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Mental Imagery: Learning, Problem-Solving And Performance

Mental imagery represents sensory states such as visual, auditory, olfactory, taste, and proprioceptive states (state of being connected to movement and posture of the body and its physiology).

Written by Team Ultrahuman

Actionables

It is a mental training technique used by productive people to prepare for action by repeating and training their thoughts, feelings, and behaviours to improve their performance and well-being.

• Mental imagery is the mental representation of sensory states such as visual, auditory, olfactory, taste, and proprioceptive states (state of being connected to movement and posture of the body and its physiology) ,
• It is used effectively in a variety of settings, including psychology, sports psychology, psychotherapy, and remedial education. Mental imagery is used in cognitive-behavioural therapies in psychiatry, particularly for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and social phobia ,
• You can learn to use mental imagery by practising it every day. Begin by visualising yourself in a specific situation. For example, imagine you’re participating in a sport like football. Visualising yourself playing before each game can help you improve your performance, confidence, control, and mental awareness while injured.

It is used effectively in a variety of settings, including psychology, sports psychology, psychotherapy, and remedial education. Mental imagery is a scientifically proven technique that uses images to maximize the brain’s potential. Imaging has an impact on more than just the muscles, causing cardiovascular and respiratory responses. 

There are numerous reasons to employ mental imagery. It allows you to:

• Mentally prepare for a future situation
• Accomplish a specific goal
• Anticipate potential future stress
• Adapt to or master difficult circumstances
• Accelerate the healing process
• Reduce and control stress.
• Modify or improve a behaviour
• Improve or develop specific skills

The brain changes when we physically learn to do an action or a task. Mental imagery is a cognitive process that activates neuronal and behavioural responses similar to actual experience by stimulating the same brain areas involved in the unconscious planning and execution of movements. Neural connections are strengthened, new connections are formed, and old cells are removed.

Mental imagery is a scientifically proven technique that uses images to maximize the brain’s potential. It has been demonstrated using brain imaging techniques such as PET-Scans with radiotracers and functional MRIs (fMRI) that the same regions of the brain are activated when we experience a real-life situation as during a mental imagery exercise and that the regions related to retinotopy (peripheral and/or central vision) are stimulated.

Imaging has an impact on more than just the muscles, causing cardiovascular and respiratory responses. For e.g. your heart rate increases, and your breathing becomes short and shallow as you vividly imagine tomorrow’s stressful meeting. The neural activity that occurs when you see, hear and smell things in visual, auditory, and olfactory imagery is functionally equivalent to an experience that can be registered in the memory. 

Vividly imagining something activates the same neural process that kicks in when you actually see/experience it with your senses in reality. In short, the brain cannot distinguish between what it actually experiences and what it imagines. This is a grey area that we can take advantage of.

When information is imagined or perceived, the brain processes it in the same areas. Mental imagery is critical for problem-solving and performing better in situations that require physical or mental exercise.

Mental images are a simplified representation of the cognitive task’s content. The anticipatory role of reasoning is critical in problem-solving, where the goal is to arrive at a solution from a given starting point. As a result, using visual images to solve problems can lead to significant success. 

Three different experimental procedures are used in this chapter to generate a visual representation of the problem elements: 

(1) problem presentation with illustrative pictures, 

(2) problem presentation with instructions to mentally visualize the scene described

(3) previous instructions to mentally visualise and freely elaborate on the problem situation and subsequent problem presentation.

Visualisation can be used to solve problems both after and before they are presented. After the problem has been posed, representations of visual form can be used to simulate the situation and mental transformations described in the problem. In this way, familiar but misleading reasoning strategies can be replaced with new and productive thinking directions that avoid the ‘traps’ created by the verbal formulation.

You can master the use of mental imagery by practising it every day. Start by dealing with the problems that arise throughout the week. Visualising yourself in a specific situation. For example, imagine your next game of football. Visualising yourself playing before each game can help you improve your performance, confidence, control, and mental awareness while injured. You can also see how an object or people appear from various perspectives [8]. A quiet space or room may be used to calm down and allow yourself to become accessible to what you want to visualise or accomplish for a longer, more intense visualisation.

Disclaimer: The contents of this article are for general information and educational purposes only. It neither provides any medical advice nor intends to substitute professional medical opinion on the treatment, diagnosis, prevention or alleviation of any disease, disorder or disability. Always consult with your doctor or qualified healthcare professional about your health condition and/or concerns and before undertaking a new healthcare regimen including making any dietary or lifestyle changes.

• The uses of mental imagery in athletics: An overview – ScienceDirect  
• Mental imagery in emotion and emotional disorders – ScienceDirect  
• Mental Imagery in the Science and Practice of Cognitive Behaviour Therapy: Past, Present, and Future Perspectives | SpringerLink  
• Brain areas underlying visual mental imagery and visual perception: an fMRI study – ScienceDirect  
• Neural foundations of imagery | Nature Reviews Neuroscience  

Team Ultrahuman

We, at Ultrahuman, are a team of biohackers, and health and fitness enthusiasts who believe in taking data-driven decisions for our health and well-being. We aim to provide information that would help our readers understand the importance of better health and lifestyle.

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• Review Article
• Published: 22 August 2023

Insights into embodied cognition and mental imagery from aphantasia

• Emiko J. Muraki   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-9534-6538 1 , 2 ,
• Laura J. Speed   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-3147-3615 3 &
• Penny M. Pexman   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-7130-0973 1 , 2  

Nature Reviews Psychology volume  2 ,  pages 591–605 ( 2023 ) Cite this article

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• Behavioural methods
• Language and linguistics

Mental representations allow humans to think about, remember and communicate about an infinite number of concepts. A key question within cognitive psychology is how the mind stores and accesses the meaning of concepts. Embodied theories propose that concept knowledge includes or requires simulations of the sensory and physical interactions of one’s body with the world, even when a concept is subsequently processed in a context unrelated to those interactions. However, the nature of these simulations is highly debated and their mechanisms underspecified. Insight into whether and how simulations support concept knowledge can be derived from studying related mental representations, such as mental imagery. In particular, research into the inability to form mental imagery, known as aphantasia, can advance understanding of mental imagery and mental simulations. In this Review, we provide an overview of embodied theories of cognition, review research in mental imagery and consider how simulation and mental imagery might overlap. We then synthesize the growing aphantasia literature and discuss how aphantasia can be used to test predictions derived from theories of embodied cognition.

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Muraki, E.J., Speed, L.J. & Pexman, P.M. Insights into embodied cognition and mental imagery from aphantasia. Nat Rev Psychol 2 , 591–605 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1038/s44159-023-00221-9

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Psych 256: Cognitive Psychology, 002, SP24

Making connections between theory and reality., a mental gymnasium for problem-solving excellence.

The checkered chess battlefield offers more than just a thrilling contest of wits. It is a realm where strategy, calculation, and foresight intersect. While the objective – the elegant capture of your opponent’s king – seems simple, achieving it demands a sophisticated approach to problem-solving. Let us dive into the fascinating world of cognitive psychology to understand how the ancient chess game sharpens our minds and prepares us for challenges on and off the board.

At the heart of chess lies visual imagery. Picture yourself studying the board, each piece a symbol of potential. Arranging and rearranging these elements in your mind is a mental exercise in spatial reasoning, crucial for pinpointing vulnerabilities and plotting cunning maneuvers. (Goldstein, 2018, chapter 10)

However, mere visualization is not enough; planning is the key to victory. In chess, we plan from the very first move. From short-term tactical strikes to long-term strategic domination, a chess player must envision possibilities several steps ahead. As Charness (1981) demonstrated, expert players are masters at “thinking ahead,” simulating scenarios in their minds to predict outcomes and outwit their opponents.

While chess is a game of infinite possibilities, calculated choice is its backbone. Each potential move requires meticulous evaluation. Is exchanging pieces strategically wise, even if it means sacrificing a powerful piece for long-term positional advantage? Should your focus bolster an impenetrable defense, or is a surprise attack the path to victory? Beginners might rely on simple heuristics, such as “never leave your king exposed,” while more seasoned players adopt complex strategic principles, continuously weighing risks and rewards with every decision.

The chessboard is dynamic, as the tide can change in a battle. An opponent’s unanticipated move might dismantle your best-laid plans, forcing you to adapt, rework your strategies, and visualize new possibilities on the fly. This echoes the unpredictable and ever-changing nature of real-world problem-solving, where mental agility is paramount.

The cognitive benefits of chess extend far beyond its 64 squares. Research like that of Gobet and Simon (1996) reveals that chess expertise enhances pattern recognition. Players develop the ability to quickly process board configurations and identify familiar tactical motifs, allowing them to access past knowledge and respond rapidly in new contexts.

Chess is more than a pastime; it is a workout for your mind. Through visual imagery, planning, evaluation, and adaptability, chess strengthens our problem-solving abilities and prepares us to tackle the unexpected. So, next time you sit before the board, remember that each move is not just about winning the game but training your brain to think creatively, analyze critically, and become a strategy master. These skills will undoubtedly serve you well in all of life’s challenges.

Goldstein, E.B. (2018). Cognitive Psychology: Connecting Mind, Research and Everyday Experience (Chapter 10: Visual Imagery). Cengage

Goldstein, E.B. (2018). Cognitive Psychology: Connecting Mind, Research and Everyday Experience (Chapter 12: Problem Solving and Creativity). Cengage

Charness, N. (1981). Searching for chess expertise.  Memory & Cognition , 9(4), 387–397.

Gobet, F., & Simon, H. A. (1996). Templates in chess memory: A mechanism for recalling several boards.  Cognitive Psychology, 31, 1-40.

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Mental Imagery and Learning

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Editorial: Creativity and Mental Imagery

Massimiliano palmiero.

1 Neuropsychology Unit, Fondazione Santa Lucia, I.R.C.C.S, Rome, Italy

2 Department of Life, Health and Environmental Sciences, University of L'Aquila, L'Aquila, Italy

Laura Piccardi

Raffaella nori.

3 Department of Psychology, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy

Liana Palermo

4 Department of Medical and Surgical Sciences, Magna Græcia University of Catanzaro, Catanzaro, Italy

Carola Salvi

5 Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, Evaston, IL, USA

6 Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA

Cecilia Guariglia

7 Department of Psychology, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy

Considering the pivotal role that creative ideas play in human societies, and creativity's contribution to multiple aspects of human life, understanding the cognitive components underlying creativity has become increasingly fundamental. Since the Five-Stages Model of the creative process proposed by Wallas ( 1926 ), creativity has become associated with topics as wide-ranging as from problem-solving (Plucker et al., 2004 ) to art (van Leeuwen et al., 1999 ; Batt et al., 2010 ). Furthermore, creativity has been identified as a predictor for educational success and wellbeing (Plucker et al., 2004 ), and has been proposed as a way to improve the quality of life in healthy and pathological aging (Cohen, 2006 ; Palmiero et al., 2012 , 2014 , 2016a , b ; Palmiero, 2015 ).

In the present Frontiers in Cognition Research Topic 11 novel publications were collected: 8 Original Research Articles, 1 Review, and 2 Perspective Articles. From the beginning, the Research Topic was planned as a collection of studies exploring the relationships between creativity and mental imagery. Mental imagery is a representational medium for providing researchers access to thoughts, symbolization, and combination of elements, possibly facilitating the emergence of new ideas and creativity. In this direction, different aspects of mental imagery were considered which could increase or explain the emergence of creativity: daydreaming styles (common forms of imagination that involve spontaneous thoughts unrelated to the context, Zedelius and Schooler ); imagination of activities over a long period of time, relevant especially for actual creative achievements in science and writing ( Jung et al. ); as well as ‘looking at nothing’ and blinking behaviors, that do not necessarily involve visual imagery ( Salvi and Bowden ). In addition, we explored the relationships between different creative objects' production and artistic drawings with different mental imaging processes (i.e., generation, inspection and transformation, Palmiero et al. ).

We also collected studies that investigated distinct and peculiar aspects of creativity and its cognitive components, such as: the equal-odds rule of divergent thinking, also known as the relationships between fluency (the number of responses) and creativity as assessed by independent judges ( Jung et al. ); or the relationships between flexibility of divergent thinking (the number of categories encompassing the relevant responses) and attentive processing ( Zmigrod et al. ). Interestingly, the relationships between convergent thinking involving insight and intelligence ( Zmigrod et al. ), and working memory updating (that is maintenance of items in working memory and binding of the incoming information, Necka et al. ). In addition, neural correlates of creativity were investigated. Chavez highlighted the key role of brain areas involved in motor imagery on highly creative individuals, whereas Boccia et al. showed that general creativity relies on multi-componential neural networks supporting executive functions, whereas domain-specific creativity (verbal, musical and visuo-spatial) roughly depends on different functional specialized brain regions.

Finally, two different tests recently developed have been reported: the Test of Creative Imagery Abilities ( Jankowska and Karwowski ), aimed at assessing three components of creative imagination: vividness of imagery, originality of responses, and transformative imagery ability; and the Artistic Creativity Domains Compendium ( Lunke and Meier ), aimed at measuring artistic creativity in visual arts, performing arts, literature and music.

Taken together, the articles included in this Research Topic bring up novel perspectives for better understanding creativity as a cognitive process and its relation with mental imagery. Despite, the role of mental imagery in creativity has been robustly supported, several issues remains to be addressed to clarify the extent to which different forms, abilities and strategies of imagery affect creative idea generation, for example, the subcomponents of the relationships between imagery and creativity in specific domains of knowledge. Apart from imagery, the Research Topic also highlights the key role of attention in creativity, opening up the question of how attention might increase creativity in different ways. Finally, the neural bases of creativity need to be further investigated since there is no agreement about the brain areas specialized for creativity.

In conclusion, the variety of approaches and methods to measure creativity and its components makes difficult to draw clear conclusion about this topic. In future studies, comparing special groups of subjects in normal and pathological conditions (e.g., artists, designers, mathematicians, patients with dementia, brain-damaged patients and so forth) might help to better understand the cognitive and neural correlates of creativity and the relationships among creativity and other cognitive domains, such as mental imagery, attention, and problem solving. We hope that the papers included in this Research Topic can help to stimulate more studies on these topics and in increasing research in the field of creativity.

Author contributions

MP: Planned the topic and edited the most of papers included in the topic. LaP: Edited some papers included in the topic. RN: Edited some papers included in the topic. LiP: Edited some papers included in the topic. CS: Edited some papers included in the topic. CG: Edited some papers included in the topic.

This work was supported by NIH [grant number T32 NS047987] to CS.

Conflict of interest statement

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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April 16, 2024

Walks in Green Parks Mean Stronger Immune Systems and Better Mental Health

Contact with nature improves physical and mental health, but greenery is not easily reached by all

By Lydia Denworth

Like so many people, I took refuge in the outdoors during the worst of the COVID pandemic, going on socially distanced walks and sitting on the deck in all kinds of weather. Being outside reduced the chance of infection, but it also helped in other ways. “I think everybody got that nature seemed to be the solution for a lot of the stress issues that people were dealing with,” says Jay Maddock, an experimental psychologist and director of the Center for Health & Nature at Texas A&M University. Scientists got it, too. Research into the health benefits of nature has “exploded” since then, Maddock says.

More time in the green is associated with lower blood pressure, strengthened immune systems, lower risk of cardiovascular disease and improved sleep. A recent study found it might slow the shortening of the telomeres that cap our chromosomes, a sign of biological aging. And there is convincing evidence that time in nature reduces depressive symptoms, alleviates stress and improves cognitive function.

A 2019 study of more than 19,000 people in the U.K. found that those who reported spending at least 120 minutes in nature (such as parks, woodlands or beaches) every week had better health or higher well-being than those who spent less time. It didn’t matter whether people reached the total time in many small increments or one long block. Researchers are also investigating beneficial health effects of “blue space” (water) and “brown space” (deserts).

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The research is also highlighting health inequality created by disparities in access to green space—something else the pandemic shone a spotlight on. Jennifer D. Roberts, a health equity scholar at the University of Maryland, says the lowest-income communities are “less likely to have trees; they’re less likely to have parks of ample acreage and high quality.” According to one recent study, neighborhoods that were once redlined (a now outlawed practice that deemed certain areas “hazardous” for investment) have less green space today than areas with similar demographics that were not redlined.

Access to parks and other greenery is linked to health disparities that can’t be explained by factors such as race, ethnicity and socioeconomic status alone, says epidemiologist Marcia P. Jimenez of the Boston University School of Public Health. “There are higher-level determinants of health, which are our access to food, our exposure to air pollution, noise, green space and the socioeconomic status of our neighborhood.” More access to green space tends to give a bigger relative health boost to disadvantaged groups than to more privileged ones, research is starting to show. “If we were to increase greenness among these vulnerable populations, we could essentially tackle health inequalities. This is where to begin,” Jimenez says.

To get a more precise measure of local greenery for some studies, scientists use Google Street View data and something called the normalized difference vegetation index, which uses satellite imagery to quantify plant density and health in an area of land. A company called Nature-Quant based in Bend, Ore., recently used machine learning to develop NatureScore, which combines multiple datasets on parks, tree canopies, and air, noise and light pollution to develop a score between 0 and 100 as a proxy for greenness for every address in the U.S. (a heavily urban environment would generally score below 30 and a forest above 70).

In a 2024 study, Maddock and his colleagues were the first to use NatureScore to analyze health outcomes, specifically for mental health. They looked at outpatient mental health service utilization, mostly for depression, anxiety or stress, across 1,169 zip codes in Texas. After adjusting for demographic and socioeconomic factors, they found that rates of mental health service use were about 50 percent lower in neighborhoods with NatureScores higher than 60. In 2022 Jimenez and her colleagues published a paper in JAMA Open Network using data from the long-running Nurses’ Health Study II to show that living in areas with more green space was associated with higher scores for overall cognition and for psychomotor speed and attention. This difference could be partly explained by fewer depressive symptoms.

There are several possible explanations for these findings. One theory holds that nature provides a respite from the mental fatigue of modern life and the built environment, thereby restoring attentional resources. A 2024 experiment that had nearly 100 participants offers support for the idea: the researchers found that a 40-minute walk in nature enhanced people’s ability to coordinate higher-level cognitive functions—such as problem-solving and multitasking—more than a 40-minute walk in an urban environment did.

A second theory suggests that time spent in nature activates the parasympathetic nervous system, which reduces the body’s stress responses. Studies show reductions in cortisol levels—part of those responses—after exposure to greenery. In addition, green space affects health indirectly because time outdoors encourages physical activity and offers chances for social connection, both of which improve mental and physical well-being.

Studies such as Jimenez’s and Maddock’s are aimed at policymakers more than individuals, but they remind us all of the importance of seeking out greenery wherever we live. I recently downloaded the NatureDose app, another Nature-Quant product, which allows me to track time outside the way I count steps. And we should all try to heed the advice that Jimenez gives to her students: “I see how stressed they are, especially during exams,” she says. “I tell them, ‘Go out for a walk.’”

This is an opinion and analysis article, and the views expressed by the author or authors are not necessarily those of Scientific American .