant (the “lightning calculator”), we may count this as knowledge. If the person has no sense of any basis of the belief, such as a sense of “things adding up that way,” it seems more accurate to speak of a basis for knowledge rather than a ground and of a cause rather than a source. But in a generic sense there is a source; and a basis is a ground in the widest sense of that term.

This is another of the many cases in which epistemologists may diverge, depending on whether they are internalists or externalists. For an internalist, if there is nothing that is in consciousness or accessible to it by reflective or introspective efforts and that can serve as justification or some kind of evidence for p , thenwe have at best a cause, not a ground, of knowledge. For an externalist, if the process by which the belief is produced is reliable and p is indeed true, that process itself may be said to be a ground of knowledge—or at least to ground it. Perhaps the externalist would agree with the internalist, however, that there is an important sense in which it is not the subject's ground . In any event, it seems fair to say that the dominant notions of source and ground in the philosophical literature are those in which sources supply accessible grounds (grounds accessible, by reflection or introspection, to the person for whom they are grounds). The four standard sources of knowledge and justification, moreover, are commonly taken to be the only basic ones.

IV. The Epistemic Autonomy of the Basic Sources

A basic source of knowledge does not have a positive epistemic dependency on some other source; but it does not in general yield indefeasibly justified beliefs (if it ever does), and it can produce true beliefs whose status as would‐be knowledge is undermined by some defeating factor. Each source, then, is to a significant degree subject to defeasibility. Defeat can come from a different source; hence we cannot adequately account for knowledge or justification apart from an understanding of the interconnections among the basic sources.

To what extent, then, is each basic source autonomous? To answer this we need to distinguish different kinds of autonomy. One way to focus the issue and to see the role of defeasibility in understanding the basic sources is to ask whether all the epistemic defeaters of beliefs that are well grounded in the standard basic sources (i.e., all the elements that defeat their justification or prevent their constituting knowledge) derive their defeating power from those same sources. The more general question here is whether, collectively, the standard basic sources are epistemically and justificationally self‐sufficient , roughly self‐sustaining in providing for all the knowledge‐conferring and justification‐conferring grounds of belief, and self‐correcting, in potentially accounting for all the grounds of defeat of (would‐be) knowledge and of justification. A quite similar question is whether, taken together, they are necessarily such that if a true belief enjoys adequate support from at least one of them, hence is properly evidenced, and that support is not defeated by at least one other, then the belief constitutes knowledge (or is justified on balance).

This self‐sufficiency thesis has some plausibility, particularly for justification. To show whether or not it holds would take far more space than I have, but we can go some distance toward an answer by exploring the two main aspects of the question whether the standard basic sources are autonomous. First, does each source yield the knowledge or justification it does independently of confirmation of the belief in question from any other source? Call this the question of individual autonomy . Second, if not, then does only the entire set of basic sources meet this independence condition? This would be collective autonomy , a freedom from the need for confirmation by any fifth source.

There is also a kind of negative autonomy : invulnerability to defeat by beliefs from another source. Such defeat may occur where “seeing is believing.” For instance, suppose I see a stone wall. My visual experience may yield a belief that there is one at the edge of the field, and that belief may constitute knowledge and retain justification despite a memory belief that, as of a few minutes ago, there was only a line of trees in that place. The justification that my memory belief had is thus defeated. As this example can also indicate, invulnerability to defeat from one source may be combined with vulnerability to another. If seeing a wall can yield knowledge or justification that overrides, and presumably cannot be overridden by, any provided by a memory belief of the kind in question, justification of a visual belief may be overridden by that of a tactual one. If, on a walk in the hot summer, I am justified by vision in believing that there is a water fountain before me, yet I cannot feel anything as I sweep my hands where its cool surface should be resisting them, I will neither know, nor any longer be justified in believing, that there is one there and am likely to conclude I am hallucinating. 19 Here, at least, with respect to both justification and knowledge, touch apparently takes priority over sight.

Positively, there apparently is a measure of individual autonomy. Each source can by itself yield some justification (as well as knowledge). If, for instance, I have a perceptual impression of a piano being played, I am prima facie justified in believing that one is being played. By contrast, if I have a sufficiently vivid and steadfast memory impression of a grassy meadow where I now see a stone wall, I may have some small degree of justification for believing the spot was covered with grass (and the wall has appeared quickly), even if the justification of my visual belief that there is a stone wall before me cannot be overridden by that of the memory belief alone. Certainly in the normal case, justification—of some degree—from one of the four standard sources does not wait upon corroboration from other sources. The same holds for knowledge.

To be sure, one cannot be justified in believing (or know) that a lot was vacant unless one has the required concepts, such as that of vacancy; and it may be that one does not acquire concepts adequate to make justified belief possible until one has a complex group of interrelated concepts. This may imply that one gets no justification at all in isolation from justification for many related propositions. That possibility is, however, quite compatible with some grounds of one's justification being single experiences. Epistemic autonomy is consistent with conceptual dependence. We cannot believe, and hence cannot know, a proposition essentially involving concepts we do not have. But a belief might have an isolated ground without in the least being isolated conceptually or in content from other beliefs.

Regarding negative individual autonomy on the part of a source—that is, its providing justification or knowledge that is overridable only by counterevidence from the same source—plainly the four standard sources do not have it. To take a different example, the justification of a memorially justified belief that there is a wall in the field can be overridden by a perception of smooth ground there. The same perception can prevent the belief 's constituting knowledge even if it is true. It may seem that reason—our rational capacity—is privileged as a source of justification. Strong rationalists might take it to possess negative individual autonomy. But surely there are some propositions, such as some in logic or mathematics, that I might justifiedly believe on the basis of reflection but, in part on the basis of sufficiently plausible testimony, can cease to be justified in believing or cease to know. Here the authority of that testimony would depend partly on perceptual and memorial factors crucial for my justifiedly accepting the credibility of the person who is its source. Thus, the overriding power of that authority does not derive from reason alone. 20

The case for collective negative autonomy is more plausible: there is some reason to think that where a belief constitutes knowledge or is justified in virtue of support from all four sources working together, its epistemic grounding (its grounding qua knowledge) and its justification are defeasible only through considerations arising from at least one of those very sources. If we assume that such defeat can come only from what confers or at least admits of justification, and if we add the highly controversial assumption that all epistemic grounding and justification of belief derive wholly from the four standard sources, we may conclude that those sources are epistemically and justificationally self‐sufficient. I make neither assumption, but I would suggest that in fact these sources may well be self‐sufficient. For there may in fact be no other basic sources (as opposed to causes) of knowledge or justification or of defeat. 21

There are at least two reasons for the caution just expressed. One concerns collective negative autonomy. The other concerns the self‐sufficiency thesis, in particular the idea that the standard basic sources are self‐corrective in providing (in principle) for all the kinds of correction needed to rectify erroneous beliefs. Let us take these points in turn.

First, it is widely recognized that sources of unreliability in our belief‐formation processes can prevent our beliefs from constituting knowledge even if we have no way, through the standard basic sources, of detecting the error. This is a lesson of the Cartesian demon scenario, in which our belief‐forming experiences, and even our efforts to check on the truth of our beliefs, are manipulated so that we cannot detect certain false beliefs. But, in principle, inanimate factors could conspire to produce the same unfortunate results. It would be a mistake, then, to say that the basic sources are necessarily self‐correcting.

Second, there is reason to think that the concept of knowledge, as opposed to that of justification, is external in roughly this sense: knowledge is possible without the knower's having internally accessible grounds for the belief constituting it. 22 Thus, suppose that, through the operation of a special mechanism in one's brain, one could know what a person very near one was thinking. Such a mechanism might deliver the beliefs constituting the knowledge whenever one concentrates attention on the person in question in a certain way but might yield no sense of any grounds for them; nor would there have to be any access to such grounds. Granted, one might gain inductive evidence of one's success, but if such knowledge is possible at all, one could presumably have it without dependence on inductive evidence of that success. There is much controversy over whether such externally grounded knowledge is possible; but, if it is, then the standard basic sources are not necessarily collectively self‐sufficient regarding knowledge even if they are for justification. There can be other sources of knowledge.

For justification as opposed to knowledge, however, there is reason to think that the four standard sources are indeed individually autonomous and, collectively, both self‐sufficient and self‐corrective. Each can provide grounds that can by themselves confer justification (as well as knowledge where the belief in question is true), though defeat by counterevidence can arise from the same or a different source and hence each lacks autonomy in the negative sense; and the entire set of sources seems, as regards justification, to be autonomous: self‐sufficient in accounting for justification (as well as for normally grounded knowledge) and, independently of any other sources, capable of accounting for defeaters of justification and, in part in that way, for correction of our beliefs. In addition, it is arguable that, at least in the case of reason and perception, there is also uniqueness, in the sense that there are kinds of knowledge and justification not possible apart from dependence on these sources. None of these properties holds for testimony, though it is like the basic sources in being both a source of direct knowledge and also epistemically essential in the ways I have described.

It has been plausibly argued, however, that one source, and perhaps the basic source, of justification is coherence among one's beliefs. Isn't my belief that the car was moving perhaps justified by its coherence with the beliefs that its orientation to the adjacent building seemed to be changing, that I recall tire sounds, and that cars are built to move? And isn't the justification of my belief that the ground where the wall stands was smooth later undermined mainly by its in coherence with the belief that I now see one there (one that looks quite old)? Let us explore the role of coherence in justification.

V. Coherence

Unfortunately, there is no account of coherence which we may simply presuppose. The notion is elusive, and there are highly varying accounts. 23 But this much is clear: we cannot assess the role of coherence in justification unless we distinguish the thesis that coherence is a basic source of justification from the thesis that in coherence can defeat justification. The power to defeat is destructive; the power to provide grounds is constructive. To see that the destructive power of incoherence does not imply that coherence has any basic constructive power, we should first note that incoherence is not the contradictory of coherence, its mere absence. It is something with a definite negative character: two beliefs that are logically and semantically irrelevant to each other, such as my beliefs that the sun is shining and that I am thinking about sources of knowledge, are neither mutually coherent nor mutually incoherent. The paradigm of incoherence is blatant logical inconsistency; positive coherence is widely taken to be far more than mutual consistency, yet far less than mutual entailment.

Clearly, that incoherence can defeat justification does not imply that coherence can create it. If it does create it (which is far from obvious), seeing this point is complicated because wherever coherence is plausibly invoked as a source of justification, there one or more of the four standard sources apparently operates in a way that provides for an explanation according to which both the coherence and the justification arise from the same elements responsible for well‐groundedness. 24 This is best seen through cases.

Consider my belief that a leaf blower is running, grounded in hearing the usual sharp blaring sounds. This appears to be justified by the relevant auditory impressions, together with background information about what the corresponding sounds indicate. If, however, I acquired a justified belief that someone is imitatively creating the blare, my justification for believing that a leaf blower is running would be undermined by the incoherence in my belief system. Does the defeating power of incoherence imply that my original justification requires coherence among my beliefs, including the belief that no one is doing that? Does one even have that belief in such a case? It would surely not be normal to have it when there is no occasion to suspect such a thing. But suppose the belief were required. Notice how many beliefs one would need in order to achieve coherence that is of sufficient magnitude to be even a plausible candidate to generate the justification in question, for example that my hearing is normal, that there is no other machine nearby that makes the same sounds, and so on. It is not quite clear how far this must go. Do we even form that many beliefs in the normal cases in which we acquire justified beliefs of the ordinary kind in question? To think so is to fall victim to a kind of intellectualism about the mind that has afflicted coherentist theories and opposing accounts of justification alike.

A further analogy may help to show how incoherence can be a defeater of justification without its absence, or beliefs that it is absent, or justification for believing something to this effect, being a source of justification. One's job may be the source of one's income, yet a severe depression might eliminate the job. It does not follow that the absence of a depression is a source of one's income. Surely it is not. Even positive economic conditions are not a source, though one's source depends on them. The idea of (positive) dependence is central in understanding that of a source. It must be granted that there is a negative sense in which one's job does depend on the absence of a depression; but that dependence—a kind of vulnerability—is too negative a condition to count as a source (much less a ground) of income. For one thing, it provides no explanation of why one has the income. Similarly, we might say that one's justification negatively depends on the absence of defeaters and positively depends on one's sources. But negative dependence on incoherence does not imply positive dependence on anything in particular, including coherence, as a source, any more than an income's negative dependence on the absence of a depression implies any particular source of that income.

To be sure, nothing can serve as a source of anything without the existence of indefinitely many enabling conditions . Some of these are conceptual. One may, for instance, be unable to believe a proposition even when evidence for it is before one; if a child has no concept of an insurance adjuster, then seeing one examining a damaged car and talk to its owner about deductibles will not function as a source of justification for the proposition that this is an insurance adjuster. Other enabling conditions are psychological, concerning our capacities or dispositions relevant to forming beliefs. If my sensory receptors are malfunctioning, or if I do not respond to their deliverances by forming beliefs in the normal way, then I may fail to be justified in certain perceptual beliefs.

Specifying a source provides both a genetic explanation of where a thing comes from and, through supplying a ground, a contemporaneous explanation of why it is as it is; enabling conditions, by contrast, provide neither. Taken together, they explain its possibility, but not its genesis or its character. It is neither correct nor theoretically illuminating to construe the absence of the enabling conditions as part of the source or as a ground. They are indispensable, but their role should be understood in terms of the theory of defeasibility rather than the theory of sources or of positive grounds.

The importance of incoherence as a defeater of justification, then, is not a good reason to take coherence to be a source of justification. This by no means implies that justification has no relation to coherence. Indeed, at least normally, justified beliefs will cohere, in one or another intuitive sense, with other beliefs one has, typically other justified beliefs. Certainly, wherever there is justification for believing something, there at least tends to be justification for believing a number of related propositions and presumably for believing a coherent set of them. This is easily seen by reflecting on the point that a single perceptual experience provides information sufficient to justify many beliefs: that someone is blowing leaves, that there is a lawn before me, that these blaring motors should be muted, and far more.

The conception of sources of knowledge and justification that I have sketched provides a way to explain why coherence apparently accompanies justified beliefs—actual and hypothetical—namely, that both are ultimately grounded in the same basic sources. In sufficiently rich forms, coherence may, for all I have said, commonly be a mark of justification: an indication of its presence. The coherence conception of knowledge and justification, however, does not well explain why justification of beliefs is apparently dependent on the standard sources. Indeed, as an internal relation among beliefs, coherence may be at least as easily imagined in artificial situations where the coherence of beliefs is unconstrained by our natural tendencies. In principle, wishful thinking could yield as coherent a network of beliefs as the most studious appraisal of evidence. 25

There is one kind of coherence that is entirely consistent with the well‐groundedness conception of justification that goes with taking it to derive from basic sources in the ways I have suggested. To see this, note first that one cannot believe a proposition without having the concepts that figure essentially in it. Whereof one cannot understand, thereof one cannot believe. Moreover, concepts come, and work, in families. This point is the core of a coherence theory of conceptual function: of the acquisition of concepts and their operation, most notably in discourse, judgment, and inference. That theory—call it conceptual coherentism , for short—is both plausible and readily combined with the kind of view I am developing. For instance, I am not justified in believing that there is a piano before me unless I have a concept of a piano. I cannot have that unless I have many other concepts, such as the concept of an instrument, of a keyboard, of playing, of sound, of music—no one highly specific concept need be necessary, and various alternative sets will do. In part, to have a concept (of something perceptible) is (at least for remotely normal persons) to be disposed to form beliefs under appropriate sensory stimulations, say to believe a specimen of the thing to be present when one can see it and is asked if there is such a thing nearby; thus, again it is to be expected that from a single perceptual experience, many connected propositions will be justified for the perceiver.

The coherence theory of conceptual function belongs more to semantics and philosophy of mind than to epistemology. But it has profound epistemological implications. That concepts are acquired in mutual relationships may imply that justification does not arise atomistically, in one isolated belief (or desire or intention) at a time. This does not imply, however, that, once a person acquires the conceptual capacity needed to achieve justification, justification cannot derive from one source at a time. This theory of conceptual acquisition and competence is also quite consistent with the view that, far from deriving from coherence, justification, by virtue of the way it is grounded in its sources, brings coherence with it.

VI. Conclusion

We have seen reason to consider perception, memory, consciousness, and reason to be basic sources of justification and, except in the case of memory, of knowledge. All can yield beliefs that are both noninferential in not being based on other beliefs and noninferentially justified in not deriving their justification from being based on any other beliefs. Testimony can also yield noninferential beliefs and even what might be called basic knowledge, but it is not a basic source or knowledge or justification. Like inference, it yields knowledge and justification only given the positive cooperation of at least one of the basic sources, but because it (commonly) yields noninferential beliefs, it is closer than inference to constituting a basic source.

The basic sources yield not only knowledge and justified belief, but also coherence. For instance, it is common for a single observation to produce a goodly number of cohering beliefs. The operation of reason—our rational capacity—tends to employ an interconnected group of concepts, such as those involving perceptible objects, psychological concepts, and logical relations, which dispose us to discover certain apparently a priori truths and to reason with and from them in ways that produce an integrated view; and memory preserves not only individual beliefs, but also our sense of some of their interconnections.

The operation of basic sources allows for defeasibility even when it yields amply justified beliefs or knowledge. Among the defeaters that can undermine would‐be justification or would‐be knowledge is incoherence. But it is essential to see that the pervasive possibility of defeat does not entail that each basic source has a positive dependence on any of the others, in the sense that in order to yield knowledge or justification, one source must rely on the operation of another one, or that any basic source positively depends on coherence.

At several points, I have indicated something about perception that may not apply to the other basic sources. Within very wide limits, the notion of perception is open‐ended. There is no fixed a priori list of perceptual modalities. In a way the notion is schematic: definite by virtue of paradigms like sight and touch that anchor it, yet capable of being filled out by changes in our relation to the world.

Might the same be said of the notion of a basic source of knowledge or of justification? Perhaps it might. The distinction between a schematic concept being filled out over time and a change of concepts by replacement is, to be sure, not sharp. I certainly want to make room for the possibility that there are or can be basic sources of knowledge or justification not considered here. Whether we call them new basic sources or instead should say that our concepts of knowledge or justification have changed would depend in large part on how they are related to the clearly basic sources that are now essential for understanding the notions of knowledge and justification. My concern has been to clarify those in relation to their sources, especially their basic sources but also testimony and inference, which are essential though not basic sources. How those two sources extend knowledge and justification gained through the basic ones is a large problem that cannot be even be approached here. 26

For each source of knowledge or justification, I have left room for cooperation between sources: two or more basic sources can together produce knowledge or justification, as can two or more nonbasic sources. Two or more sources from the different categories can also cooperate, as where testimony, a nonbasic source of justification, supports memory, which is a basic source of it, or where reason, by producing an inference to a proposition confirmed by memory, supports that faculty. The possibility of cooperation is matched by that of conflict. Skeptics find the latter possibility highly damaging to common‐sense views of the extent of our knowledge and justification. If I have been right, it may well be that the basic sources are collectively autonomous in a way that permits adjudication of this matter. I should like to think this is so; but even if it is, on some aspects of the question the jury is still out. 27

For detailed discussion of the distinction between positive and negative epistemic dependence, see my Epistemology (London: Routledge, 1998 ), esp. chap. 7.

If “blind sight” is a case of perception, this may not be so (though it is arguable that the subject simply does not believe there are visual sensations or other experiential elements corresponding to perception).

The apparent noncausal character of abstract entities is a main reason that knowledge of them—indeed their very existence—is often considered problematic. For one kind of challenge to the causal inertness claim see Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993 ).

For introspection and consciousness, as for external perception, one can devise a plausible adverbial view, as described in chap. 1 of Epistemology .

See Fred I. Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981 ), and William Alston, Perceiving God (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), for indications of how broad the notion of perception is.

The need for ‘if’ here has been suggested already: a duplicate of me would, at the moment of creation, know dispositionally a great deal I now know from memory (not all of it, of course, because some depends on my actual history and it would have no history yet); but it is unclear how this depends on memory. Perhaps we should say that it does not depend on remembering —hence does not require the operation of memory—but does depend on memorial capacity , since it would not be true of me that if I needed to bring a certain item of knowledge to mind I could, unless I had sufficient memorial capacity to retain it from the moment I needed it (e.g., a phone number) to the “next” moment, at which I bring it to mind.

Granted, I could memorially believe p but not know it (having too little evidence, say) and then be told by you that p . But if I now know it, this is on the basis of your testimony; I don't know it from memory until I retain the knowledge and not just the belief. Believing from memory can instantaneously become knowing, but does not instantaneously become knowledge from memory.

For a detailed discussion of the epistemology of memory, with many references to relevant literature, see my “Memorial Justification,” Philosophical Topics 23 (1995): 31–45.

See, for example, Hume's extraordinary affirmation of privileged access in the Treatise , cited and discussed in my Epistemology , chap. 3.

The relevant kind of understanding and the notions of a priori knowledge and justification in general are discussed in detail in chap. 4 of Epistemology and in my “Self‐Evidence,” in Philosophical Perspectives 13 ( 1999 ): 205–228.

Thus, for God or any being with infinite memorial capacity, no use of reason essentially depends on the exercise of memory. I might add even if the points made here about inference and memory are mistaken, the overall point that reason may ground justification for p without yielding knowledge of it can be illustrated by many other cases, presumably including the proposition that some classes are members of themselves (since this embodies a type‐error).

This point must be qualified if W. V. Quine is right in denying that there is a viable distinction between the empirical and the a priori—at least one would have to speak in terms of, say, differences in degree. For extensive criticism of Quine, see BonJour, “Against Naturalized Epistemology,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994): 283–300, and for the notion of a priori justification see also my “Self‐Evidence.”

See Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1969). For a defense of a Reidian view see C. A. J. Coady, Testimony (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992 ). For a contrasting account of testimony more sympathetic to a Humean perspective see Elizabeth Fricker's chapter on testimony in Handbook of Epistemology , ed. Ilkka Niiniluoto and Matti Sintonen (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002).

For a developed distinction between these and a case for positing fewer beliefs than most philosophers apparently do, see my “Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe,” Nous 28 (1994): 419–434.

This point may be more controversial for internalist than for externalist views, since an externalist can hold that my belief can constitute knowledge so long as it is reliably produced, even if I do not have accessible grounds for p , as I would if I had good inferential grounds for it. I cannot discuss the contrast between internalism and externalism in this paper. For discussion see, for example William P. Alston, Epistemic Justification (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989 ), Paul K. Moser, Knowledge and Evidence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989 ), and my Epistemology , chap. 8.

I discuss the issue of voluntary control of belief and cite much relevant literature in “Doxastic Voluntarism and the Ethics of Belief,” Facta Philosophica 1, no. 1 (1999): 87–109.

This point is explained and defended in my “The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification,” American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 404–422.

This point may support my view, defended in “The Place of Testimony,” that to acquire justification for p from testimony, one needs some degree of justification for taking the attester to be credible. (I do not think one needs this to acquire prima facie justification from one of the standard basic sources.)

This is not to imply that just any tactual belief is better justified than any conflicting visual one. Matters are far more complicated, but need not be pursued in detail here.

This is not to deny that there may be justified beliefs of logical truths so luminous that the justification of these beliefs cannot be overridden. The point is that doxastic justification grounded in reflection can be overridden by factors that are at least not entirely a priori. That can be so even when the beliefs in question are true. For further discussion of this issue see Laurence BonJour, In Defense of Pure Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), and my “Self‐Evidence,” cited in note 10 .

Another possibility is that there are other basic sources which are comparatively weak, so that although they may add to the justification available through the standard sources, they are not sufficient to yield belief that is justified on balance (roughly, justified to a degree ordinarily sufficient to render a true belief knowledge). On the other hand, if they can add to justification from the standard sources, then they could render a belief that would not ordinarily defeat the justification of another belief able to do so. This would limit the self‐sufficiency of the basic sources. We should surely be cautious about affirming even the de facto self‐sufficiency of the sources, and I leave it open.

A brief treatment of externalism is provided in my Epistemology ; for a more extensive treatment see Ernest Sosa, Knowledge in Focus, Skepticism Resolved (forthcoming from Princeton University Press), and chapter 8 in the present volume.

For two major accounts see Keith Lehrer, Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974 ), and Laurence BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985 ); and for much discussion see John Bender, ed., The Current State of the Coherence Theory (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989). It should be noted that in “The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism,” in John Greco and Ernest Sosa, eds., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999 ), BonJour has since abandoned coherentism.

This is suggested and to some degree argued in my Belief, Justification, and Knowledge (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1988) and The Architecture of Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

If it is taken to be an internal relation among beliefs, their content does not matter, nor does their fit with experience. This sort of thing has been widely noted; see Moser, Knowledge and Evidence , and John Bender, The Current State of the Coherence Theory (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989 ), for some relevant points and many references.

An approach to understanding the inferential extension of justification and knowledge is developed in chap. 6 of Epistemology . Testimonial extension of justification and knowledge is approached in my “The Place of Testimony.”

For helpful comments on an earlier version of this article (which derives, in part, from chap. 1 of my Architecture of Reason and from my paper on testimony, cited above), I heartily thank Paul Moser and Richard Swinburne.

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Essays About Knowledge: 5 Examples and 7 Prompts

Discover our guide with example essays about knowledge and helpful writing prompts to inspire you and assist with your next piece of writing.

Knowledge refers to information, facts, and skills acquired through education, life experience, and others. It’s critical in achieving power, wisdom, and respect as it lets us be conscious of our surroundings. Our knowledge sets us apart from others as we apply it to every aspect of our lives, such as problem-solving and skill development.

Since knowledge is a broad topic, it’s used in various writings, such as academic and personal essays . Before writing, ensure you understand the subject, know the proper format, and have the main points ready to add to your piece.

5 Essay Examples

1. long essay on knowledge by prasanna, 2. knowledge is power essay for students and children by anonymous on toppr.com, 3. importance of historical knowledge by kristopher fitzgerald, 4. knowledge is power – essay by kirti daga, 5. knowledge is a lifelong process and leads to inventions by ankita yadav, 1. what is knowledge, 2. the true meaning of knowledge is power, 3. the value of knowledge, 4. how to boost knowledge, 5. knowledge vs. wealth, 6. the effect of insufficient knowledge, 7. how does knowledge help me in my everyday life.

“If there is no knowledge or not acquiring knowledge, such a person is merely existing or surviving and not living. Because to live a life, we are bound to make decisions. An appropriate decision can be made if we have the proper knowledge to analyze the problem and decide it.”

Prasanna defines knowledge as a weapon, shield, and the key to life. It’s something that sustains our existence. She deems that apart from books, one can learn from other people, nature, and even things we think are too trivial to matter. Prasanna includes a quote from Alexander Pope to discuss the importance of having extensive knowledge.

She suggests that it’s essential to apply knowledge to enjoy all of its perks. But ultimately, Prasanna believes that while knowledge is limitless, people should prioritize filling their brains with the information they can share with others. You might also be interested in these essays about leadership .

“… We can say that true knowledge help [a] person to bloom. Also, it keeps people away from fights and corruption. Besides, knowledge brings happiness and prosperity to the nation. Above all, knowledge opens the door of success for everyone.”

In this essay, the author refers to knowledge as something that can create and destroy life and balance on the planet. Although many are educated, only a few know the importance of knowledge. The writer further lists some benefits of knowledge, such as making impossible ideas possible, avoiding repeated mistakes, and realizing the difference between good and evil. Ultimately, the author believes that knowledge makes a person richer than billionaires because, unlike money, no one can steal knowledge.

“Understanding our past is vitally important to the present and future of our civilization. We must find out to grow from our previous successes and errors. It is humanity to make errors, however the less we make, the stronger and smarter we end up being.”

Fitzgerald explains that understanding history is essential to learning from past mistakes. He points to the results of past failures recorded in books, such as death and damages. In addition, historical knowledge improves our lifestyle through modern technologies and efforts to restore the environment.

By studying the history of the world, people can understand the differences in customs and beliefs of different religions. This knowledge gives way to acceptance and appreciation, which are critical to avoiding conflicts originating from ignorant perceptions.

“Knowledge is power because it is intangible whereas money is tangible. An individual with knowledge is better than a fool with money because money cannot buy knowledge whereas knowledge can carve a part which will ultimately help in gaining loads and loads of money.”

In her essay, Daga provides two situations demonstrating how knowledge is more valuable than money. First, she states that wealth, skills, resources, and talent are useless if one doesn’t have the proper knowledge to use them. Meanwhile, even if you have few skills but are knowledgeable enough in a particular field, you have a higher chance of succeeding financially.

The essay also contains information about general knowledge vital to achieving life goals. It incorporates ways to gain knowledge, including reading books and newspapers, watching the latest news, and networking with people.

“The whole life we learn and gain knowledge. Knowledge increases day by day. We work on the process of learning to gain more knowledge.”

Yadav relates knowledge to something that makes life beautiful. However, unlike an ordinary ornament, knowledge isn’t easily acquired. Knowledge is a lifelong process that people get from experiences, media, books, and others. It has many benefits, such as creating new inventions that improve society and the country. Yadav concludes her essay by saying that knowledge is a valuable asset. It assists people in achieving life goals and honing their moral values.

7 Prompts for Essays About Knowledge

Essays About Knowledge: What is knowledge?

There are many essays that define the word “knowledge”, you can use this prompt to explain the concept of knowledge in your own words. First, explain its textbook definition briefly, then analyze it using your own words and understanding. To conclude your piece, write about how you intend to use knowledge in your life.

“Knowledge is power” is a famous quotation from Francis Bacon in his book Neues Organon. It’s a powerful quote that sparked various interpretations. For this prompt, you can compile meanings you see online or interview people on what they think the quote means. Then, compare it with the actual intention and origin of the citation.

Tip : Remember to add your analysis and ask the readers to create their interpretation to involve them in the discussion.

Continuous learning makes us better individuals and opens more opportunities for us. When we do what we can to collect knowledge from various media, we also feel a sense of accomplishment. For this prompt, list the reasons why you want to enrich your knowledge. Use this prompt to show the good and bad sides of cultivating knowledge by including what can happen if an individual applies their knowledge to do despicable things.

You don’t need to follow a strict program or enroll in top universities to build your knowledge. In this essay, enumerate easy ways to enhance someone’s knowledge, such as having a healthy curiosity, being a reasonable observer and listener, and attending gatherings to socialize. Write down all the possible ways and tools someone needs to acquire more knowledge. Then, explain why it’s essential never to stop learning new things.

Essays About Knowledge: Knowledge vs. Wealth

At the start of your essay, ask your readers what they prefer: Extensive knowledge or ample wealth? Some will choose knowledge because money runs out quickly. They will argue that knowing how to handle cash will help secure and grow their finances. On the other hand, others will choose wealth and insist that they can hire people to manage their sizable assets. Share what your thoughts are on the question and answer it as well. You can look for surveys, interviews, and other research materials to gather data that can support your reasoning.

Identify the effects of having insufficient knowledge about a specific topic or in general terms. Add any negative results that can stem from this deficiency. Then, discuss why people need to get more knowledge today. For example, people automatically believe what they see on social media without fact-checking.

Tip : You can include steps the government and organizations should take to provide people with the correct information to avoid false claims.

For this essay topic, describe how knowledge assists you in your day-to-day life and enhances your experiences. Ensure to tackle how knowledge plays a part in your decision-making and your pathway in life.

For instance, you watched a documentary about greenhouse gasses and learned about light pollution. So, on bright mornings, you turn off all the lights in your house to decrease your bill and protect the environment .

If you want to use the latest grammar software for your paper, read our guide to using an AI grammar checker.

Maria Caballero is a freelance writer who has been writing since high school. She believes that to be a writer doesn't only refer to excellent syntax and semantics but also knowing how to weave words together to communicate to any reader effectively.

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The Value of Knowledge

The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno , philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than knowledge, such as justification or understanding, are distinctively valuable. We will call the general question of why knowledge is valuable the value problem .

1. Value problems

2. reliabilism and the meno problem, 3. virtue epistemology and the value problem, 4. understanding and epistemic value, 5. the value of knowledge-how, 6. other accounts of the value of knowledge, 7. weak and strong conceptions of knowledge, 8. the value of true belief, 9. the value of extended knowledge, works cited, other important works, other internet resources, related entries.

In Plato’s Meno , Socrates raises the question of why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Call this the Meno problem or, anticipating distinctions made below, the primary value problem .

Initially, we might appeal to the fact that knowledge appears to be of more practical use than true belief in order to mark this difference in value. But, as Socrates notes, this could be questioned, because a true belief that this is the way to Larissa will get you to Larissa just as well as knowledge that this is the way to Larissa. Plato’s own solution was that knowledge is formed in a special way distinguishing it from belief: knowledge, unlike belief, must be ‘tied down’ to the truth, like the mythical tethered statues of Daedalus. As a result, knowledge is better suited to guide action. For example, if one knows, rather than merely truly believes, that this is the way to Larissa, then one might be less likely to be perturbed by the fact that the road initially seems to be going in the wrong direction. Mere true belief at this point might be lost, since one might lose all confidence that this is the right way to go.

The primary value problem has been distinguished from the secondary value problem (Pritchard 2007: §2). The secondary value problem pertains to why knowledge is more valuable, from an epistemic point of view, than any proper subset of its parts. Put otherwise, why is knowledge better than any epistemic standing falling short of knowing? This includes, but is not restricted to, mere true belief. To illustrate the distinction, consider a possible solution to the primary value problem: knowledge is justified true belief, and justified true belief is better than mere true belief, which explains why knowledge is better than true belief. If correct, this hypothesis successfully answers the primary value problem. However, it requires further development to answer the secondary value problem. For example, it requires further development to explain why knowledge is better than justified belief.

Of course, on many standard theories of knowledge, knowledge is not defined as justified true belief. For instance, according to some theorists, knowledge is undefeated justified true belief (Lehrer & Paxson 1969); on other widely discussed accounts, knowledge is true belief that is non-accidental (Unger 1968), sensitive (Nozick 1981), safe (Sosa 1999), appropriately caused (Goldman 1967), or produced by intellectual virtue (Zagzebski 1996). This puts us in a position to appreciate what some theorists call the tertiary value problem . The tertiary value problem pertains to why knowledge is qualitatively better than any epistemic standing falling short of knowledge. Consider that if knowledge were only quantitatively better than that which falls just short—for instance, on an envisioned continuum of epistemic value—then it would be mysterious why epistemologists have given such attention to this particular point on the continuum.

Why does knowledge have this “distinctive value” not shared by that which falls just short of knowledge (Pritchard 2009: 14)?

Not all theorists accept that the value problems are genuine. For example, in light of the literature on the Gettier problem, some theorists deny that the secondary value problem is genuine. On this approach, whatever is added to justified true belief to rule out Gettier cases does not increase the value of the agent’s intellectual state: it is of no consequence whether we have Gettier-proof justified true belief rather than mere justified true belief (Kaplan 1985). Of course, Gettier cases are peculiar and presumably rare, so in practice having Gettier-proof justified true belief is almost invariably confounded with having mere justified true belief. This could lead some theorists to mistake the value of the latter for that of the former. Other theorists deny that the primary value problem is genuine. For example, on one approach, knowledge just is true belief (Sartwell 1991). If knowledge is true belief, then knowledge cannot be better than true belief, because nothing can be better than itself. However, the definition of knowledge as true belief has not been widely accepted.

The first contemporary wave of work on the value problem largely concerned whether this problem raised a distinctive difficulty for reliabilist accounts of knowledge—i.e., those views which essentially define knowledge as reliably-formed true belief. In particular, the claim was that reliabilism was unable to offer an answer even to the primary value problem.

A fairly clear statement of what is at issue here is given in a number of places by Linda Zagzebski (e.g., 2003a; cf. DePaul 1993; Zagzebski 1996; Jones 1997; Swinburne 1999, 2000; Riggs 2002a; Kvanvig 2003; Sosa 2007: ch. 4; Carter & Jarvis 2012). To begin with, Zagzebski argues that the reliability of the process by which something is produced does not automatically add value to that thing, and thus that it cannot be assumed that the reliability of the process by which a true belief is produced will add value to that true belief. In defense of this claim, she offers the analogy of a cup of coffee. She claims that a good cup of coffee which is produced by a reliable coffee machine—i.e., one that regularly produces good cups of coffee—is of no more value than an equally good cup of coffee that is produced by an unreliable coffee machine.

Furthermore, as this line of objection goes, true belief is in the relevant respects like coffee: a true belief formed via a reliable belief-forming process is no more valuable than a true belief formed via an unreliable belief-forming process. In both cases, the value of the reliability of the process accrues in virtue of its tendency to produce a certain valuable effect (good coffee/true belief), but this means that where the effect has been produced—where one has a good cup of coffee or a true belief—then the value of the product is no greater for having been produced in a reliable way.

Elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Kvanvig 2003), this problem has been called the “swamping problem”, on account of how the value of true belief ‘swamps’ the value of the true belief being produced in a reliable (i.e., truth-conducive) way. So expressed, the moral of the problem seems to be that where reliabilists go awry is by treating the value of the process as being solely captured by the reliability of the process—i.e., its tendency to produce the desired effect. Since the value of the effect swamps the value of the reliability of the process by which the effect was achieved, this means that reliabilism has no resources available to it to explain why knowledge is more valuable than true belief.

It’s actually not clear that this is a problem that is specific to reliabilism. That is, it seems that if this is a bona fide problem, then it will affect any account of the value of knowledge which has the same relevant features as reliabilism—i.e., which regards the greater value of knowledge over true belief as instrumental value, where the instrumental value in question is relative to the valuable good of true belief. In particular, it will affect veritist proposals about epistemic value which treat truth as the fundamental epistemic good. See Kvanvig (2003: Ch. 3) for discussion of how internalist approaches to epistemic justification interface with the swamping problem; see Pettigrew (2018) and Pritchard (2019) for responses to the swamping argument on behalf of the veritist.

Furthermore, as J. Adam Carter and Benjamin Jarvis (2012) have argued, there are reasons to be suspicious of a key premise driving the swamping argument. The premise in question, which has been referred to as the “Swamping Thesis” (Pritchard 2011), states that if the value of a property possessed by an item is instrumentally valuable only relative to a further good, and that good is already present in that item, then it can confer no additional value. Carter and Jarvis contend that one who embraces the Swamping Thesis should also, by parity of reasoning, embrace a corollary thesis which they call the Swamping Thesis Complement, according to which, if the value of a property possessed by an item is instrumentally valuable only relative to a further good, and that good has already failed to be present in that item, then it can confer no additional value. However, as they argue, the Swamping Thesis and the Swamping Thesis Complement, along with other plausible premises, jointly entail the unpalatable conclusion that non-factive epistemic properties—most notably, justification—are never epistemically valuable properties of a belief. See Dutant (2013) and Bjelde (2020) for critical responses to Carter and Jarvis’ line of reasoning and Sylvan (2018) for a separate challenge to the swamping argument, which rejects its tacit commitment to epistemic instrumentalism (cf., Bjelde 2020). For an overview of the key moves of the argument, see Pritchard (2011).

However, even granting the main elements of the swamping argument, there are moves that the reliabilist can make in response (see, e.g., Goldman & Olsson 2009; Olsson 2011; Bates 2013; Roush 2010; cf. Brown 2012; Davis, & Jäger 2012; Hovarth 2009; Piller 2009). For example, it is surely open to the reliabilist to argue that the greater instrumental value of reliable true belief over mere true belief does not need to be understood purely in terms of instrumental value relative to the good of true belief. There could, for instance, be all sorts of practical benefits of having a reliable true belief which generate instrumental value. Indeed, it is worth noting that the line of response to the Meno problem sketched by Plato, which we noted above, seems to specifically appeal to the greater practical instrumental value of knowledge over mere true belief.

Moreover, there is reason to think that this objection will only at best have an impact on process reliabilist proposals—i.e., those views that treat all reliable belief-forming processes as conferring a positive epistemic standing on the beliefs so formed. For example, agent reliabilism (e.g., Greco 1999, 2000) might be thought to be untouched by this sort of argument. This is because, according to agent reliabilism, it is not any sort of reliable process that confers positive epistemic status to belief, but only those processes that are stable features of the agent’s “cognitive character”. The main motivation for this restriction on reliable processes is that it excludes certain kinds of reliable but nonetheless strange and fleeting processes which notoriously cause problems for the view (such as processes where the reliability is due to some quirk in the subject’s environment, rather than because of any cognitive trait possessed by the agent herself). Plausibly, however, one might argue that the reliable traits that make up an agent’s cognitive character have some value independently of the instrumental value they possess in virtue of being reliable—i.e., that they have some final or intrinsic value. If this is right, then this opens up the possibility that agent-reliabilists can evade the problem noted for pure reliabilists.

Zagzebski’s diagnosis of what is motivating this problem for reliabilism seems , however, explicitly to exclude such a counter-response. She argues that what gives rise to this difficulty is the fact that the reliabilist has signed up to a “machine-product model of belief”—see especially, Zagzebski (2003a)—where the product is external to the cause. It is not clear what exactly Zagzebski means by this point, but she thinks it shows that even where the reliable process is independently valuable—i.e., independently of its being reliable—it still doesn’t follow that the value of the cause will transfer to add value to the effect. Here again the coffee analogy is appealed to: even if a reliable coffee machine were independently valuable, it would not thereby confer additional value on a good cup of coffee.

Perhaps the best way to evaluate the above line of argument is to consider what is required in order to resolve the problem it poses. Perhaps what is needed is an ‘internal’ connection between product and cause, such as the kind of internal connection that exists between an act and its motive which is highlighted by how we explicitly evaluate actions in terms of the motives that led to them (Zagzebski 2003a). On this picture, then, we are not to understand knowledge as a state consisting of a known belief, but rather as a state which consists of both the true belief and the source from which that true belief was acquired. In short, then, the problem with the machine-product model of belief is that it leads us to evaluate the state of the knowledge independently of the means by which the knowledge was acquired. If, in contrast, we have a conception of knowledge that incorporates into the very state of knowledge the way that the knowledge was acquired, we can avoid this problem.

Once one effects this transition away from the machine-product model of belief, one can allow that the independent value of the reliable process can ensure that knowledge, by being produced in this way, is more valuable than mere true belief (Zagzebski 2003a). In particular, if the process by which one gained the true belief is an epistemic virtue—a character trait which is both reliable and intrinsically valuable—then this can ensure that the value of the knowing state in this case is more valuable than any corresponding state which simply consisted of a true belief.

Other commentators in the virtue epistemology camp, broadly conceived, have put forward similar suggestions. For example, Wayne Riggs (2002a) and Greco (e.g., 2003) have argued for a ‘credit’ version of virtue epistemology, according to which the agent, in virtue of bringing about the positively valuable outcome of a true belief, is due credit as a result. Rather than treating the extra value of knowledge over true belief as deriving simply from the agent’s attainment of the target true belief, however, Riggs and Greco instead argue that we should regard the agent’s knowing as the state the agent is in when she is responsible for her true belief. Only in so doing, they claim, can we answer the value problem. Jason Baehr (2012), by contrast with Riggs and Greco, has argued that credit theories of knowledge do not answer the value problem but, rather, ‘provide grounds for denying’ (2012: 1) that knowledge has value over and above the value of true belief.

Interestingly, however, other virtue epistemologists, most notably Ernest Sosa (2003), have also advocated a ‘credit’ view, yet seem to stay within the machine-product picture of belief. That is, rather than analyze the state of knowing as consisting of both the true belief and its source, they regard the state of knowing as distinct from the process, yet treat the fact that the process is intrinsically valuable as conferring additional value on any true belief so produced. With Sosa’s view in mind, it is interesting to ask just why we need to analyze knowledge in the way that Zagzebski and others suggest in order to get around the value problem.

The most direct way to approach this question is by considering whether it is really true that a valuable cause cannot confer value on its effect where cause and effect are kept separate in the way that Zagzebski claims is problematic in the case of knowledge. One commentator who has objected to Zagzebski’s argument by querying this claim on her part is Berit Brogaard (2007; cf. Percival 2003; Pritchard 2007: §2), who claims that a valuable cause can indeed confer value on its effect in the relevant cases. Brogaard claims that virtue epistemologists like Zagzebski and Riggs endorse this claim because they adhere to what she calls a “Moorean” conception of value, on which if two things have the same intrinsic properties, then they are equally valuable. Accordingly, if true belief and knowledge have the same intrinsic properties (which is what would be the case on the view of knowledge that they reject), it follows that they must have the same value. Hence, it is crucial to understand knowledge as having distinct intrinsic properties from true belief before one can hope to resolve the value problem.

If one holds that there is only intrinsic and instrumental value, then this conception of value is compelling, since objects with the same intrinsic properties trivially have the same amount of intrinsic value, and they also plausibly have the same amount of instrumental value as well (at least in the same sort of environment). However, the Moorean conception of value is problematic because—as Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (1999, 2003) have pointed out—there seem to be objects which we value for their own sake but whose value derives from their being extrinsically related to something else that we value. That is, such objects are finally —i.e., non-instrumentally—valuable without thereby being intrinsically valuable. For criticism of this account of final value, see Bradley (2002).

The standard example in this regard is Princess Diana’s dress. This would be regarded as more valuable than an exact replica simply because it belonged to Diana, which is clearly an extrinsic property of the object. Even though the extra value that accrues to the object is due to its extrinsic properties, however, it is still the case that this dress is (properly) valued for its own sake, and thus valued non-instrumentally.

Given that value of this sort is possible, then it follows that it could well be the case that we value one true belief over another because of its extrinsic features—i.e., that the one true belief, but not the other, was produced by a reliable cognitive trait that is independently valuable. For example, it could be that we value forming a true belief via a reliable cognitive trait more than a mere true belief because the former belief is produced in such a way that it is of credit to us that we believe the truth. There is thus a crucial lacuna in Zagzebski’s argument.

A different response to the challenge that Zagzebski raises for reliabilism is given by Michael Brady (2006). In defense of reliabilism, Brady appeals to the idea that to be valuable is to be a fitting or appropriate object of positive evaluative attitudes, such as admiration or love (e.g., Brentano 1889 [1969]; Chisholm 1986; Wiggins 1987; Gibbard 1990; Scanlon 1998). That one object is more valuable than another is thus to be understood, on this view, in terms of the fact that that object is more worthy of positive evaluation. Thus, the value problem for reliabilism on this conception of value comes down to the question why knowledge is more worthy of positive evaluation on this view than mere true belief. Brady’s contention is that, at least within this axiological framework, it is possible for the reliabilist to offer a compelling story about why reliable true belief—and thus knowledge—is more valuable than mere true belief.

Central to Brady’s argument is his claim that there are many ways one can positively evaluate something, and thus many different ways something can be valuable. Moreover, Brady argues that we can distinguish active from passive evaluative attributes, where the former class of attitudes involve pursuit of the good in question. For example, one might actively value the truth, where this involves, for instance, a striving to discover the truth. In contrast, one might at other times merely passively value the truth, such as simply respecting or contemplating it.

With this point in mind, Brady’s central thesis is that on the reliabilist account knowledge is more valuable than true belief because certain active positive evaluative attitudes are fitting only with regard to the former (i.e., reliable true belief). In particular, given its intrinsic features, reliable true belief is worthy of active love, whereas an active love of unreliable (i.e., accidental) true belief because of its intrinsic features would be entirely inappropriate because there is nothing that we can do to attain unreliable true belief that wouldn’t conflict with love of truth.

This is an intriguing proposal, which opens up a possible avenue of defense against the kind of machine-product objection to reliabilism considered. One problem that such a move faces, however, is that it is unclear whether we can make sense of the distinction Brady draws between active and passive evaluative attitudes, at least in the epistemic sphere. When Brady talks of passive evaluative attitudes towards the truth, he gives examples like contemplating, accepting, embracing, affirming, and respecting. Some of these attitudes are not clearly positive evaluative attitudes, however. Moreover, some of them are not obviously passive either. For example, is to contemplate the truth really to evaluate it positively , rather than simply to consider it? Furthermore, in accepting, affirming or embracing the truth, isn’t one actively positively evaluating the truth? Wouldn’t such evaluative attitudes manifest themselves in the kind of practical action that Brady thinks is the mark of active evaluative attitudes? More needs to be said about this distinction before it can do the philosophical work that Brady has in mind.

A further, albeit unorthodox, recent approach to the swamping problem is due to Carter and Rupert (2020). Carter and Rupert point out that extant approaches to the swamping problem suppose that if a solution is to be found, it will be at the personal level of description, the level at which states of subjects or agents, as such, appear. They take exception to this orthodoxy, or at least to its unquestioned status. They maintain that from the empirically justified premise that subpersonal states play a significant role in much epistemically relevant cognition, we should expect that they constitute a domain in which we might reasonably expect to locate the “missing source” of epistemic value, beyond the value attached to mere true belief.

So far this discussion has taken it as given that whatever problems reliabilism faces in this regard, there are epistemological theories available—some form of virtue epistemology, for example—that can deal with them. But not everyone in the contemporary debate accepts this. Perhaps the best known sceptic in this respect is Jonathan Kvanvig (2003), who in effect argues that while virtue epistemology (along with a form of epistemic internalism) can resolve the primary value problem (i.e., the problem of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief), the real challenge that we need to respond to is that set by the secondary value problem (i.e., the problem of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than that which falls short of knowledge); and Kvanvig says that there is no solution available to that . That is, Kvanvig argues that there is an epistemic standing—in essence, justified true belief—which falls short of knowledge but which is no less valuable than knowledge. He concludes that the focus of epistemology should not be on knowledge at all, but rather on understanding , an epistemic standing that Kvanvig maintains is clearly of more value than knowledge and those epistemic standings that fall short of knowledge, such as justified true belief.

What Kvanvig says about understanding will be considered below. First though, let us consider the specific challenge that he poses for virtue epistemology. In essence, Kvanvig’s argument rests on the assumption that it is essential to any virtue-theoretic account of knowledge—and any internalist account of knowledge as well, for that matter (i.e., an account that makes a subjective justification condition necessary for knowledge possession)—that it also includes an anti-Gettier condition. If this is right, then it follows that even if virtue epistemology has an answer to the primary value problem—and Kvanvig concedes that it does—it will not thereby have an answer to the secondary value problem since knowledge is not simply virtuous true belief. Moreover, Kvanvig argues that once we recognize what a gerrymandered notion a non-Gettierized account of knowledge is, it becomes apparent that there is nothing valuable about the anti-Gettier condition on knowledge that needs to be imposed. But if that is right, then it follows by even virtue epistemic lights that knowledge—i.e., non-Gettierized virtuous true believing—is no more valuable than one of its proper sub-sets—i.e., mere virtuous true believing.

There are at least two aspects of Kvanvig’s argument that are potentially problematic. To begin with, it isn’t at all clear why the anti-Gettier condition on knowledge fails to add value, something that seems to be assumed here. More generally, Kvanvig seems to be implicitly supposing that if an analysis of knowledge is ugly and gerrymandered then that is itself reason to doubt that knowledge is particularly valuable, at least assuming that there are epistemic standings that fall short of knowledge which can be given an elegant analysis. While a similar assumption about the relationship between the elegance (or otherwise) of the analysis of knowledge and the value of the analysandum is commonplace in the contemporary epistemological literature—see, for example, Zagzebski (1999) and Williamson (2000: chapter 1)—this assumption is contentious. For critical discussion of this assumption, see DePaul (2009).

In any case, a more serious problem is that many virtue epistemologists—among them Sosa (1988, 1991, 2007), Zagzebski (e.g., 1996, 1999) and Greco (2003, 2007, 2008, 2009)—hereafter, ‘robust virtue epistemologists’—think that their view can deal with Gettier problems without needing to add an additional anti-Gettier condition on knowledge. The way this is achieved is by making the move noted above of treating knowledge as a state that includes both the truly believing and the virtuous source by which that true belief was acquired. However, crucially, for robust virtue epistemologists, there is an important difference between (i) a belief’s being true and virtuously formed, and (ii) a belief’s being true because virtuously formed. Formulating knowledge along the latter lines, they insist, ensures that the target belief is not Gettiered. Even more, robust virtue epistemologists think the latter kind of formulation offers the resources to account for why knowledge is distinctively valuable.

To appreciate this point about value, consider the following ‘performance normativity framework’ which robust virtue epistemologists explicitly or implicitly embrace when accounting for the value of knowledge as a true belief because of virtue.

Performance Normativity Framework

Dimensions of evaluation thesis Any performance with an aim can be evaluated along three dimensions: (i) whether it is successful, (ii) whether it is skillful, and (iii) thirdly, whether the success is because of the skill.

Achievement thesis If and only if the success is because of the skill, the performance is not merely successful, but also, an achievement.

Value thesis Achievements are finally valuable (i.e., valuable for their own sake) in a way that mere lucky successes are not.

Notice that, if knowledge is a cognitive performance that is an achievement , then with reference to the above set of claims, the robust virtue epistemologist can respond to not only the secondary value problem but also the tertiary value problem (i.e., the problem of explaining why knowledge is more valuable, in kind and not merely in degree, than that which falls short of knowledge). This is because knowledge, on this view, is simply the cognitive aspect of a more general notion, that of achievement, and this is the case even if mere successes that are produced by intellectual virtues but which are not because of them, are not achievements. (Though, see Kim 2021 for a reversal of the idea that knowledge involves achievement; according to Kim, all achievements, in any domain of endeavour, imply knowledge).

As regards the value thesis , one might object that some successes that are because of ability—i.e., achievements, on this view—are too trivial or easy or wicked to count as finally valuable. This line of objection is far from decisive. After all, it is open to the proponent of robust virtue epistemology to argue that the claim is only that all achievements qua achievements are finally valuable, not that the overall value of every achievement is particularly high. It is thus consistent with the proposal that some achievements have a very low—perhaps even negative, if that is possible—value in virtue of their other properties (e.g., their triviality). Indeed, a second option in this regard is to allow that not all achievements enjoy final value whilst nevertheless maintaining that it is in the nature of achievements to have such value (e.g., much in the way that one might argue that it is in the nature of pleasure to be a good, even though some pleasures are bad). Since, as noted above, all that is required to meet the (tertiary) value problem is to show that knowledge is generally distinctively valuable, this claim would almost certainly suffice for the robust virtue epistemologist’s purposes.

In any case, even if the value thesis is correct—and indeed, even if the achievement and dimensions of evaluation theses are also correct—the robust virtue epistemologist has not yet satisfactorily vindicated any of the aforementioned value problems for knowledge unless knowledge is itself a kind of achievement—and that is the element of the proposal that is perhaps the most controversial. There are two key problems with the claim that knowledge involves cognitive achievement. The first is that there sometimes seems to be more to knowledge than a cognitive achievement; the second is that there sometimes seems to be less to knowledge than a cognitive achievement.

As regards the first claim, notice that achievements seem to be compatible with at least one kind of luck. Suppose that an archer hits a target by employing her relevant archery abilities, but that the success is ‘gettierized’ by luck intervening between the archer’s firing of the arrow and the hitting of the target. For example, suppose that a freak gust of wind blows the arrow off-course, but then a second freak gust of wind happens to blow it back on course again. The archer’s success is thus lucky in the sense that it could very easily have been a failure. When it comes to ‘intervening’ luck of this sort, Greco’s account of achievements is able to offer a good explanation of why the success in question does not constitute an achievement. After all, we would not say that the success was because of the archer’s ability in this case.

Notice, however, that not all forms of luck are of this intervening sort. Consider the following case offered by Pritchard (2010a: ch. 2). Suppose that nothing intervenes between the archer’s firing of the arrow and the hitting of the target. However, the success is still lucky in the relevant sense because, unbeknownst to the archer, she just happened to fire at the only target on the range that did not contain a forcefield which would have repelled the arrow. Is the archer’s success still an achievement? Intuition would seem to dictate that it is; it certainly seems to be a success that is because of ability, even despite the luckiness of that success. Achievements, then, are, it seems, compatible with luck of this ‘environmental’ form even though they are not compatible with luck of the standard ‘intervening’ form.

The significance of this conclusion for our purposes is that knowledge is incompatible with both forms of luck. In order to see this, one only needs to note that an epistemological analogue of the archer case just given is the famous barn façade example (e.g., Ginet 1975; Goldman 1976). In this example, we have an agent who forms a true belief that there is a barn in front of him. Moreover, his belief is not subject to the kind of ‘intervening’ luck just noted and which is a standard feature of Gettier-style cases. It is not as if, for example, he is looking at what appears to be a barn but which is not in fact a barn, but that his belief is true nonetheless because there is a barn behind the barn shaped object that he is looking at. Nevertheless, his belief is subject to environmental luck in that he is, unbeknownst to him, in barn façade county in which every other barn-shaped object is a barn façade. Thus, his belief is only luckily true in that he could very easily have been mistaken in this respect. Given that this example is structurally equivalent to the ‘archer’ case just given, it seems that just as we treat the archer as exhibiting an achievement in that case, so we should treat this agent as exhibiting a cognitive achievement here. The problem, however, is that until quite recently many philosophers accepted that the agent in the barn façade case lacks knowledge. Knowledge, it seems, is incompatible with environmental luck in a way that achievements, and thus cognitive achievements, are not (see, for example, Pritchard, e.g., 2012).

Robust virtue epistemologists have made a number of salient points regarding this case. For example, Greco (2010, 2012) has argued for a conception of what counts as a cognitive ability according to which the agent in the barn façade case would not count as exhibiting the relevant cognitive ability (see Pritchard 2010a: ch. 2 for a critical discussion of this claim). Others, such as Sosa (e.g., 2007, 2015) have responded by questioning whether the agent in the barn façade case lacks knowledge, albeit, in a qualified sense. While Sosa’s distinctive virtue epistemology allows for the compatibility of barn façade cases with animal knowledge (roughly: true belief because of ability), Sosa maintains that the subject in barn façade cases lacks reflective knowledge (roughly: a true belief whose creditability to ability or virtue is itself creditable to a second-order ability or virtue of the agent). Other philosophers (e.g., Hetherington (1998) have challenged the view that barn façade protagonists in fact lack (any kind of) knowledge. In a series of empirical studies, most people attributed knowledge in barn façade cases and related cases (Colaco, Buckwalter, Stich & Machery 2014; Turri, Buckwalter & Blouw 2015; Turri 2016a). In one study, over 80% of participants attributed knowledge (Turri 2016b). In another study, most professional philosophers attributed knowledge (Horvath & Wiegmann 2016). At least one theory of knowledge has been defended on the grounds that it explains why knowledge is intuitively present in such cases (Turri 2016c).

Even setting that issue aside, however, there is a second problem on the horizon, which is that it seems that there are some cases of knowledge which are not cases of cognitive achievement. One such case is offered by Jennifer Lackey (2007), albeit to illustrate a slightly different point. Lackey asks us to imagine someone arriving at the train station in Chicago who, wishing to obtain directions to the Sears Tower, approaches the first adult passer-by she sees. Suppose the person she asks is indeed knowledgeable about the area and gives her the directions that she requires. Intuitively, any true belief that the agent forms on this basis would ordinarily be counted as knowledge. Indeed, if one could not gain testimonial knowledge in this way, then it seems that we know an awful lot less than we think we know. However, it has been argued, in such a case the agent does not have a true belief because of her cognitive abilities but, rather, because of her informant’s cognitive abilities. If this is correct, then there are cases of knowledge which are not also cases of cognitive achievement.

It is worth being clear about the nature of this objection. Lackey takes cases like this to demonstrate that one can possess knowledge without it being primarily creditable to one that one’s belief is true. Note though that this is compatible, as Lackey notes, with granting that the agent is employing her cognitive abilities to some degree, and so surely deserves some credit for the truth of the belief formed (she would not have asked just anyone, for example, nor would she have simply accepted just any answer given by her informant). The point is thus rather that whatever credit the agent is due for having a true belief, it is not the kind of credit that reflects a bona fide cognitive achievement because of how this cognitive success involves ‘piggy-backing’ on the cognitive efforts of others.

As noted above, the main conclusion that Kvanvig (2003) draws from his reflections on the value problem is that the real focus in epistemology should not be on knowledge at all but on understanding, an epistemic standing that Kvanvig does think is especially valuable but which, he argues, is distinct from knowing—i.e., one can have knowledge without the corresponding understanding, and one can have understanding without the corresponding knowledge. (Pritchard [e.g., 2010a: chs 1–4] agrees, though his reasons for taking this line are somewhat different to Kvanvig’s). It is perhaps this aspect of Kvanvig’s book that has prompted the most critical response, so it is worth briefly dwelling on his claims here in a little more detail.

To begin with, one needs to get clear what Kvanvig has in mind when he talks of understanding, since many commentators have found the conception of understanding that he targets problematic. The two usages of the term ‘understanding’ in ordinary language that Kvanvig focuses on—and which he regards as being especially important to epistemology—are

when understanding is claimed for some object, such as some subject matter, and when it involves understanding that something is the case. (Kvanvig 2003: 189)

The first kind of understanding he calls “objectual understanding”, the second kind “propositional understanding”. In both cases, understanding requires that one successfully grasp how one’s beliefs in the relevant propositions cohere with other propositions one believes (e.g., Kvanvig 2003: 192, 197–8). This requirement entails that understanding is directly factive in the case of propositional understanding and indirectly factive in the case of objectual understanding—i.e., the agent needs to have at least mostly true beliefs about the target subject matter in order to be truly said to have objectual understanding of that subject matter.

Given that understanding—propositional understanding at any rate—is factive, Kvanvig’s argument for why understanding is distinct from knowledge does not relate to this condition (as we will see in a moment, it is standard to argue that understanding is distinct from knowledge precisely because only understanding is non-factive). Instead, Kvanvig notes two key differences between understanding and knowledge: that understanding, unlike knowledge, admits of degrees, and that understanding, unlike knowledge, is compatible with epistemic luck. Most commentators, however, have tended to focus not on these two theses concerning the different properties of knowledge and understanding, but rather on Kvanvig’s claim that understanding is (at least indirectly) factive.

For example, Elgin (2009; cf. Elgin 1996, 2004; Janvid 2014) and Riggs (2009) argue that it is possible for an agent to have understanding and yet lack true beliefs in the relevant propositions. For example, Elgin (2009) argues that it is essential to treat scientific understanding as non-factive. She cites a number of cases in which science has progressed from one theory to a better theory where, we would say, understanding has increased in the process even though the theories are, strictly speaking at least, false . A different kind of case that Elgin offers concerns scientific idealizations, such as the ideal gas law. Scientists know full well that no actual gas behaves in this way, yet the introduction of this useful fiction clearly improved our understanding of the behavior of actual gasses. For a defense of Kvanvig’s view in the light of these charges, see Kvanvig (2009a, 2009b; Carter & Gordon 2014).

A very different sort of challenge to Kvanvig’s treatment of understanding comes from Brogaard (2005, Other Internet Resources). She argues that Kvanvig’s claim that understanding is of greater value than knowledge is only achieved because he fails to give a rich enough account of knowledge. More specifically, Brogaard claims that we can distinguish between objectual and propositional knowledge just as we can distinguish between objectual and propositional understanding. Propositional understanding, argues Brogaard, no more requires coherence in one’s beliefs than propositional knowledge, and so the difference in value between the two cannot lie here. Moreover, while Brogaard grants that objectual understanding does incorporate a coherence requirement, this again fails to mark a value-relevant distinction between knowledge and understanding because the relevant counterpart—objectual knowledge (i.e., knowledge of a subject matter)—also incorporates a coherence requirement. So provided that we are consistent in our comparisons of objectual and propositional understanding on the one hand, and objectual and propositional knowledge on the other, Kvanvig fails to make a sound case for thinking that understanding is of greater value than knowledge.

Finally, a further challenge to Kvanvig’s treatment of knowledge and understanding focuses on his claims regarding epistemic luck, and in particular, his insistence that luck cases show how understanding and propositional knowledge come apart from one another. In order to bring the luck-based challenge into focus, we can distinguish three kinds of views about the relationship between understanding and epistemic luck that are found in the literature: strong compatibilism (e.g., Kvanvig 2003; Rohwer 2014), moderate compatibilism (e.g., Pritchard 2010a: ch. 4) and incompatibilism (e.g., Grimm 2006; Sliwa 2015). Strong compatibilism is the view that understanding is compatible with the varieties of epistemic luck that are generally taken to undermine propositional knowledge. In particular, incompatibilists maintain that understanding is undermined by neither (i) the kind of luck that features in traditional Gettier-style cases (1963) cases, nor with (ii) purely ‘environmental luck (e.g., Pritchard 2005) of the sort that features in ‘fake barn’ cases (e.g., Goldman 1979) where the fact that one’s belief could easily be incorrect is a matter of being in an inhospitable epistemic environment. Moderate compatibilism, by contrast, maintains that while understanding is like propositional knowledge in that it is incompatible with the kind of luck that features in traditional Gettier cases, it is nonetheless compatible with environmental epistemic luck. Incompatibilism rejects that either kind of epistemic luck case demonstrates that understanding and propositional knowledge come apart, and so maintains that understanding is incompatible with epistemic luck to the same extent that propositional knowledge is.

The received view in mainstream epistemology, at least since Gilbert Ryle (e.g., 1949), has been to regard knowledge-that and knowledge-how as different epistemic standings, such that knowing how to do something is not simply a matter of knowing propositions, viz., of knowledge- that . If this view—known as anti-intellectualism —is correct, then the value of knowledge-how needn’t be accounted for in terms of the value of knowing propositions. Furthermore, if anti-intellectualism is assumed, then—to the extent that there is any analogous ‘value problem’ for knowledge-how—such a problem needn’t materialize as the philosophical problem of determining what it is about knowledge-how that makes it more valuable than mere true belief.

Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson (2001) have, however, influentially resisted the received anti-intellectualist thinking about knowledge-how. On Stanley & Williamson’s view— intellectualism —knowledge-how is a kind of propositional knowledge, i.e., knowledge- that , such that (roughly) S knows how to φ iff there is a way w such that S knows that w is a way for S to φ. Accordingly, if Hannah knows how to ride a bike, then this is in virtue of her propositional knowledge—viz., her knowing of some way w that w is the way for her (Hannah) to ride a bike.

By reducing in this manner knowledge—how to a kind of knowledge—that, intellectualists such as Stanley have accepted that knowledge-how should have properties characteristic of propositional knowledge, (see, for example, Stanley 2011: 215), of which knowledge-how is a kind. Furthermore, the value of knowledge-how should be able to be accounted for, on intellectualism, with reference to the value of the propositional knowledge that the intellectualist identifies with knowledge-how.

In recent work, Carter and Pritchard (2015) have challenged intellectualism on this point. One such example they offer to this end involves testimony and skilled action. For example, suppose that a skilled guitarist tells an amateur how to play a very tricky guitar riff. Carter and Pritchard (2015: 801) argue that though the amateur can uncontroversially acquire testimonial knowledge from the expert that, for some way w that w is the way to play the riff, it might be that the expert, but not novice, knows how to play the riff. Further, they suggest that whilst the amateur is better off, with respect to the aim of playing the riff, than he was prior to gaining the testimonial knowledge he did, he would likewise be better off further—viz., he would have something even more valuable—if he, like the expert, had the lick down cold (something the amateur does not have simply on the basis of his acquired testimonial knowledge) ( Ibid : 801).

The conclusion Carter and Pritchard draw from this and other similar cases (e.g., 2015: §3; see also Poston 2016) is that the value of knowledge-how cannot be accounted for with reference to the value of the items of knowledge-that which the intellectualist identifies with knowledge-how If this is right, then if there is a ‘value problem’ for knowledge-how, we shouldn’t expect it to be the problem of determining what is it about certain items of propositional knowledge that makes these more valuable than corresponding mere true beliefs. A potential area for future research is to consider what an analogue value problem for knowledge-how might look like, on an anti-intellectualist framework.

According to Carter and Pritchard’s diagnosis, the underlying explanation for this difference in value is that knowledge-how (like understanding, as discussed in §4 ) essentially involves a kind of cognitive achievement, unlike propositional knowledge, for reasons discussed in §4. If this diagnosis is correct, then further pressure is arguably placed on the robust virtue epistemologist’s ‘achievement’ solution to the value problems for knowledge-that, as surveyed in §3 . Recall that, according to robust virtue epistemology, the distinctive value of knowledge-that is accounted for in terms of the value of cognitive achievement (i.e., success because of ability) which robust virtue epistemologists take to be essential to propositional knowledge. But, if the presence of cognitive achievement is what accounts for why knowledge-how has a value that is not present in the items of knowledge-that the intellectualist identifies with knowledge-how, this result would seem to stand in tension with the robust virtue epistemologist’s insistence that what affords propositional knowledge a value lacked by mere true belief is that the former essentially involves cognitive achievement.

John Hawthorne (2004; cf. Stanley 2005; Fantl & McGrath 2002) has argued that knowledge is valuable because of the role it plays in practical reasoning. More specifically, Hawthorne (2004: 30) argues for the principle that one should use a proposition p as a premise in one’s practical reasoning only if one knows p . Hawthorne primarily motivates this line of argument by appeal to the lottery case. This concerns an agent’s true belief that she holds the losing ticket for a fair lottery with long odds and a large cash prize, a belief that is based solely on the fact that she has reflected on the odds involved. Intuitively, we would say that such an agent lacks knowledge of what she believes, even though her belief is true and even though her justification for what she believes—assessed in terms of the likelihood, given this justification, of her being right—is unusually strong. Moreover, were this agent to use this belief as a premise in her practical reasoning, and so infer that she should throw the ticket away without checking the lottery results in the paper for example, then we would regard her reasoning as problematic.

Lottery cases therefore seem to show that justified true belief, no matter how strong the degree of justification, is not enough for acceptable practical reasoning—instead, knowledge is required. Moreover, notice that we can alter the example slightly so that the agent does possess knowledge while at the same time having a weaker justification for what she believes (where strength of justification is again assessed in terms of the likelihood, given this justification, that the agent’s belief is true). If the agent had formed her true belief by reading the results in a reliable newspaper, for example, then she would count as knowing the target proposition and can then infer that she should throw the ticket away without criticism. It is more likely, however, that the newspaper has printed the result wrongly than that she should win the lottery. This sort of consideration seems to show that knowledge, even when accompanied by a relatively weak justification, is better (at least when it comes to practical reasoning) than a true belief that is supported by a relatively strong justification but does not amount to knowledge. If this is the right way to think about the connection between knowledge possession and practical reasoning, then it seems to offer a potential response to at least the secondary value problem.

A second author who thinks that our understanding of the concept of knowledge can have important ramifications for the value of knowledge is Edward Craig (1990). Craig’s project begins with a thesis about the value of the concept of knowledge. Simplifying somewhat, Craig hypothesises that the concept of knowledge is important to us because it fulfills the valuable function of enabling us to identify reliable informants. The idea is that it is clearly of immense practical importance to be able to recognize those from whom we can gain true beliefs, and that it was in response to this need that the concept of knowledge arose. As with Hawthorne’s theory, this proposal, if correct, could potentially offer a resolution of at least the secondary value problem.

Recently, there have been additional attempts to follow—broadly speaking—Craig’s project, for which the value of knowledge is understood in terms of the functional role that ‘knowledge’ plays in fulfilling our practical needs. The matter of how to identify this functional role has received increasing recent attention. For example, David Henderson (2009), Robin McKenna (2013), Duncan Pritchard (2012) and Michael Hannon (2015) have defended views about the concept of knowledge (or knowledge ascriptions) that are broadly inspired by Craig’s favored account of the function of knowledge as identifying reliable informants. A notable rival account, defended by Klemens Kappel (2010), Christoph Kelp (2011, 2014) and Patrick Rysiew (2012; cf. Kvanvig 2012) identifies closure of inquiry as the relevant function. For Krista Lawlor (2013) the relevant function is identified ( à la Austin) as that of providing assurance , and for James Beebe (2012), it’s expressing epistemic approval/disapproval.

In one sense, such accounts are in competition with one another, in that they offer different practical explications of ‘knowledge’. However, these accounts all accept (explicitly or tacitly) a more general insight, which is that considerations about the function that the concept of knowledge plays in fulfilling practical needs should inform our theories of the nature and corresponding value of knowledge. This more general point remains controversial in contemporary metaepistemology. For some arguments against supposing that a practical explication of ‘knowledge’, in terms of some need-fulfilling function, should inform our accounts of the nature or knowledge, see for example Gerken (2015). For a more extreme form of argument in favor of divorcing considerations to do with how and why we use ‘knows’ from epistemological theorizing altogether, see Hazlett (2010; cf. Turri 2011b).

A further and more recent practically oriented approach to the value of knowledge is defended by Grindrod (2019), who considers specifically the ramifications of epistemic contextualism for the value of knowledge. Contextualists maintain that knowledge attributing sentences can vary in truth value across different contexts of utterance. This kind of position about the semantics of knowledge attributions is often motivated by context-shifting cases, such as DeRose’s (1992) bank case, which seem to suggest that the a knowledge attribution is true depends on the epistemic standards (as fixed by practical stakes) of the attributor of the knowledge ascription (see entry on Epistemic Contextualism ). Grindrod maintains that if epistemic contextualism is true, then epistemic value (including whatever epistemic value might separate knowledge from mere true belief) should be contextualised.

Laurence BonJour argues that reflecting on the value of knowledge leads us to reject a prevailing trend in epistemology over the past several decades, namely, fallibilism, or what BonJour calls the “weak conception” of knowledge.

BonJour outlines four traditional assumptions about knowledge, understood as roughly justified true belief, which he “broadly” endorses (BonJour 2010: 58–9). First, knowledge is a “valuable and desirable cognitive state” indicative of “full cognitive success”. Any acceptable theory of knowledge must “make sense of” knowledge’s important value. Second, knowledge is “an all or nothing matter, not a matter of degree”. There is no such thing as degrees of knowing: either you know or you don’t. Third, epistemic justification comes in degrees, from weak to strong. Fourth, epistemic justification is essentially tied to “likelihood or probability of truth”, such that the strength of justification covaries with how likely it makes the truth of the belief in question.

On this traditional approach, we are invited to think of justification as measured by how probable the belief is given the reasons or evidence you have. One convenient way to measure probability is to use the decimals in the interval [0, 1]. A probability of 0 means that the claim is guaranteed to be false. A probability of 1 means that the claim is guaranteed to be true. A probability of .5 means that the claim is just as likely to be true as it is to be false. The question then becomes, how probable must your belief be for it to be knowledge?

Obviously it must be greater than .5. But how much greater? Suppose we say that knowledge requires a probability of 1—that is, knowledge requires our justification or reasons to guarantee the truth of the belief. Call such reasons conclusive reasons .

The strong conception of knowledge says knowledge requires conclusive reasons. We can motivate the strong conception as follows. If the aim of belief is truth, then it makes sense that knowledge would require conclusive reasons, because conclusive reasons guarantee that belief’s aim is achieved. The three components of the traditional view of knowledge thus fit together “cohesively” to explain why knowledge is valued as a state of full cognitive success.

But all is not well with the strong conception, or so philosophers have claimed over the past several decades. The strong conception seems to entail that we know nearly nothing at all about the material world outside of our own minds or about the past. For we could have had all the reasons we do in fact have, even if the world around us or the past had been different. (Think of Descartes’s evil genius.) This conflicts with commonsense and counts against the strong conception. But what is the alternative?

The alternative is that knowledge requires reasons that make the belief very likely true, but needn’t guarantee it. This is the weak conception of knowledge . Most epistemologists accept the weak conception of knowledge. But BonJour asks a challenging question: what is the “magic” level of probability required by knowledge? BonJour then argues that a satisfactory answer to this question isn’t forthcoming. For any point short of 1 would seem arbitrary . Why should we pick that point exactly? The same could be said for a vague range that includes points short of 1—why, exactly, should the vague range extend roughly that far but not further? This leads to an even deeper problem for the weak conception. It brings into doubt the value of knowledge. Can knowledge really be valuable if it is arbitrarily defined?

A closely related problem for the weak conception presents itself. Suppose for the sake of argument that we settle on .9 as the required level of probability. Suppose further that you believe Q and you believe R , that Q and R are both true, and that you have reached the .9 threshold for each. Thus the weak conception entails that you know Q , and you know R . Intuitively, if you know Q and you also know R , then you’re automatically in a position to know the conjunction Q & R . But the weak conception cannot sustain this judgment. For the probability of the conjunction of two independent claims, such as Q and R , equals the product of their probabilities. (This is the special conjunction rule from probability theory.) In this case, the probability of Q = .9 and the probability of R = .9. So the probability of the conjunction ( Q & R ) = .9 × .9 = .81, which falls short of the required .9. So the weak conception of knowledge along with a law of probability entail that you’re automatically not in a position to know the conjunction ( Q & R ). BonJour considers this to be “an intuitively unacceptable result”, because after all,

what is the supposed state of knowledge really worth, if even the simplest inference from two pieces of knowledge [might] not lead to further knowledge? (BonJour 2010: 63)

BonJour concludes that the weak conception fails to explain the value of knowledge, and thus that the strong conception must be true. He recognizes that this implies that we don’t know most of the things we ordinarily say and think that we know. He explains this away, however, partly on grounds that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning, which creates strong “practical pressure” to confabulate or exaggerate in claiming to know things, so that we can view ourselves as reasoning and acting appropriately, even though usually the best we can do is to approximate appropriate action and reasoning. (BonJour 2010: 75).

So far, in common with most of the contemporary literature in this regard, we have tended to focus on the value of knowledge relative to other epistemic standings. A related debate in this respect, however—one that has often taken place largely in tandem with the mainstream debate on the value of knowledge—has specifically concerned itself with the value of true belief and we will turn now to this issue.

Few commentators treat truth or belief as being by themselves valuable (though see Kvanvig 2003: ch. 1), but it is common to treat true belief as valuable, at least instrumentally. True beliefs are clearly often of great practical use to us. The crucial caveat here, of course, concerns the use of the word ‘often’. After all, it is also often the case that a true belief might actually militate against one achieving one’s goals, as when one is unable to summon the courage to jump a ravine and thereby get to safety , because one knows that there is a serious possibility that one might fail to reach the other side. In such cases it seems that a false belief in one’s abilities—e.g., the false belief that one could easily jump the ravine—would be better than a true belief, if the goal in question (jumping the ravine) is to be achieved.

Moreover, some true beliefs are beliefs in trivial matters, and in these cases it isn’t at all clear why we should value such beliefs at all. Imagine someone who, for no good reason, concerns herself with measuring each grain of sand on a beach, or someone who, even while being unable to operate a telephone, concerns herself with remembering every entry in a foreign phone book. Such a person would thereby gain lots of true beliefs but, crucially, one would regard such truth-gaining activity as rather pointless. After all, these true beliefs do not seem to serve any valuable purpose, and so do not appear to have any instrumental value (or, at the very least, what instrumental value these beliefs have is vanishingly small). It would, perhaps, be better—and thus of greater value—to have fewer true beliefs, and possibly more false ones, if this meant that the true beliefs that one had concerned matters of real consequence.

At most, then, we can say that true beliefs often have instrumental value. What about final (or intrinsic) value? One might think that if the general instrumental value of true belief was moot then so too would be the intuitively stronger thesis that true belief is generally finally valuable. Nevertheless, many have argued for such a claim.

One condition that seems to speak in favor of this thesis is that as truth seekers we are naturally curious about what the truth is, even when that truth is of no obvious practical import. Accordingly, it could be argued that from a purely epistemic point of view, we do regard all true belief as valuable for its own sake, regardless of what further prudential goals we might have (e.g., Goldman 1999: 3; Lynch 2004: 15–16; Alston 2005: 31; Pritchard 2019; cf. Baehr 2012: 5). Curiosity will only take you so far in this regard, however, since we are only curious about certain truths, not all of them. To return to the examples given a moment ago, no fully rational agent is curious about the measurements of every grain of sand on a given beach, or the name of every person in a random phone book—i.e., no rational person wants to know these truths independently of having some prudential reason for knowing them.

Still, one could argue for a weaker claim and merely say that it is prima facie or pro tanto finally good to believe the truth (cf. David 2005; Lynch 2009), where cases of trivial truths such as those just given are simply cases where, all things considered , it is not good to believe the truth. After all, we are familiar with the fact that something can be prima facie or pro tanto finally good without being all-things-considered good. For example, it may be finally good to help the poor and needy, but not all-things-considered good given that helping the poor and needy would prevent you from doing something else which is at present more important (such as saving that child from drowning).

At this point one might wonder why it matters so much to (some) epistemologists that true belief is finally valuable. Why not instead just treat true belief as often of instrumental value and leave the matter at that? The answer to this question lies in the fact that many want to regard truth—and thereby true belief—as being the fundamental epistemic goal, in the sense that ultimately it is only truth that is epistemically valuable (so, for example, while justification is epistemically valuable, it is only epistemically valuable because of how it is a guide to truth). Accordingly, if true belief is not finally valuable—and only typically instrumentally valuable—then this seems to downplay the status of the epistemological project.

There are a range of options here. The conservative option is to contend that truth is the fundamental goal of epistemology and also contend that true belief is finally valuable—at least in some restricted fashion. Marian David (2001, 2005) falls into this category. In contrast, one might argue that truth is the fundamental goal while at the same time claiming that true belief is not finally valuable. Sosa (see especially 2004, but also 2000a, 2003) seems (almost) to fall into this camp, since he claims that while truth is the fundamental epistemic value, we can accommodate this thought without having to thereby concede that true belief is finally valuable, a point that has been made in a similar fashion by Alan Millar (2011: §3). Sosa often compares the epistemic domain to other domains of evaluation where the fundamental good of that domain is not finally valuable. So, for example, the fundamental goal of the ‘coffee-production’ domain may be great tasting coffee, but no-one is going to argue that great tasting coffee is finally valuable. Perhaps the epistemic domain is in this respect like the coffee-production domain?

Another line of response against the thesis that true belief is finally valuable is to suggest that this thesis leads to a reductio . Michael DePaul (2001) has notably advanced such an argument. According to DePaul, the thesis that true belief is finally valuable implies that all true beliefs are equally epistemically valuable. Though this latter claim, DePaul argues, is false, as is illustrated by cases where two sets each containing an equal number of true beliefs intuitively differ in epistemic value. Ahlstrom-Vij and Grimm (2013) have criticized DePaul’s claim that the thesis that true belief is finally valuable implies that two sets each containing an equal number of true beliefs must not differ in epistemic value. Additionally, Nick Treanor (2014) has criticized the argument for a different reason, which is that ( contra DePaul) there is no clear example of two sets which contain the same number of true beliefs. More recently, Xingming Hu (2017) has defended the final value of true belief against DePaul’s argument, though Hu argues further that neither Ahlstrom-Vij and Grimm’s (2013) nor Treanor’s (2014) critique of DePaul’s argument is compelling.

Another axis on which the debate about the value of true belief can be configured is in terms of whether one opts for an epistemic-value monism or an epistemic-value pluralism—that is, whether one thinks there is only one fundamental epistemic goal, or several. Kvanvig (e.g., 2005) endorses epistemic-value pluralism, since he thinks that there are a number of fundamental epistemic goals, with each of them being of final value. Crucial to Kvanvig’s argument is that there are some epistemic goals which are not obviously truth-related—he cites the examples of having an empirically adequate theory, making sense of the course of one’s experience, and inquiring responsibly, and more recently, Brent Madison (2017) has argued by appealing to a new evil demon thought experiment, that epistemic justification itself should be included in such a list. This is important because if the range of goals identified were all truth-related, then it would prompt the natural response that such goals are valuable only because of their connection to the truth, and hence not fundamental epistemic goals at all.

Presumably, though, it ought also to be possible to make a case for an epistemic-value pluralism where the fundamental epistemic goals were not finally valuable (or, at least, à la Sosa, where one avoided taking a stance on this issue). More precisely, if an epistemic-value monism that does not regard the fundamental epistemic goal as finally valuable can be made palatable, then there seems no clear reason why a parallel view that opted for pluralism in this regard could not similarly be given a plausible supporting story.

In his essay, “ Meno in a Digital World”, Pascal Engel (2016) questions whether the original value problem applies to the kind of knowledge or pseudo-knowledge that we get from the internet? (2016: 1). One might initially think that internet and/or digitally acquired knowledge raises no new issues for the value problem. On this line of thought, if digitally acquired (e.g., Googled knowledge, information stored in iPhone apps, etc.) is genuine knowledge, then whatever goes for knowledge more generally, vis-à-vis the value problems surveyed in §§1–2, thereby goes for knowledge acquired from our gadgets.

However, recent work at the intersection of epistemology and the philosophy of mind suggests there are potentially some new and epistemologically interesting philosophical problems associated with the value of technology-assisted knowledge. These problems correspond with two ways of conceiving of knowledge as extending beyond traditional, intracranial boundaries (e.g., Pritchard 2018). In particular, the kinds of ‘extended knowledge’ which have potential import for the value of knowledge debate correspond with the extended mind thesis (for discussion on how this thesis interfaces with the hypothesis of extended cognition, see Carter, Kallestrup, Pritchard, & Palermos 2014) and cases involving what Michael Lynch (2016) calls ‘neuromedia’ intelligence augmentation.

According to the extended mind thesis (EMT), mental states (e.g., beliefs) can supervene in part on extra-organismic elements of the world, such as laptops, phones and notebooks, that are typically regarded as ‘external’ to our minds. This thesis, defended most notably by Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998), should not be conflated with comparatively weaker and less controversial thesis of content externalism (e.g., Putnam 1975; Burge 1986), according to which the meaning or content of mental states can be fixed by extra-organismic features of our physical or social-linguistic environments.

What the proponent of EMT submits is that mental states themselves can partly supervene on extracranial artifacts (e.g., notebooks, iPhones) provided these extracranial artifacts play kinds of functional roles normally played by on-board, biological cognitive processes. For example, to borrow an (adapted) case from Clark and Chalmers (1998), suppose an Alzheimer’s patient, ‘Otto’, begins to outsource the task of memory storage and retrieval to his iPhone, having appreciated that his biological memory is failing. Accordingly, when Otto acquires new information, he automatically records it in his phone’s ‘memory app’, and when he needs old information, he (also, automatically and seamlessly) opens his memory app and looks it up. The iPhone comes to play for Otto the functionally isomorphic role that biological memory used to play for him vis-à-vis the process of memory storage and retrieval. Just as we attribute to normally functioning agents knowledge in virtue of their (non-occurrent) dispositional beliefs stored in biological memory (for example, five minutes ago, you knew that Paris is the capital of France), so, with EMT in play, we should be prepared to attribute knowledge to Otto in virtue of the ‘extended’ (dispositional) beliefs which are stored in his notebook, provided Otto is as epistemically diligent in encoding and retrieving information as he was before (e.g., Pritchard 2010b).

The import EMT has for the value of knowledge debate now takes shape: whatever epistemically valuable properties (if any) are distinctively possessed by knowledge, they must be properties that obtain in Otto’s case so as to add value to what would otherwise be mere true (dispositional) beliefs that are stored, extracranially, in Otto’s iPhone. But it is initially puzzling just why, and how, this should be. After all, even if we accept the intuition that the epistemic value of traditional (intracranial) knowledge exceeds the value of corresponding true opinion, it is, as Engel (2016), Lynch (2016) and Carter (2017) have noted, at best not clear that this comparative intuition holds in the extended case, where knowledge is possessed simply by virtue of information persisting in digital storage.

For example, consider again Plato’s solution to the value problem canvassed in §1 : knowledge, unlike true belief, must be ‘tied-down’ to the truth. Mere true belief is more likely to be lost, which makes it less valuable than knowledge. One potential worry is that extended knowledge, as per EMT—literally, often times, knowledge stored in the cloud—is by its very nature not ‘tethered’, or for that matter even tetherable, in a way that corresponding items of accurate information which fall short of knowledge are not. Nor arguably does this sort of knowledge in the cloud clearly have the kind of ‘stability’ that Olsson (2009) claims is what distinguishes knowledge from true opinion (cf., Walker 2019). Perhaps even less does it appear to constitute a valuable cognitive ‘achievement’, as per robust virtue epistemologists such as Greco and Sosa.

EMT is of course highly controversial, (see, for example, Adams & Aizawa 2008), and so one way to sidestep the implications for the value of knowledge debate posed by the possibility of knowledge that is extended via extended beliefs, is to simply resist EMT as a thesis about the metaphysics of mind.

However, there are other ways in which the technology-assisted knowledge could have import for the traditional value problems. In recent work, Michael P. Lynch (2016) argues that, given the increase in cognitive offloading coupled with evermore subtle and physically smaller intelligence-augmentation technologies (e.g., Bostrom & Sandberg 2009), it is just a matter of time before the majority of the gadgetry we use for cognitive tasks will be by and large seamless and ‘invisible’. Lynch suggests that while coming to know via such mechanisms can make knowledge acquisition much easier, there are epistemic drawbacks. He offers the following thought experiment:

NEUROMEDIA: Imagine a society where smartphones are miniaturized and hooked directly into a person’s brain. With a single mental command, those who have this technology—let’s call it neuromedia—can access information on any subject […] Now imagine that an environmental disaster strikes our invented society after several generations have enjoyed the fruits of neuromedia. The electronic communication grid that allows neuromedia to function is destroyed. Suddenly no one can access the shared cloud of information by thought alone. […] for the inhabitants of this society, losing neuromedia is an immensely unsettling experience; it’s like a normally sighted person going blind. They have lost a way of accessing information on which they’ve come to rely […] Just as overreliance on one sense can weaken the others, so overdependence on neuromedia might atrophy the ability to access information in other ways, ways that are less easy and require more creative effort. (Lynch 2016: 1–6)

One conclusion Lynch has drawn from such thought experiments is that understanding has a value that mere knowledge lacks, a position we’ve seen has been embraced for different reasons in §4 by Kvanvig and others. A further conclusion, advanced by Pritchard (2013) and Carter (2017), concerns the extent to which the acquisition of knowledge involves ‘epistemic dependence’—viz., dependence on factors outwith one’s cognitive agency. They argue that the greater the scope of epistemic dependence, the more valuable it becomes to cultivate virtues like intellectual autonomy that regulate the appropriate reliance and outsourcing (e.g., on other individuals, technology, medicine, etc.) while at the same time maintaining one’s intellectual self-direction.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

Brogaard, Berit, 2005, “ I Know. Therefore, I Understand ”, manuscript, available at philpapers.org.
Epistemic Value , a weblog devoted to the topic of epistemic value.
Epistemic Value , entry by Patrick Bondy in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015).

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Earl Conee, Alan Millar and several referees at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for useful comments on earlier versions of this entry.

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3.5: Immanuel Kant – On the Sources of Knowledge

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The Critique of Pure Reason

Introduction, i. of the difference between pure and empirical knowledge..

THAT all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare, to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it.

But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion ), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and not to be answered at first sight,—whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions? Knowledge of this kind is called a priori , in contradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources a posterior i , that is, in experience.

But the expression, “ a priori ,” is not as yet definite enough adequately to indicate the whole meaning of the question above started. For, in speaking of knowledge which has its sources in experience, we are wont to say, that this or that may be known a priori , because we do not derive this knowledge immediately from experience, but from a general rule, which, however, we have itself borrowed from experience. Thus, if a man undermined his house, we say, “he might know a priori that it would have fallen;” that is, he needed not to have waited for the experience that it did actually fall. But still, a priori , he could not know even this much. For, that bodies are heavy, and, consequently, that they fall when their supports are taken away, must have been known to him previously, by means of experience.

By the term “knowledge a priori ,” therefore, we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only a posterior i , that is, through experience. Knowledge a priori is either pure or impure. Pure knowledge a priori is that with which no empirical element is mixed up. For example, the proposition, “Every change has a cause,” is a proposition a priori , but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience.

II. The human intellect, even in an unphilosophical state, is in possession of certain cognitions a priori .

THE question now is as to a criterion , by which we may securely distinguish a pure from an empirical cognition. Experience no doubt teaches us that this or that object is constituted in such and such a manner, but not that it could not possibly exist otherwise. Now, in the first place, if we have a proposition which contains the idea of necessity in its very conception, it is a judgment a priori; if, moreover, it is not derived from any other proposition, unless from one equally involving the idea of necessity, it is absolutely a prior i . Secondly, an empirical judgment never exhibits strict and absolute, but only assumed and comparative universality (by induction); therefore, the most we can say is,—so far as we have hitherto observed, there is no exception to this or that rule. If, on the other hand, a judgment carries with it strict and absolute universality, that is, admits of no possible exception, it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely a priori .

Empirical universality is, therefore, only an arbitrary extension of validity, from that which may be predicated of a proposition valid in most cases, to that which is asserted of a proposition which holds good in all; as, for example, in the affirmation, “All bodies are heavy.” When, on the contrary, strict universality characterizes a judgment, it necessarily indicates another peculiar source of knowledge, namely, a faculty of cognition a prior i . Necessity and strict universality, therefore, are infallible tests for distinguishing pure from empirical knowledge, and are inseparably connected with each other. But as in the use of these criteria the empirical limitation is sometimes more easily detected than the contingency of the judgment, or the unlimited universality which we attach to a judgment is often a more convincing proof than its necessity, it may be advisable to use the criteria separately, each being by itself infallible.

Now, that in the sphere of human cognition we have judgments which are necessary, and in the strictest sense universal, consequently pure a priori , it will be an easy matter to show. If we desire an example from the sciences, we need only take any proposition in mathematics. If we cast our eyes upon the commonest operations of the understanding, the proposition, “every change must have a cause,” will amply serve our purpose. In the latter case, indeed, the conception of a cause so plainly involves the conception of a necessity of connection with an effect, and of a strict universality of the law, that the very notion of a cause would entirely disappear, were we to derive it, like Hume, from a frequent association of what happens with that which precedes; and the habit thence originating of connecting representations—the necessity inherent in the judgment being therefore merely subjective. Besides, without seeking for such examples of principles existing a priori in cognition, we might easily show that such principles are the indispensable basis of the possibility of experience itself, and consequently prove their existence a priori . For whence could our experience itself acquire certainty, if all the rules on which it depends were themselves empirical, and consequently fortuitous? No one, therefore, can admit the validity of the use of such rules as first principles. But, for the present, we may content ourselves with having established the fact, that we do possess and exercise a faculty of pure a priori cognition; and, secondly, with having pointed out the proper tests of such cognition, namely, universality and necessity.

Not only in judgments, however, but even in conceptions, is an a priori origin manifest. For example, if we take away by degrees from our conceptions of a body all that can be referred to mere sensuous experience—colour, hardness or softness, weight, even impenetrability— the body will then vanish; but the space which it occupied still remains, and this it is utterly impossible to annihilate in thought. Again, if we take away, in like manner, from our empirical conception of any object, corporeal or incorporeal, all properties which mere experience has taught us to connect with it, still we cannot think away those through which we cogitate it as substance, or adhering to substance, although our conception of substance is more determined than that of an object. Compelled, therefore, by that necessity with which the conception of substance forces itself upon us, we must confess that it has its seat in our faculty of cognition a priori .

III. Philosophy stands in need of a science which shall determine the possibility, principles, and extent of human knowledge a priori

OF far more importance than all that has been above said, is the consideration that certain of our cognitions rise completely above the sphere of all possible experience, and by means of conceptions, to which there exists in the whole extent of experience no corresponding object, seem to extend the range of our judgments beyond its bounds. And just in this transcendental or supersensible sphere, where experience affords us neither instruction nor guidance, lie the investigations of Reaso n , which, on account of their importance, we consider far preferable to, and as having a far more elevated aim than, all that the understanding can achieve within the sphere of sensuous phenomena. So high a value do we set upon these investigations, that even at the risk of error, we persist in following them out, and permit neither doubt nor disregard nor indifference to restrain us from the pursuit. These unavoidable problems of mere pure reason are GOD, FREEDOM (of will), and IMMORTALITY. The science which, with all its preliminaries, has for its especial object the solution of these problems is named metaphysics—a science which is at the very outset dogmatical, that is, it confidently takes upon itself the execution of this task without any previous investigation of the ability or inability of reason for such an undertaking.

Now the safe ground of experience being thus abandoned, it seems nevertheless natural that we should hesitate to erect a building with the cognitions we possess, without knowing whence they come, and on the strength of principles, the origin of which is undiscovered. Instead of thus trying to build without a foundation, it is rather to be expected that we should long ago have put the question, how the understanding can arrive at these a priori cognitions, and what is the extent, validity, and worth which they may possess? We say, this is natural enough, meaning by the word natural, that which is consistent with a just and reasonable way of thinking; but if we understand by the term, that which usually happens, nothing indeed could be more natural and more comprehensible than that this investigation should be left long unattempted. For one part of our pure knowledge, the science of mathematics, has been long firmly established, and thus leads us to form flattering expectations with regard to others, though these may be of quite a different nature. Besides, when we get beyond the bounds of experience, we are of course safe from opposition in that quarter; and the charm of widening the range of our knowledge is so great that, unless we are brought to a standstill by some evident contradiction, we hurry on undoubtingly in our course. This, however, may be avoided, if we are sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions, which are not the less fictions on that account.

Mathematical science affords us a brilliant example, how far, independently of all experience, we may carry our a priori knowledge. It is true that the mathematician occupies himself with objects and cognitions only in so far as they can be represented by means of intuition. But this circumstance is easily overlooked, because the said intuition can itself be given a priori , and therefore is hardly to be distinguished from a mere pure conception. Deceived by such a proof of the power of reason, we can perceive no limits to the extension of our knowledge. The light dove cleaving in free flight the thin air, whose resistance it feels, might imagine that her movements would be far more free and rapid in airless space. Just in the same way did Plato, abandoning the world of sense because of the narrow limits it sets to the understanding, venture upon the wings of ideas beyond it, into the void space of pure intellect. He did not reflect that he made no real progress by all his efforts; for he met with no resistance which might serve him for a support, as it were, whereon to rest, and on which he might apply his powers, in order to let the intellect acquire momentum for its progress. It is, indeed, the common fate of human reason in speculation, to finish the imposing edifice of thought as rapidly as possible, and then for the first time to begin to examine whether the foundation is a solid one or no. Arrived at this point, all sorts of excuses are sought after, in order to console us for its want of stability, or rather, indeed, to enable us to dispense altogether with so late and dangerous an investigation. But what frees us during the process of building from all apprehension or suspicion, and flatters us into the belief of its solidity, is this. A great part, perhaps the greatest part, of the business of our reason consists in the analysation of the conceptions which we already possess of objects. By this means we gain a multitude of cognitions, which although really nothing more than elucidations or explanations of that which (though in a confused manner) was already thought in our conceptions, are, at least in respect of their form, prized as new introspections; whilst, so far as regards their matter or content, we have really made no addition to our conceptions, but only disinvolved them. But as this process does furnish real a priori knowledge,which has a sure progress and useful results, reason, deceived by this, slips in, without being itself aware of it, assertions of a quite different kind; in which, to given conceptions it adds others, a priori indeed, but entirely foreign to them, without our knowing how it arrives at these, and, indeed, without such a question ever suggesting itself. I shall therefore at once proceed to examine the difference between these two modes of knowledge.

IV. Of the difference between analytical and synthetical judgments.

IN all judgments wherein the relation of a subject to the predicate is cogitated (I mention affirmative judgments only here; the application to negative will be very easy), this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as somewhat which is contained (though covertly) in the conception A; or the predicate B lies completely out of the conception A, although it stands in connection with it. In the first instance, I term the judgment analytical, in the second, synthetical. Analytical judgments (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through identity; those in which this connection is cogitated without identity, are called synthetical judgments. The former may be called explicativ e , the latter augmentativ e [1] judgments; because the former add in the predicate nothing to the conception of the subject, but only analyse it into its constituent conceptions, which were thought already in the subject, although in a confused manner; the latter add to our conceptions of the subject a predicate which was not contained in it, and which no analysis could ever have discovered therein. For example, when I say, “all bodies are extended,” this is an analytical judgment. For I need not go beyond the conception of body in order to find extension connected with it, but merely analyse the conception, that is, become conscious of the manifold properties which I think in that conception, in order to discover this predicate in it: it is therefore an analytical judgment. On the other hand, when I say, “all bodies are heavy,” the predicate is something totally different from that which I think in the mere conception of a body. By the addition of such a predicate, therefore, it becomes a synthetical judgment.

Judgments of experience, as such, are always synthetical. For it would be absurd to think of grounding an analytical judgment on experience, because in forming such a judgment I need not go out of the sphere of my conceptions, and therefore recourse to the testimony of experience is quite unnecessary. That “bodies are extended” is not an empirical judgment, but a proposition which stands firm a prior i . For before addressing myself to experience, I already have in my conception all the requisite conditions for the judgment, and I have only to extract the predicate from the conception, according to the principle of contradiction, and thereby at the same time become conscious of the necessity of the judgment, a necessity which I could never learn from experience. On the other hand, though at first I do not at all include the predicate of weight in my conception of body in general, that conception still indicates an object of experience, a part of the totality of experience, to which I can still add other parts; and this I do when I recognize by observation that bodies are heavy. I can cognize beforehand by analysis the conception of body through the characteristics of extension, impenetrability, shape, etc., all which are cogitated in this conception. But now I extend my knowledge, and looking back on experience from which I had derived this conception of body, I find weight at all times connected with the above characteristics, and therefore I synthetically add to my conceptions this as a predicate, and say, “all bodies are heavy.” Thus it is experience upon which rests the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate of weight with the conception of body, because both conceptions, although the one is not contained in the other, still belong to one another (only contingently, however), as parts of a whole, namely, of experience, which is itself a synthesis of intuitions.

But to synthetical judgments a priori , such aid is entirely wanting. If I go out of and beyond the conception A, in order to recognize another B as connected with it, what foundation have I to rest on, whereby to render the synthesis possible? I have here no longer the advantage of looking out in the sphere of experience for what I want. Let us take, for example, the proposition, “everything that happens has a cause.” In the conception of something that happen s , I indeed think an existence which a certain time antecedes, and from this I can derive analytical judgments. But the conception of a cause lies quite out of the above conception, and indicates something entirely different from “that which happens,” and is consequently not contained in that conception. How then am I able to assert concerning the general conception—“that which happens”—something entirely different from that conception, and to recognize the conception of cause although not contained in it, yet as belonging to it, and even necessarily? what is here the unknown = X, upon which the understanding rests when it believes it has found, out of the conception A a foreign predicate B, which it nevertheless considers to be connected with it? It cannot be experience, because the principle adduced annexes the two representations, cause and effect, to the representation existence, not only with universality, which experience cannot give, but also with the expression of necessity, therefore completely a priori and from pure conceptions. Upon such synthetical, that is augmentative propositions, depends the whole aim of our speculative knowledge a priori; for although analytical judgments are indeed highly important and necessary, they are so, only to arrive at that clearness of conceptions which is requisite for a sure and extended synthesis, and this alone is a real acquisition.

V. In all theoretical sciences of reason, synthetical judgments; a priori are contained as principles.

MATHEMATICAL judgments are always synthetical. Hitherto this fact, though incontestably true and very important in its consequences, seems to have escaped the analysts of the human mind, nay, to be in complete opposition to all their conjectures. For as it was found that mathematical conclusions all proceed according to the principle of contradiction (which the nature of every apodeictic certainty requires), people became persuaded that the fundamental principles of the science also were recognized and admitted in the same way. But the notion is fallacious; for although a synthetical proposition can certainly be discerned by means of the principle of contradiction, this is possible only when another synthetical proposition precedes, from which the latter is deduced, but never of itself.

Before all, be it observed, that proper mathematical propositions are always judgments a prior i , and not empirical, because they carry along with them the conception of necessity, which cannot be given by experience. If this be demurred to, it matters not; I will then limit my assertion to pur e mathematics, the very conception of which implies that it consists of knowledge altogether non-empirical and a prior i .

We might, indeed at first suppose that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is a merely analytical proposition, following (according to the principle of contradiction) from the conception of a sum of seven and five. But if we regard it more narrowly, we find that our conception of the sum of seven and five contains nothing more than the uniting of both sums into one, whereby it cannot at all be cogitated what this single number is which embraces both. The conception of twelve is by no means obtained by merely cogitating the union of seven and five; and we may analyse our conception of such a possible sum as long as we will, still we shall never discover in it the notion of twelve. We must go beyond these conceptions, and have recourse to an intuition which corresponds to one of the two,—our five fingers, for example, or like Segner in his “Arithmetic,” five points, and so by degrees, add the units contained in the five given in the intuition, to the conception of seven. For I first take the number 7, and, for the conception of 5 calling in the aid of the fingers of my hand as objects of intuition, I add the units, which I before took together to make up the number 5, gradually now by means of the material image my hand, to the number 7, and by this process, I at length see the number 12 arise. That 7 should be added to 5, I have certainly cogitated in my conception of a sum = 7 + 5, but not that this sum was equal to 12. Arithmetical propositions are therefore always synthetical, of which we may become more clearly convinced by trying large numbers. For it will thus become quite evident that, turn and twist our conceptions as we may, it is impossible, without having recourse to intuition, to arrive at the sum total or product by means of the mere analysis of our conceptions. Just as little is any principle of pure geometry analytical. “A straight line between two points is the shortest,” is a synthetical proposition. For my conception of straight , contains no notion of quantity , but is merely qualitative . The conception of the shortest is therefore fore wholly an addition, and by no analysis can it be extracted from our conception of a straight line. Intuition must therefore here lend its aid, by means of which, and thus only, our synthesis is possible.

Some few principles preposited by geometricians are, indeed, really analytical, and depend on the principle of contradiction. They serve, however, like identical propositions, as links in the chain of method, not as principles,—for example, a = a, the whole is equal to itself, or (a + b); a, the whole is greater than its part. And yet even these principles themselves, though they derive their validity from pure conceptions, are only admitted in mathematics because they can be presented in intuition. What causes us here commonly to believe that the predicate of such apodeictic judgments is already contained in our conception, and that the judgment is therefore analytical, is merely the equivocal nature of the expression. We must join in thought a certain predicate to a given conception, and this necessity cleaves already to the conception. But the question is, not what we must join in thought to the given conception, but what we really think therein, though only obscurely, and then it becomes manifest that the predicate pertains to these conceptions, necessarily indeed, yet not as thought in the conception itself, but by virtue of an intuition, which must be added to the conception.

The science of Natural Philosophy (Physics) contains in itself synthetical judgments a priori , as principles. I shall adduce two propositions. For instance, the proposition, “in all changes of the material world, the quantity of matter remains unchanged;” or, that, “in all communication of motion, action and re-action must always be equal.” In both of these, not only is the necessity, and therefore their origin a priori clear, but also that they are synthetical propositions. For in the conception of matter, I do not cogitate its permanency, but merely its presence in space, which it fills. I therefore really go out of and beyond the conception of matter, in order to think on to it something a priori , which I did not think in it. The proposition is therefore not analytical, but synthetical, and nevertheless conceived a priori ; and so it is with regard to the other propositions of the pure part of natural philosophy.

As to metaphysics, even if we look upon it merely as an attempted science, yet, from the nature of human reason, an indispensable one, we find that it must contain synthetical propositions a priori . It is not merely the duty of metaphysics to dissect, and thereby analytically to illustrate the conceptions which we form a priori of things; but we seek to widen the range of our a priori knowledge. For this purpose, we must avail ourselves of such principles as add something to the original conception—something not identical with, nor contained in it, and by means of synthetical judgments a priori , leave far behind us the limits of experience; for example, in the proposition, “the world must have a beginning,” and such like. Thus metaphysics, according to the proper aim of the science, consists merely of synthetical propositions a priori .

VI. The universal problem of pure reason.

IT is extremely advantageous to be able to bring a number of investigations under the formula of a single problem. For in this manner, we not only facilitate our own labour, inasmuch as we define it clearly to ourselves, but also render it more easy for others to decide whether we have done justice to our undertaking. The proper problem of pure reason, then, is contained in the question: “How are synthetical judgments a priori possible?”

That metaphysical science has hitherto remained in so vacillating a state of uncertainty and contradiction, is only to be attributed to the fact that this great problem, and perhaps even the difference between analytical and synthetical judgments, did not sooner suggest itself to philosophers. Upon the solution of this problem, or upon sufficient proof of the impossibility of synthetical knowledge a priori , depends the existence or downfall of the science of metaphysics. Among philosophers, David Hume came the nearest of all to this problem; yet it never acquired in his mind sufficient precision, nor did he regard the question in its universality. On the contrary, he stopped short at the synthetical proposition of the connection of an effect with its cause ( principium causalitati s ), insisting that such proposition a priori was impossible. According to his conclusions, then, all that we term metaphysical science is a mere delusion, arising from the fancied insight of reason into that which is in truth borrowed from experience, and to which habit has given the appearance of necessity. Against this assertion, destructive to all pure philosophy, he would have been guarded, had he had our problem before his eyes in its universality. For he would then have perceived that, according to his own argument, there likewise could not be any pure mathematical science, which assuredly cannot exist without synthetical propositions a priori ,—an absurdity from which his good understanding must have saved him.

In the solution of the above problem is at the same time comprehended the possibility of the use of pure reason in the foundation and construction of all sciences which contain theoretical knowledge a priori of objects, that is to say, the answer to the following questions:

How is pure mathematical science possible?

How is pure natural science possible?

Respecting these sciences, as they do certainly exist, it may with propriety be asked, how they are possible?—for that they must be possible is shown by the fact of their really existing.[2] But as to metaphysics, the miserable progress it has hitherto made, and the fact that of no one system yet brought forward, far as regards its true aim, can it be said that this science really exists, leaves any one at liberty to doubt with reason the very possibility of its existence.

Yet, in a certain sense, this kind of knowledge must unquestionably be looked upon as given; in other words, metaphysics must be considered as really existing, if not as a science, nevertheless as a natural disposition of the human mind ( metaphysica naturali s ). For human reason, without any instigations imputable to the mere vanity of great knowledge, unceasingly progresses, urged on by its own feeling of need, towards such questions as cannot be answered by any empirical application of reason, or principles derived therefrom; and so there has ever really existed in every man some system of metaphysics. It will always exist, so soon as reason awakes to the exercise of its power of speculation. And now the question arises—How is metaphysics, as a natural disposition, possible? In other words, how, from the nature of universal human reason, do those questions arise which pure reason proposes to itself, and which it is impelled by its own feeling of need to answer as well as it can?

But as in all the attempts hitherto made to answer the questions which reason is prompted by its very nature to propose to itself, for example, whether the world had a beginning, or has existed from eternity, it has always met with unavoidable contradictions, we must not rest satisfied with the mere natural disposition of the mind to metaphysics, that is, with the existence of the faculty of pure reason, whence, indeed, some sort of metaphysical system always arises; but it must be possible to arrive at certainty in regard to the question whether we know or do not know the things of which metaphysics treats. We must be able to arrive at a decision on the subjects of its questions, or on the ability or inability of reason to form any judgment respecting them; and therefore either to extend with confidence the bounds of our pure reason, or to set strictly defined and safe limits to its action. This last question, which arises out of the above universal problem, would properly run thus: How is metaphysics possible as a science?

Thus, the critique of reason leads at last, naturally and necessarily, to science; and, on the other hand, the dogmatical use of reason without criticism leads to groundless assertions, against which others equally specious can always be set, thus ending unavoidably in scepticism.

Besides, this science cannot be of great and formidable prolixity, because it has not to do with objects of reason, the variety of which is inexhaustible, but merely with Reason herself and her problems; problems which arise out of her own bosom, and are not proposed to her by the nature of outward things, but by her own nature. And when once Reason has previously become able completely to understand her own power in regard to objects which she meets with in experience, it will be easy to determine securely the extent and limits of her attempted application to objects beyond the confines of experience.

We may and must, therefore, regard the attempts hitherto made to establish metaphysical science dogmatically as non-existent. For what of analysis, that is, mere dissection of conceptions, is contained in one or other, is not the aim of, but only a preparation for metaphysics proper, which has for its object the extension, by means of synthesis, of our a priori knowledge. And for this purpose, mere analysis is of course useless, because it only shows what is contained in these conceptions, but not how we arrive, a priori , at them; and this it is her duty to show, in order to be able afterwards to determine their valid use in regard to all objects of experience, to all knowledge in general. But little self-denial, indeed, is needed to give up these pretensions, seeing the undeniable, and in the dogmatic mode of procedure, inevitable contradictions of Reason with herself, have long since ruined the reputation of every system of metaphysics that has appeared up to this time. It will require more firmness to remain undeterred by difficulty from within, and opposition from without, from endeavouring, by a method quite opposed to all those hitherto followed, to further the growth and fruitfulness of a science indispensable to human reason—a science from which every branch it has borne may be cut away, but whose roots remain indestructible.

VII. Idea and division of a particular science, under the name of a Critique of Pure Reason.

FROM all that has been said, there results the idea of a particular science, which may be called the Critique of Pur e Reason . For reason is the faculty which furnishes us with the principles of knowledge a priori . Hence, pure reason is the faculty which contains the principles of cognizing anything absolutely a priori . An Organon of pure reason would be a compendium of those principles according to which alone all pure cognitions a priori can be obtained. The completely extended application of such an organon would afford us a system of pure reason. As this, however, is demanding a great deal, and it is yet doubtful whether any extension of our knowledge be here possible, or, if so, in what cases; we can regard a science of the mere criticism of pure reason, its sources and limits, as the propaedeutic to a system of pure reason. Such a science must not be called a doctrine, but only a critique of pure reason; and its use, in regard to speculation, would be only negative, not to enlarge the bounds of, but to purify, our reason, and to shield it against error,—which alone is no little gain. I apply the term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible a priori . A system of such conceptions would be called Transcendental Philosophy . But this, again, is still beyond the bounds of our present essay. For as such a science must contain a complete exposition not only of our synthetical a priori , but of our analytical a priori knowledge, it is of too wide a range for our present purpose, because we do not require to carry our analysis any farther than is necessary to understand, in their full extent, the principles of synthesis a prior i , with which alone we have to do. This investigation, which we cannot properly call a doctrine, but only a transcendental critique, because it aims not at the enlargement, but at the correction and guidance, of our knowledge, and is to serve as a touchstone of the worth or worthlessness of all knowledge a priori , is the sole object of our present essay. Such a critique is consequently, as far as possible, a preparation for an organon; and if this new organon should be found to fail, at least for a canon of pure reason, according to which the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason, whether it extend or limit the bounds of that reason, might one day be set forth both analytically and synthetically. For that this is possible, nay, that such a system is not of so great extent as to preclude the hope of its ever being completed, is evident. For we have not here to do with the nature of outward objects, which is infinite, but solely with the mind, which judges of the nature of objects, and, again, with the mind only in respect of its cognition a priori . And the object of our investigations, as it is not to be sought without, but, altogether within, ourselves, cannot remain concealed, and in all probability is limited enough to be completely surveyed and fairly estimated, according to its worth or worthlessness. Still less let the reader here expect a critique of books and systems of pure reason; our present object is exclusively a critique of the faculty of pure reason itself. Only when we make this critique our foundation, do we possess a pure touchstone for estimating the philosophical value of ancient and modern writings on this subject; and without this criterion, the incompetent historian or judge decides upon and corrects the groundless assertions of others with his own, which have themselves just as little foundation.

Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science, for which the Critique of Pure Reason must sketch the whole plan architectonically, that is, from principles, with a full guarantee for the validity and stability of all the parts which enter into the building. It is the system of all the principles of pure reason. If this Critique itself does not assume the title of transcendental philosophy, it is only because, to be a complete system, it ought to contain a full analysis of all human knowledge a priori . Our critique must, indeed, lay before us a complete enumeration of all the radical conceptions which constitute the said pure knowledge. But from the complete analysis of these conceptions themselves, as also from a complete investigation of those derived from them, it abstains with reason; partly because it would be deviating from the end in view to occupy itself with this analysis, since this process is not attended with the difficulty and insecurity to be found in the synthesis, to which our critique is entirely devoted, and partly because it would be inconsistent with the unity of our plan to burden this essay with the vindication of the completeness of such an analysis and deduction, with which, after all, we have at present nothing to do. This completeness of the analysis of these radical conceptions, as well as of the deduction from the conceptions a priori which may be given by the analysis, we can, however, easily attain, provided only that we are in possession of all these radical conceptions, which are to serve as principles of the synthesis, and that in respect of this main purpose nothing is wanting.

To the Critique of Pure Reason, therefore, belongs all that constitutes transcendental philosophy; and it is the complete idea of transcendental philosophy, but still not the science itself; because it only proceeds so far with the analysis as is necessary to the power of judging completely of our synthetical knowledge a prior i .

The principal thing we must attend to, in the division of the parts of a science like this, is: that no conceptions must enter it which contain aught empirical; in other words, that the knowledge a priori must be completely pure. Hence, although the highest principles and fundamental conceptions of morality are certainly cognitions a priori , yet they do not belong to transcendental philosophy; because though they certainly do not lay the conceptions of pain, pleasure, desires, inclinations, (which are all of empirical origin), at the foundation of its precepts, yet still into the conception of duty,—as an obstacle to be overcome, or as an incitement which should not be made into a motive,—these empirical conceptions must necessarily enter, in the construction of a system of pure morality. Transcendental philosophy is consequently a philosophy of the pure and merely speculative reason. For all that is practical, so far as it contains motives, relates to feelings, and these belong to empirical sources of cognition.

If we wish to divide this science from the universal point of view of a science in general, it ought to comprehend, first, a Doctrine of the Element s , and, secondly, a Doctrine of the Method of pure reason. Each of these main divisions will have its subdivisions, the separate reasons for which we cannot here particularize. Only so much seems necessary, by way of introduction of premonition, that there are two sources of human knowledge (which probably spring from a common, but to us unknown root), namely, sense and understanding. By the former, objects are given to us; by the latter, thought . So far as the faculty of sense may contain representations a priori , which form the conditions under which objects are given, in so far it belongs to transcendental philosophy. The transcendental doctrine of sense must form the first part of our science of elements, because the conditions under which alone the objects of human knowledge are given must precede those under which they are thought.

That is, judgments which really add to, and do not merely analyse or explain the conceptions which make up the sum of our knowledge.— T r .
As to the existence of pure natural science, or physics, perhaps many may still express doubts. But we have only to look at the different propositions which are commonly treated of at the commencement of proper (empirical) physical science—those, for example, relating to the permanence of the same quantity of matt,etrhe vis inertia e , the equality of action and reaction, &c.—to be soon convinced that they form a science of pure physics p h ( ysica pur a , or rationalis ), which well deserves to be separately exposed as a special science, in its whole extent, whether that be great or confined.
The Originals: Classic Readings in Western Philosophy. Authored by : Dr. Jeff McLaughlin . Provided by : BCcampus. Located at : https://pressbooks.bccampus.ca/classicreadings/ . License : CC BY: Attribution

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5.1: Three Theories of Knowledge

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Language Overview

Before we look into the various theories about how we know what we know when we make propositional claims and how to determine if claims are true or not it would be helpful to make a number of important points or distinctions about language and how we use it. Not all uses of language involve a claim that can be described as claims of knowledge. There are a variety of forms of expressions or sentences in any language. Not all sentences are functioning for the speaker in the same way.

Language Claims

Here are five of the different uses for language:

Expressive (this use includes sentences that are neither true nor false). They express the feelings of the speaker/writer.

Directive (thus use includes sentences that are neither true nor false). This use offers instructions or requests information.

please close the door
what time is it?
how much does that cost?

Performative (thus use includes sentences that are neither true nor false). This use actually performs some operation. It presents no information and makes no requests.

I bid five dollars
I promise that i will do that
I now pronounce you ...

Evaluative (thus use includes sentences that are neither true nor false). This use expresses how people think about some object, activity, person, condition, or situation.

That is a good car
She is a good person
Chocolate is the best flavor for ice cream.

As the standard for making such evaluations is not such as to be derived from a source that is recognized as existing apart from humans and uninfluenced by culture there is no commonly agreed upon method for determining if such evaluations are true or not true. Sentences expressing evaluations are not taken as making claims about what is known so much as making claims about how the evaluator thinks.

Cognitive (this use includes sentences that are either true or false, or potentially true or false). It is the cognitive use of language that concerns us with the issue of knowledge.

There are three sides to a triangle. The sum of their angles is 180 degrees.
There is a computer in front of you right now.
23 + 11= 34
A bachelor is an unmarried male.
If a is more than b, and b is more than c, then a is more than c.
There are 1.8376 x 10 73 grains of sand on planet earth.

This is the use involved with propositional knowledge. It is the cognitive use that makes claims that should be capable of being determined to be either true or false. Cognitive use of language expressing that which is claimed as knowledge exists in a variety of forms: logical, semantic, systemic, and empirical. We will examine them in a subsequent section. What they have in common is that claims are made that can be determined to be true or false in some manner or other.

Rationalism

Rationalism is a reliance on reason {lat. ratio } as the only reliable source of human knowledge. In the most general application, rationalism offers a naturalistic alternative to appeals to religious accounts of human nature and conduct. A psychological characterization of rationalism would describe it as an overly deductive way of thinking and to the molding of reality to fit one's theoretical understanding. More specifically, rationalism is the epistemological theory that significant knowledge of the world can best be achieved by a priori means; it therefore stands in contrast to empiricism.

The first philosophers who are today referred to as having been rationalists include Descartes (1596-1650), Leibniz (1646-1716), and Spinoza (1632-1677). These thinkers thought they were defending a form of rational thought in the form of a science, against the older school of thought known as scholasticism. The defense of science offered by Descartes included a form of dualism that carried over elements of tradition of the scholastic's in a form of thinking that is technical, deductive, and abstract. In Spinoza's Ethics , the method is again deductive and modeled on the geometric system of Euclid's Elements . Rationalism is a method of thinking that is marked by a deductive and abstract way of reasoning.

Baruch Spinoza

In ordinary usage, Rationalism is a basic sense of respect for reason or refers to the idea that reason should play a large role in human life (in contrast, say, to mysticism). So with rationalism it is possible to have knowledge without having sensory experiences. There is knowledge of logic and its laws or rules that are based upon reasoning and not sensory experience. There is a knowledge that is innate or born inside of us, that is to say that there are forms of knowledge that exists within our minds from the time we are born.

For Descartes knowledge involves certainty and certainty exists in the form of clear and distinct ideas, which are ideas that are indubitable (not capable of being doubted). These would be innate ideas that all rational beings are born with such as; knowledge of self, God, and the world. But all knowledge is the result of acts of reasoning.

Rene Descartes

Leibniz distinguished the truths of reasoning which were necessary truths as in the rule of contradictions, and excluded middle (statements are either true or false) from the truths of fact which are not necessary but are contingent upon experience and sufficient reason needed to accept what the senses report. The work of Leibniz anticipated modern logic and analytic philosophy, but his philosophy also looks back to the scholastic tradition, in which conclusions are produced by applying reason to first principles or prior definitions rather than to empirical evidence.

Reliance on experience as the source of ideas and knowledge. More specifically, empiricism is the epistemological theory that genuine information about the world must be acquired by a priori means, so that nothing can be thought without first being sensed. Prominent modern empiricists include Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Mill. In the twentieth century, empiricism principles were extended and applied by the pragmatists and the logical positivists.

Empiricism is a theory that states that knowledge comes only or primarily from sensory experience. It is one of several views of epistemology, the study of human knowledge, along with rationalism and skepticism. Empiricism emphasizes the role of empirical evidence in the formation of ideas, over the idea of innate ideas or traditional empiricists may argue however that traditions (or customs) arise due to relations of previous sense experiences.

Empiricism in the philosophy of science emphasizes evidence, especially as discovered in experiments. It is a fundamental part of the scientific method that all hypotheses and theories must be tested against observations of the natural world rather than resting solely on a priori reasoning, intuition, or revelation.

Empiricism, often used by natural scientists, says that "knowledge is based on experience" and that "knowledge is tentative and probabilistic, subject to continued revision and falsification.

Empiricists

For Locke the mind is a blank slate at birth ( tabula rasa ) and all knowledge results from experiences that enter the mind from the experiences of the body. Knowledge of ideas is possible because ideas are representations of things experienced. But if representations are copies of our experiences, just how accurate are they?

Locke distinguished the primary and secondary qualities of an object of an experience and opened a door to a major problem in determining just how accurate sense knowledge could ever be. Locke distinguished the properties that where in or with the object and those that existed within the mind of the subject of the experience. The object has a texture but the idea of “smoothness” is in the subject. The object had a degree of heat but “hot” and “cold” are ideas in the knower.

John Locke on Epistemology

Hume was a skeptic. He agreed with Locke that we are born with a blank slate, tabla rasa and that all our knowledge comes through the senses (empiricism), but he did not think that we could know all that much for certain. (skepticism). He held that are perceptions are or make impressions which are our thought, that we have no ideas without sense impressions, that reasoning ( a priori ) does not lead to knowledge, that sense impressions are not proof of an external independent reality.

Empiricism (David Hume)

Problems with Empiricism

The empiricists could not overcome problems with accounting for forms of knowledge that did not relate to the senses, e.g., in mathematics and in logic. And they could not account for how it could be that humans can have knowledge for which there is no direct experience, for example of the universe as a whole or of subatomic events or quanta of energy, entities for which there can be no direct experience.

The Epistemological Theory of Immanuel Kant

For Kant there is:

Unity of consciousness
Unity of being
Unifying act of the mind

To account for this and our relation to being, Kant postulates that there must exist rules for thoughts, which he calls categories that are innate and necessary for understanding. Without such rules operating there is no way to account for our knowledge of such ideas as:

cause and effect
possibility

Knowledge has both form and content.

part of the way in which the mind operates
provided through the senses

So, ideas constitute our experience but, there is a fundamental distinction to be made of two types of knowledge

This is possible and what we generally call knowledge of the world
a thing as it is in itself

This is not possible for humans can never get beyond or away from the categories of the understanding which shape and influence all that the human experiences because humans can never think without using the mind-brain and thus involving its structure and manner of operating.

For Kant humans will never know things as they are in themselves because humans can never think without their brains and the brains are so structured as to provide for arrangements and ordering and connecting elements for human thought to occur. It is as if the humans must always see things through colored glasses because they cannot remove them. Therefore the universe will always appear through the tinting of those glasses. Humans will never know how the universe actually looks. Humans may get close, but can not experience the thing itself directly. How do we acquire ideas?

Kant combines ideas of the rationalists and the empiricists.

How is knowledge organized in the mind? The mind introduces new principles of order into experience and arranges, stores and tests arrangements and then tests the efficacy of those ideas and arrangements.

Transcendental idealism

all propositions are a priori empirical

analytic syntheti

Analytic a priori : e.g. Math, definitions
Analytic empirical: don't exist
part of perception
part of thought
Synthetic empirical: all physical claims - this includes all of the sciences.

Kant's Theory of Epistemology

Kant’s contributions of the distinction of types of knowledge and of the role played by the order of the brain remain a dominating influence over thinking about epistemological issues to this day.

Immanuel Kant is considered to be one of the world's greatest philosophers. In his account of epistemological theory of knowledge, called transcendental idealism, he claimed that “the mind of the knower makes an active contribution to experience of objects before us”. He meant that whatever we already know through our experience makes it easier for us to acquire new means of knowledge.

Accordingly, Kant specified two sources of our knowledge, which are the mind’s receptive capacity (sensibility), and the mind’s conceptual capacity (understanding). He thought that it would be impossible for people to have any experience of objects, which are not placed in space and time. These conditions of sensibility are due to our consciousness, which must “apprehend objects as occupying a region of space and persisting for some duration of time”.

However, sensibility by itself doesn’t make judging objects possible. According to empirical derivation, it also takes understanding, which provides the concepts, the rules for determining what is “common or universal in different representations”. He said, “without sensibility no object would be given to us; and without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind”. He meant that in order to think about some object it takes understanding, which assigns concepts, based on the object’s sensation input, to identify what is common and general about it.

Nevertheless, empirical derivation discussed above is not sufficient to explain all of the concepts that arise in the human life, such as causation, substance, self, identity, space, time, etc. It’s due to the fact that these concepts are products of our experience, which is constituted by ideas. Therefore, “Kant postulates that there must exist rules for thoughts, which he calls categories that are innate and necessary for understanding” all of the concepts. In addition to mind’s conceptual contribution to experience only that special set of concepts organized into these fundamental categories of thought make empirical concepts and judgments possible.

Although these concepts cannot be experienced directly, they are present when particular judgments of objects take place. Plus, “since objects can only be experienced spatio-temporally, the only application of concepts that yields knowledge is to the empirical...world." Kant rejects any kind of knowledge that goes beyond the bounds of sensation because there can be no objects for the understanding to judge, rightly or wrongly. While Kant is a transcendental idealist he believes the nature of objects as they are in themselves is unknowable to us.

However, the knowledge of appearance is...possible. Therefore, knowledge of the things can never get beyond the categories of understanding, which shape and influence all that the human experiences. Accordingly, human will never know how the universe actually looks because they aren’t able to think without any arrangement and order of elements. Kant’s theory of knowledge combines rationalism and the empiricism in his account to distinct types of knowledge and the principles of mind‘s order.

Skepticism is the belief that some or all human knowledge is impossible. Since even our best methods for learning about the world sometimes fall short of perfect certainty, skeptics argue, it is better to suspend belief than to rely on the dubitable products of reason. Classical skeptics include Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus. In the modern era, Montaigne, Mayle, and Hume all advocated some form of skeptical philosophy. Fallibilism is a more moderate response to the lack of certainty.

The Problem of Skepticism

A degree of skepticism is quite healthy as a counterpoint to being too credulous and being taken in by poor reasoning and illusions or deliberate attempts to mislead and deceive. Skepticism holds that it is not possible to have knowledge is self-defeating and not productive. There should be a skeptical inquiry that is used before humans reach conclusions and decide which beliefs they will hold. There is a sort of positive skepticism that urges caution and all deliberate care and critique before drawing conclusions or setting beliefs but does not reject the possibility of either achieving knowledge or gaining closer proximity to knowledge and truth.

Philosophical Applications

How much and what type of evidence or support is needed to warrant a claim to know something?

NOTE: Different types of knowledge would require different types of support. What would be needed and how much to prove a claim to know something?

Is truth relative, or a matter of opinion?

Read the following quote and answer the question.

“How often has it happened to me that in the night I dreamt that I found myself in this particular place…while in reality I was lying in bed.”

Can you be certain that you’re not dreaming right now? If so, how?

Vocabulary Quizlet 5.1

Essay on Knowledge for Students and Children

500+ words essay on knowledge.

Knowledge is understanding and awareness of something. It refers to the information, facts, skills, and wisdom acquired through learning and experiences in life. Knowledge is a very wide concept and has no end. Acquiring knowledge involves cognitive processes, communication, perception, and logic. It is also the human capacity to recognize and accept the truth. Knowledge can be used for positive as well as negative purposes. Thus knowledge can create and destroy at the same time. One may use knowledge for personal progress as well as the progress of the community, city, state, and nation. Some may use it for negative purposes that may not only harm individuals but can also harm the community.

Importance of Knowledge

* Knowledge is a success – In today’s world without education and the power of knowledge, it is not possible to succeed in life or even keep up with the fast-paced life. It is not just enough to have knowledge on a particular subject to succeed but it is also important to have knowledge about how to use it effectively to succeed. One should have knowledge about various aspects of a subject.

* Personal Development- Knowledge can last for a lifetime and it impacts our growth which influences everything in our life from relationships to work. Knowledge is important for personal growth and development . We can gain knowledge on everything that we find interesting like any dance form, art, architecture, history or just about anything for our personal development. It makes us wise enough to independently make our decisions in life. But it is important to adopt a positive mindset to become a constant learner only then it helps us progress and achieve our goals.

* Knowledge solves problems – problems in life which can be solved with the power of knowledge. Knowledge sharpens our skills like reasoning and problem-solving . A strong base of knowledge helps brains function more smoothly and effectively. We become smarter with the power of knowledge and solve problems more easily.

* Everyday Life- Knowledge is important and useful in day to day events. For example, if I have to buy air tickets online, I need to have knowledge about the various sites and their discounts, their terms & conditions or like online banking. If I don’t have knowledge then I end up paying more. So gaining knowledge is a constant process and is useful every single day.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

The process to increase knowledge

Open-Minded- We always learn something new by building on the knowledge that we have. We must always be open to accepting knowledge or information from anywhere we get. It may be from books, virtual media, friends, etc. To move on from one step to another we need to know more. Like in school we start from LKG, KG and then move on to 1st standard, 2nd standard and so on. It builds a strong base.

Reading Magazines- Reading helps to decode text and improves fluency to pronounce the speech sounds clear. Reading gives an idea about different topics and different views about them. One can get the actual global knowledge. Apart from that one can learn many new terms and phrase.

Communication- Shared knowledge allows you to communicate. Shared knowledge is important for communicating and understanding each other. When we discuss a certain topic with classmates, friends or relatives they have certain knowledge about it. So through communication, we get new ideas, facts and develops our knowledge. We can also identify what have we learned and what still we don’t know that helps us to clear our doubts later.

Watch documentaries or educational videos- Discovery Channel, for example, provides excellent documentaries that keep you engaged. If you don’t like reading, this is an excellent alternative to getting your daily dose of knowledge while still relaxing in your couch!

The more knowledge we have the more power we possess. It is important for our personal and professional development and leads us to achieve success in life. Knowledge helps us in several ways but the best part is that it helps us understand ourselves as well as those around us better. It also helps us act wisely in different situations

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Sources of Knowledge (Essay Sample)

The task on the paper was to identify other sources of knowledge apart from books and scientific observation. The paper has two sources which are books. The paper is double spaced.

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Essay on Knowledge is Power: Samples in 100, 200, 300 Words

Updated on
Dec 15, 2023

‘ Knowledge is power’ phrase is derived from a Latin term, which is attributed to Sir Francis Bacon, a well-known essayist of all times. Knowledge is power has been accepted widely and timelessly as it underscores the significance of knowledge in empowering people, societies and countries .

Benjamin Franklin once said, ‘An investment in knowledge pays the best interest.’ Knowledge not only improves a person’s understanding of the world but also teaches them life lessons to develop decision-making skills and contribute to the betterment of society. Below we have discussed some essays on knowledge is power in different word limits.

Table of Contents

1 Essay on Knowledge is Power in 100 Words
2 Essay on Knowledge is Power in 200 Words
3 Essay on Knowledge is Power in 300 Words

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Essay on Knowledge is Power in 100 Words

‘Knowledge is power’ is a timeless truth. A person with knowledge can empower himself to make informed decisions, enhance personal growth and contribute to the development of society. Knowledge equips us with effective tools to navigate the challenges of life and achieve our goals in real-time. The pursuit of knowledge is education. A person who is educated and has the right knowledge will find success in life.

The world we live in is driven by knowledge-based education and innovations. From agriculture to healthcare, every activity and field requires you to have proper knowledge and understanding of it. Whether it is at the individual level or global level, people who prioritize education and knowledge enjoy economic prosperity and influence.

Essay on Knowledge is Power in 200 Words

Knowledge is so powerful that it can reshape the entire world or destroy it, depending on the purpose for which it is used. The phrase, ‘Knowledge is Power’ was given by Sir Francis Bacon. With knowledge, one can have a profound impact on their life and the people surrounding it.

Knowledge emperors a person in various ways, from personal growth to changes at the global level. With knowledge, we gain new skills, insights and perspectives about a particular subject. This equips us to excel in our chosen field, pursue all our aspirations and fulfil our dream life.

A person with the right knowledge can make informed decisions. If you are someone who possesses broad knowledge about different subjects, it will be very easy for you to critically analyze any situation, weigh options and make choices that best suit your plans. This not only leads to better personal outcomes but also fosters a sense of autonomy and self-determination. Knowledge is considered as the driving force behind progress. Scientific discoveries, technological innovations, cultural evolution and social developments are all fueled by accumulated knowledge. A very classic example of this is the history of human civilization. We must use knowledge knowledge ethically and ensure its equitable distribution or access.

Also Read – Essay on Unity in Diversity

Essay on Knowledge is Power in 300 Words

Knowledge is deemed as the most powerful tool a human possesses. It is the cornerstone of power in our modern society. The universally acknowledged phrase ‘Knowledge is power’ highlights the profound impact knowledge has on individuals and society, and both.

The first thing to know about knowledge is that it is the key to personal development and empowerment. When a person acquires knowledge, they open doors to personal growth and development. Depending on the person’s expertise and field, this empowerment can come in various forms. I person with the right knowledge often finds himself confident, adaptable, and capable of overcoming obstacles in life.

Moreover, knowledge equips you to make informed decisions. We are living in a world which is driven by information. A person who is well-equipped with knowledge about his or her specific field can critically assess a situation, evaluate the options and make choices that best suit their individual needs and values. This not only enhances their personal lives but also fosters a sense of agency and self-determination.

Knowledge is the driving force behind progress, development and innovation. From the time of industrialization to the invention of the internet, knowledge has been the deciding factor for transformative change, improving the quality of life for countless individuals.

The importance of knowledge is not only limited to individual benefits of scientific discoveries. It also plays a critical role in a country’s governance. It allows you to make informed political decisions, and actively participate in the democratic process. In this way, knowledge serves as a safeguard against tyranny and injustice.

At last, the phrase ‘knowledge is power’ remains a timeless truth that highlights the profound impact of knowledge on a person’s development and societal changes. With this power comes the responsibility to use knowledge ethically and ensure equal access for all, as knowledge remains a vital path to personal and collective empowerment in our ever-changing world.

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The phrase ‘knowledge itself is power’ denotes the meaning that knowing empowers your understanding of the world so that you can make informed decisions for yourself and others. In this way, knowledge is equal to power, as it can help in shaping the future of an individual to an entire country.

Knowledge is considered as an accumulation of information, skills facts and understanding acquired through deep learning, experience and observation. It represents a deep and organised awareness of the world around us, encompassing various fields of knowledge, such as culture, science and technology, history and practical know-how. Knowledge empowers individuals by providing the tools to make informed decisions, solve problems, and navigate life’s complexities. It serves as a foundation for personal growth, innovation, and societal progress, shaping our perceptions and actions.

A person can improve their knowledge by reading informative articles, newspapers and books, enrolling in courses related to their field of study, attending workshops and seminars, engaging in discussions, etc.

For more information on such interesting topics, visit our essay writing page and follow Leverage Edu .

Shiva Tyagi

With an experience of over a year, I've developed a passion for writing blogs on wide range of topics. I am mostly inspired from topics related to social and environmental fields, where you come up with a positive outcome.

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COMMENTS

Sources of Knowledge: Rationalism, Empiricism, and the Kantian
Upon completion of this chapter, readers will be able to: Identify the main theories of the sources of knowledge, including rationalism, empiricism, and the Kantian synthesis.; Employ each theory to reconstruct the origins of a given instance of knowledge.; Differentiate the categories of knowledge that arise from the a priori/a posteriori, necessary/contingent, and analytic/synthetic ...
2 The Sources of Knowledge
Abstract. This article identifies the sources from which one acquires knowledge or justified belief. It distinguishes the "four standard basic sources": perception, memory, consciousness, and reason. A basic source yields knowledge or justified belief without positive dependence on another source. This article distinguishes each of the ...
The Analysis of Knowledge
1. Knowledge as Justified True Belief. There are three components to the traditional ("tripartite") analysis of knowledge. According to this analysis, justified, true belief is necessary and sufficient for knowledge. The Tripartite Analysis of Knowledge:S knows that p iff. p is true; S believes that p;
Types of Sources Explained
Revised on May 31, 2023. Throughout the research process, you'll likely use various types of sources. The source types commonly used in academic writing include: Academic journals. Books. Websites. Newspapers. Encyclopedias. The type of source you look for will depend on the stage you are at in the writing process.
Essays About Knowledge: 5 Examples And 7 Prompts
First, explain its textbook definition briefly, then analyze it using your own words and understanding. To conclude your piece, write about how you intend to use knowledge in your life. 2. The True Meaning of Knowledge Is Power. "Knowledge is power" is a famous quotation from Francis Bacon in his book Neues Organon.
Epistemology
4. The Extent of Human Knowledge a. Sources of Knowledge. Given the above characterization of knowledge, there are many ways that one might come to know something. Knowledge of empirical facts about the physical world will necessarily involve perception, in other words, the use of the senses. Science, with its collection of data and conducting ...
The Value of Knowledge
1. Value problems. In Plato's Meno, Socrates raises the question of why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief.Call this the Meno problem or, anticipating distinctions made below, the primary value problem.. Initially, we might appeal to the fact that knowledge appears to be of more practical use than true belief in order to mark this difference in value.
Knowledge
In principle, knowledge-that is the kind of knowledge present whenever there is knowledge of a fact or truth — no matter what type of fact or truth is involved: knowledge that 2 + 2 = 4; knowledge that rape is cruel; knowledge that there is gravity; and so on. When philosophers use the term 'know' unqualifiedly, knowledge-that is ...
3.5: Immanuel Kant
Knowledge apriori is either pure or impure. Pure knowledge apriori is that with which no empirical element is mixed up. For example, the proposition, "Every change has a cause," is a proposition apriori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience. II. The human intellect, even in an unphilosophical ...
Sources Of Knowledge : Understanding Students And Their ...
1. Sources of knowledge - ways of knowing things by way of personal experience, intuition, traditions, expert authority, logic, or research. Personal experience, intuition, traditions, and logic are valuable sources of knowledge, but many times cannot show enough evidence to support the theory. These sources of knowledge may not be valid or ...
Sources Of Knowledge Essay Examples
Sources Of Knowledge Essays. Positivism vs Interpretivism. Introduction A paradigm in science represents a set of concepts, facts, including theories and other natural phenomena that constitute legitimate contributions to a specific field. In research, there are various paradigms that can be alluded to as sources of knowledge and it is vital to ...
5.1: Three Theories of Knowledge
Reliance on experience as the source of ideas and knowledge. More specifically, empiricism is the epistemological theory that genuine information about the world must be acquired by a priori means, so that nothing can be thought without first being sensed. Prominent modern empiricists include Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Mill.
Sources of knowledge
Personal experience, intuition, traditions, and logic are valuable sources of knowledge, but many times cannot show enough evidence to support the theory. These sources of knowledge may not be valid or reliable for various reasons. Expert authorities on subjects are another valuable source of knowledge, but these experts can lead one to believe ...
Essay On Sources Of Knowledge
Essay On Sources Of Knowledge. 786 Words4 Pages. SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE- CONCEPT OF EDUCATION 1. Due to western influence, we Indians have started to think like the western world in many ways. Take for example 'Source of knowledge'. We have started believing that if a person is educated i.e. has a lot of college degrees, then he or she is a ...
Sources Of Knowledge : Understanding Students And Their ...
Sources of knowledge - ways of knowing things by way of personal experience, intuition, traditions, expert authority, logic, or research. Personal experience, intuition, traditions, and logic are valuable sources of knowledge, but many times cannot show enough evidence to support the theory. These sources of knowledge may not be valid or ...
Knowledge
Knowledge is an awareness of facts, a familiarity with individuals and situations, or a practical skill.Knowledge of facts, also called propositional knowledge, is often characterized as true belief that is distinct from opinion or guesswork by virtue of justification.While there is wide agreement among philosophers that propositional knowledge is a form of true belief, many controversies ...
Essay on Knowledge is Power for Students
500 Words Essay On Knowledge is Power. Knowledge is the most substantial element in the world. It can make or break your life alone. Moreover, knowledge is what differentiates humans from animals. With knowledge, one can utilize their skills and make their lives better. When you have knowledge at your disposal, you can accomplish a lot in your ...
Essay on Knowledge for Students and Children
Knowledge is understanding and awareness of something. It refers to the information, facts, skills, and wisdom acquired through learning and experiences in life. Knowledge is a very wide concept and has no end. Acquiring knowledge involves cognitive processes, communication, perception, and logic. It is also the human capacity to recognize and ...
Source-based essay
3 years ago. Would love to have six to ten source-based essay prompts for practice! It is easy to find lots of argumentative essay prompts in random places online, but the source-based version is rather scarce. Thanks so much! I rocked the Math and Reading PRAXIS with the help of Khan! Just have the Writing left to take this week...
Sources of Knowledge Essay
The second source of knowledge is reason. The reason is an exceptional source of knowledge among human beings because it ensures that people reach the door of perception or intuition. Reason plays the critical role of collecting and generalizing facts to a conclusion (Beyer & Burri, 2007, p.131). The third critical source of knowledge is internet.
Robert Audi, The sources of knowledge
In "The Sources of Knowledge," Robert Audi distinguishes what he calls the "four standard basic sources" by which we acquire knowledge or justified belief: perception, memory, consciousness, and reason. With the exception of memory, he distinguishes each of the above as a basic source of knowledge. Audi contrasts basic sources with ...
Source Of Knowledge Essay
1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES Every activity in learning is to cover the frontiers of the body of knowledge. Our aim in this essay is to critically analyze Antonio Rosmini's thought on the true source of knowledge. Antonio Rosmini criticized the rationalist and empiricist as regards the true source of knowledge and proposed that the "idea of ...
An essay about Sources of knowledge
They are an interesting source of knowledge. The Internet is a source of knowledge. It is of very recent origin. However the influence it has on society is immeasurable. The scope is very wide. It is known the world over. It is easily accessible to everyone. Knowledge has got a new dimension with the introduction of the internet. An user has ...
Essay on Knowledge is Power: Samples in 100, 200, 300 Words
Source - Motivation for Success (YouTube) Essay on Knowledge is Power in 100 Words 'Knowledge is power' is a timeless truth. A person with knowledge can empower himself to make informed decisions, enhance personal growth and contribute to the development of society.
Sources Of Knowledge Essay
The main sources of knowledge are as follows - (a) Internal sources: Internal sources include the organizational operations such as Design, Development, Engineering, Sales, Marketing, Manufacturing, Customer contact etc. This is the basic source of organizational information which is controllable and can be easily canalized to knowledge ...
PDF What is the Most Important Source for Teachers' Knowledge ...
more specific knowledge source frameworks, multiple ways of data collection, random selection of research subjects, and inferential statistical analysis. In addition, further studies should also look into the psychological and social-cultural mechanisms of teachers' knowledge development as well as the sources of teachers' knowledge.